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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an examination of the ways in which city-life photography can 
provide insights into the structuring conditions of urban spectatorship during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. To this end, the thesis will involve a 
survey of some of the uses of photography in the representation various cities 
during this period. However, the aim of this survey is not simply to collate a range 
of 'images of the city'. Instead, the central theme of this work is a discussion of the 
ways in which photography structures our perception. 
Fundamental to this discussion is a reformulation of what constitutes a 
photographic archive. It is as a means to redefining this archive that the notion of 
the gaze which will be employed to refer both to structures of subjectivity and 
vision and to particular regimes of representation. As a consequence of this reading, 
the archive will not be defined in terms of individual photographers, styles or 
genres. Instead, it will be read as a structure of repetition and displacement, of 
identity and difference: in short, as a system of signification which both offers and 
denies positions of security, knowledge and pleasure to the viewer. 
As a means of pursuing this reappraisal of the archive the thesis will be organised 
around a series of readings of texts from post-structuralist and psychoanalytical 
theory as well as from critical commentaries on urbanism, modernity and social 
space. Following from these readings will be an analysis of photographs with 
reference to the intersection of the psychical and the social which will not be cited as 
two distinct registers of experience but will instead be seen as being mutually 
inflected. It is within this theoretical framework that photographs will be viewed as 
images which both summon and disrupt the presence (as stable identity) of the 
viewer and the presence (as unmediated literal transcription) of the objects and 
scenes which they represent. 
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The camera introduces us to an unconscious optics, 
as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses. 
Walter Benjamin 
Introduction 
CITY, SPACE, PHOTOGRAPHY 
Our relationship to the past is now a spatial one I 
Put in its most summary form, the subject of this thesis is the relation between 
photography and the representation of various cities and of particular aspects of 
metropolitan life and experience within them during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Focusing largely on British cities but also, to a lesser extent, on 
Paris and New York, the broad topic of this study is the relationship between the 
applications of photography and the growth and transformations of cities during 
this period. This terrain can, however, be pinned down further m that the central 
concern of this work is an examination of photography with reference to what 
might be called the perceptual structureS of urban subjectivity: in other words, how 
might photographs be read as images which potentially give us access to the 
conditions of urban spectatorship during the latter nineteenth century. 
Cognitive maps 
A useful starting point for an introductory discussion of some of the concerns of 
this thesis is Frederic Jameson's essay, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of 
Late Capitalism", in which he cites space as a fundamental site of ideological and 
cultural production. As part of this essay Jameson argues that the: 
latest mutation in space - postmodern hyperspace - has finally succeeded in transcending the 
capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organise its immediate surroundings 
perceptually, and to cognitively map its position in a mappable external world .... this alarming 
disjunction point between the body and its built environmenL .. can stand as a symbol and analogue 
of that even sharper dilemma which is the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to map the 
great global multinational and decentered communicational network in which we find ourselves 
caught as individual subjects. 2 
As a means of overcoming this dislocation between the subject and its environment, 
Jameson calls for "an aesthetic of cognitive mapping". Of this he writes: 
the conception of space that has been developed here suggests [that] a model of political culture 
appropriate to our own situation will have to raise spatial issues as its fundamental organising 
, Anders Stephanson, "ReSudinS Postmodemism - A Conversation with Frederic Jameson". Social 
Tal, 7. 3. Winter 1988. p. 6. 
I "Postmodemism, or The Cultural LoSic of Late Capitalism", New Left Review, 146. 1984. pp. 83-4. 
1 
concern. I will therefore provisionally define the aesthetic of such a new (and hypothetically) 
cultural form as an aesthetic of cognitive mapping. ' 
Jameson then explains what this "cognitive mapping" would involve 
In a classic work. The Image of the City. Kevin Lynch taught us that the alienated city is above 
all a space in which people are unable to map (in their minds) either their own position or the 
urban totality in which they fmd themselves: grids such as those of New Jersey. in which none of 
the traditional markers (monuments. nodes. natural boundaries. built perspectives) obtain. are the 
most obvious examples. Disalienation in the traditional city. then. involves the practical 
reconquest of a sense of place. and the construction or reconstruction of an articulated ensemble 
which can be retained in the memory and which the individual subject can map and remap along the 
moments of mobile. alternative trajectories. 4 
Remarking that Lynch's work was addressed only to the "problems of the city", 
Jameson argues that it also "becomes extraordinarily suggestive when projected 
outwards at some of the larger national and global spaces. " 5 
Despite the criticisms that might be levelled against Jameson's somewhat 
Lukacsian framework in, for instance, his demand for new and disalienating urban 
spaces, his essay does signal some important issues which shall also be my concern ' 
here. Firstly, he points to the fundamental significance of space within socio-
cultural production and experience, coupled with an emphasis upon the historicity 
of spatial formations. Furthermore, Jameson addresses the question of the relation 
between space and perception in the positioning and, if only implicitly perhaps, the 
construction of the individual subject. Allied to this are questions concerning 
possible ways of describing space by reference to theories of representation. 
Finally, Jameson's essay raises the question of whether the city and, indeed, 
society itself can be perceived as a totality and what might be the structuring role of 
representation within such perceptions. 
These are of course complex issues and cannot be satisfactorily dealt with solely 
in abstract terms. But, before turning to the specific question of photography, it 
would be useful to refer briefly to the text which Jameson himself cites as a 
precedent for his own analysis - Lynch's The Image of the City. For, despite its 
limitations, this text does nonetheless provide a useful framework and vocabulary 
for examining the question of representation and the city. More specifically, 
however, while my aim here is in fact to retain much of Lynch's terminology, I 
wish also to utilise it within a theoretical framework altogether different from his 
own. 




Arguing that the city is "a construction in space", Lynch defmes it in terms of 
the associations, memories and meanings which it evokes for the citizens within it. 
Moreover, describing the city in terms of both its "moving elements" and its 
"stationary physical parts", Lynch also observes that "We are not simply observers 
of this spectacle, but are ourselves a part of it, on the stage with the other 
participants." 6 Essentially Lynch's focus is on the "mental image" of the city" 
which he defmes in terms of its "the apparent clarity" or "legibility". This latter 
quality is specified in terms of: 
the ease with which its partS can be recognized and can be organized into a coherent pauem ..... a 
legible city would be one whose districts or landmarks or pathways are easily identifiable and are 
easily grouped in to an over-all pattem ... To understand this, we must consider not just the city as a 
thing in itself, but the city being perceived by its inhabitants. 7 
The apprehension of this legibility by the city's inhabitants is achieved by means of 
their abilities at "structuring and identifying the environment" by means of their 
"techniques of orientation" and in terms of their "consistent use and organization of 
definite sensory cues from the external environment." For Lynch, however, this 
ability to orientate oneself within the city has more than a merely functional 
application in that: 
The need to recognize and pattern our surroundings is so crucial, and has such long roots in the 
past, that this image has wide practical and emotional importance to the individual ..... a clear image 
enables one to move about both easily and quickly ... But an ordered environment can do more than 
this; it may serve as a broad frame of reference, an organizer of activity or belief or knowledge ... A 
clear image is the surroundings is thus a useful basis for individual growth.' 
Not only does a "vivid and integrated physical setting ..... furnish the raw material 
for the symbols and collective memories of the group" but a "good environmental 
image gives its possessor an important sense of emotional security." 9 
But, while not condemning the"visual chaos" of the modem city and while also 
acknowledging that "there is some value in mystification, labyrinth, or surprise in 
the environment", Lynch argues that this should occur "only under two conditions": 
First, there must be no danger of losing basic form or orientation, of never coming ouL The 
surprise must occur in an over-all framework; the confusions must be small regions in a visible 
whole. Furthermore, the labyrinth or mystery must in itself have some form that can be explored 
and in time be apprehended. Complete chaos without hint of connection is never pleasurable.10 
These observations lead Lynch to "point to an important qualification" in that the 
'The Image of the City, Cambridge Mass. and London, The M.I.T. Press. 1960. p. 2. 
7 ibid., pp. 2-3. 
'ibid., p. 4. 
• ibid. 
to ibid., pp. S-6. 
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"observer himself should play an active role in perceiving the world and should 
have an active part in developing his image". As such: "Environmental images are 
the result of a two-way process between the observer and his environment. The 
environment suggests distinctions and relations, and the observer - with great 
adaptability and in the light of his own purposes - selects, organizes and endows 
with meaning what he sees." 11 
Claiming, then, that "the coherence of the image may arise in several ways", 
Lynch refers to the use of "systems of orientation" and the organization of the 
world "around a set of focal points". But more specifically, he claims that "For the 
most part these examples seem to echo ... the formal types of the image elements into 
which we can conveniently divide the city image: path, landmark, edge, node, and 
district.12 It is around these features that Lynch argues that an "environmental image 
may be analyzed into three components; identity, structure, and meaning .• \. Lynch 
then further defines the "value for orientation" of the city image in tenns of a map 
which "must be readable". Moreover, extending the metaphor, Lynch continues 
that: "The image should preferably be open-ended, adaptable to change, allowing 
the individual to continue to investigate and organize reality: there should be blank 
spaces where he can extend the drawing for himself." 14 It is this aspect of the 
urban image which Lynch calls its "imageability", in other words "that quality in a 
physical object which gives it a higher probability of evoking a strong image in any 
given observer ..... which facilitates the making of vividly identified, powerfully 
structured, highly useful mental images of the environment" 1S and which is itself 
symptomatic of "the need for identity and structure in our perceptual world." 16 
Various criticisms can be made of Lynch's model of "cognitive mapping". The 
most significant of these for the present context can be briefly summarised as 
follows. Firstly, Lynch dermes the city solely in terms of its physical fonn which 
l1·b·d 6 1 1 ., p. . 
12 ibid., pp. 7-8. 
13 Thus, for example, "a workable image requires frrst the identification of an object ... its recognition as 
a separable entit)' .•. Second. the image must include the spatial or pattern relation of the object to the 
observer and to other objects. Finally, this object must have some meaning for the observer, whether 
practical or emotional. Meaning is also a relation, but quite a different one from a spatial or pattern 
relation. " (p. 8) 
14 ·b·d 9 1 1 ., p. . 
11 ibid. 
tI ibid., p. 10 
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itself can be further reduced to just five basic features: path, landmark, edge, node, 
and district. Moreover, defined in somewhat limited terms of usage and function, 
these features are ultimately divorced from any social or symbolic meaning. 
Secondly, perception is defined as the perceptual knowledge of physical form 
which is itself known only through patterns of recognition and identification. Urban 
physical form thus functions as the support, prop or cue for the appropriate 
behavioural response from the individual. Allied to this, not only does Lynch posit 
an essentially re-active urban spectator, but urban space becomes solely an object of 
cognition or picturing by a monadic, asocial subject. This rational and calculating 
subject (Le. a subject of perceptual judgments) is itself the construct of a 
behaviourist narrative of the individual's adaptation to its external surroundings - a 
model both produced, and then subsequently reinforced by, Lynch's own 
"methodological individualism"" which is itself largely premised upon the 
measurement of intra-subjective judgments. In effect, the 'meanings' of the city are 
reduced to being the epiphenomena of the individual's mental cognition. Not only 
is this model unable to move from the individual to the larger social group - from 
the micro to the macro - but this account ignores the question of representation, in 
other words, not only of how the meanings of urban space are constantly 
reproduced and circulated but also what the terms of this production might be. 
For Jameson, however, Lynch's work does explicitly foreground important 
questions concerning representation: 
Nor should it be too hastily assumed that his [Lynch's] model - while it clearly raises very central 
issues of representation as such - is in any way easily vitiated by the conventional post-
structuralist critiques of the 'ideology of representation' or mimesis. The cognitive map is not 
exactly mimetic, in that older sense; indeed, the theoretical issues it poses allow us to renew the 
analysis of representation on a higher and more complex level. II 
But while, undoubtedly, a notion of representation is necessarily implicit within, 
for example, the concept of mental mapping and within the individual's cognitive 
schema, what is missing or, rather, what was more likely simply unavailable to 
Lynch, was the notion of signification - at least in a non-Piercian sense. For, by 
using such a model of signification, one can argue that Lynch's essentially 
topological account of urban space does not go beyond the level of denotation (i.e. 
of recognition and identification). Moreover, employing a binary subject/object 
division, Lynch reads urban space as a physical space which exists independently 
" This term is used by M. Gottdicner and Alexandros Ph. Lagopoulos in their Introduction to The City 
tJ1Id the Sigll, All I""oductioll to U,btm Semiotics, New York. Columbia University Press, 1986, p.7. 
II "Postmodcrnism , or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism", op. cit., p. 89. 
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of the conditions of its perception by a discrete, stable observer who is in tum 
independent of any determining environment. In this sense, physical space or form 
exists as an inert 'container' for the urban spectator's progress through the city. 
Space, presence and photography 
For Lynch, urban space is both unitary and static. And, rather than being in part an 
effect of representation, it exists in an a priori dimension outside of social practices. 
As such, any disruption of that space or, more precisely, of its legibility is defined 
solely in terms of the physical absence of those traditional markers for recognition. 
My point, however, is not to jettison Lynch's terminology but instead to relocate the 
notion of mental mapping both within processes of signification and within the 
shifting structures of perception. As a means of doing this, the business of this 
thesis will be to employ various aspects of those "conventional post-structuralist 
critiques of the 'ideology of representation' and mimesis" that Jameson would 
appear to disparage. 
However, before moving on to this, the relationship between space and social 
practices or what might be described as "social space" - a term also used by 
Jameson - requires some brief explanation with reference to the notion of 
representation. One of the most useful descriptions of social space is that which is 
provided in the work of the social geographer David Harvey and most notably 
perhaps in his Social Justice and the City. Here, arguing against the methodological 
separation of physical space and social practices, Harvey claims that "spatial form 
and social process are different ways of describing the same thing. "19 For this 
purpose, he argues that: 
Each fonn of social activity defines its space; there is no evidence that such spaces are Euclidean or 
even that they are remotely similar to each other. From this we have the geographer's concept of 
socio~nomic space, the psychologist's and anthropologist's concept of "personal space" and so 
on. A primary need, if we are to understand the spatial form of the city, therefore, is the 
articulation of an adequate philosophy of social space. Insofar as we can only understand social 
space by reference to some social activity. we are forced to attempt an integration of sociological 
and geographical imagination. 20 
Fundamental, however, to Harvey's account is his assertion that "social space is 
not isomorphic with physical space".21 Thus, while arguing that "Euclidean 
geometry is the relevant geometry for discussing the organization of objects in 
Ii Social Justice and the City, London. Edward Arnold. 1973. p. 26. 
10 ibid. p. 30 
21 ibid. p. 29. 
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physical space", Harvey claims that this fonn of geometry cannot of itself provide a 
wholly sufficient description of social space. Given this, Harvey implicitly argues 
for an asymmetrical relation between physical space and its perception: a relation 
which he describes as "some structural isomorphism between the geometry used 
and the particular perc~ptual experience or set of experiences under analysis. " 22 
The notion of an asymmetry within perception will be a central theme 
throughout this thesis. For Harvey specifically, this isomorphism is one between a 
measurable and calculable physical space as distinct from social space which he 
describes as being: 
made up of a complex of individual feelings and images about and reactions towards the spatial 
symbolism that surrounds that individual. Each person it seems lives in his own personally 
constructed web of spatial realtionships, contained, as it were in his own geometric system.%! 
This is not to argue, however, for an account of space which turns solely upon the 
subjective relativism of a myriad of individual perceptions for: 
it seems reasonable to adopt as a working hypothesis the view that individuals possess some 
proportion (as yet undetermined) of "common image" derived from some group nonns ..... and a 
proportion of "unique image" which is highly idiosyncratic and unpredictable. It is the common 
part of the spatial image with which we must first concern ourselves, if we are to squeeze out 
some details of the real nature of social space. ~ 
In effect, while arguing that "if we are to build an analytically tractable theory of 
spatial fonn, we must eventually resort for formal geometry", a description of 
social space requires the use of "a more continuous geometry" for, above all: 
we have to conclude that social space is complex, non-homogeneous, perhaps discontinuous, and 
almost certainly different from the physical space in which the engineer and the planner typically 
work. 25 
This description of space will be axiomatic for much of my discussion of 
photography. Indeed, from the start I shall argue for an instability of effect even 
within the apparently absolute realm of Euclidean geometry. This instability, 
however, needs to be located as an effect of representation. The notion of 
representation is one which Harvey himself uses to illustrate the disjunction 
between physical and social space in that he differentiates between a description of 
space premised upon "physical principles" as opposed to one structured according 
to "aestheti9 ones". Summarising the arguments of Susanne Langer, Harvey 
observes that, "the space in which we have our physical being is a system of 
a'b'd 1 1 • 
21 ibid., p. 34 
24ibid• 
21 ibid., p. 35. 
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relationships whereas the space of art is a created space built out of forms, colours 
and so on. Thus the visual space dermed by a painting is essentially an illusion." :115 
Two aspects of this distinction are pertinent here. Firstly, Harvey posits a lack 
of congruity between physical space and the representation of that space in that the 
la~er is ordered and intentional- or, at least, is supposedly so. Clearly this division 
has implications for the belief that photographs themselves transcriptively 
reproduce the external world. As distinct from this belief, however, photographs 
need to be situated within the realm of social space. Secondly, and allied to this, 
Harvey also appears to be drawing a distinction from aesthetics between the direct 
perception of physical space and the intentional and illusory (or "virtual ") spaces of 
images or representations. A distinction is thus made between a direct and 
unmediated perception which takes as its object physical space - a mode of 
perception which, like that space itself, can be both measured and quantified within 
behavioural schema - as distinct from representational space which is in some sense 
always mediated: most obviously, for example, by its various conventions. 
In many ways of course this distinction between disparate cognitive forms (to 
remain for the moment within the language of these accounts) has some validity, 
but any rigid separation between the two has its limitations. Not only is perception 
itself always encoded and structured by existing schema - as demonstrated in 
Lynch's own work - but arguably even geometry itself is no more than a 
sophisticated representation in that it, too, is a set of culturally specific conventions. 
But this aside, my point here is that while a separation between seeing and 
representing objects has much pertinence with reference, for instance, to painting, 
the situation with photography is altogether less clear-cut. For if a photograph 
cannot be read in the same way as a painting or drawing it is in part because of the 
different investments that are made around each of them. For while each process 
involves codes and conventions, certain beliefs or assumptions are brought to 
photography that do not apply so readily to painting. 
To put i~ crudely, photographs are posited as being literal records of perception 
which possess an innate connection with what they depict as opposed to their being 
read as unmotivated or arbitrary representations. It is in this sense that I shall be 
citing photography as a paradigmatic example of a logocentric regime of 
representation in that photography was, and still is, posited as a form of 
representation which comes closest to being a physical trace of the act of perception 
A ibid., p. 31. 
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itself. 27 Nor is it my immediate concern to argue for the falsity of this belief. For 
while important work has been produced which exposes the naturalist or realist 
pretensions of both photography and film (in part through a dismantling of the 
"classic realist text"), it is also the case that an analysis of photographs premised 
solely upon treating them as texts, while useful, is not altogether adequate and in 
many ways misses out on what is specific to photography or, rather, what in part 
marks its difference from other fonns of image production. In short, this belief in 
this innate connection between photography and its objects cannot be readily 
dismissed. Instead, what needs to be examined is how this belief organises and 
27 The belief in the status of the photograph as an unmediated copy or substitute for actual objects is 
evident from the earliest accounts of photography. Thus, for example, a notion of photography as a 
literal re-presentation of a palpable presence whereby objects or people effectively 'drew' or imprinted 
themselves on the paper or plate (thereby effacing the distinction between original and copy) is 
operative in Fox Talbot's account of his own photography, i.e: "the object which would take the most 
skillful artist days or weeks of labour to trace or to copy, is effected by the boundless powers of natural 
chemistry in the space of a few seconds ... To give an idea of the degree of accuracy with which some 
objects can be illustrated by this process, I need only mention one instance. Upon one occasion, having 
made an image of a piece of lace of an elaborate pattern, I showed it to some persons at the distance of a 
few feet, with the inquiry, whether it was a good representation? when the reply was, That they were not 
to be so easily deceived, for it was evidently no picture, but the piece of lace itself," ("Some Account of 
the Art of Photogenic Drawing" (1839) in Photography in Print: Writings from 1816 to the Present, ed. 
Vicki Goldberg, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1981, p. 39). Talbot also recounts how his 
experimentation in photography was partly initiated by his speculation as to "whether it might be 
possible to cause the image to impress itself upon the paper, and thus let Nature substitute her own 
inestimable pencil, for the imperfect., tedious, and almost hopeless attempt at copying a subject so 
intricate" (ibid .• p. 43). while he also remarks upon his making of "a great number of representation of 
my house in the country ... [that] this building [is] I believe the first that was ever known to have drawn 
its own picture" (ibid., p. 46). Similarly, in 1840, Edgar Allen Poe wrote: "if we imagine the 
distinctiveness with which an object is reflected in a perfectly polished mirror, we come as near the 
reality as by any other means. For, in truth. the Daguerreotyped plate is infinitely (we use the term 
advisedly) more accurate in its representation than any painting by human hand ... the closest scrutiny of 
the photogenic drawing discloses only a more absolute truth. a more perfect identity of aspect with the 
thing represented. The variation of shading and the gradations of both linear and aerial perspective are 
those of truth itself in the supremeness of its perfection" ("The Daguerreotype", reprinted in Classic 
Essays on Photography, ed. Alan Trachtenberg, New Haven, Leete's Island Books, 1980, p. 38). For 
Samuel Morse, daguerreotypes were "painted by Nature's self with a minuteness of detail. which the 
pencil of light in her hands alone can trace ... they cannot be called copies of nature, but portions of 
nature herselr' (letter of 1840 quoted in Richard Rudishill, Mirror Image: The Influence of the 
Daguerreotype on American Society, Albuquerque, 1971, p. 57). This line of thinking reached its apogee 
in Oliver Wendell Holmes's description in 1859 of how the Daguerreotype "has fixed the most fleeting 
of our illusions, that which the apostles and the philosopher and the poet have alike used as the type of 
instability and unreality. The photograph has completed the triumph, by making a sheet of paper reflect 
images like a mirror and hold them as a picture ... [this] invention of the mirror with a memory" ("The 
Stereoscope and the Stereograph", in Photography in Print, op.cit., p. 101). Photography, Holmes 
argued, would eventually be able to supply a copy of everything, a universal "currency" of equivalence 
between the photographic sign and "objects of nature", i.e. "There is only one Coliseum or Pantheon; 
but how many millions of potential negatives have they shed - representatives of billions of pictures -
since they were erectedl ... Every c:onceivable object of Nature and Art will soon scale off its surface for 
us. Men will hunt all curious, beautiful and grand objects ... for their skins ... The consequence of this will 
soon be such a huge collection of forms that they will have to be classified and arranged in vast 
libraries, u boob are now. The time will come when a man who wishes to see any object, natural or 
artificial, will go the Imperial, National or City Stcreographic Library and call for its skin or form, as he 
would for a book at any common library, where all men can fmel the special forms they particularly 
desire to ICe. .. And u a means of facilitating the formation of public and private ltereographic libraries, 
there must be arranged a comprehensive IYltem of exchanges, so that there may grow up lomething like 
a universal currency of these bank notes, or promises to pay in solid lubstance, which the sun has 
engraved for the great Bank of Nature" (ibid., pp. 112-113). 
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conditions the ways in which we might look at and use photographs particularly 
within the context of historical enquiry. 
An initial exposition of the logocentrism within photography can be gleaned 
from Jacques Derrida's description of what he has called "the phonocentric 
necessity: the privilege of the voice over writing" in his statement that: 
The priority of spoken language over written or silent language stems from the fact that when 
words are spoken the speaker and the listener are supposed to be simultaneously present to each 
other; they are supposed to be the same. pure unmediated presence. This ideal of perfect self-
presence. of the immediate possession of meaning. is what is expressed by the phonocentric 
necessity. Writing. on the other hand. is considered subversive in so far as it creates a spatial and 
temporal distance between the author and the audience; writing presupposes the absence of the 
author and so we can never be exactly sure what is meant by a written text; it can have many 
different meanings as opposed to a single unifying one. 21 
By substituting vision for voice, perception for phonocentrism and representation 
for writing, much of Derrida's account has a bearing on photography in that it too, 
like speech, is posited as being the site of an authentic and unmediated self-presence 
(as image) which is identical with the real. Photography in this sense stands, like 
logocentrism, as a 'metaphysical' project committed to a desire for presence secured 
through a direct and unmediated knowledge of the real. Within this project. the 
guarantee of immediate access with the real is the "transcendental signified"29 
which, as a fixed point of contact, exists above the play of textuality (or 
representation). However, with photography there is something of a reversal of 
Derrida's account with reference to the role of spatial distance (although his remarks 
remain pertinent in terms of the authorship of photographs) in that much of my 
concern in what follows is to argue that, with photography, it is precisely this 
distancing which operates as the guarantee of both coherent meaning and 
spectatorial security while it is proximity which can provoke a crisis of meaning and 
threaten the stability and coherence of the perceiving subject. 
But while photography can be framed as being premised upon logocentric 
notions of presence (as both perception and transcription). I would also want to 
argue for a mobility or undecidability of the photographic image within this regime 
of presence in that, at the level of our common assumptions at least, photographs 
oscillate between the two registers of direct perception and coded representation. 
D "Deconstruction and its other" in Richard Kearney, Dialogues with contemporary continental 
thinlcers, the phenonumological heritage, Manchester University Press. 1984, pp. 115.116 . 
.. For perhaps the best introduction to Derrida's critique of losocentrism and the "transcendental 
sisnified", see "Structure, Sian and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in Writing and 
Difference, trans. A. BUI. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, espec. pp. 278·282. 
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Indeed, it is this undecidability or oscillation which is in part the source of their 
specificity - and fascination. 
However, the positing of the undecidability of photography is not in any sense 
synonymous with a return to a belief in the self-evidence of the photographic 
image. But what I would argue for here is a notion of a psychical reality in terms, 
for example, of the structures of perception and the nature of the spectator's 
investment in the image. However, this psychical reality is not reducible to a 
positivist framework of truth and falsity - a framework which arguably is still 
operative in those analyses of the "classic realist text". 
But before discussing further the implications of a critique of logocentrism for 
an analysis of photography, it is worth recapping on what the various accounts of 
spatiality that I shall be using in this thesis might offer a history of photography - as 
well as indicating what their limitations might be. For, as opposed to the ascription 
of a status of self-evidence to photography, the aim of this thesis is to construct a 
series of frameworks around photography. Indeed, it is precisely because there is 
no stable or inherent meaning in photographs that it becomes necessary to construct 
such a series of frameworks or models within which photographs can then be 
situated. It is in this sense that one might cite Brecht's observation that: 
less than ever does the mere reflection of reality tell us anything about reality. A photograph of the 
Krupp works or AEO tells us next to nothing about these institutions. Actual reality has slipped 
into the functional. The reifacation of human relations - the factory, say - means that they are no 
longer explicit. So something must in fact be built up, something artificial, posed. 30 
Not only do accounts of social space in part provide such a framework (of 
"something ... [to] be built up") with reference to city-life photography but as 
Harvey himself observes with reference to his own methodological procedures: 
the only adequate conceptual framework. for understanding the city is one which encompasses and 
builds upon both the sociological and geographical imaginations ... We need, above all, to 
formulate conceptS which allow us to harmonize and integrate strategies to deal with the intricacies 
of social processes and the elements of spatial fonn. '1 
It is this fonnulation of concepts and the construction of frameworks which will be 
much of my concern. More specifically, the necessity of looking at photographs in 
tenns of spatiality can be located at both a polemical and at a practical level. Above 
all, it provides a means of overcoming or, rather, of making redundant the 
traditional art historical models and narratives that are increasingly being imposed 
so Quoted by Walter Benjamin, "A Small History of Photography" in OM.Way Street, trans., Edmund 
Jephcou and Kingsley Shorter, NLB. 1979. p. 2SS .. 
'1 Social Justice and 1M City • op. cit., p. 17. 
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upon photography and in panicular upon the photography of the nineteenth century. 
For as the history of photography gains some recognition, albeit still limited, it 
is at the price of its being contained within the paradigm of authorship which is 
most readily apparent in the notion of the distinctive style - the personal or 'unique 
eye' approach. And, even more so perhaps than with the history of art itself, 
photography remains framed within narratives of origins and descent (Le. the 
endless debates on who constituted the founding fathers of photography), while 
analyses of individual photographs remain couched in terms of formalist 
descriptions. Furthermore, just as the history of photography moves back and forth 
between a narrative of a technical evolution (most usually in the form of the 'fIrst 
use') and those narratives derived from the history of art, so too, it repetitively 
addresses itself to resolving the pseudo-debate as to whether photography's 
essential identity is either scientifIc or artistic, i.e. between its being an objective or 
expressive medium. 
Yet, if photography has any form of identity, it is a parasitic one in that it is 
defined by discourses and institutions outside of itself. This important line of 
argument has already been productively broached within recent photographic 
history, perhaps most notably in the work of John Tagg and Allan Sekula.32 But 
while this work has transformed what might constitute both photography and its 
social history, this re-evaluation remains largely marginalised and the history of 
photography continues for the most part to follow well-worn and increasingly 
unyielding paths. For the moment I wish merely to point out two major 
consequences which result from the continued use of these traditional historical 
models. The most obvious consequence is the almost total exclusion of the vast 
bulk of photographic production since it does not lend itself to being readily framed 
within the paradigms of authorship, style or genre. As much photography is 
anonymous or at best institutional (especially in the nineteenth century) it falls 
beneath what Michel Foucault has called "the threshold of description" 33 or, in this 
case, even of recognition. Moreover, as much photography is repetitive, 
12 See 10hn Tagg, The Bllrden of Representation, essays on photographies and histories, Macmillan, 
1988, espcc. the Introduction and Allan Sekula, Photograph, Against the Grain: Essays and Photo 
Works, HaUfax. The Nova Scotia College of An and Design, 1984. I have discussed the value and 
limitations of Tagg's approach in relation to the traditional history of photography in "The Subject of 
Photography". Ox/ordArIJOKrnQJ. 12. 2.1989. 
"Discipline and Pllnish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979, 
p. 191. 
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unarresting and mundane, it is deemed unworthy of historical enquiry. Yet this 
judgment should not be taken as a statement of fact but is instead a consequence of 
the limited terms operative within photographic history itself. It is in this sense that 
the ways of reading photographs that shall be developed here are a means to 
recouping and making visible photographs that have been neglected l?ecause they 
may not have an author or because they do not fit into the modernist paradigm of 
stylistic innovation. 
However, there is another aspect to this which goes beyond the practical 
necessity of retrieving hitherto neglected images. For the major criticism that can be 
levelled against much photographic history, or what passes for it, is that in fact it 
usually says very little about photographs themselves. When the specific question 
of pictorial meaning is addressed it is often in somewhat haphazard terms which 
reflect the confusions within those paradigms which motivate and frame such 
commentaries. 
But, beyond this, a fundamental contradiction arises between the assumptions 
of photographic history and the inadequacy of what it is actually able to say about 
individual photographs. For. on the one hand. the sheer impoverishment of 
photographic history when it comes to discussing photographic meaning is an effect 
of a belief in the self-evidence of photographs. By this I mean that historical 
commentaries have a merely tautological function in that the text often simply 
describes what is in the photograph. In this sense the text is no more than an 
inventory of pictorial referents. However, this paucity of analysis can be read 
another way in that it is symptomatic of the lack of any self-evident meaning in 
photographs just as pictorial meaning and effect cannot be accounted for by a 
catalogue of subject-matter. Thus, although working from the premise that 
photographs are essentially transparent and hence readily legible images, historical 
discourse is unable to say anything about photographs beyond the banally obvious. 
Not only, then, does photographic history have very little to say about photographs 
themselves (beyond the anecdotal) but what is usually presented is a series of 
tangential details and narratives. 
It is as a means to viewing photographs in terms of the production and 
circulation of representations that theoretical accounts of social space can here be 
employed. To this end it is necessary to outline various spatial models of the city 
and to examine their inter-relation. Such models of the city might include, for 
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example, descriptions of the city as a fonnal spatial pattern or as a physical 
environment or might also take the fonn of a description of the specific spatial 
orderings of individual cities in terms of zones, districts, urban centres, traffic 
systems etc. The city can also be seen as an organism or body as, for instance, 
within hygienist, medical and environmental disc:ourses. An economic model would 
perhaps sees the city as the space of the circulation, consumption and exchange of 
commodities, surplus value and labour. Another account, and one which will be 
central here, is to view the city as the space of social encounter. 
Clearly, such models are not exhaustive. Moreover, they need to be seen as 
being layered upon each other. However, despite the importance of citing them, it is 
not my concern to describe these spatial accounts of the city in any great theoretical 
detail. Rather, they will be implicit throughout my discussion. But the important 
point to stress here is that these various models are themselves representations. 
Furthermore, they draw attention to the spatial dimension within other 
representation of the city such as those produced through demographic surveys, 
statistical profiles, social investigations and, of course, photography. 
It is this spatial dimension which allows for connections to be made between 
these diverse models of the city and analytical descriptions of space. Such 
descriptions could include the defining of spatiality in tenns, for example, of social, 
created and absolute space. Other obvious spatial categories which suggest 
themselves are the division between public and private or an account of space as a 
register of social distance. It is in order to describe and account for these spaces 
that a particular vocabulary is needed, a vocabulary which would, for instance, 
describe space as homogeneous, fragmented or hierarchical and which could 
describe the structuring of space in terms grids, maps, zones, territories, centres 
and margins. Finally, from such descriptions one can begin so read photographs in 
tenns of strategies and effects of representation (as distinct from intrinsic meanings) 
such as emplacement, or exclusion and inclusion, and in tenns of the construction 
of lines of vision and visibility across the city's spaces. 
It is these descriptions of the city as a spatial entity which very much structure 
the first half of this thesis - but most notably in Chapter 2. In particular they would 
seem to provide a means of thinking about urban space and representation which 
avoids reducing space to being either inert or else as being the prop for modes of 
perceptual experience and consciousness (as in The Image of the City ). But having 
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said this, however, and despite the sophistication of these analyses of urban space, 
there is a danger perhaps of returning to a recurrent position within historical 
narratives of photography whereby the photographs cited ultimately function as no 
more than illustrations of social processes or events. What crucially needs to be 
addressed is not only the question of representation - the production of meanings 
for the city - and the ways in which these representations are themselves referable to 
other representations and social practices, but the positioning of the viewer or 
spectator in relation to these images. In short, there can be no space without 
subjects. But while this claim need not entail the re-installation of the notion of an 
autonomous subject, I wish also to avoid the danger of evacuating altogether the 
category of the subject or of simply presenting it as no more than a prop for 
extrinsic processes. What is needed, then, is a bridge between the discrete, monadic 
consciousness of phenomenology and the over-abstracted and generalised subject 
of, for example, structural Marxism (or, one might add, of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis). 
The beginnings of a delineation of some of the features of what might be called 
an urban subjectivity - and, in particular. the psychical life of such a subject - can in " 
part be fonned from accounts offered by urban sociology. While the aim of many 
of these accounts has been to produce a static and nonnative urban "type", some of 
the phenomena which these accounts outline are nonetheless pertinent here. Within 
this sociology of the city perhaps the first systematic attempt to provide a 
description of the psychical structures of an urban subject is that which is provided 
by Georg Simmel in his essay "The Metropolis and Mental Life" written at the turn 
of the century. The special significance of Simmel for the present context is his 
attempt to link the psychical with the particular spatial organisation of the city. As 
one commentator has remarked: 
Simmers account of rrwdernite [is] located in specific spatial configurations. Simmel was the flISt 
sociologist to reveal explicitly the social significance of spatial contexts for human 
interaction ... no other theorist was so preoccupied with social distance, with detachment from 
reality, with 'the intersection of social circles' as was Simmel.]4 
A number of connected features within Simmel's description of the urban subject of 
modernity will be relevant throughout this thesis. Among these are his emphasis 
upon the primacy of perceptual experience within the city and, as part of this, the 
determining effects of distance and proximity in structuring the fonns of social 
encounter and experience available within it. This can be described more precisely 
Sot David Frisby. Fragments 0/ Motkrnity, Cambridge. Polity Press, 1985. p.71. 
15 
in tenns of what Simmel cites as "the intensification of nelVOUS stimulation" as an 
aspect of urban existence and, with it, the threat of the obliteration of autonomous 
selfhood. 
Arguing from the premise that "the deepest problems of modem life derive from 
the cl~im of the individual to preselVe the autonomy and individuality of his 
existence" ,35 Simmel describes an essentially defensive urban type who adopts a 
number of strategies which aim to protect the individual from the perceptual 
onslaught of metropolitan life and to preserve identity from "those relations to 
others ... [which] dissolve the boundaries of the individual": 36 
The psychological basis of the metropolitan type of individuality consists in the intensification 
of nervous stimulation which results from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner 
stimuli. Man is a differentiating creature. His mind is stimulated by the difference between a 
momentary impression and the one which preceded it. Lasting impressions, impressions which 
differ only slightly from one another, impressions which take a regular and habitual course and 
show regular and habitual contrasts - all these use up, so to speak, less consciousness than does 
the rapid crowding of changing images, the sharp discontinuity in the grasp of a single glance, and 
the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions. These are the psychological conditions which the 
metropolis creates. With each crossing of the street, with the tempo and multiplicity of economic, 
occupational and social life, the city sets up a deep contrast with small town and rural life with 
reference to the sensory foundations of psychical life .. .!n order to accommodate to change and to 
the contrast of phenomena, the intellect does not require any shocks and inner upheavals ... Thus the 
metropolitan type of man - which of course exists in a lhousand individual variants - develops an 
organ protecting him against the threatening currents and discrepancies of his external environment 
which would uproot him ..• to preserve subjective life against the overwhelming power of 
metropolitan life.37 
Simmel lists a number of traits as part of the profile of this urban individual. 
Among these are the blase attitude, the cultivation of reSeIVe, indifference and even 
open hostility: "Indeed ... the inner aspect of this outer reserve is not only 
indifference but, more often than we are aware, it is a slight aversion, a mutual 
strangeness and repulsion, which will break into hatred and fight at the moment of a 
closer contact, however caused. "]I 
Maintenance of personality against perceptual over-stimulation, discontinuity 
and threat ("shocks and inner upheavals") in conjunction with the preservation of 
individuality against absorption into the anonymous group ("the atrophy of 
individual culture") thus rests, for Simmel, not only upon the cultivation of 
particular "mental and psychic traits", but also upon the development of special 
skills for reading the city. Partly arising from the pace of city life and the 
Sli "The Metropolis and Mental Ufe", Tht! Sociology of Gt!orgt! Sil7ll7lt!l, trans. and edited by Kurt H. 
Wolff, New York, The Free Press, 19S0, p. 409. 
_ ibid., p. 417. 
17 ibid., pp.409-411. 
-ibid., pp. 41S-416. 
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preponderance of "brief metropolitan contacts", the urban individual necessarily 
develops a "sensitivity for differences" and a self-consciousness about "the 
awareness of others. "39 For, without the adoption of these defence mechanisms and 
cognitive skills, "one would be completely atomized internally and come to an 
unimaginable psychic state. "40 
However, as with Lynch's account of the city, my concern here is not simply to 
replicate the terms of Simmel's analysis but, rather, to recast them within a different 
framework. And while Simmel's sociology foregrounds the spatial dimension 
which structures the intersubjective experience of urban modernity, the question 
also arises of the spatial organisation of our perception and access to the past 
especially when that access is through images. This question is raised in Jameson's 
claim that "our relation to the past is now a spatial one." For Jameson this is an 
effect of the loss of visual and interpretive depth and of the flattening of historical 
time which he cites as intrinsic features of po stmoderni sm. This process he 
describes as the "spatialisation of time" in that "time has become a perpetual present 
and thus spatial."41 Arguably, however, this spatialisation of time is not a feature 
unique to postmodernism (should one chose to accept the validity of the term) but 
instead it is one which has been a defining feature of modernity and one which, for 
instance, one can trace back to Baudelaire.41 But, the question of postmodernism 
aside, I would suggest that these remarks have a relevance not only to the 
employment of photography (and the status of photographs as historical 
documents) but, more broadly, that the issue of spatiality is fundamental to any 
account of modernity. More specifically, I wish to situate photography within what 
Jameson, employing a language derived from both Lynch and Foucault, calls "the 
cognitive mapping of power, the construction of picture-models, and the transfer of 
conceptions of social power and its forms onto powerful spatial figures. "43 
Jameson's call for a spatial or geo-political reading of postmodemity thus 
evokes the notion of the "cognitive mapping" of those mystificatory spaces which 
mask the instrumentalist operations of power and social control. This mapping then 
provides the means of overcoming spatial alienation or dislocation. To this end, 
:,. ibid., p. 421. 
~ ibid., p. 415. 
41 "Regardins Postmodemism", op. cit., pp. 66-67. 
42 See, for example, Paul de Man's discussion of Baudelaire's notion of 'la rq,resentation du pr~sent' in 
Blindness and Insight: Enays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, New York, Oxford 
Univenity Presl, 1971, pp. 156-161. 
""Regarding Postmodernism", op.cit., pp.6-7. 
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Jameson describes how, within his own critical project, "the loss of ability to 
position ourselves within this space and cognitively map it .. .is then projected back 
on the emergence of a global, multinational culture that is decentered and cannot be 
visualised, a culture in which one cannot position oneself. "44 
For Jameson, then, "we must ... begin to think of cultural politics in terms of 
space and the struggle for space".4S But, once again, as with the notion of the 
spatialization of time, the cognitive mapping of urban space, the loss of spatial 
positioning and the "struggle for space" all occurred during the nineteenth century 
(although not necessarily described as such by contemporaries) - Engels's 
description of the industrial city and the events of the Paris Commune being two 
obvious examples. However, aside from the question of the chronological 
placement of these phenomena, my concern is less with Jameson's 'macro' level of 
analysis but more with the 'micro' level in that I wish to pin down these processes 
with reference to specific photographs. 
As a means of doing this one might usefully cite Walter Benjamin as a precedent 
for examining photography as a means of uncovering the pathology of modernity. 
For Benjamin it was Atget who, more than any other photographer, "wiped off the 
mask and then set about removing the make-up from reality.'t46 But while 
Benjamin's description of Atget's photographs as "the forerunners of surrealist 
photography" has often been repeated (usually in order to support the view that all 
photographs are inherently surrealist)47 what is often overlooked is the diagnostic 
status ascribed to Atget's photography in terms of what Benjamin describes as the 
uncovering of the "physiognomical aspects" of modernity and the demystification 
of the aura. Ignoring the "great sights and so-called landmarks", Atget: 
initiates the emancipation of object from aura. .. He looked for what was unremarked. forgotten. cast 
adrift, and thus such pictures operate against the exotic, romantically sonorous names of the cities; 
they pump the aura out of reality like water from a sinking ship .•. [the photographs] are not lonely. 
merely without mood; the city in these pictures looks cleared out, like a lodging that has not yet 
found a new tenant. It is in these achievements that surrealist photography sets the scene for a 
salutory estrangement between man and his surroundings. It gives free play to the politically 
educated eye, under whose gaze all intimacies are sacrificed to the illumination of detai1.41 
However, my citing of Benjamin's reading of Atget's photographs is not intended 
to grant some kind of unique or privileged vision to Atget himself for the drift of 
44ibid .• p. 7. 
41 ibid .• p. IS. 
4 •• A Small History of Photography". op.cit. p.249. 
47 For example. Susan Sontag. On Photography. Hannondsworth. Penguin, 1982. espec. pp. SI-82. 
41 "A Small History of Photography". op. cit. pp. 250-251. 
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what Benjamin says is applicable to much nineteenth century photography 
although, in the case of the photographs that I shall be discussing, this is not to 
argue for a conscious or motivating authorial intention. Nor is this to posit a notion 
of the photographs' self-revelatory details or effects. Instead our own gaze needs to 
be mobilised through the use frameworks along the lines that I have indicated. 
But this is not to argue that photographs, once situated within such 
frameworks, then allow us direct and unmediated access to the 'historical past'. 
For, instead of granting us this, photography both organises and disrupts what 
might be called our perceptual access. As Benjamin argues, photography was a 
"new way of seeing" which transfonned not only the objects but also the structures 
of perception and of looking. Photography thus functions as a kind of grid or 
template, while individual photographs themselves need to be read as "powerful 
spatial figures. II Indeed one might use the analogy of textual translation here in that 
a translation (like a photograph) both refers to but simultaneously transforms a 
prior text (or referent, the 'real' etc.). How,ever, reference to something else is not 
synonymous with unmediated replication. Instead, what is involved in both 
translation and photography is a kind of doubling or repetition, but a doubling 
which is a transformative process involving distortion and distancing.49 
An unconscious optics 
It is as a means of uncovering this work of (re)organisation and disruption I shall 
be taking a further cue from Benjamin when he remarks upon what he describes as 
photography's "optical unconscious": 
No mattel' how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed his SUbject, the beholder 
feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the Here and 
Now, with which reality has so to speak seared the subject .. For it is another nature that speaks to 
the camera than to the eye: other in the sense that a space infonned by human consciousness gives 
way to a space informed by the unconscious .. lt is through photography that we fIrst discover the 
existence of this optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through 
psychoanalysis.'" 
While the optical unconscious that Benjamin describes here refers more to 
photography's revealing of objects and processes (through slow motion and 
at "In effect, the theme of the transcendental signified took shape within the horizon of an absolutely 
pure, transpuent, and unequivocal translatability. In the limits to which it is possible, or at least 
appeCU's possible, translation practices the difference between the signifier and the signified. But if this 
difference is never pure, no more so is translation, and for the notion of translation we would have to 
substitute a notion of transfonnation: a regulated transfonnation of one IlJlguage by another, of one text 
by another. We will never have, mel never have had, to do with some 'transport' of pure signifieds from 
one IlJlguage to another, or within one and the lame language, that the lignifying instrument would 
leave virgin and intact" PositiolU, trans. Alan Bus, London. Athlone Press, 1982, p. 20. 
10 ibid., p. 243. 
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enlargement) not available to nonnal vision, his reference to psychoanalysis implies 
more than mere analogy in that he alludes to the workings of both conscious and 
unconscious processes. 
It is these psychical processes that are very much the focus of this thesis. 
However this was not its original starting point. For my initial concern was with 
thinking about photography in terms of the spatial taxonomies outlined above. But 
while the situating of photographs within an historical account of particular spatial 
orders remains fundamental, what was missing was a specific address to the 
summoning or production of a gaze for the photographs. For the issue of 
photography's ordering and disruption of our perceptual field is inseparable from 
the the gaze and the determinant contexts for looking. It is at this juncture that 
psychoanalysis made a (somewhat belated) entry but an entry which transformed 
not only how one might approach individual photographs and what constitutes the 
archive but also what makes its maintenance as a discrete structure unsustainable 
(i.e. as one which can be contained solely by reference to subject-matter, 'authors' 
or styles). 
Benjamin's "seared" subject might thus be reappropriated as referring to the 
viewer-subject of photography and not only to photography's objects. But while 
Benjamin's remarks provide a useful starting point for this inquiry, the citing of 
photography as an optical metaphor for perception was not unique to him and, 
within psychoanalysis, references to photography, the camera and the negative 
were regularly employed by Freud.51 More recently, Jean-Louis Baudry, in part 
following upon Freud's account of the dream-work and Jacques Lacan's 
description of the subject as "an apparatus", has developed this theme and several 
aspects of Baudry's analysis of the cinematic apparatus are not only pertinent to 
photography but draw comparisons with Derrida's characterisation of logocentrism 
as the desire for an immediacy of perception and.signification. Thus, for example, 
Baudry refers to the "hallucinatory factor, the lack of distinction between 
representation and perception ... that something of a desire in dream unifying 
perception and representation - whether with representation passing itself off for 
perception ... or whether perception passes itself off for perceived representation. "51 
I' Sarah Kofman cites several examples in her Camera obscllTa , de l'id~ologie • Paris. &litions galil~e. 
1973. pp. 37-46. See also Freud's references to photography and the negative in "The Dynamics of 
Trmsference" (Stanilard Editio,. , vol. XII) and in "Notes on the Concept of the Unconscious in 
Psychoanalysis" (Standard Edition. vol. XU). 
12 "11le Apparatus", Irms. Bernard Augst and Jean Andrews. CameraObscllTa. 1 .1976. p. 117. 
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While I do not wish to identify photography solely with the dream-work, what 
is important to note for the moment in Baudry's analysis is the notion of the 
subject-effect produced through projective identification with the image. More 
particularly, Baudry describes this subject as "the subject of the unconscious". 
What I wish to draw out from this is not only the reference to the unconscious 
subject but also the situating of representations at the interface between perceptual 
and unconscious processes so as to then argue that representations or, more 
precisely, their effects need to be located between the systems described by Freud 
as perception-consciousness and the unconscious. As Baudry himself remarks: "the 
dream wish is fonned from daytime residues in the Pcs system which are reinforced 
by drives emanating from the UCS."S3 However, these two systems should not be 
seen as operating in tandem so as to mutually reinforce each other (although at 
times, of course, this is possible) but should be seen as existing in a state of 
tension. For, following the founding insight of psychoanalysis into the workings 
of repression (which, in the fonn primal repression, initiates the emergence of a 
dynamic and structured unconscious), the relation between these two systems needs 
to be described as one of mutual conflict As such, one element within my approach 
to photography will be to examine images which initiate a rupture between 
perception-consciousness and the unconscious and to locate these images within 
what Lacan has described as "the absolute separation between perception and 
consciousness", within "the interval that separates them, in which the place of the 
other is situated, in which the subject is constituted." 54 
The presence of the gaze: vision and/as text 
This method of looking at photographs is adopted as a strategy in order to pursue 
the central concern of this thesis which is to focus on the ways in which 
photography destabilises its own logocentric aspirations. This can be clarified 
perhaps by some brief explanation of method by reference to the thesis sub-title, 
"the presence of the gaze." My aim here is to employ a 'deconstructive' critique of a 
logocentrism understood as referring to the desire for access to and mastery of 
knowledge, meaning, presence, identity, origins etc. It is within this logocentric 
regime that I shall situate photography which, like speech and instrumentalist 
II ibid., p. ItS. 
'7he Fo", FlUldaJMntal Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Alan Sheridan, London, Tavistock, 1977, 
pp.4S-46. 
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language, is posited as a transparent and unmediated medium. However, this 
critique will run in conjunction with various psychoanalytic accounts of subjectivity 
and in particular with those accounts which focus on perception and representation. 
It is these accounts of the production of the subject that will be employed as a 
means to arguing tha~ the subject-effect of photography can be situated (via a 
psychoanalytic reading) within (an unstable) logocentrism. 
In part, this project involves the conjoining of deconstructive notions of, for 
instance, presence, absence, the supplement, undecidability etc. with a 
psychoanalytic vocabulary of narcissism and ego functions, lack/castration, 
repression, ambivalence! instability and so on. However, this is not a matter of 
producing a system of equivalence through matching respective concept with 
concept and thereby attempting to conflate two very distinct orders of discourse. 
Instead, this conjoining involves not only employing deconstruction as a technique 
for reading psychoanalysis, but also involves emphasising what might be called the 
proto-deconstructive elements within psychoanalysis itself. Within the present 
context this will largely tum upon 'the logic of the supplement'. For if Derrida's 
project can be understood as a subversion of "the principle of identity, the founding 
expression of a philosophy of presence"55 (on which is predicated an autonomous, 
self-relexive and sovereign subject, which is both the constitutive origin of both 
language and meaning and which is also concentric with its self-knowledge), a 
similar destabilisation of hierarchical binary oppositions is operative (if only 
implicitly perhaps) within psychoanalysis. As Jonathan Culler explains: 
Freud begins with a series of hierarchical oppositions: normal/pathological, sanity/insanity, 
real{unaginary, experience! dream, conscious/unconscious, life/death. In each case the fIrst term 
has been conceived as prior, a plenitude of which the second is a negation or complication. 
Situated on the margin of the fIrst term, the second term designates an undesirable, dispensable 
deviation. Freud's investigations deconstruct these oppositions by identifying what is at stake in 
our desire to repress the second and showing that in fact each fIrst term can be seen as a special case 
of the fundamentals designated by the second term, which in this process is transformed. 
Understanding of the marginal or deviant term becomes a condition of understanding the supposedly 
prior term ... These deconsttuctive reversals, which give pride of place to what had been thought 
marginal, are responsible for much of the revolutionary impact of Freudian theory." 
At the risk of extreme reductiveness, the basic operative terms within a 
deconstructive reading are presence and absence in that, for Derrida, identity and 
meaning etc. are defined through their constitutive (but suppressed) opposites or 
differences. Within phono-Iogocentrism, the supposed full plenitude of speech -
.. "Freud and the Scene of Writing" in Writing and Diffuence, op. ciL , p. 207. 
II On Deconstruction, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, pp. 160.161. 
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"the unique experience of the signified producing itself spontaneously from within 
the self' 57 - is always inhabited by the differential trace of writing. Speech, as the 
privileged site of unmediated meaning! consciousness, is thus always mediated by 
writing (its non-present but pre-existent substitutes) in that speech itself not only 
involves signification (and thus also the spatio-temporal difference between 
signifiers), but its status of inunediate and natural self-presence (the coincidence of 
intention and meaning) is contingent upon the viewing of writing as an unnatural. 
supplementary or contaminating activity marked by the loss or denial of self-
presence. In other words. the possibility or conceptualising of speech and presence 
is contingent upon writing. the non-present. the non-originary. Le."that what opens 
meaning and language is writing as the disappearance of natural presence. "51 
This notion that presence. despite its privileging over absence. is always 
marked or constituted by what is (apparently) absent has an obvious counterpart in 
psychoanalysis in that consciousness (as presence-to-perception. for example) is 
always inhabited by what is absent (the unconscious). So also. for example. 
conscious (intentional) speech is always overdetennined by the otherness of the 
unconscious. 
A more specific example of this relation is provided by Freud's use of the 
writing-toy. the 'Mystic Writing Pad', as a metaphor for the operations of the 
psychical apparatus. Freud employs this model not only to describe both how 
perceptions are received from the outside world but also to show how traces and 
memories are inscribed within the unconscious. Explaining the inadequacy of either 
a sheet of paper or of chalk and slate as models of the the functioning of the 
psychical apparatus. Freud remarks that: "an unlimited receptive capacity and the 
retention of permanent traces seem to be mutually exclusive properties in the 
apparatus which we use as substitutes for our memory: either the receptive surface 
must be renewed or the note must be destroyed."" However, while these "devices 
to aid our memory seem particularly imperfect". the Mystic Writing Pad in "its 
construction shows a remarkable agreement with my hypothetical structure of our 
perceptual apparatus and that it can in fact provide an ever-ready receptive surface 
and the permanent traces of the notes that have been made upon it "60 
5701 Grommatology • trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, London and Baltimore, The lohns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976, p. 20. 
M ibid., p. 159. 
it "A Note Upon the Mystic Writing Pad" (1924), SttJNlard Edition, vol.XIX, pp. 227-228. 
10 ibid., p. 228. 
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Within this model the top layer of the perceptual apparatus (the Pcpt.-Cs.) 
functions as both a receptive surface and as the psyche's protective shield against an 
excess of external stimuli - a process which has with distinct parallells with 
Simmel's account of the urban individual's psychological defence mechanisms: 
The layer of the celluloid thus acts as a protective sheath for the waxed paper, to keep off injurious 
effects from without. The celluloid is a 'protective shield against stimuli'; the layer which actually 
receives the stimuli is the paper ... the perceptual apparatus of our mind consists of two layers, of 
an external protective shield against stimuli whose task is to diminish the strength of excitations 
coming in, and of a surface behind it which receives the stimuli, namely the system Pcpt.-Cs ... the 
permanent ttaces of what was written is retained upon the wax slab itself and is legible in suitable 
lights. Thus the pad provides not only a receptive surface that can be used over and over again, like 
a slate. but also permanent ttaces of what has been written, like an ordinary paper pad: it solves the 
problem of combining the two systems by dividing them between two separate but interrelated 
component parts or systems ... precisely the way ... our mental apparatus perfonns its perceptual 
function. The layer which receives the stimuli - the system Pcpt.-Cs. - form no permanent ttaces; 
the foundations of memory come about in the other adjoining systems." 
While acknowledging that, ''There must come a point at which the analogy between 
an auxiliary apparatus of this kind and the organ which is its prototype will cease to 
apply .. .It is true, too, that once the writing has been erased, the Mystic Pad cannot 
'reproduce' it from within", Freud continues: 
None the less, I do not think it too far-fetched to compare the celluloid and the waxed paper cover 
with the system Pcpt.-Cs. and its protective shield, the wax slab with the unconscious behind 
them, and the appearance and disappearance of the writing with the flickering and passing-away of 
consciousness in the process of perception .... .If we imagine one hand writing upon the surface of 
the Mystic Writing Pad while another periodically raises the covering sheet from the wax slab, we 
shall have a concrete representation of the way in which I tried to picture the functioning of the 
perceptual apparatus of the mind.G 
While the top layer (the Pcpt.-Cs.) retains no lasting record since it is continually 
erased (a process which itself might be taken as an analogy for the reconstitution of 
presence through its continual erasure)," the secondary or underlying layer (the 
Ucs.) is never erased and retains permanent traces which never appear on the top 
layer. It is this aspect of the model of the psyche as "a writing machine'l6l that 
Derrida takes up in his assertion that permanent traces exist "always already" before 
perception is even aware or conscious of itself. The trace (which is absent from 
consciousness) thus forms the constitutive basis of consciousness itself in that 
presence/perception are derived from supplementary but non-present traces: 
Writing supplements perception before perception even appears to itself. "Memory" or writing is 
the opening of that process of appearance itself. The "perceived" may be read only in the past, 
II ibid., p. 230. 
II ibid., pp. 230-232. 
Ii "The becoming-visible which alternates with the disappeuance of what is written would be the 
mckering (Aufleuchten) and passing-away (Vergehen) of consciousness in the process of perception.", 
"Freud and the Scene of Writing", ope CiL, p. 225 . 
.. ibid., p. 221. 
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beneath perception and after it. 65 
Fundamental to Derrida's reading and critique of Freud here are the terms 
'presence' and 'absence'. Presence and absence are not marked, however, by some 
kind of manichean divide but are instead mutually interactive and, indeed, ultimately 
dissolve as discrete categories. But this is not to argue that the unconscious is 
'knowable' in the same manner as perception-consciousness for it can only be 
'known' via its effects. Yet to claim this does not then involve citing the 
unconscious as being no more than a 'container' for repressed contents which 
sometimes erupt from it, nor is it to posit the unconscious as a presence which is 
merely 'elsewhere'. As one commentator notes, "Freud recognised that the tenn 
'unconscious' was better used as a descriptive adjective rather than as a 
topographical noun. Although everything which was repressed was unconscious, 
not everything unconscious was repressed. "66 The unconscious, then, is not 
another or secondary consciousness or mind. Instead, for Freud, it is other to but 
constitutive of conscious mental processes. But as Freud also came to recognise, a 
simple opposition between the ego (consciousness) and the unconscious was 
untenable for part of the ego is itself unconscious while it was also the latter which 
is also the agent of repression. Given this, psychical tension might very crudely be 
understood as being between the ego and what is repressed. 
Derrida, describing the unconscious in relation to differance, writes: 
differance maintains our relationship with that which we necessarily misconsttue, and which 
exceeds the alternative of presence and absence. A cenain alterity - to which Freud gives the 
metaphysical name of the unconscious - is definitively exempt from every process of presentation 
by means of which we would call upon it to show itself in person. In this context, and beneath 
this guise, the unconscious is not, as we know, a hidden, virtual, or potential self-presence. It 
differs from, and defers, itself; which doubtless means that it is woven of differences, and also that 
it sends out delegates, representatives, proxies; but without any chance that the giver of proxies 
might "exist", might be present, be "itself" somewhere, and with even less chance that it might 
become conscious. In this sense, contrary to the tenns of an old debate full of the metaphysical 
investments that it has always assumed, the "unconscious" is no more a "thing" than it is any 
other thing, is no more a thing than it is a virtual or masked consciousness. This radical alterity as 
concerns every mode of presence is marked by the irreducibility of the after effect, the delay. In 
order to describe traces, in order to read the traces of "unconscious" traces (there are no conscious 
traces), the language of presence and absence, the metaphysical discourse of phenomenology, is 
inadequate.'" 
Just as a return to the discrete registers of presence/absence would initiate a return 
Q ibid., p. 228. 
II Anthony Storr, FrtIItl, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989, p.46. See also Freud's 
discussion in "The Unconscious", Skllldard Edition , vol. XIV, e.g. "the unconsc:ious does not cover 
everything that is repressed" (p. 166). 
17 "Diff"ance" in Margins 0/ Philosophy, trans. Alan Bus. Brighton, Harvester Press. 1982. pp. 20-
21. 
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to a binary logic of identity structured upon mutually exclusive and hierarchised 
polarities (a logic of either/or), what is at work instead within the constitution of the 
subject is an undecidability or supplementary logic (one of both/and). Moreover, 
while the self -disruptive movements or essential ambiguity of undecidability are, 
for Derrida, the effects of dijferance, dijferance itself "is no longer conceivable on 
the basis of the opposition presence/absence. "68 
Derrida's neologism of dijferance does not then imply merely the reversal of 
terms or the prioritisation of the hitherto secondary term over its dominant 
counterpart although of course he does argue that, for instance, writing or 
difference are the constitutive conditions for speech and identity respectively and are 
thus logically anterior to either of them. But differance is not equivalent to being 
another identity (albeit a 'negative' one) for this would ultimately mean that 
deconstruction amounts to no more than a fetishisation of difference. Instead, 
differance is the movement which both precedes and exceeds oppositional pairings, 
while it is also a movement which is not resolved either through dialectical 
resolution or the production of a synthetic third term. 
Put (over)simply the logic of the supplement is the process by which identity is 
both achieved (through oppositional difference) yet the very processes or structures 
which would seem to secure identity simultaneously, because of their excess, 
threaten any stable identity or meaning. It is this generative absence and surplus 
(itself neither a concept nor even definable) which deconstruction focuses upon 
through its "double gesture" of overturning and dislodging," a strategy which is 
altogether distinct from the reification of differences. For while reversal simply 
leaves the structure of oppositional polarities intact, displacement seeks to reveal the 
constitutive dependence of the dominant term upon its subordinated 'other'. It is in 
part this relation of dependence which is designated by the term 'undecidable' as 
referring to that which not only subverts binary oppositions and classificatory 
systems, but which also simultaneously initiates and occupies both terms. As 
Derrida obselVes of philosophical texts: . 
it has been necessary to analyze. to set to work, within the text of the history of 
philosophy ..• certain marks ... that by analogy .• .I have called undecidable. that .. can no longer be 
included within the philosophical (binary) opposition. but which. however. inhabit philosophical 
opposition. resisting and disorganizing it, without ever constituting a third term. without ever 
leaving room for a solution in the form of speculative dialectics ... the supplement is neither a plus 
nor a minus. neither and outside nor the complement of an inside. neither accident nor essence 
II See also Denida's'summary' (if one can usc the word) of differance in Positions. Op.c:iL. pp. 8-9. also 
p.4S. 
II ibid •• p. 41 ff. 
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etc ..• Neither/nor, that is, simultaneously either/or 111 
It is in this sense that Derrida discusses the unconscious and differance not with 
the aim of ascribing an identity to it (although I would wish to retain a notion of the 
unconscious as a distinct register of consciousness) but with the aim instead of 
describing it as the play of forces which produces identities. The 'traces' which are 
the marks of this play of forces are not then literal representations but are instead, 
for Derrida, the material inscriptions and effects of differance. More particularly, 
the specific spatio-temporal implications of differance (as difference and deferral) 
deny any resolution to this play of forces just as, more broadly, the failure of any 
ultimate coincidence of signifier and signified precludes any fmally securable and 
coherent 'presentness' of meaning or identity. But more immediately, what I shall 
be pursuing here are the effects of differance, (as the logic of the supplement or 
"undecldable oscillation"),71 which psychoanalysis reveals within the psychic life of 
the subject whether, for instance, as the unconscious traces which constitute 
consciousness or else as the splitting of the subject, or its ability to simultaneously 
occupy or identify with multiple (and seemingly contradictory) subject-positions.71 
However, while, as Derrida claims, the "putting into question the primacy of 
presence as consciousness ... [is] the major motif of Freud's thought",73 the 
sustainability of a conjunction between deconstruction and psychoanalysis is by no 
means unproblematic and a number of reservations need to be addressed. Not least 
of these is the question of the compatibility of the two in that it is debatable as to 
70 ibid., pp.42-43. 
71 Sarah Kofman, "Ca cloche", lectures de derrida, Paris, ~ditions gali1~, 1984, p. 132. This lecture is 
also available, (trans. Caren Kaplan), in Derrid4 and Deconstruction, ed Hugh J. Silverman. New York 
and London. Routledge, 1989, pp. 108-138. As Derrida remarks in the discussion included with the 
translation. "It is because there is indecidability that everything is put into gear" (p. 135). See also 
Kofman's discussion of undecidability and psychoanalysis in the book's major section, "un philosophe 
'unheimlich' ", espec.pp. 76-90. 
n However, as Derrida himself emphasises, "Despite appearances, the deconstruction of logocentrism is 
not a psychoanalysis of philosophy"("Freud and the Scene of Writing", op. cit., p. 196). So 
too,"logocentric repression is not comprehensible on the basis of the Freudian concept of repression" 
(ibid., p. 197). More particularly, in 0fGrammatology , Derrida states that "in spite of appearances, the 
location of the word sllppkment is here not at all psychoanalytical" (op. cit., p.159), although he adds, 
"if by that we understand an interpretation that takes us outside writing toward a psychobiographical 
signified." Clearly, what I am advancing here is not a psycho-biography of authors (photographers) and 
with it a notion of the supplement to be Wlderstood a search for pathological symptoms. Nor do I wish 
to present deconstruction (which is essentially a technique or strategy for reading texts) as a theory of 
the subject However, while there are strong aCrmities between the supplement and, for instance, Lacan's 
objet do my concern here is to draw out the correspondences between the logic of the supplementarity 
and, for example, Freud's account of the dream-work, e.g. the claim that "The alternative 'either-or' 
cannot be expressed in dreams in any way" (TM Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Edilion , vols. IV-
V), or his discussion of the subject's ability in phantasy to simultaneously occupy or identify with 
several and apparently mutually exclusive subject-positions, for example as outlined in the paper "A 
Child is Being Beaten". 
71 "D·f~.t. .. . 8 I ~~rance , op. Cit., p. 1 . 
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whether such (apparently) anthropocentric notions as perception and desire, let 
alone the category of the subject, can be accommodated within deconstruction's 
project. 
Thus, to take one example, despite the usefulness of Freud's analogy of the 
Mystic Writing Pad, as a description of the perceptual apparatus, it is at first glance 
perhaps questionable as to how pertinent Derrida's own reading of it might be with 
reference to the question of vision in that he would appear to reduce perception to 
being no more than a textual effect, i.e: 
If there were only perception, pure permeability to breaching, there would be no breaches. We 
would be written, but nothing would be recorded, no writing would be produced, retained, repeated 
as legibility. But pure perception does not exist: we are written only as we write, by the agency 
within us which already keeps watch over perception, be it internal or external.'4 
Indeed, elsewhere, Derrida has denied that "anything like perception exists" or "that 
there is any perception."7S But while this assertion might appear to support the 
charge that Derrida cannot conceive (or, perhaps, cannot allow) anything to exist 
outside of language, his target here is the use or function of the term 'perception' in 
the context of the epistemological models of meaning or conceptions of the subject 
which cite perception as both support and validation. For Derrida, 'perception' is 
implicated in a metaphysics premised upon "a concept of an intuition or a given 
originating from the thing itself, present itself in its meaning, independently from 
language, from the system of reference ... [a] concept of origin and of center. "76 So 
also, in his critical reading in Speech and Phenomena of RusserI's attempt to 
ground inner self-presence, Derrida observes, "We have discovered the systematic 
solidarity of the concepts of meaning, identity, objectivity, truth, intuition, 
perception, expression. Their common matrix is being as presence." 77 However, 
with reference to the example of texts, it is precisely their generative excess and 
instability which precludes the immediacy of presence: 
A text remains, moreover, forever imperceptible. Its laws and rules are not, however, harbored in 
the inaccessibility of a secret It is simply that they can never be hooked into the present, into 
anything that could rigorously be called a perception." 
7- "Freud and the Scene of Writing", op. cit., p. 226. 
75 Discussion after "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in Th~ 
StrllctlUali.rt COnlrovu,ry , cds. Richud Macksey and Eugenio Donato, London and Baltimore. The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972, p. 272. The discussion in which these remuks are made is nOl 
included in Writing and Difference. 
71 ibid. 
77 Sp~ecla and PlaenolMM and Other &.ray.r on HIl8.rerl'.r Theory 0/ Sign.r, trans. David Allison, 
Evanston. Northwestern Univenity Press, 1913, p. 99. 
71 "The Double Session", in Di.rsemination, trans. Barbara Iohnson, London, Athlone Press, 1981. 
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A sharper hold on the relation between perception, the trace and the supplement 
can be fonned from Derrida's discussion of memory in the context of Plato's attack 
on the Sophists.Distinguishing between "memory itself" and "monuments, 
inventories, archives, citations, copies, accounts, tales, lists, notes, duplicates, 
chronicles, genealogies, references. Not memory but memorials", Derrida writes: 
What Plato is attacking in sophistics. therefore. is not simply recourse to memory but. within 
such recourse. the substitution of the mnemonic device for live memory ... the active reanimation of 
knowledge. for its reproduction in the present The boundary (between inside and outside. living 
and nonliving) separates not only speech from writing but also memory as an unveiling 
(re)producing a presence from re-memoration as the mere repetition of a monument; truth as 
distinct from its sign. being as distinct from types. The "outside" does not begin at the point 
where what we now call the psychic and the physical meet. but at the point where the mneme • 
instead of being present to itself in its life as a movement of truth, is supplanted by the archive, 
evicted by a sign of re-memoration. The space of writing. space as writing, is opened up in the 
violent movement of this surrogation. in the difference between mneme and hypomnesis ... A 
limitless memory would in any event be not memory but infinite self-presence. Memory would 
always need signs in order to recall the non-present, with which it is necessarily in 
relation ... Memory is thus contaminated by its first substitute: hypomnesis. But what Plato 
dreams of is a memory with no sign. That is. with no supplement.19 
This description of writing and memory complements the account of perception 
outlined in reference to the Mystic Writing Pad in that perception is itself structured 
upon mnemic traces which in turn form an archive. It is this textuality or writing (as 
substitutions) which constitute both memory and perception and undermine any 
notion of self-presence. But although the psyche can be described by means of a 
metaphorics of 'writing', Derrida also remarks that, "It is not enough to speak of 
writing in order to be faithful to Freud, for it is then that we betray him more than 
ever.'110 For Derrida's description of the unconscious is not as the transposing of 
(another) pres~nce, a return to "an ancient phonologism",'l but instead it as a kind 
of "nontranscriptive writing": 
The conscious text is thus not a transcription because there is no text present elsewhere as an 
unconscious one to be transposed or transported. For the value of presence can also dangerously 
affect the concept of the unconscious. There is then no unconscious truth to be discovered by 
79 "Plato's Pharmacy" in Dissemiruuion. op. cit .• pp. 108-109. 
10 "Freud and the Scene of Writing". op. cit., p. 211. 
1\ "It is with a graphematics still to come. rather than a linguistics dominated by an ancient 
phonologism, that psychoanalysis sees itself as destined to collaborate.' (ibid. p. 220). But while, as 
Derrida observes, Freud's work is permeated by references to writing, i.e. "From a system of traces 
functioning ICCOrding to a model which Freud would have preferred to a natural one. and from which 
writing is entirely absent [in the Project), we proceed toward a configuration of traces which can no 
longer be represented except by the structure and functioning of a writing" (ibid.), he argues that Freud 
remains bound to a logocentric valuation of presence. i.e. "Freud. like Plato. thus continues to oppose 
hypomnemic writing to writing en te; psyche; • itself woven of traces, empirical memories of a present 
truth outside of time. Henceforth, the Mystic Writing Pad, separated from psychical responsibility. a 
representation abandoned to itself, still participates in Cartesian space and mechanics: MtlU'al wax, 
exteriority of the memory aid. (ibid. p. 227). It is precisely this juxtaposition of 'natural' memory (as 
"the pure transparency of a perception without memory". ibid. p.211) and auxiliary or external 
supplementation which is connoted in Wendell Holmes's description of the photograph as "a mirror with 
• memory". 
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virtue of being written elsewhere. There is no text written in the present elsewhere which would 
then be subjected, without being changed, to an operation and a temporalization ..... which would be 
external to it, floating on its surface. There is no present text in general, and there is not even a 
past present text, a text which is past as having been present The text is not conceivable in an 
originary or modified fonn of presence. The unconscious text is already a weave of pure traces, 
differences in which meaning and force are united - a text nowhere present, consisting of aIChives 
which are always already transcriptions. Originary prints. Everything begins with a reproduction. 
Always already: repositories of a meaning which was never present, whose signified presence is 
always reconstituted by deferral, nachtrlIgUch , belatedly, supplementarily: for the nachtrliglich 
also means supplementary. The call of the supplement is primary, here, and it hollows out that 
which will be reconstituted by deferral as the present The supplement which seems to be added as 
a plenitude to a plenitude, is equally that which compensates for a lack.12 
It is this which also accounts for the threat of the supplement or substitute. Thus, 
asking "Why is the surrogate or supplement dangerous?", Derrida replies: 
Its slidiogs slips it out of the simple alternative presence/absence. That is the danger. And that is 
what enables the type to pass for the original. As soon as the supplementary outside is opened, its 
structure implies that the supplement itself can be "typed", replaced by its double, and that a 
supplement to the supplement, a surrogate for the surrogate, is possible and necessary ..... writing 
appears to Plato ..... as that process of redoubling in which we are fatally (en)trained: the 
supplement of a supplement, the signifier, the representative of a representative.D 
What is partly at issue here in Derrida's description of the unconscious is its own 
active productivity. Thus he claims that "consciousness for Freud is a surface 
exposed to the external world".14 Within this description the unconscious is seen as 
being composed of acreted and layered sedimentations produced as a consequence 
of its being written upon (even though the unconscious then retains these 
perceptions as pennanent traces). Derrida's own emphasis, however, is on the 
active production of meanings by the unconscious, it being "already a weave of 
pure traces, differences in which meaning and force are united." The unconscious 
is thus not only a receptive surface (the wax slab) which retains impressions from 
an external source but it is always reworking, deferring and creating the archives 
which constitute it Against the model of the receptive surface, Derrida argues for 
the "possibility of a writing advanced as consciousness and acting in the world",15 
an irreducible and "originary spacing, deferring, and erasure of a simple origin, and 
polemics on the very threshold of what we persist in calling perception. "86 It is this 
originary repetition which also accounts for the inadequacy of the analogy of a 
ii ibid. pp. 211-212. In "OiCf&ance", Derrida writes, "the trace is not a presence but the simulacrum of a 
presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself. refers itself properly to no site - erasure belongs to its 
structure" (op. CiL p. 24). 
U "Plato's Pharmacy". op. ciL p. 109. 
M "Freud and Scene of Writing" op. CiL p. 212 • 
.. ibid • 
.. ibid. p. 226. 
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machine for describing the psyche, i.e. liThe machine does not run by itself. 1187 
For Derrida, then, it is differance , the supplement and undecidability which 
mark the activity of the unconscious and which render as unsustainable the presence 
of perceptual self-consciousness - an understanding of the psyche which is not, 
however, incompatible with Freud.1I But if 'perception' is framed within an idealist 
metaphysics through its being summoned as confmnation of the presentness of 
meaning - a summoning which is operative, as Derrida has also argued, within 
psychoanalysis itself 19 - this does not mean, however, that the term must then be 
done away with altogether. Instead, precisely by developing Freud's model of the 
writing pad, perception can be likened to an overlaid palimpsest in that it is 
structured by constitutive representations and traces but ones which are not fmally 
reducible to textual or linguistic structures. Moreover, for Freud, perception is 
always structured by representations or memories whether 'real' or phantasies.90 It 
is with reference to these precedents that I shall argue that the phantasy of scopic 
presence is both predicated upon and threatened by representations of lack or 
17 ibid. 
II Derrida is perhaps only giving a greater emphasis to something that is already implicit in in Freud's 
notion of "deferred action" (Nachtraglichkeit). Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis describe this 
process as referring to "experiences, impressions and memory traces [which] may be revised at a later 
date to fit in with fresh experiences or with the attainment of a new stage of development. They may in 
that event be endowed not only with a new meaning but also with psychical effectiveness" in that "the 
subject revises past events at a later date (nachlrlJglich) and that it is this revision which invests them 
with significance and even with efficacity or pathogenic force" (The Language 0/ Psychoanalysis, 
London. Hogarth Press, 1973, pp. 111-112). Thus, while Freud describes a receptive psychical apparatus 
which receives external perceptions (a description in which the unconscious involves a sedimentation of 
perceptions etc.) the unconscious also actively transforms these perceptions - an aspect of psychical life 
which could not be represented by the Mystic Writing Pad. However Freud. in his account of the Writing 
Pad. also refers to the unconscious (the wax pad) as "the foundations of memory", a description not 
incompatible with Derrida's reference to the unconscious consisting of "archives which are always 
already transcriptions." The notion of deferred action (which of course has obvious correspondences 
with the operations of diJfbance) does not then imply a simple linear causal relation between past 
events and the present or a delayed release of affect. Nor, as Laplanche and Pontalis state can, "the 
Freudian conception of nachtraglich ... be understood in terms of a variable time-lapse, due to some kind 
of storing procedure, between stimuli and response" (ibid. p. 113). Instead, Freud himself (in a letter to 
Fliess of December 6th 1896)' refers to it as both "a process of stratification" and as "a re-
arrangement. .. a re-transcription" (quoted. p. 112). And. as Laplanche and Pontalis further suggest, "for 
Freud a real working-over is involved - a 'work of recollection' which is not the mere discharge of 
accumulated tension but a complex set of psychological operations' (ibid. p.114). More particularly, 
Freud sees deferred action as the psychical investment of previously unassimilable perceptions and 
memories (notable traumatic ones). Yet while these memories are for the most part linked to 'real' 
perceptions, this operation is also pertinent to primal phantasies. Either way, deferred action grants to 
the unconscious a role of actively producing meanings which. like Derrida's transcriptions, are "always 
already" worked over. I. The Post Card, From Socralu 10 Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago, The University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 382-383. 
10 Primal phantasies would be an obvious instance here. These are described by Laplanche and Pontatis 
as "structures [which] exist in the phantasy dimension (1a fantasmatique) which are irreducible to the 
contingencies of the individual's lived experience." (The Language of Psychoanalysis, Ope cit., p. 337). 
See for example Freud and Breueis references to disturbances of vision and visual hallucinations in their 
Studies in Hysteria, Standard Edition, vol. U. molt notably the case of Anna O. 
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absence. The self-presence of perception or of the gaze is thus always produced 
through unconscious traces which both constitute and undermine it. 
To retain a notion of perception does not then imply a reversion to a model of a 
perception that is somehow pure or unmediatedly self-present. However, the 
question of the relation between perception and textuality is an aspect of the broader 
issue of the relation between language and the subject in deconstruction or whether 
it can even accommodate any reference to a subject. For while deconstruction 
initiates a dissolution of the logic of identity, I am not arguing here for a dissolution 
(as denial) of identity itself or, more specifically, of psychic identity. However, to 
say this is not to claim that such a dissolution is in fact operative within 
deconstruction or that it evacuates the category of the subject. But as this is a charge 
frequently brought against Derrida (despite his recent protestations to the 
contrary),'l it perhaps requires some brief response here if only to help clarify some 
of the terms at issue. 
Thus one criticism that might be made against deconstruction is that it cannot 
account for the breaks or ruptures of the logocentrism within which the subject is 
implicated. For if signs cannot refer beyond themselves (if "there is nothing outside 
of the text"),n heterogeneity (as an effect of differance) is ultimately a purely 
internal function within signification, while grammatology itself remains no more 
than an immanent critique of the sign. This, in effect, is the gist of Julia Kristeva's 
critical claim that: 
grammatology denounces the economy of the symbolic function and opens up a space the latter 
cannot subsume. But in its desire to bar the thetic and put (logically or chronologically) previous 
energy transfers in its place, the grammatologica1 deluge of meaning gives up on the subject and 
must remain ignorant not only of his functioning as social practice, but also of his chances of 
experiencing jouissance or being put to death. Neutral in the face of all positions, theses, and 
structures, grammatology is, as a consequence, equally restrained when they break, burst, or 
rupture: demonstrating disinterestedness toward (symbolic and/or social) structure, grammatology 
remains silent when faced with its destruction or renewal .. .Indeed, since diff~rance neutralizes 
productive negativity, it is conceived of as a delay that comes before, a (pre)condition, a 
possibility, becoming and become, a movement preceding the sign, logos, the subject, being, and 
located within every differentiated entity .n 
Not only do the totalising effects of differance efface heterogeneity, but Kristeva 
implies that differance (as trace) is posited as an initiating and causal origin in that 
"concealed in Being and all its variations, concealing the other within itself, the 
., See for example "DcconslJUCuon and its other", op. CiL, p. 125. One might add (perhaps unfairly) 
that Derrida's defences of the subject have a rather ad hoc md gestural quality about them in that they are 
made during interviews and not in his major texts. 
ta Of GrtllMlQlolo", op. cit. p. 1S8, ("there is no outside text; it n'y a pas de hors toxto"). 
t3 Revol",ioll in P~lic LmaglUJg~, trUlS. Leon S. Roudiez, Oxford. Basil Blackwell, 1980, p. 142. 
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trace marks anteriority to every entity and thus to every position. "114 
For Kristeva, however, it is the subject which accounts for these movements of 
disruption and heterogeneity. More precisely, it is the subject of the drives (the 
bridgehead between the psychical and the somatic)" or, rather, the "drive residues" 
(themselves encompassed within her notion of the semiotic), which are the origins 
of the heterogeneity which, Kristeva argues, is effaced by grammatology's 'trace': 
Indeed grammatology seems to brush aside the the drive "residues" that are not included in the 
differance toward the sign, and which return, heterogeneous, to interrupt its contemplative retention 
and make language a practice of the subject in procession trial. This instinctual heterogeneity -
neither deferred nor delayed, not yet understood as a becoming sign - is precisely that which enters 
into contradiction with diJferance and brings about leaps, intervals, abrupt changes, and breaks in 
its spacing. Contradiction can only be the irruption of the heterogeneous which cuts short any 
differance. ,. 
However, this critique, despite some validity, does not in itself deny the possibility 
of an enriching relation between grammatology and psychoanalysis. Indeed, as 
Kristeva herself acknowledges, "the psychoanalytic discovery paves the way, in a 
•• ibid., p. 143. Kristeva's remarks anti<:ipate Peter Dews's recent critique of what he describes as the 
"vicious circularity" of Derrida's concept of differance in terms of its necessary assumption of "an 
essential logical prioritising of non-identity over identity" in Logics of Disintegration: Post-
Structuralist Thought and tM Claims of Critical Theory, London., Verso, 1987, espec. pp. 25-31. 
15 Peter Gay has neatly defmed the drive as "as an urge translated into a wish". However, as he also 
observes, "Freud was never completely happy with his theory of the drives, whether in its early or late 
form ... this absence of theoretical clarity was in large part due to the inability of biologists and 
psychologists to generate a consensus on the the nature of the drives or instincts. Lacking their 
guidance, Freud constructed his own theory by observing psychological phenomena in the light of 
whatever biological information was available. To understand the drive one needs both disciplines" 
(Freud, A LifeforOurTitM, London. 1. M. Dent. 1988, pp. 341-2). 
This lack of clarity is itself symptomatic of the somewhat ambiguous description and status of the 
unconscious within psychoanalysis arising out of Freud's attempt to conflate, or at least to work across, 
two quite distinct models of the mind. On the one hand, a (neuro-)biologist and mechanistic model of 
causes md effects; a hydraulics of energy, libido, discharge etc. As distinct from this physicalist model, 
there is a also a mentalist one involving a hermeneutics of affects, meanings and disguised symbolism 
irreducible to biology - a division which becomes a variant on the opposition Nature/Culture. Arguably, 
however, the use of these two broad models is not so much debilitating but is instead the generative 
dynamic within psychoanalysis. It might also be added that the question of the articulation between the 
somatic and the psychical remains a perennial one within psychology. 
For a discussion which. while acknowledging the "overall coherence and plausibility" of Freud's 
account of the unconscious, focuses primarily upon its difficulties and inconsistencies (in particular the 
difference between the descriptive and substantive status of the unconscious), see David Archard. 
ConsciousfWs and the UlIConsciolU (London. Hutchinson, 1984), especially Chapter 1. As Archard 
says of the drives, "As a theory of the psychic, psychoanalysis is concerned not to deal with the drives 
in biological termJ but with their representatives in the psyche. For the most part then, Freud is careful 
to distinguish between the physiological notion of an instinct and the properly psychical concept of an 
instinct's psychical representative" (p.2S). Within this model, the "wish itself is ... presented as an 
amalgam of unthinking energy md self-symbolizing intent" (p.27). However, as Archard continues 
(although only making passing reference to the notion of cathexis), "Unfortunately such an approach 
leaves unanswered a number of embarrassing questions, such as how somatic instincts are 'represented' in 
the psyche, or, how psychic energy can 'flow' from idea to idea. In surn, many of the difficulties of 
Freud's theory of 'the unconscious' derive not from his use of two epistemologically inconsistent forms 
of explanation. but from two onlOlogically incompatible philosophies of mind. Freud's explmations 
are ambiguous because their object is ambiguously described" (P31) . 
.. Revolution ill Poetic LtuaglUlg~, Opt cit. , pp. 143-144. 
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certain sense, for grammatology itself. "91 As she argues: 
But materialism and Freudian practice ... show that it is impossible to gather up the heterogeneous 
element into dijferance without leaving any remainders. The return of the heterogeneous element 
in the movement of dijferance (symbolic retention, delayed becoming- sign-subject-being), through 
perception and the unconscious (to use Freudian categories), brings about the revolution of 
differance: expenditure, semantico-syntactic anomaly, erotic excess, social protest, jouissance. 
This heterogeneity breaks through the barrier of repression and censorship that writing entails ... Ft] 
is a threat to repression and tosses it aside." 
But while Kristeva ultimately overstates her case here through her imposition of an 
essentialist identity upon a libidinal economy of uncathected drives which she 
presents as being radically 'other' to language, the Symbolic and the law (for what 
we also need to follow through is the complicity of the psychical with the 
Symbolic), her basic assertion that language does not exhaust the formation of the 
subject remains valid. 
But what is perhaps at issue in both Kristeva's remarks and in other critical 
responses to deconstruction is the meaning of the term 'the text'. For if the text is to 
be understood literally as referring only to verbal language (to which everything is 
subordinated), then there is indeed much to be said in support of such criticisms. 
Yet while deconstruction is most widely thought of with reference only to Derrida's 
by now notorious statement that "there is nothing outside of the text", it is clear that 
for Derrida there is no single definition of what constitutes a text. As he has 
frequently indicated, the text is not to be understood solely as 'the book', i.e. as a 
discrete authorial text or, indeed, as a literal object." But while the text refers to a 
particular signifying relationship (which may perhaps involve an author) the very 
possibility of such a text is predicated upon a much broader notion of 'writing'. 
Thus, just as Derrida cites an archi-ecrinue which precedes the opposition between 
speech and writing, so the existence of a text rests upon the operations of writing. 
As he remarks of Rousseau's text: 
in what one calls the real life of these existences of flesh and bone, beyond and behind what one 
believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau's text there has never been anything but a writing; there 
have never been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which could only come 
forth in a chain of differential references, the 'real' supervening, and being added only while taking 
on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the supplement etc.lI11 
Derrida's strategy, as he has himself said, is to "recast the concept of the text by 
generalizing it almost without limit, in any case without present or perceptible limit, 
.7 ibid., p. 143 • 
.. ibid., p.I44 • 
.. See for example, 01 GrammalOlogy , op. cit., Chapter 1 and p. IS8 cr. 
tOO ibid., p. IS9. 
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without any limit that is. That's why there is nothing 'beyond the text'."101 It is in 
this sense that the text falls within the broader category of writing which can refer to 
any form of signification which is (necessarily) structured upon difference and, as 
such, is divorced from any ultimate guarantee of origins or presentness. Any 
attempt therefore to go "beyond the text" amounts not only to an attempt to avoid 
the operations of difference, the supplement etc. but can only involve a 'return' to 
writing and the supplement. If textuality or writing can thus be understood as 
referring as to any relation or articulation of difference (thereby allowing the 
possibility of a non-linguistic text) or as any system of "spacing" (of signs detached 
from an authenticating origin),I02 then it is feasible to conceive of processes such as 
perception (and of other forms of experience which are irreducible to language) as 
being textual in that they are structured by a writing. Moreover, "the text is always 
a field of forces: heterogeneous, differential, open and so on. "103 Thus, for 
instance, within the framework of psychoanalysis, Derrida's claim that "writing is 
unthinkable without repression" is fully reversible.104 
Arguably for some, no doubt, this notion of a general text "without limit" 
involves such a broadening of 'the text' that it becomes virtually meaningless. But, 
for the moment, my concern here is simply to argue that, as the example of 
perception demonstrated, reference to textuality and writing does not in itself 
involve the reduction of the subject to being purely an effect of either language or of 
'the text' as understood literally. Given this, the question to be posed with reference 
to what Derrida calls a "psychical writing" is: 
101 "But Beyond ... {Open letter to Anne McClintock and Rob Dixon", trans. Peggy Kamuf, Critical 
["'llliry, 13, Autumn 1986, p. 167. 
102 "We have already dermed elsewhere the fundamental property of writing, in a difficult sense of the 
word, as spacing : diastem and time becoming space; an unfolding as well, on an original site, of 
meaning which irreversible, linear consecution, moving from present point to present point, could only 
tend to repress, and (te a certain extent) could only fail to repress.", "Freud and the Scene of Writing", 
op. cit., p.217. Elsewhere Derrida has described writing as the "textual spacing of differences ... the 
chain of substitutions ... {uchi-trace, uchi-writing, reserve, brisure, uticulation, supplement, diff~rance: 
there will be others.)",Positions, op. cit., p. 14, or as "the impossibility of a chain arresting itself on a 
signified that -would not relaunch that signified, in that this signified is already a substitution. ", ibid., p. 
82. 
101 "But Beyond. •• ", op. cit., p. 168. 
104 "Freud ad 1he Scene of Writing". op. cit. p. 226. Moreover. it is repression (both psychical and 
social) which Derrida would also seem to be citing as "the agency within us which always already keeps 
watch over perception, be it internal or extemal"(ibid.). Moreover, 'writing' always entails a form of 
self-reprusion or protection. i.e •• "There is no writing which does not devise some means of 
protection. to prolecl against itself. against 1he writing by which the 'subject' is himself threatened as 
he lets himself be written: as lie Ufl06U lainaulf". ibid. p. 224. 
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not if the psyche is indeed a kind of text, bue what is a text, and what must the psyche be if it can 
be represented by a text? For if there is neither machine nor text without psychical origin, there is 
no domain of the psychic without text lOS 
The archive: repetition and difference 
Not only, then, do the potential tensions between grammatology and 
psychoanalysis arise in part from differing defmitions of the meaning of the tenns 
'text', 'textuality' etc. but they can, I believe, be further resolved by the use of 
deconstruction as a technique for reading and using psychoanalysis - a strategy 
which is open to the charge of itself ascribing a supplementary status to 
deconstruction in relation to psychoanalysis. In many respects such a charge is 
justified in that I would also argue that while deconstruction provides an invaluable 
critical vocabulary, it is psychoanalysis which supplies the mechanisms which \ 
account both for the desire for presence and the disruptive effects of alterity. It is in 
this sense that the language of deconstruction needs to be situated within what 
Kristeva calls the "materialist practice" of psychoanalysis.106 More specifically. I 
what I wish to focus on is the affective or experiential life of the subject which. 
while it is undoubtedly structured upon a writing (in the Derridean sense) and 
shaped by language, is not however reducible to purely linguistic structures. Indeed \ 
10$ "Freud and the Scene of Writing", op. cit., p. 199. 
101 Thus while, for example, Derrida claims that "Without the possibilty of differance, the desire of 
presence as such would not fmd its breathing space" (Of Grammatology , op. cit., p. 143) or else refers 
to "the desire for the centre in the constitution of structure and the process of signification" ("Structure, 
Sign and Play".Wriling and Difference. op. cit., p. 280), he is ultimately unable to account for the 
existence of these logocentric imperatives (as the desire of/for presence, the repression of differance 
etc.). Instead, deconstruction can only describe their structures, workings and effectivites. In this sense 
Kristeva's criticism of grammatology would appear to be legitimate. Derrida would thus seem to assume 
some kind of generative psychical economy within logocentrism (but one which remains largely 
untheorised) although an acknowledgement of psychical primacy is perhaps implied in his reference to a 
"psychic writing, which prefigures the meaning of writing in general" ("Freud and the Scene of Writing" 
op. ciL. p. 2(9). But perhaps the reticence of such a theorisation is because. for Derrida, this would 
imply a return to presence. Yet while, in "Freud and the Scene of Writing", Derrida argues that ''The 
concept of a (conscious or unconscious) subject necessarily refers to the concept of substance - and thus 
of presence - out of which it is bom. .. Thus the Freudian concept of the trace must be radicalised and 
extracted from the metaphysics of presence which still retain it (particularly in the concepts of 
consciousness, the unconscious, perception. reality and several others" (op. cit .• p. 229), he himself. in 
order to lCCOunt for what both runs and disrupts the psychical "machine". and for the inadequacy of the 
machine metaphor itself u a representation of the psyche, makes reference to an energy, e.g. "the labour 
of writing which circulated like psychical energy between the unconscious and the conscious" (po 212). 
and to an "energetics","surplus" and "force" which would seem to be an aspect of the trace itself (i.e." a 
weave of pure traces. in which meaning and force are united"). Yet this would then seem to contradict his 
assertion that "The distinction between force and meaning ... belongs to a metaphysics of consciousness 
and preaence, or rather presence in the world." Derrida thus not only makes recourse (against hirnselO to 
a Corm of substantive grounding of the psychical (u an economy of forces and energies) and thus some 
kind of presence, "a certain Being-in-the-world of the psyche" (po 228). but he remains caught within the 
same difficulty of describing the articulation between the psychical and the somatic ("between force and 
meaning") which had been a feature of Freud's own theory of the drives. 
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one might take the functioning of the drives as an example of this relation in that, 
while they become attached to and structured by words and representations (an 
aspect neglected by Kristeva) and as such are themselves a text, this is not to say 
that they then disappear by being absorbed within the internal relation between 
verbal signifiers.107 
But more broadly I would argue that, as opposed to Kristeva's charge of 
grammatology's ignorance "of [the subject's] functioning as social practice" and of 
its "disinterestedness toward (social and/or symbolic) structure", the mobilisation of 
psychoanalysis within a deconstructive reading provides a necessary dimension for \ 
a psycho-social analysis - ~ kind of psycho-pathology of modernity - which allows \ 
us to focus on those moments of rupture and instability within photography's 
hegemonic production of knowledge and subject positions. Essential to this reading, ! 
is a rethinking of the archive which is now no longer to be viewed in tenns of genre , 
(the level of the referent) or of authorship, but can instead be framed in terms of 
both the presence of the gaze and its absence (as a consequence of the negativity 
which Kristeva describes as "the sudden interruption of conscious presence and its 
fmitude").ulI The archive can thus be read as a structure of repetition or return (as 1 
the continual production of a gaze for the SUbject) and of difference or rupture (as I 
the simultaneous destabilisation and denial of that presence). 
However, this is not to argue that the repetition at work across the archive is an 
essentially static process, i.e. a repetition of the same. Or rather, while this may be 
the impulse behind repetition - the (re)affmnation of identity - its effects militate 
against cohesion and stability. For (to modify Derrida slightly),"[Re]iteration alters: 
---------
107 In fact, the charge of over-valuating the constitutive role of language is one more justifiably brought 
against Lacan and his"linguisterie" than against Derrida. Lacan's axiomatic statement that the 
unconscious "is struc:tured like a language" comes not only to mean in effect that the unconscious is 
language (i.e. that it is • linguistic structure) but also that its origin is solely a function of the 
acquisition of language (i.e. enby into the Symbolic). Derrida's position (and the understanding of the 
unconscious that I am also .. guing for here) would seem to be closer to that of Lacan's followers lean 
Laplanche and Serge Leclaire for whom 'The unconscious .. .rather than a language, is the very condition 
of language" (Laplanche's "Postscript" to 'The unconscious: A psychoanalytic study", trans. Patrick 
Coleman, Yale French Struliu, 1972. p. 178). For a Lacanian rebuttal of Laplanche and Leclaire, see 
Anika Lemaire. Jacqw.r Lacon, trans. David Macey, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, pp. 113-
131. For an effective countering of Lacan's excessive linguisticism within the context of the dream-
work, see lean-Francois Lyotard, DiscOW's, figlUe , op. cit., pp. 250-260. Put of this chapter entitled 
"I.e travail du reve ne pense pas" which contains this critique is available as "The Dream-Work does not 
Think", trans. Mary Lydon, Oxford Literary Rniew , 6, I, 1983. See also Lyotard's extensive 
discussion of Freud'. paper which, in its account of the scene of phantasy as a "writing", bears some 
(limited) comparison with Derrida's description of the psyche (Disco"r.r, FiglUe, Paris, ~ditions 
Klinckaieck, 1971, pp. 327-360, espec. p. 349) and also his 'The Unconscious as mis-en·.rceM " in 
Per/OI'1fIIlIla, ods. M. Benamou and C. CuameUo, Madison. Coda Press, 1978. 





something new takes place. "Ie» Thus instead of affmrung a pre-existent presence, 
identity or origin, repetition or reiteration betrays a (neurotic) anxiety over the non-
coincidence of meaning with itself - the non-self-identity of both sign and subject. 
Not, therefore, always a confmnation of presence, repetition (as both symptom and 
supplement) can operate as a transformative addition to an origin or identity which 
in fact never was a presence. In effect, then, repetition: 
is not the origin. but that which takes its place; which is not. moreover, the opposite of an origin. 
It in not absence instead of presence, but a trace which replaces a presence which never has been 
presenL .. [the] repeated. . .is no longer exactly the same ... [for] as soon as a sign emerges, it begins 
by repeating itself. Without this, it would not be a sign, would not be what it is, that is to say, 
the non-self-identity which regularly refers to the same.IIO 
Moreover, while identity is necessarily produced through difference, difference 
(as a negative and secondary contrary) remains subordinated to identity in so far as 
it serves to re-instate the position of a prior identity or origin. However, an effect of 
repetition, as supplement and displacement, is to initiate a dissolution of regulative 
boundaries and structures. It is this repetition, or "repetition as difference", which 
Foucault sets against a "philosophy of representation" predicated upon identity, a 
philosophy within which repetition "becomes, within a system of representation, 
the organizing principle for similarities." Ultimately Foucault's target is a dialectics 
--
of contradiction, a dialectics which acknowledges but then suppresses difference: 
In actuality, dialectics does not liberate differences; it guarantees, on the conttary. that they can 
always be recaptured. The dialectical sovereignty of similarity consists in permitting differences to 
exist. but always under the rule of the negative, as an instance of non-being. They may appear as 
the successful subversion of the Other, but contradiction secretly assists in the salvation of 
identities.1Il 
Against this repetition-of-the-same, Foucault highlights the destabilising effects of 
repetition within dialectics - a repetition which dialectical thought must repress: 
As for repetition. it would cease to function as the dreary succession of the identical, and would 
become displaced difference .. .difference that displaces and repeats itself, that contracts and expands; 
a singular point that consists and slackens the indefinite repetition in an acute event. One must 
give rise to thought as intensive irregularity - disintegration of the SUbjecL .. [for] repetition betrays 
the weakness of similarity at the moment when it can no longer negate itself in the other. when it 
can no longer recapture itself in the other. Repetition, at one time pure exteriority and a pure figure 
of the origin, has been transformed into an internal wealcness, a deficiency of finitude, a sort of 
stuttering of the negative: the neurosis of dialectics.' 12 
toe "Limited Inc abc", Glypla, II, 1977. 
110 "Ellipsis" in Writing and Difference, Op.CiL, pp. 29S-297. 
ttl "Theatrum PhilolOplUcum" in Language, COlUller-Memory, Practice: selected essays and interviews, 
ed.and trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1977, pp. 184-18S. 
m ibid., pp. 182-184. Foucault's essay is a review of Gilles Deleuzc's Dijference et Repetition which 
argues for a non-dialectical difference, i.e'"Difference and repetition have replaced the identical and the 
negative, identity and contradiction", Dijference et Repetition, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France. 
1972, p. 1. Against a repetition u mechanical replication (tho antithesis of difference), Deleuze argues 
for a difference u repetition which, in the form for example of 'nomadic' difference (difference lwre ) is a 
difference of dilpenal and diasolution. 
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Transferring this account of repetition-as-difference to the archive, it too can be 
read as a structure of repetitions whether, for example, in tenns of the photograph's 
status as the 'copy' of an 'original' presence or in relation to photography's 
continual summoning of spectatorial presence. But more broadly, what is a work 
across the archive, as a consequence of the self-disrupting effects of repetition, is a 
I f~xin~ and unfixing of spectatorial subject positions: However, this is not to 
subsume the subject as entirely an 'effect' of the text (as either photograph or 
archive). ~ather, it is a question of the interaction or engagement between the , 
subject-as-text (itself a mnemic archive) and the specificity of the archive-as-text. It , 
is this redefinition of the archive which constitutes the central concern of the thesis I 
which will involve the juxtaposition of the cognitive mapping of the city and the I 
(attempted) securing of urban identities and legibility (a fonn of photo-cartography ! 
which can be framed within the debates around social space) with a discussion of 
.1 
those moments of incoherence and threat - moments that involve what Jiirgen 
Habennas has called the "exposing" of the individual "to the dangers of sudden, 
shocking encounters"m - which can be situated in relation to forms of social 
encounter and to the question of proximity and distance. In particular I shall be 
focusing on the asymmetry within perception (between, for example, the look and 
the Gaze, and the disjunction between spectatorial investment in representation as 
distinct from what images may return) as a means to arguing that photography itself 
undermines the oppositional boundaries (of presence/absence, subject/object, 
exteriority/ interiority etc.) across which it operates~ 
This self-undermining is symptomatic of the structuring tension within the 
archive between the discursive representations of photography as distinct from its 
practices and effects. This argument will in part determine the structure of this 
thesis which will move between a broad discussion of photography and space (both 
its production and destabilisation) and a detailed reading of a few selected 
photographs. However, it is also necessary to register at least one caveat or, rather, 
to cl~y the usage of some terminology. For the notion of 'presence' employed 
here has something of a heuristic status (as arguably much of Derrida's own 
terminology does) in that, while it initiates a redefmtion of the archive, I do not 
wish to imply a monumentalising of presence as a meta-concept co-extensive with 
iii "Modernity - An Incomplete Project" in The Anti-Aesthetic, Essays on Postmodern Culture. cd. Hal 
Foster. Port Townsend. Wuhington. Bay Press, 1983, p. S. 
39 
Western thought or with a socially abstracted subject. Moreover, another (alleged) 
danger that has been posited as arising from such a reading is that the denial of 
presence simultaneously becomes not only a nostalgic elegy for its disappearance. 
As one commentator has claimed: 
deconstruction .. .keeps alive the demand for transcendence simply by never-endingly denying its 
possibility - a criticism of essentialism which can rapidly become a lament for its loss, a 
consolation of the limitations of the human condition which is simultaneously a recipe for 
political quietism.1I4 
However, while there may indeed be some truth to the observation that the repeated 
affmnation of loss turns into an attempt to recoup that loss by making it knowable, 
such criticisms perhaps arise in part as a consequence of a misreading of 
deconstruction or, rather, of what sometimes passes for it. However, while the use 
of a language of 'presence' need not of itself produce totalising analytical models,m 
any potential dangers of lapsing into such nostalgia are, I would suggest, avoidable 
Vby locating presence as a retroactive phantasy. But more particularly, this thesis can 
be read as being in part a response to Roland Barthes's call for "a History of 
Looking" .114i This history needs to be further broken down and at most my concern 
here is to track particular moments of looking and spectatorship which always need 
to be brought back to the specificity of the photographs themselves. 
However, this thesis is not a history of photography. Instead, it is aimed at 
countering traditional models of photographic history and entails thinking about·' 
. 
photography in terms of a reformulation of the archive as both an unstable ,\ 
construction and as one which ultimately ceases to be a discrete and containable j 
entity. As such, it is not my concern to construct yet another taxonomy of the 
archive for implicit in much of my approach is a notion of discontinuity. Just as 
there is, for example, no direct line between the unconscious and the social, so also 
I do not intend to employ psychoanalysis as a 'master-code' within an historical 
account of perception so as to produce a seamless theoretical model or some kind of 
psycho-social account of modernity.ll7 Nor do I want to ascribe a systemic 
fl4 Tony Bennett, "Texts in History; the determination of readings and their texts" in Post-
Strucluralism and 1M Qll4slion 0/ History, eds. Derek Attridge, Geoff Bennington. and Robert Young, 
Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 6S-66. 
111 Moreover, as Derrida has often observed, it is impossible to operate outside of the terms of 
logocentrism. As he says of Heidegger, for example," [He) recognizes that economically and 
strategically he had to borrow the syntax and lexical resources of the language of metaphysics, as one 
must always do at the very moment that one deconstructs this language", Posilions, op. cit. p. 10. 
ttlCQ1I'IeI'aLllcida, trans. Richard Howard, Fontana. 1984, p. 12. 
m See, for example. Christopher Lasch's TM Cllllllre of Narcissism, London, Abacus,I980 or prior to 
this the critical writings of Marcuse and Reich. 
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coherence to the social itself. Instead, what is involved here is an altogether more 
modest project which seeks merely to draw attention to some of the psychical 
investments and displacements operative across photography. For the 'historical' 
(having been 'described') does not then exist as something to which we can directly 
'refer' photography. As distinct from a matching of images and their historical 
referents, what is at work in the archive is an interplay of vision and writing, of 
perception and inscription - a textuality of the gaze. It is particular moments within 
this inscription of the gaze (or, rather, of gazes) across the archive that I shall be 
pursuing here. This of course does not imply an evacuation of the historical for 
questions of identity and spectatorship need to be located within the specific 
context of the nineteenth century city. But the initial concern of this thesis is to 
generate frameworks within which further historical analysis might then take place. 
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1 
GEOMETRIES OF PRESENCE 
The subject is always searchingfor his certainty , 
In this chapter I wish primarily to discuss just one photograph - Charles Marville's 
picture of the Rue de Rivoli taken in the 1850s (fig. 1.1). There are two aspects of 
this image that I shall pursue here. Firstly, I shall argue that Marville's photograph 
is, in many respects, a photograph 'of photography in the sense of its being a 
photograph which affmns the discursive representation of photography. Secondly, 
a reading of this particular image can serve as a point of departure for examining the 
relation between the photographic image and the city. As such, my concern here is 
to begin to outline an analytical framework which will be further amplified in 
subsequent chapters. Starting with a discussion of Marville's photograph within a 
brief survey of the historical identity of space and the Haussmannisation of Paris, I 
shall then situate the photograph in the context of psychoanalytical debates around 
subjectivity and vision. 
Photographic space 
Aside from its topographical interest, the most striking feature of Marville's 
photograph is its spatial organisation. This organisation of space involves the 
juxtaposition of two apparently disparate spatial registers. On the one hand, there is 
an empty, expansive and indeterminate foreground space which, aside from the 
relatively weak pattern of the cobblestones, is structured solely by the arbitrary 
limits of the photograph's own edges rather than by any of the objects within the 
picture itself. On the other hand, there is the space of a relentless and plunging 
perspective which disappears to infmity just left of centre. In fact, these two spatial 
orders are not altogether mutually discrete for the function of the 'deep' space of the 
mid and background is, in effect, to organise and structure the formless space in the 
foreground.This spatial formation is not, however, simply a consequence arising 
i Jacques I..acm, TM FoUl" Fllndatnenlal ConceptI of Psycho-Analysis, op.cit., p. 129. 
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from the requirements of topographic record. For Marville's photograph operates as 
more than just "record". Instead, this is a photograph of spatial excess. More 
specifically, it is an image of the excess of a particular order of space - that of 
geometrical perspective. 
My concern here is is with the way in which that space produces a particular 
viewing subject for the image. For the effect of the perspective in this photograph 
is to evoke or, rather, to demand a spectatorialpresence. Indeed, everything within 
this photograph (the external features of the buildings and the convergence of the 
colonnades, lamp posts and railings towards a fixed vanishing point) serves to 
produce an irresistible perspective which not only summons up a viewing subject 
but which also tyrannically organises its gaze. 
However, while this presence is predicated upon spatial fonns, space here is 
not an abstract phenomenon nor is it simply the effect of an independent mental 
picturing. Space has a history and it is a history of representation. And it is within 
an archaeology of the spatial that photography needs to be situated. As part of this 
archaeology it is possible to trace broad historical mutations of space. Thus a 
metrical classical spatial order was replaced during the Middle Ages by a 
hierarchical space of emplacement (i.e. of designated and fixed places for the 
subject). This in turn was superseded by Renaissance perspective which was rust 
codified by Alberti. Taking Euclid's "Optics" as its model, this was an 
anthropocentric space organised around the projection from a central observer. 
Post-Renaissance and Enlightenment theories of space built upon this model and 
worked from the basic premise that spatiality was to be understood as the totality of 
'objective' appearances perceived through sensory-based perception. Within this 
description there were, of course, particular variations, e.g. a Cartesian 
mathematical model, Newtonian mechanics etc. But in all of these accounts, and 
those of Locke and Hume, space is an autonomous natural order reducible to 
physical objects. Knowledge of space was founded upon an accumulation of 
information about phenomenal forms and appearances with a particular emphasis 
upon measurement and quantification. Essentially a sensory objectivism directed 
towards the description of objects, these accounts (regardless of whether they 
described space as a natural, mechanical or organic phenomenon) involved a 
universalisation of space and its imputed properties. 
Concomitant with this sensory objectivism, however, although often in the 
form of a denial of it, was the notion of space as cognition, i.e. of space as a mental 
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construct. This was most ambitiously proposed and argued for by Kant. There is 
some ambiguity, however, within Kant's account as to whether space is an innate 
property of things or whether it is an a priori category of the mind whereby the 
mind has an inherent knowledge of space with, for example, the axioms of 
geometry as the necessary conditions of knowledge. Either way, for Kant space is a 
continuous and measurable Euclidean absolute through which the individual moves. 
Physical and social space are collapsed into a mental space or, rather, the 
individual's mental representation of space. It is this ideational subject (often in 
association with an objectivist model) which still structures the dominant paradigm 
of spatiality according to which space is the mental ordering of phenomena. 
My purpose is not to argue for a strict sequential chronology of spatial 
mutations for clearly there are overlaps and co-existences of different spatial 
formations. Instead, the point to emphasise is that photography and the construction 
of photographic space need to be placed within this history of space and its 
dominant paradigms. However, while photography was never the mimetic 
mirroring and replication of spatial forms that already existed in the 'real' world, 
this is not to argue that photographic space was something wholly new or original 
even though the particular industrial processes of image production certainly were. 
Instead, the image produced by the camera was itself premised upon the 
reproduction of pre-existent spatial types. While the specific technology of the 
camera was indeed novel in the nineteenth century, the principle behind it had a 
long history. In this sense the camera's representation of space served, on both a 
technical and discursive level, to reaffirm and 'prove' a broad range of beliefs and 
assumptions about space and, more especially, perspective. 
Paradoxically, however, while photography was the culmination of a long 
tradition of describing space, the codification and hegemony of the camera's optic 
in the latter nineteenth century occurred at the historical moment in which the 
'classical' spatial order upon which it was predicated was itself under attack or, at 
least, being exposed as a construction. With, for example, the beginnings of the 
new physics and the rise of non-Euclidian geomet:ry2 together with the emergence of 
philosophical perspectivism (most notably Nietzsche) and Freud's account of the 
radically 'other' space of the unconscious (with The Interpretation of Dreams being 
published in 1899), the idea of a single homogeneous spatial order was being 
I See Stephen Kern. The C"dllU'e o/TirM and Space: 1880.1918, London, Wiedenfeld and Nicholson 
1983, p. 131ff. 
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comprehensively undermined. 
Fundamental, however, to the still dominant discourse upon spatiality is the 
belief both in the centrality of the perceiving eye and in the existence of perspectival 
space. Portrayed as a detached and mechanical (and therefore objective) eye, the 
historical role of the camera was to legitimise the fIXed centrality of the perceiving 
subject. Prerequisite to this process was the notion of central projection: 
The conception of the Quattrocento system is that of scenographic space, set out as a spectacle for 
the eye of the spectator. Eye and knowledge come together; subject, object and the distance of the 
steady observation that allows the one to master the other; the scene with its strength of geometry 
and optics. Of that projected utopia, the camera is the culminating realisation ... the image it 
furnishes becomes, precisely. the currency of that vision. that space.' 
This identification between the spectatorial subject and the camera as the point and 
source of vision was itself the central tenet of the the system of monocular 
perspective. But while the codification of perspective has its own evolution, as an 
optical system it rested upon a belief in and a construction of an independent and 
external space that was above all measurable. A spatial order was thus described 
which was homogeneous and continuous with its spatial co-ordinates focusing 
ultimately upon a single point of vision. 
That photographic space is not, in fact, synonymous with actual human 
perception and that the camera is not the exact replicator of the real is both 
scientifically and anatomically demonstrable.' Not only does monocular, fixed 
perspective bear little correspondence with binocular vision (the stereoscope being 
the nearest approximation to it), but the analogy between the eye and the camera 
also ignores intrinsic aspects of photography such as camera angles, frozen vision, 
field and depth of focus and the need (at first) for long exposures. Instead, the 
belief in a centralised vision grounded in perspective functioned, as it still does, as a 
"powerful ideal". As Stephen Heath explains: 
What must be more carefully emphasised is that the ideal of a steady position. of a unique 
embracing centre ... is precisely that: a powerful ideal ... there is a real utopianism at work. the 
construction of a code - in every sense a vision - projected onto a reality to be gained in all its 
hoped-for clarity much more than onto some naturally given reality.' 
This ideal of a rational, homogeneous and universal space, given to cubic 
measurement, was not invented in conjunction with photography. From its origins 
photography was bound up with commonplace notions about space and objectivity. 
Indeed, as Hubert Damisch has claimed: 
S "Narrative Space", Screen, 17. 3. 1976. p.76. 
, See Mlllrice Pirenne,Optic.r, Painting and Photography. Cambridge University Press. 1970. 
• "Narrative Space". op.cit •• p. 76. 
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The lens itself, which had been carefully corrected for 'distortions' and adjusted for 'errors', is 
scarcely as objective as it seems. In its structure and in the ordered image of the world it achieves, 
it complies with an especially familiar though very old and dilapidated system of spatial 
construction. to which photography belatedly brought an unexpected revival of current interest' 
Moreover, as Joel Snyder has argued, the power of photographs in part rests upon 
a belief in a "natural connection" between the photograph itself and the real. In a 
similar fashion, the perspectival grid was posited as a natural model of space. As 
Snyder explains: 
Photographs make a special claim upon our attention because they are supposed not only to look 
realistic (although they do not all look realistic) but also to derive from or be caused by the objects 
they represent This 'natural connection' has been taken as a reinforcement and even as a guarantee 
of realistic depiction.' 
However, as Snyder further argues, this "program" of realistic depiction and the 
belief that photographs are natural phenomena is itself tied to "a model of vision 
itself as pictorial": 
Cameras do not provide scientific corroboration of the schemata or rules invented by painters to 
make realistic pictures. On the contrary, cameras represent the incorporation of those schemata into 
a tool designed and built, with great difficulty and over a long period of time, to aid painters and 
draughtsmen in the production of certain kinds of pictures ..• The construction of the camera did not 
flow out of the abrupt discovery of the 'image of nature' but rather that it developed as an aid for 
the production of realistic paintings and that such paintings provided the standard for the kind of 
image that the camera was designed to produce ... We have completely reversed the history of the 
camera in our popular accounts of photography. The problem for post-Renaissance painters was 
not how to make a picture that looked like an image produced by the camera, it was how to make a 
machine that produced an image like the one they painted.· 
As such, Snyder concludes:"The mechanism of the camera was thoroughly 
standardised to meet specific pictorial requirements ... Photography did not sidestep 
the standards of pictorial production, it incorporated them. '" 
However, while Snyder argues that photography is bound to a model of space 
and vision that is inherently pictorial (a model first fully elaborated by Alberti), 
there is an implicit danger of eliding photography with painting in tenns of their 
formal equivalences even though their specific operative procedures are very 
different. It is this tendency to view photographs in purely aesthetic formal tenns 
that motivates John Berger's comment that: 
We must rid ourselves of a confusion brought about by continually comparing photography with 
the fme arts •• .Painting is an art of arrangement: therefore it is reasonable to demand that there be 
some kind of order in what is arranged. Every relation between forms on a painting is to some 
degree adaptable to the painter's purpose. This not the case with photography ... Composition in the 
profound, formative sense of the word cannot enter into photography •.. The formal arrangement of a 
, "Note, for a Phenomenology of the Photographic Image" in Classic E.ssays 011 Photography, ed. 
Alan Trachtenberg, New Haven, Leete', Island Boob, 1980, p.289. 
7 "Picturing Vilion" in Tire Ltuaguag. of /magu , eel. W .J.T .Mitchell, University of Chicago Press, 
1980, p.224. 
• ibid. pp. 231-232. 
• ibid. pp. 233-234. 
photograph explains nothing.I ' 
While Berger's anti-fonnalist attack is in itself legitimate (Berger in fact argues that 
it is time which gives a photograph its meaning and significance), "composition" in 
terms of the spatial arrangement within a photograph cannot be so easily dismissed. 
For far from being neutral or transparent, photographic space is an organised and 
signifying space. 
The point to be made here is that a photograph does involve a structuring of 
space in that objects and people etc. are positioned within the frame. Here 
photography directly shares in the concept of the picture as a window but even 
more powerfully so as a consequence of the photograph's status as a natural object. 
But while the frame and 'composition' are fundamental to photography, this also 
involves a tension. As Steve Neale observes with reference to painting: 
Just as the frame borders and packages an imaginary space, a depicted scene, so it also borders and 
packages a real space, the surface of the picture. An awareness of this surface is fundamental to 
painting. It is part of the pleasure it involves. But it is an awareness that oscillates and shifts. 
For the fmal component of monocular perspective as a system, a regime of vision, is that the 
surface should ideally function as a window, with the frame as the window's edge ... An apparent 
contradiction exists then between the notion of the surface as a window, as 'transparent' glass, and 
the necessity for an awareness of the surface as a surface. But it is only, indeed, apparent. It is a 
contradiction that is managed. For the window is the other side of an impossible ideal. The surface 
is necessary therefore to ensure that it [the scene] is stable, that it constitutes a palpable identity. 
Only if this stability exists can monocular perspective construct its scenes so perfectly and 
centrally for the look of the individual eye.1I 
Within photography's elimination of the painterly trace upon the surface of the 
image (the mark of a transformative labour), photographs themselves take on the 
status of the real in all its clarity, density and texture. Moreover, as a consequence 
of the growing hegemony of photography a direct equivalence was posited between 
the space represented by the photograph and 'real' space. As William Ivins 
observes: 
Strong as the mathematical convention of perspective had become in picture making before the 
pervasion of photography, that event defmitely clamped it on our vision and our beliefs about 'real' 
shapes etc. The public has come to believe that geometrical perspective, so long as it does not 
involve unfamiliar points of view, is 'true'. just as a long time ago it believed that the old 
geometty of Euclid was 'the Truth'.12 
It is within the context of this belief in the natural identity between real space, the 
space of the photograph and the discrete individual's own line of vision that one can 
cite the recurrence of those photographs in which, through the avoidance of oblique 
angles and the combination of long narrow perspectives with often dramatic depths 
10 "Undentandin, I Photo&raph" in Trachtenberg. ope cit., pp.292-3. 
11 CiMma: T«lutology tJNl ProdMClion. London, British Film Institute,198S, p. 19. 
tI Art aM GeOl'Mtry: A Study in SptlCe IntuitioNS, Cambridge, Musachusetts, Harvard University Press. 
1946. p. 127. 
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of field, the vanishing point of the scene directly counterpoints the external presence 
of the spectator as the point of origin of a projective gaze (figs. 1.2 - 1.3). 
Photo-polis 
With perspective cited as being synonymous with the spatial ordering of reality 
itself, an unbroken identity was posited between the look and space, and between 
the perceiving eye and its object of vision. As Neale further argues: 
Photography thus constituted an enormous investment in perspective and in its image of the world 
on the part of the industrialised countries. It therefore constituted also an enormous social 
investment in the centrality of the eye, in the category and identity of the individual, in a spatial 
form of visual pleasure, and in an ideology of the visible world." 
Framed within a discourse upon perspective, photography was bound up with what 
Edward Said has called a "rationality of time, space and personal identity" .14 One of 
the major sites for the ideological investment in this regime of spatiality was the city 
itself. Indeed, in his account of the Renaissance citra ideaie, Siegfried Giedion has 
suggested that urbanism was premised upon a system of perspectival space, i.e. 
"The central building in the midst of the star-shaped city fulflls the same role ... [as] 
a symbolic observer at the focal point. "15 
This spatial rationalisation was a motivating dynamic for urban planning with 
the Haussmannisation of Paris being the most comprehensive and spectacular 
example during the nineteenth Century. Haussmann's reconstruction of Paris 
during the 1850s and 1860s can be seen as an attempt to impose a rational order 
upon the fabric and structure (both physical and social) of a city and marked both 
the fruition of a history of urban planning and the beginnings of a new spatial 
order. As Anthony Vidler observes: 
Carrying the techniques of mtionalist analysis and the formal instruments of the Ancien Regime, 
as refurbished by the FU'St Empire and its institutions, to their logical extreme, Haussmann joined 
them to the power released by the burgeoning consumer economies of speculative credit in a 
magnificent attempt to seal up disorder, and enshrine measured progress, in an aesthetic package 
derived from Beaux-Arts academic formulas realized with all the expertise of engineering science." 
Haussmann's imposition of a rational order upon Paris, in terms of greater beauty, 
efficiency and social control, was both an aesthetic and political project. This 
project marked the culmination, through the revival of classical city planning, of 
Enlightenment ideals and the Reason of the philosophes but now in conjunction 
,I Cinema: T«ItnoIDg, and ProdKCtiora, op.cit., p. 22. 
'40r icnlalism. Peregrine, 1987, p. 167. 
tlSp«e, Time and Arcldl«lll1'e, Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 44. 
1. "The Scenes on the Street: Transfonnations in Ideal and Reality, 1750-1871" in On Streets, ed. 
Stanford Anderson, MIT Press, 1986, p. 87. 
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with the instrumentalist rationality of the modern bourgeoisie. Not only was Paris 
to be rebuilt as befitted its status as the capital of the French Empire but the 
reconstruction of the city can be seen as a variant within a long tradition, going back 
to the Greek city-state, of creating an urban space which was both adequate to and 
exemplified the individual's possession of a political sovereignty and civic identity. 
A necessary stage prior to the actual work of rebuilding was the imposition of a 
perspectival grid across the city. For the preparation of a highly detailed and 
accurate plan of Paris involved the intensive surveying and measurement by 
triangulation of the proposed areas for demolition and rebuilding. As Vidler 
describes: 
From such a triangulation was prepared the first detailed survey of the city, a basis for the 
instrumentalization of Louis Napoleon's plan of transfonnation ... To detennine a new network of 
communication for Paris .. .8D abstract network of precise geometry was traced at a level far above 
the streets." 
As a consequence of this triangulation the city itself was now viewed as a holistic 
entity and not an assemblage of parts. It is within this cartography of the city, 
involving the detailed measurement and quantification of urban spaces, that 
Marville's photographs need to be situated. 11 
While Marville's photographs need to be seen as subject to the demands of 
architectural and topographic documentation and not as a nostalgic or anecdotal 
picturesque record, their motivating origin was congruent with Haussmann's 
reforming ambition. As such, there was a conscious polemical context to the 
photographs. As Maria Morris Hambourg explains: 
Thus the pictures suggest, contrary to the traditional view, that Marville was very much 
Haussmann's man, quite in sympathy with the rigorous, relentless logic of the Prefect's plan. His 
photographs of small streets presents them very much as Haussmann's philosophy painted them: 
narrow, uneven passages choked with curbstones and carts, their central gutters awash with 
noxious waste water. The axial and relatively low camera position Marville selected makes them 
seem so, for it emphasized the damp cobblestones and rivulets that glimmer in the foreground of 
the pictures ... As a group, the pictures of old Paris record the insalubrious, dank, darkness which 
would be opened to light and air; the accidents which would be corrected by plan; the picturesque 
heterogeneity that would disappear beneath crisp homogeneity; the historic heritage that would 
exist in the future only as archival documents.I ' 
It is within this framework of rational order and civic progress that Marville's 
photograph of the Rue de Rivoli acquires its significance. The extension of the Rue 
'7 ibid. 
II Probably originally commissioned by Haulsmum himself and later under the direction of the Travaux 
Historiquel, Marville methodically documented those areas of the city destined for demolition. The 
photosraphs themselves (some 425 altogether) were intended to form part of a multi-volumed Histoire 
generale de Paris of which one (of the two) parts was entitled Toposraphie historique du vieux Paris. 
"CluJrle, Marville: Pholograph, 0/ Old Pari, 1852-1878 , New York, French Inltitute:Alliance 
Francais, 1981, p. 10. 
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de Rivoli, together with the rebuilding of the central markets, was among the 
earliest projects in the reconstruction of Paris and had been inherited by the 
Emperor Louis Napoleon from his predecessor Napoleon I. The completion of 
these two popular but frequently delayed projects was adopted by Louis Napoleon 
as a propaganda device to contrast the dynamism of the Empire with the inactivity 
and inefficiency of both the monarchy and the preceding Republican government. 
Despite concerns about the financing of the work, in 1851 Louis Napoleon 
successfully argued for the extension of the Rue de Rivoli by another 1,000 metres 
and work began in 1852. As David Pinkey relates: 
The flrst expropriations of land and buildings in the line of the Rue de Rivoli were made in mid-
October, and within a year wreckers had cut a broad path straight through the crowded central 
quarters. For the fll"St time Parisians could stand in the Place de L'Oratoire on the north side of the 
Louvre and see across the old city to the City Hall.-
With the further planning of the extension of the Rue de Rivoli in 1851 and its 
instigation the following year, the frrst stage in the rebuilding of Paris was well 
underway before Haussmann's appointment as Prefect of the Seine in 1853. 
However, one of Haussmann's fust tasks was to supervise the completion of the 
Rue de Rivoli which had been ordered by the Emperor in 1854: 
At the end of September, 1854, the Emperor authorized the construction of the last section of the 
Rue de Rivoli - at its eastern extremity from the City Hall to the church of Saint-Paul on the Rue 
Saint-Antoine. When it was completed the following year Napoleon rs dream of a broad, straight 
thoroughfare across the city was realized and the central barrier of ancient buildings and narrow 
streets was at last broken." 
As one of the Ancien thoroughfares and as the frrst major construction to be 
completed, the Rue de Rivoli was a prototype of the most dramatic sign and 
consequence of the Haussmannisation of Paris - the boulevard Commenting upon 
the extension of the Rue de Rivoli, Haussmann himself described it as a "spacious, 
direct, monumental and above all strategic route", observing also that its straight 
and broad alignment "did not lend itself to the habitual tactic of local 
insurrections. "22 
Within Haussmann's opening up of Paris as a network of "beautiful 
perspectives"» each of which was to culminate in a dramatic "point of view"24 
(usually a civic monument), the Rue de Rivoli stood as an example of the regular 
(and regulated), uniform and homogeneous construction of space that the new Paris 
iO Napoleon III and 1M Rtbllilding of Paris • New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1958, p.51. 
It ibid. pp. 56.". 
-Quoted in Vidler op.cit •• pp. 91-93. 
U Baron Haussmann. Memoiru,vol. ll, quoted in Vidler, Ope cit., p. 93. 
14 Memolru, vol. m, quoted in Vidler, ope CiL. p. 96. 
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was to be - as well as being an obvious contrast with the images of the old city 
(figs.1.4 - 1.6).15 Marville's photograph, as a variant upon the classical urban 
veduta, marks the convergence of this rational and ordered city space with the 
projected, ideal space of photography. This ordered space, a space both open to the 
viewer's gaze and one with which the spectator, as civic subject, identified was not 
only a recurrent motif in photography from its beginnings (fig. 1.7) - and one which l 
was often reinforced by the application of new technological developments aimed at 
replicating depth of vision (fig.1.8) - but it remained a standard motif in twentieth 
century urban photography (fig.1.9). Yet this rational space cannot simply be taken 
on its own terms. For what this spectatorial identification is grounded upon, yet , 
what is also repressed at a discursive level, is the imaginary identification between 
the viewing subject, the photograph and the urban scene which it frames. 
An optics for desire 
Ari account of the psychical mechanisms through which this spectatorial 
identification is evoked might begin with Lacan's narrative of the minor stage. But 
more broadly, through mobilising a psychoanalytical reading of Marville's 
photograph, I wish to emphasise the constitutive role of narcissism within 
perception and representation as a prelude to examining the relation between 
photography and what might be called the space of the Imaginary. For despite the 
ambiguities within its accounts of narcissism and identification, psychoanalysis 
provides an important vocabulary for describing the relation between 
representation, space and subjectivity with reference both to the psychical 
mechanisms at work ( introjection, projection etc.) and to the subjective identities 
produced. 
Three inter-related aspects of Lacan's account of the mirror stage are pertinent 
here. Firstly, the emphasis upon an identification that is both visual and spatial as 
the precondition for the operations of narcissism and desire - and, indeed, for the 
subsequent development of the ego (itself traceable, for Lacan, to the minor stage). 
Secondly, the determinant role of an image (a reflection) that is perceived as being 
external to the infant/subject within that moment of primary identification. Finally, I 
B For a discussion of tho charJea brought against Hauamam by his contemporariea including the 
charge of reducing the city 10 a seriea of blank spaces which obliterated topographical juxtapositions 
and chanco views (fig.1.6), lee T J. Clark. TIte Pailltu., of MOth", Life, (London. Thames and Hudson. 
1985). espec. chp. 1. AI Edmond Goncourt. quoted by Clark. wrote of the new Puis in his JOfIntIll, "I am 
a Itranger 10 what is coming, 10 what is. as I am 10 thcao new boulevards without turningl, without 
chance perspectivea, impllCablo in their Itraight linea, which no IOlller smack of the world of Balzac, 
which make one think of lOme American Babylon of the future" (ibid., polS). 
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wish to draw upon Lacan's framing of identification, narcissism and desire in tenns 
of a spatial projection. 
Describing the mirror stage as involving "an identification ... namely, the 
transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image", Lacan 
continues that it "would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic 
matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial fonn, before it is objectified in 
the dialectic of identification with the other.":16 Within Lacan's account, the mirror 
stage marks the moment when the pre-Oedipal infant (still in a condition of 
dependency, motor incoordination and disorganised drives) engages with its own 
specular reflection and anticipates its future self-mastery and corporeal totality. 
Caught within the disjunction between its its own motor incapacity and its stable 
reflection, the child identifies with the image as total fonn (Gestalt). In effect, the 
reflection functions as the teleological sign of the infant's anticipated subjecthood in 
that the reflection is perceived as an image of what the child is yet to be. Within this 
reversed transitivism or transference from sign to subject, the infant aspires to 
imitate or confonn to its own ideal image. It is this identification between the infant 
and its reflection which, argues Lacan, becomes the basis of the projective 
equivalences that will structure the subject's relation to the world as the individual's 
own body becomes the mediating referent governing its perceptual access to 
external space. It is from this imaginary position, too, that the subject is also able to 
retroactively fantasise about the "body-in-pieces". 
This relation between body and space involves an identification with an idealised 
image yet the child is also, according to Lacan, alienated from that image: 
The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation 
- and which manufactures the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession 
of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality which I shall call 
orthopaedic - and. lastly. to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity. which will 
mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development %I 
Not only does the subject in the mirror stage become an object of its own 
perception, but the identification with an idealised image initiates the "fictional 
direction" of the child's misrecognition (meconnaissance) of itself as an imaginary 
unity (the specular moi ), i.e. an identification of itself as an independent (and 
increasingly rigidified) ego with its concomitant "illusion of autonomy". For Lacan, 
the ego as an Imaginary instance, functions as a defence mechanism protecting the 
R"The mirror ltaae u Cormative oC the Cunc:tion oC the I u revealed in plychoanalytical experience" in 
tcriu:A Sekction , irani. by Alan Sheridan, London. Tavistock. 1977, p. 2. 
17 ibid. p.4. 
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subject from the recognition of its own fundamental lack. For this reason, Lacan 
argues, we must: 
not regard the ego as centted on the perception- consciousness system, or as organised by the 
'reality principle' ... Our experience shows that we should start instead from the function of 
meconnaissance that characterises the ego in all its structures.a 
While the structure for this emergence of identity is derived from Hegel's 
dialectic of self-consciousness (especially the dialectic of master and slave) in which 
the subject's self-awareness is achieved through its reciprocal recognition by the 
Other,29 Lacan as it were misreads Hegel in that the self-transparent, intentional 
consciousness of the Hegelian dialectic is displaced by a model of inter-subjective 
opacity and asymmetry in that the subject's alienation in the mirror stage is a 
consequence of its projective identification with the mirror image as an ego-ideal or 
alter-ego which stands over the subject (of lack). Within this disjunction between 
self and image, the perception of the self from the place of or as the other initiates a 
"splitting" in the' subject while also provoking an auto-rivalisation and an 
aggressivity directed towards the other. For this reason too it forms the basis of the 
paranoid nature of self-identification. Moreover, Lacan, arguing for "the evident 
connection between the narcissistic libido and the alienating function of the I, [and] 
the aggressivity it releases in any relation to the other, even in a relation involving 
the most samaritan of aid"30 points to aggression as the necessary correlative of 
narcissism. 
Not only, then, does the mirror stage initiate the founding of the Imaginary - the 
illusory belief in an unmediated immediacy between subject and object (which 
recalls Derrida's descriptions of "transcendental signified") - but it also contains the 
basis for the ambivalent binary oppositions (e.g.between narcissism and an 
alienating identity or between paranoia and aggressivity) which structure it. 
Engagement with its own reflection thus places the child within a process of 
identification and separation, i.e. in a process of resemblance and rivalry with the 
21 ibid. p. 6. 
"O.W.F. Hegel,Phenomenolo" o/Spirit.trans. A.V.Miller. Oxford. 1977. See also Wnferd Ver Becke. 
"Hegel u Lacan'J Source of Neceasity in Psychoanalytical Theory" inlnterprezing LtJcan, eds. Joseph H. 
Smith and William Kerrigan. Newhaven and London, Yale University Press. 1983. For the immediate 
precedent for Lacan's reIdins of Hegel, see Alexandre Kojeve, Introdllction to lhe Reading 0/ Hege~ 
London, 1980. 
10 "The Mirror stage", op.CiL, p.6. As Llean describes elsewhere, "what the subject finds in this altered 
imale of his body is the paradigm of all the fonna of resemblance that will bring over onto the world of 
objects a tinge of hostility by projecting on them the manifestation of the nuciasiatic image, which. 
from the pleasure derived from meeting himself in the mirror. becomes when confrontating (sic.) his 
fellow man an outlet for his most intimate aggressivity .. lt is in this image that becomes fixed, the ideal 
ego, from the point at which the lubject ltops u ego ideal. From this point on, the ego is a function of 
mastery, a play of presence, a bearing (preJtancc), and of constituted rivalry", "The subversion of the 
subject in the dialectic of desiJe in the Freudian unc:onscioUI". £Crill, Op.CiL, p. 307. 
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other (which is also, of course, its own image). Essentially, however, the structure 
of the mirror stage remains dyadic, i.e. between the specular subject and its own 
reflection. What is crucially missing from Lacan's account is the look of the other 
(primarily the mother) which is present from the very moment of primary J 
identification and is not subsequent to it 
Lacan argues that the mirror stage occurs "before [the subject] is objectified in 
the dialectic of identification with the other" yet it is the confmnatory look-of-the-
(m)other which is as important, if not more so, than the child's engagement with its 
own image. Indeed it is the image of the parental figure and not the child's own 
reflection which would most likely provide the ideal image or ego with which it 
identifies. As Donald Winnicott remarks: "Lacan does not think of the mirror in 
terms of the mother's face".31 Moreover, Winnicott continues: 
the mother's role of giving back to the baby the baby's own self continues to have importance in 
terms of the child and the family. Naturally, as the child develops and the maturational processes 
become sophisticated, and identifications multiply, the child becomes less and less dependent on 
getting back the self from the mother's and father's face and from the faces of other's who are in 
parental or sibling relationships.J2 
However, a recognition of this initial omission of the look-of-the-mother would 
seem to be implicit in Lacan's subsequent references to the mirror stage in, for 
example, his description of : 
the gesture with which the child in front of the mirror, turning to the one who is holding it, 
appeals with its look to the witness who decants, verifying it, the recognition of the image, of the 
jubilant assumption, where indeed it already was. " 
In other words, at the 'moment' of the mirror stage (itself a continual process of 
engagement), the child is already caught within an exchange of looks and is 
positioned through the look of the other. As Jacqueline Rose comments: "The 
permeation of the other over the specular relation therefore reveals the necessity of 
appeal, and hence the structural incompleteness of the relation, and then, through 
that, the irreducible place of desire within the original model."34 By now tracing 
desire (for the other) to the mirror stage itself, Lacan here shifts its significance 
away from that of identification only. Now identification and desire would appear 
to be co-existent. 
Through following through Lacan's citing of desire within the mirror stage it is 
51 "Mirror-role of Mother and Family in Child Development" in Playing and R~ality. London. Tavislock. 
1971, p. 111. 
12 ibid. p. 118. 




now possible to query his original account For, rather than citing a primordial 
moment of (self-)recognition and alienation - the moment which initiates the 
emergence of the ego - it is possible to argue instead that the subject only comes to 
'know' itself through introjecting the gaze, or the use Winnicott's term, the v' 
"attitude'IlS of the other. Here self-identity arises from its being mirrot:ed back to the 
subject from the place of the other's desire. 
It is this desire both of and for the other which also resolves the problem within 
Lacan's original account of the subject's seemingly spontaneous but pre-reflexive 
recognition of itself. For a basic difficulty with Lacan's original account is that, for 
the infant to be able to (mis)recognise itself, it must already have some conception 
of self-identity - in effect, it must already be a subject. Recognition cannot simply 
be a spontaneous event for the subject can only recognise itself as a 'me' if it 
already has a prior conception of being an '1'. For this reason the self-conscious 
unitary subject, 'even as the bearer of an illusory identity, cannot be the point of 
departure for subsequent development. Instead, like the "body-in-pieces", the 
specular image of a unitary subject is a retroactive phantasy. In his initial account of 
the mirror stage, however, Lacan in effect reifies and temporally projects back a 
phantasy of self-plenitude as an empirical moment (but one now lost) within the 
subject's history. 
In effect, Lacan posits a self-causing subject which from the start 'knows' or ~p 
recognises its own lack. My point here is not to reject Lacan's account of the mirror 
stage but merely to question one aspect of it and to argue that, instead of seeing the 
subject's early history as a development arising from (the recognition of) primordial 
lack, it can be read as a movement from undifferentiated fusion and identity (with 
the mother) to separation and loss (of course themselves fonns of lack). Moreover, 
I would argue that in some sense the subject is always positioned by the gaze of the 
other in that an awareness of that Gaze is not temporally subsequent to the 
narcissistic exchange with the mirror image. For, following Freud's account in 
Beyond .the Pleasure Principle, it is the experience of loss which precipitates the 
ego's formation as a protective "shell". This notion was developed further in The 
Ego and the Id. Here Freud's description of the ego as "frrst and foremost a bodily 
ego .•. [and] not merely a surface entity, but .. the projection of a surface'lJ6 (Le. as a 
body ego) would in part support Lacan's account of the mirror stage. But Freud, 
D "Mirror-role of Mother and Family in Child Development". Ope ciL 
• Statulard Edition. vol. XIX. p. 26. 
ss 
following his remarks in "Mourning and Melancholia" regarding introjection and 
"the identification of the ego with the abandoned object" ,TI further argues that the 
incorporation of lost loved ones is a means of understanding all ego fonnation in 
that the ego is "a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes ... [ which] contains the 
history of those object choices".31 In this sen~, the ego is originally (an)other in 
that the subject "becomes like" another ego through an introjective identification. 
Introjection[mcorporation is the key process here in that the abandoned objects 
that constitute the ego or subjective identity are objects which were originally 
external to the subject but which have been internalised. Describing the process by 
which the subject mediates between itself and the external world through using an 
"internal representation", Richard Wollheim has described one aspect of the process 
by which internal objects have "derived their existence from incorporative 
phantasies of the subject they inhabit."" More specifically he adds, "any internal 
object. .. owes its existence to a phantasy of oral incorporation. "40 Incorporation, 
argues Wollheim, is the mechanism of intemalisation which, he suggests, can be 
seen as a defensive strategy adopted by the individual subject: 
The account begins with a perception, in which the figure in the environment is perceived by a 
subject as either very benign or very malign, and this figure the subject then phantasizes by taking 
in to himself. If the perception is what motivates the phantasy, it is reasonable that what the 
subject wishes to achieve, in the case of the malign perception, is to protect himself from the 
harm that the figure might do him.~l 
It is not so much the defensive aspect that I wish to focus on here but, rather, 
the libidinal investment active within the process of incorporation itself.What is 
significant here is Wollheim's description of phantasies as being "self-
representing", in other words as referring to the body itself: 
in phantasizing the incorporation of the figure the subject thereby incorporates him, and this in 
tum could be accounted for if not merely did the subject's phantasies include a representation of 
themselves but these representations represented them as the very bodily activities that they are of. 
It is essential to the incorporative phantasy that it represents itself as an actual incorporative 
process. and this bridges the gap which otherwise would open uP. between resort to phantasy and 
the lowering of anxiety.42 
While Wollheim then goes on to claim that "Corporeal self-representation cannot 
stop short at the incorporative phantasy, it must extend to internalisation" ,.3 it is 
i'f Standard Edition, vol. XIV. p. 249. 
II Standard Edition, vol. XIX. p. 29. 
18 "The bodily ego" in Philosophical Essays on Freud. eds. Richard Wollheim and James Hopkins, 
Cambridge University Press. 1984. p. 137 . 
.0 ibid. pp. 137-138. 
4' ibid. p. 132. 
41 ibid • 
.. ibid. p. 133. 
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, ' 
with reference to the phantasy of incorporation itself - which is self-represented 
corporeally (i.e. orally) - that we can in part describe perception. The subject's gaze 
can here be likened to Freud's description of "the original pleasure-ego [which] 
wants to introject into itself everything that is good and to eject from itself 
everything that is bad"44 - whereas .for Wollheim the subject internalises both good 
and bad objects. The self-representation of a (devouring) gaze is here detennined by 
what Wollheim calls "something corporeal" - in this case oral incorporation. It is 
this representation which can then be put with Freud's description of the ego as a 
"body ego ... a surface entity ... the projection of a surface" whereby perception and 
the look can be situated within an auto-affective libidinal economy. Thus, as Jean 
Laplanche argues: 
But if it is true that hunger and the function of eating can be completely supported and 
underwritten by love and narcissism. why not consider the same situation as applicable to other 
vital functions. and perhaps to 'perception' itself? The relation of the ego to perception. as 
conceived of by a cenain 'ego-psychology'. would be reversed while at the same time retaining all 
its specificity. The ego does not blossom forth from the 'perception system'. but. on the one hand. 
it is fonned from perceptions and primarily from perceptions of a fellow creature. and. on the other 
hand. it takes over libidinally. as its own, the activity of perception. I perceive. just as I eat, 'for 
the love of the ego'.·s 
For Lacan, however, the structure of the ego does not gradually emerge from 
the incorporation of external objects (an incorporation which, in the example of 
perception, is libidinally charged) but, as an Imaginary instance, it arises 
spontaneously as a compensatory response to the subject's alienation during the 
mirror stage.But, by following Freud's description of the ego as a defence 
mechanism (as distinct from his later theory of the ego as a self-conscious adaptive 
agency), the subject's belief in its autonomy can be seen not as a point of origin for 
subjectivity but as a defensive phantasy provoked by the realisation of loss and I 
contingency. Whereas Lacan posits as an origin a subject which already knows 0/1-
recognises itself as incomplete, the 'self can instead be seen as emerging both from 
the gradual experience of loss, separation and difference46 and from the gaze of the 
other - an account which could still, however, retain the notion of the ego as an 
Imaginary instance. 
As distinct, then, from Lacan's positing of the subject's inaugural and 
apparently spontaneous recognition of its own primordial lack, the phantasy at ') ---\ 
at "Negation". Staru/Qrd Edition., vol. XIX, p. 237. 
,. U/e GI'ItI Dealh ill P'1Chtx.uuJI,sis, trIM. Jeffrey Mehlman, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins 
University Prou, 1976. p. 83 • 
.. See, for example. Freud's discussion of "the significance of the loss of object" in Inhibitions, 
S,mptOlM tuatl Auie", Stattd4rtl Edition. vol. XX. sec. 8, espec. pp. 138-140. 
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work in the mirror stage can only operate retrospectively from the Symbolic and 
cannot exist prior to it. In fact the presence of the Symbolic within the mirror stage 
is evident in the concept of an "ideal" image with its implication of a cultural norm 
which renders untenable any rigid separation between Symbolic and Imaginary. 
Moreover, entry into the Symbolic (the process of socialisation) is via a sequential 
narrative of separation and loss (a narrative which ultimately comes to be figured by 
the castration complex) and it is this socialising process which in turn produces the 
retroactive phantasy or compensatory belief in an original (but now lost) plenitude. 
For Lacan, however, the misperception of the mirror stage implies a denial of 
castration yet a denial which is prior to the experience of difference and lack. What 
is at work here instead would seem to be a direct effect of Nachtrliglichkeit 
(deferral) in that it is socialisation which induces a phantasy or 'memory' of what 
preceded it.47 This memory or belief is not only a phantasy which is then projected 
back into the past but it is a phantasy which then supplies the possibility of meaning 
or affect to an earlier economy which was necessarily unavailable to signification. 
In short, a self-aware monadic subject cannot be the starting point for a process of 
socialisation. Instead it is the experience of loss and separation which generates a 
phantasy of presence (as a unified self) and it is within this phantasy structure that 
signification functions as substitute-formations (representations) of a desired 
plenitude. 
But more immediately, however, the narratives of Nachtrliglichkeit and the 
formation of the ego are, of course, closely bound to the question of narcissism. In 
his account of the mirror stage Lacan would seem to be describing a secondary 
narcissism in that the image, although a reflection, stands as an ego-ideal. What is 
.7 The temporal complexity of the mirror stage has been noted by lane Gallop. As he observes,"There is 
something quite difficult about the temporal order of the mirror stage. It produces contradiction in those 
trying to to describe it. .• The specific difficulty in thinking the temporality of the mirror stage is its 
intrication of anticipation and retroaction. The retroaction is based upon anticipation. In other words, 
the self is constituted through anticipating what it will become, and thus this anticipatory model is used 
for gauging what was before", (Reading lA.can. Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1985, pp. 
80-81).Thus the infant before the mirror "rmds in the mirror image, 'already there" a mastery that she 
will actually learn only later. The jubilation, the enthusiasm, is tied to the temporal dialectic by which 
she appears alrefJlly to be what she will only laIer become" (ibid., p. 78). And, although Gallop does not 
make reference to the effects of Nachtraglichk.eil within "the temporal dialectic of a moment that is at 
once anticipatory and retroactive", the mirror stage is similarly structured upon deferred or retroactive 
knowledge - a knowledge, which in this instance, is based upon anticipation: "The infant is thus thrown 
from 'insufficiency' to 'anticipation'. However, that 'insufficiency' can be understood only from the 
perspective of the 'anticipation'. The image of the body in pieces is fabricated retroactively from the 
mirror stage. It is only the IIIlticipated 'orthopedic' form of its totality that can derme - retroactively - the 
body u insufficient. Thus the impetus of the drama turns out to be 10 radically accelerated that the second 
term precedes the fust ... anticipation is always entangled with retroaction" (ibid., p. 86). For a 
discussion of Naclatragliclauit with reference to historical temporality, see Rainer Nagele's 
"Belatedness: History After Freud and Lacan" in his Reading After Freud, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1987, pp. 169-201. 
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thus omitted, or perhaps elided, within this narrative is the role of primary 
narcissism. For it is primary narcissism which, I would argue, also plays a part in 
overdetermining the retroactive phantasy of plenitude. Within this scenario, primary 
narcissism does not denote a self-conscious plenitude (a moment of monadic 
autonomy) but instead describes both an auto-eroticism and a condition of 
undifferentiation or fusion between subject and object/other. Not only, as Winnicott 
describes, does the child "see him or herself' in the face of the mother but "no 
object external to the self is known. "41 Effectively seeing its own self everyWhere, it 
is the boundaryless subject of primary narcissism which is akin to Lacan's 
description of an "asubjectivity of total presence"·' or the "absolute subject".50 of the 
newborn infant. 
However, as Laplanche has argued, following Freud's own description of 
primary narcissism as a "fiction", primary narcissism has something of a mythical 
status in that it refers to: 
a kind of hypotllttical initial state in which tilt organism would form a closed unit in relation to 
its surroundings. This state would not be defined by a cathexis of the ego. since it would be prior 
even to the differentiation of an ego. but by a kind of stagnation in place of libidinal energy in a 
biological unit conceived of as not having any objects ... [lt is] the image of a primal state. closed 
in upon itself. the prototype of the state of sleep and of dreaming.51 
What makes this condition unsustainable is what Laplanche calls "the imperfection 
of the system, the hiatus - however slight - introduced between need and maternal 
aid, that would provoke the hallucination [i.e. of the object providing satisfaction]." 
But while it is need which provokes what Freud called "hallucinatory 
satisfaction",'~ it also renders as problematic the very concept of "primal 
satisfaction" since it is need or demand which propel the biological organism into 
object relations, difference and signification: 
For. in any event, hallucination presupposes a minimal ideational content and consequently a/irst 
cleavage. however imperfect a cleavage not so much between the ego and the object, or between 
internal and external excitations, but between immediate satisfaction and the signs which 
accompany every deferred, imperfect, contingent and mediated satisfaction: that brought by a fellow 
creature." 
However,to raise the question of a "first cleavage" is not "to deny the possible 
existence of biologically closed systems, but only underscores the contradiction 
1I Donald Winnicott, "The Relationship of a Mother to her Baby at the Beginning" in TM Family and 
Individual Dev,lopfMIII. London, Tavistock, 1963. p . 
•• Quoted in Rosemary Jackson, Fanlasy:TM Lilual/U'e of Sllbvusion, London and New York Methuen, 
1981. p. 89. OriginallOUI'CC not cited. 
1O"Th' ". S e manor stage , Op.Clt., p. • 
II Life and DlDlh in Psychoanalysis. op. cit., p. 70 . 
.. ibid. 
II ibid .• p. 71. 
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inherent in any attempt to conceptualise that [subjectivity] 'for itself and even 
more, to retrace the genesis of that 'for itself. Primary narcissism as a psychical 
reality can only be a primal myth of a return to the maternal breast, a scenario that 
Freud on occasion classifies as one of the principle primal phantasies. "s. 
Primary narcissism is thus quite distinct from the secondary narcissism of the 
mirror stage. Here Lacan's own account accords with Freud's description of the 
role of narcissism in the formation of the ego: 
There comes a time in the development of the individual at which he unifies his sexual drives 
(which have hitherto been engaged in auto-erotic activities) in order to obtain a love-object; and he 
begins by taking his own body as his love-object, and only subsequently proceeds from this to the 
choice of some person other than himself.55 
Here Freud cites narcissism as the transitional stage between auto-eroticism (the 
infant's relation to its own body as sexual object) and object-choice proper. Two 
forms of narcissism are cited here. Firstly, the subject loves itself as itself. 
Secondly, narcissism involves an identification as the child seeks a love object 
conceived in its own image. Within this account the body is elided with the person -
an elision which does, however, parallel Freud's description of the ego as both a 
mental and corporeal entity. What is important here is that this narcissism is 
predicated upon the existence of an ego as it denotes a condition in which the ego 
directs libido upon itself. The ego-libido of narcissism is thus, for Freud, 
subsequent to an ego-less auto-eroticism but prior to the object libido of sexual 
choice. Moreover, the ego-ideal has its beginnings within this original narcissism 
which it serves to retain. As Freud observes: "What he projects before him as his 
ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his 
own ideal. "56 
Just as the ego-ideal is here the object of an original narcissistic love, so also the 
super-ego arises from ego-ideal identifications. This is most evident in the super-
ego's role of setting up ideal goals such as critical self-observation and punishment. 
It is this persecutory super-ego which also forms the basis for the paranoiac 
dimension of self-identification. By the time of The Ego and the Id the ego-ideal 
and the super-ego are inseparable as the narcissistic aim of being loved and 
approved of by oneself merges with the ambition of being loved and approved of 
by an internalised ideal parent (the super-ego). It is this need to be loved or 
recognised together with the fear of punishment that leads to the ego's submission 
i4 ibid., p. 72. 
II "On NlI'ciuiam". SlIUldartl Edition, vol. XIV. pp. 60-1. 
II ibid., p. 95. 
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to the super-ego. 
Freud's views on narcissism, however, are by no means clear-cut or consistent. 
Thus, in "Mourning and Melancholia", he seems to view narcissism as the 
identification with a lost love-object thereby conflating narcissism with 
identification - as does Lacan with the mirror stage. However, as Anthony Wilden 
notes: 
There are at least three types of identification involved: (1) primary identification which Freud 
describes as the original pre-Oedipal affective link to an object. related to incorporation, the oral 
stage and the mother. (2) identification as the regressive substitute for an abandoned object-choice; 
and (3) non-sexual identification with another insofar as one person has something in common 
with another person." 
In a subsequent work, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud 
describes two further forms. Firstly, an objectless, primary narcissism which is 
characterised by an indifferentiation between the ego and the id and by the absence 
of object relations - although elsewhere Freud describes the mother as the frrst love-
object from the start. Secondly, Freud introduces the notion of a pre-sexual father 
as an ideal thus breaking with his account in "On Narcissism" where all forms of 
identification are ultimately related to object-choice and the primary role of the 
mother. 
But for the present context, however, I shall broadly cite narcissism as the 
resistance to or the denial of difference. More particularly, the plenitude of primary 
narcissism is essentially a solipsist identity through which the subject (though being 
ego-less it cannot strictly yet be a self-reflexive subject) 'knows' only itself. While 
the experience of separation, loss and difference from those objects originally 
believed to be co-extensive with the subject (the process which Freud simply 
described as the experience of reality) makes primary narcissism untenable, 
arguably it is never lost but instead it is maintained as a primal phantasy. Indeed, as 
Freud comments,"The development of the ego consists in a departure from the 
primary narcissism and results in a vigorous attempt to recover it."51 Moreover, it is 
the emergence of the object-libido as described by Freud (the identification and 
introjection of ~go-idea1s) which fractures the absolute and undifferentiated unity of 
the 'subject'-libido within primary narcissism. It is this primary narcissism, rather 
than the emergence of an autonomous ego, which would make sense of the 
alienation arising from the child's identification with an image different from its 
if TM Lt,ua,/UJ,e 0/ tlte Self, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968, pp. 
169-70. 
II "On Narcissism", op.cit., p. 96. 
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own experience. 
My immediate point here is to differentiate secondary narcissism from primary 
in that with the former identity is achieved via identification with the other (an ego-
ideal). A primary narcissistic investment in objects, whereby those objects are 
returned as being the same as the subject, is thus <l:istinct from the object-libido 
identification of secondary narcissism. Indeed, narcissism (as the projection or 
recuperation of the self through or as the other) is opposed to identification (which 
is premised upon the recognition of difference).As Anthony Wilden remarks: 
"Identification and narcissism, or the relationship between ego and alter-ego, are 
not relationships of identity; it is always a question of each trying to take the place 
of the other. '$ What would seem to be involved here is the subject's attempted 
recuperation of the other as the means of securing a narcissistic autonomy. The 
identification with an ego-ideal is thus still grounded upon an original narcissism. 
As Freud himself observes: "In many individuals the separation between the ego 
and the ego-ideal is not very far advanced; the two still coincide regularly; the ego 
has often preserved its earlier narcissistic self -complacency. '1CiO 
This observation can perhaps be read not just as a commentary upon individual 
pathologies but, in the context of Lacan's account of the mirror stage, as signalling 
the conflictual intersection of narcissism and the positioning of the subject from the 
place of the other. However, Freud's remark would to an extent appear to counter 
Lacan's division or separation of the Imaginary from the Symbolic and his positing 
of the Imaginary (and the ego) as a regressive stage. Instead, the subject's access to 
the Symbolic is always mediated through the Imaginary. As Andre Green 
comments: 
in the zone of the imaginary. the subject goes in one of the two directions: either toward the 
object or toward the ideal. We know that in Freudian thought this orientation is heavily dependent 
upon narcissism ... lhe other can be reached only through the two paths just described. via the object 
or via narcissism. There is no other direct route to the Other." 
It is precisely this movement towards the other that provokes a crisis of 
subjectivity. Within this narrative the mirror stage can be seen as initiating a tension 
between the subject's necessary engagement with the other (which is both external 
and contingent) so as to take on and verify its own identity and the subject's 
preservation of its imaginary (narcissistic) autonomy from the other's Gaze. In this 
"The lAnguage of the Self. op.cit .• p. 168. 
10 Group Psychology tutd the Analysis of the Ego, StDNltud Edilion, vol. xvm, p. 129. 
ft "Logic of Lacan'. objet (a) and Freudian Theory: Convergences and Questions" inlnlerpreting Lacan, 
op. ciL, p. 166. 
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scenario the specular moi attempts to identify itself with and to function as an 
intentional and autonomous subject. The subject is thus constituted both through a 
narcissistic exclusivity and through extrinsic identities given to it by the other. 
Narcissism and difference both function here as intrinsic facets of identity. And it is 
within this conflictual. scenario of the subject's need to recognise (and to be 
recognised by) the other (the object), but in conjunction with its attempted 
recuperation of alterity (narcissism), that the ego exists as an 'instance' within a 
self-reflexive narcissistic closure. 
It is across this tension between a narcissistic self-regard and an identity which 
is a function of otherness that I wish to situate the question of the spectatoriallook 
and photography. For if access to and knowledge of the other is via a self-
identification which is also alienating (i.e. involving a splitting), the work of visual 
representation in part involves an effacing of lack and the restoration of a fictive 
plenitude to the subject. 
More specifically, this can be located in the disjunction between the point of 
view (the subject's own look) and the Gaze. Commenting upon the "classic realist" 
film text, Colin MacCabe writes: 
The point of view is always related 10 an objecL But in so far as the object is given there is always 
the possibility of seeing it together with all the possible points of view. The point of view 
preserves the primacy of vision, for what is left out of the point of view can always be supplied by 
another. The look. however. is radically defective. Where the point of view is related to an object, 
the look is related to other looks. The look's field is not defmed by a science of optics in which the 
eye features as a geometrical point, but by the fact that the object we are looking at offers a 
position from which we can be looked aL Cl 
Within this division of the scopic field, the point of view offers a position of 
spectatorial plenitude, origin and presence with the intentional subject's mastery 
over the image recalling the child's "anticipation" in front of the mirror. What 
MacCabe calls the look (but what is in fact the Gaze), on the other hand, denotes 
the subject's emplacement by the other. As Lacan remarks: "what detennines me at 
the most profound level, in the visual field, is the gaze that is outside. "6) Not 
necessarily 'seen' by the subject, the Gaze is one that is imagined or introjected by 
the subject from the field of the other. As the sign of a loss and of the subject's 
lack, the Gaze here marks the subject's fading and is thus a threat to "that fonn of 
vision that is satisfied with itself in imagining itself a consciousness."64 Within 
MacCabe's account of ftIm, it is the role of the point of view to efface the disruptive 
Ii "Tbcol)' and film: principles or realism and pleasure" in Theoretical Essays: film, linguistics, 
liurolllTc. Manchester University Press. 1985. p. 67. 
QTM FOIIT FlUlllalMnla' Concepts of Psycho-AnaZ,su, op. cit.. p. 106 . 
.. ibid •• p. 74. 
63 
threat of the Gaze and to restore to the viewer an imaginary plenitude of vision. 
MacCabe's discussion of the look and the Gaze draws heavily upon Lacan's 
extended description of the the gaze as an objet petit a .65 This description not only 
provides an account of vision and subjectivity which is no longer predicated upon a 
'reflection' theory of the subject's constitution but it is one that can be more readily 
matched with Freud's notion of the ego as "a precipitate of abandoned object-
cathexes." More specifically, the concept of the objet a provides the basis for an 
account of how a form of identification can take place between, for instance, a 
subject and an image (in a broad sense) which does not need to posit a pre-reflexive 
consciousness or self-identity as its point of departure. In other words, the objet a 
provides the framework for an account of how the subject is captured by 
representation while avoiding recourse to reflection or identification as the 
mechanism for this process. Thus while still retaining the specular relation of the 
mirror stage as a trap or lure, the subject, instead of being reflected in signification, 
is now an effect of signification in the sense of being inscribed within it 
In "The Gaze as petit objet a " Lacan moves away from a narrative of 
identification and (mis)recognition and instead describes a signifying economy 
structured upon desire and lack. Within this economy or, more precisely, 
metonymy, the objet a is a 'sign' of a separation or of what the subject lacks. 
However, its status is ambiguous in that, like a fetish, it marks both the sign and 
the annealing of a lack or absence. As such, rather like the castrating effects of 
language, the objet a simultaneously constitutes and splits the subject while, also 
like language, functioning as a bridge between the subject and the Other. 
Kaja Silverman has described the objet a in terms of those objects: 
which the child attempts to introject into itself ... [and] which give it pleasure, and which it does 
not yet distinguish from itself. The first such object is generally the breast ... [which] the 
child ... perceives as its missing complement, that thing the loss of which resulted in sense of 
deficiency ... There will be many such objects in the life of the subject Lacan refers to them as 
"objets petit a," which is an abbreviation for the more complex formula "objets petit aUlre" . This 
rubric designates objects which are not yet clearly distinguished from the self and which are not 
fully grasped as other (autre). The object (a) ... derives its value from its identification with some 
missing complement of the subject's self, whether that loss is seen as primordial, as the result of a 
bodily organization, or as the consequence of some other division!' 
However, what perhaps needs to be emphasised is that the objet a is not an actual 
object but a 'phantasy-object' which can perhaps be characterised in terms of 
Freud's notion of primal phantasy (which includes primary narcissism). Thus 
although it may refer to primordial objects or relations (which provide the 'original' 
"ibid., pp. 67-119. 
"TM Subject ofSemioticl, New York. Oxford Univenity Press. 1983, p. IS6. 
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material or reference of the phantasy), the objet a, unlike 'the other' in the mirror, 
does not appear but instead it is what the subject searches for in representation. But 
essentially, as a lost or absent object of desire, the objet a is non-specularisable. 
And, as a lost object, it is a function of what Lacan describes as the subject's 
"want-to-be" (manque-a-etre ).67 For if the subject or ego designates a space of 
disparate functions (e.g. of narcissism, introjection, identification etc.) which 
cannot be assimilated into a unified totality (except within the Imaginary), the 
subject perpetually seeks the "missing complement" which will provide it with its 
desired wholeness: 
The question of desire is that the fading subject yearns to fmd itself again by means of some sort 
of encounter with the miraculous thing defined by the phantasm. In its endeavour it is sustained 
by ... the lost objecL .. which is a terrible thing for the imagination. That which is produced and 
tranSformed here, and which in my vocabulary I call the object, lower case, a , is well known by 
all psychoanalysts as all psychoanalysis is founded upon the existence of this peculiar object. But 
the relation between this barred subject with this object (a), is the structure which is always found 
in the phantasm which supports desire, in as much as desire is only that which I have called the 
metonymy of all signification.-
While signification proffers the possibility of this wholeness, it is the engagement 
with signification (essentially language for Lacan) which in fact denies this 
plenitude. Not so much directly estranged from its own self (as in the mirror stage), 
the subject is instead now barred from the signifier. As Lacan writes: 
This is our starting point: through his relationship to the signifier, the subject is deprived of 
something ... of himself, of his life, which has assumed the value of that which binds him to the 
signifier. The phallus is our term for the signifier of his alienation in signification. When the 
object is deprived of this signifier, a particular object becomes for him as object of desire.-
Within the metonymy of signification the subject is inscribed within a movement of 
perpetual displacement or exchange of phantasised objects or substitutes for the lost 
object - process described by Kristeva as the subject's "interminable quest for an 
adequate fit between 'meaning' and 'object"'.70 Moreover, for Lacan, the subject, 
"always a fading thing under the chain of signifiers",71 is itself inscribed, through 
its "signifying dependence",72 in or as a sequence of substitutions for "above all he 
if The Fo",r F"'MalMntal Concepts, op. cit., p. 29. As Stuart Schneiderman explains,"For the 
psychoanalyst the important object is the lost object, the object always desired and never attained, the 
object that causes the subject to desire in cases where he can never gain the satisfaction of possessing 
the objecL Any object the subject desires wnI never be anything other than a substitute for the object a" , 
"Lacan's Early Contributions to Psychoanalysis" in Retuning to Frewl: Clinical Approaches in the 
School 0/ Lactu&, Yale University Press, 1980, p. 4 . 
.. "Of Structure u an Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever", in The 
Structuali.st COrllrovU'S'j, op. cit., p. 194. 
M Seminar 011 HGmkl, quoted by Silverman, op. CiL, p. 183. 
70 /n the Beginning wu Love; PS'jchoanalysis Gnd Faith, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, New York, 
Columbia University Prell, 1987, p. 62. 
71 "Of Structure u an Inmixina", op. ciL, p. 194. 
11 The FOII.f Frutdomertlal Concepts, op. cit., p. 77. 
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is these objects, according to the place where they function within his fundamental 
phantasy. illS 
It is within this structure of both the desire and the denial of unity and plenitude 
within signification that the gaze functions as an objet a. However, within Lacan's 
account of vision the gaze in fact refers to several gazes as both the viewer's own 
gaze (the look) and the Gaze of other's or the Other, as well as to the structure of 
the picture (the screen) and its iconic signifiers. As with the mirror stage, Lacan 
describes a split or unequal scopic exchange in that the subject misrecognises itself 
as a point of vision (eye) which can fully see the other when, in fact, the eye is a 
point within or for the other's Gaze. The optic field thus allows the subject to be a 
viewing subject but only on the condition that it becomes the point of vision for 
another subject. Moreover, writes Lacan (echoing the paranoia inherent in the 
mirror stage), "I see only from one ~int, but in my existence I am looked at from 
all sides."74 
Describing two imagined cones intersecting at the picture surface with the 
subject as "a sort of geometrical point, a point of perspective" ,75 Lacan argues that 
the viewer is positioned or situated by perspective (the cone converging on the eye) 
while simultaneously appearing to master the vanishing point (the convergence of 
the inner cone). Addressed as a punctual, full subject and as the bearer of a 
projective gaze (the centric ray), the picture offers the viewer a position whereby "I 
see myself seeing myself'76 - a position reinforced through an identification with the 
gaze of the painter "which claims to impose itself as the only gaze".77 The viewer is 
thus spatially positioned by the picture while being interpellated as mastering its 
projective space. But for Lacan the viewing subject essentially misrecognises the 
image or other as an effect of its vision whereas the subject is instead an effect of 
the representation itself (as both screen and gaze). The picture or Gaze and, above 
all, the returned look (which is perhaps the only instance in which the Gaze, rather 
than the screen, can in fact be seen), become signs of the subject's own lack. 
In the present context, and in the light of the previous discussion, Lacan's 
complex account of this division might be described as one between the look (Le. 
the subject, eye, point of view etc.) and the Gaze (of the other). For if, following 
7S "The direction of treatment and lite principles of its power". in £Crus. op. cit .• pp. 251-252. 
7·1114 Fo"" FfI1IIlommlal COtICt:pts. op. cit •• p. 12. 
71 ibid., p. 86. 
71 ibid., p. 80. 
77 ibid., p. 113. 
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Lacan's accoun4 the structures of looking are themselves constitutive of the self-
reflexive subject - i.e. the subject which observes itself as a consciousness - it is 
also the radical instability or asymmetries within perception which deny to that 
subject any fmal autonomy of consciousness as presence. What is operative here is 
an unequal division between vision and the Gaze, between what might be described 
as a narcissistic self-regard and s~ural identity as a function of an external other. ' 
Within this scopic regime, the look (libidinally invested and directed outwards), 
misrecognises itself as an origin of vision as scopic mastery. The Gaze, on the 
other hand, not only exists outside but is the sign of the subject's emplacement by 
the other. Furthermore, the Gaze, as the potentially repressive sign of separation, 
lack and castration, threatens the imaginary coherence of the viewing subject in that 
it exists (as both "missing complement" and lack) as the constitutive horizon of the 
subject and as the terminal point or fading where the subject "is led .. t? lay down 
its gaze. ",. It is this relation which precludes any schematic separation between the 
look and the Gaze. Moreover, by taking up Lacan's account of the gaze, one can 
argue that the look is always framed by the Gaze (almost literally in terms of 
pictures) but this is not a relation of one-sided domination but of tension and it is 
this tension which can be explored further." 
,. 'b'd 109 1 1 •• p. . 
7t An example of this interaction. as potential tension. between the look and the Gaze is implicit in 
Freud's discussion of blindness in hysterical patients. Freud describes this disturbance of vision as 
arising from "the undeniable opposition between instincts which subserve sexuality. the attainment of 
sexual pleasure. and those other instincts. which have as their aim the self preservation of the individual 
_ the ego-instincts" (''The Psycho-Analytical View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision''. Standard 
Edition. vol. XI. p. 214). Moreover. Freud observes."The sexual and ego-instincts alike have in general 
the same organs and systems of organs at their disposal...the eyes perceive not only the alterations in 
the external world which are important for the preservation of life. but also characteristics of objects 
which lead to their being chosen as objects of love - their charms. The closer the relation into which an 
organ with a dual function of this kind enters with one of the major instincts. the more it withholds from 
the other" (ibid .• pp. 21S-216). If the ego, and more specifically the super-ego. is understood as a 
function of the introjection of the Gaze of the Other. Freud's description of the "relation of an organ with 
a double claim on it - its relation to the conscious ego and the repressed sexuality" can be related to the 
tension between the look (as a libidinal conduit of desire) and the Gaze (as prohibition). This. however. 
is not a relation of one-sided dominance for, as Freud's own discussion indicates, the look - as (repressed) 
sexuality, libidinal excess - escapes the control of the Gaze (ego), i.e: "Let us suppose that the sexual 
component instinct which makes use of looking - lexual pleasure in looking (scopophilia) - has drawn 
upon itself defensive action by the ego-instincts in consequence of excessive demands. so that the ideas 
in which its ~ires are expressed succumb to repression and are prevented from being conscious; in that 
cue there will be a general disturbance of the relation of the eye and the act of seeing to the ego and 
consciousness. The ego will have 10lt its dominance over the organ and will now be wholly at the 
dispolal of the repressed sexual instincL It looks as though the repression had been carried out too far by 
the ego. as though it had emptied the baby out with the bath-water: the ego refuses to see anything at any 
more, now that the sexual interest in seeing has made itself so prominent. But the alternative picture 
seems more to the point. This attributes the active role instead to the repressed pleasure in looking. The 
repressed instinct ta1cel revenge for being held back from further psychical expansion, by becoming 
also able to extend its dominance over the organ that is in its service. The 1011 of conscious dominance 
over the orlan is the detrimental substitute for the repression which has miscarried and wu only made 
possible at that price" (ibid .• p. 216). Nor. moreover. are the Gaze and the look radically antithetical. 
Indeed, the sidistic IWI would appear to be an example of the internalisation of the Gaze which is. u it 
were, taken OVer by the look. 
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By following through these various scenarios we can return to Marville's 
photograph in the light of Lacan's remark that, "the mirror-image would seem to be 
the threshold of the visible world. "10 One possible implication of Lacan's 
observation would be that any engagement between the viewer and an image 
involves an re-enactment of the subject's recognition of and (via the mirror stage) 
entry into the outside world. More specifically, however, the exchanges within the 
mirror stage and the phantasy structures of the objet a can help provide an answer to 
the question: what is the spectator's investment in this image? In other words, what 
is returned to our look? 
Within the structures of narcissism, Marville's photograph offers the viewer a 
phantasy of complete return. Functioning as an image through which the subject, in 
its search for a unified total self, can see itself seeing, the photograph offers a 
positio~ of fixity and plenitude for the spectator. A direct and symmetrical 
reciprocity would seem to exist between the viewer as the point of convergence 
outside the photograph 'mirroring' the vanishing point within it. For by setting up 
a relation of identity between the subject, eye and the camera, the photograph 
produces a space which is not only contiguous with our own but one which is 
meaningful only in relation to the position of the viewer. 
This relation between eye and camera has been described by Jean-Louis Baudry 
as one in which the camera "lays out the space of ideal vision and in this way 
assures the necessity of a ... transcendental subject."lt However, the subject does not 
identify simply with what it sees (the image, the screen) but, rather, "with what 
makes it visible in the same movement as the spectator himself sees. "12 In other 
words, the camera operates as a relay or analogue of the perceiving subject. As 
Christian Metz describes it: 
the spectator identifies with himself, with himself as a pure act of perception ... the condition of 
possibility of the perceived and hence as a kind of transcendental subject, which comes before every 
there is ... [and] as he identifies with himself as look, the spectator can do no other than identify 
with the camera, too, which has looked before him at what he is now looking at and whose 
stationing (=frarning) determines the vanishing poinL . .an apparatus the spectator has behind him, 
at the back of his head, that, is, precisely where phantasy locates the 'focus' of all vision." 
Although the "apparatus" which both Metz and Baudry are describing here is 
principally cinema, these remarks (as Baudry says of his own comments) are 
Ii "The mirror stage" op. CiL, p. 3. 
" "Ideological Effects of the Buic Cinematographic Apparatus", quoted in Bertrand Augst's Introduction 
to "'The Apparatus", CQlPll!Ttlobscru4, op. cit., p. 98. 
12 ibid., p. 99. 
II Ps,choanalYlu tuad CiMma: 1M Imaginary Signir~r, trans. Celia Britton, Anwyl Williams, Ben 
Brewster and Alfred Guzetti, London, Macmillan, 1983. 
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referable to painting and theatre - and clearly also to photography. This apparatus 
Baudry describes as "the answer to a desire inherent in our psychical structure ... A 
desire ... [for] a fonn of lost satisfaction which its apparatus would be assured at re-
discovering in one way or another ... and to which the impression of reality would 
seem to be the key.'~ This account of cinema echoes Lacan's metonymy of the 
objet a in that the subject is inscribed within a series of regressive movements as 
"the compulsion to repeat ... [a] return to a former condition"" of "primitive 
narcissism." This (primary) narcissism Baudry relates to a "fusion of interior with 
the exterior" as experienced prior to the mirror stage, "a state in effect of 
indistinction between a hallucinatory wish, a sign of satisfaction and desire for 
perception, of contact with the real."16 Akin to Laplanchets description of a primal 
phantasy of monadic autonomy before the "frrst cleavage" (of hallucination, 
representation and difference etc.), a time "when the system of consciousness-
perception had not yet differentiated itself'," cinema is marked by "something of a 
desire in dreams unifying perception and representation - whether with 
representation passing itself for perception ... or whether perception passes itself off 
for perceived representation."11 
By drawing upon Baudry's account of one specific system of representation 
(cinema), the (logocentric) desire of unmediated presence (as an unfractured 
immediacy of perception) can be located within those metonymic structures within 
which the subject searches for the lost object (objet a ). For Baudry the lost object 
would be the hallucination of "a fonn of archaic satisfaction", i.e. 
the desire of cinema ... would recall. . .a form of archaic satisfaction expressed by the subject, by 
reproducing the scene of iL .• the desire to recover archaic forms of desire which in fact structure any 
form of desire, and the desire 10 stage for the subject. 10 put in representation of form, what might 
recall its own operation ... land which] brings about a state of artifICial regression ... to an interior 
phase of [the subject's) development. . .It is the desire, unrecognized by the subject,to return to this 
phase. an early state of development with its own form of satisfaction .•. Retum to a relative 
narcissism .. .as enveloping and in which the separation between one's own body and the exterior 
world is not well defined .. .A return 10 a primitive narcissism by a regression of the libido ... [as] the 
absence of the delimitation of the body; the ttansfusion of the interior out onlO the exterior ... 8 
more archaic mode of identifications ... desire as such. i.e. a desire of desire, the nostalgia for a state 
in which desire has been satisfied through a transfer of perception to a formation resembling 
hallucination ... a condition in which what is perceived would no longer be distinguished from 
representations ... a simulation machine." 
Of course, as Baudry points out, cinema (or photography) are not equivalent to 
U'The Apparatus". CameraobscIITa, Ope cit., p. 113. 
81 ibid .• p. 108. 
"ibid .• p. 117. 
17 ibid., p. IlS. 
"ibid., p. 117-118. 
H ibid .• pp. 118-121. 
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dreams not least because the fonner are mediations of perception, "an impression of 
reality". Instead, "the simulation apparatus ... consists in transfonning a perception 
into a quasi-hallucination endowed with real-effect which cannot be compared to 
that which results from ordinary perception. "90 
This rigid division between (cinematic) perception and "ordinary perception" is 
perhaps a somewhat surprising one for Baudry to make, for, with reference to the 
notion of perception as itself being a text, structures of phantasy can be seen as 
pervading perception in all its forms. But more generally, what emerges from 
Baudry's analysis is an account of a dynamic unconscious which binds the subject 
into representations which then function as the self-representations or stagings of 
that subject. The metonymy of representation is thus symptomatic of: 
the existence of an unconscious where the subject's early mode of functioning persists ... never 
ceases requiring of the subject and proposing to him. by multiple detours (even if only through 
artistic practice), representations of his own scene ... the subject is induced to produce machines 
which would not only complement or supplement the workings of the secondary processes, but 
which represent his overall functioning to him: he is led to produce mechanisms mimicking. 
simulating the apparatus which is no other than himself. The presence of the unconscious also 
makes itself felt through the pressure it exerts in seeking to get itself represented by a subject who 
is still unaware of the fact that he is representing to himself the very scene of the unconscious 
where he is." 
However, despite the desire to return to state of undifferentiated fusion between 
subject and object, what is perhaps also involved here is something akin to the 
"bodily perception" (which, Jameson argues, is effaced by postmodem space) or 
the apperception (Winnicott's tenn for the structuring of perception by reference to 
the subject's own bOOy) within the dyadic exchange of the mirror stage. For not 
only can the look be represented by reference to a corporeal (oral) phantasy of 
incorporation, but the entire body itself becomes the referent of perception and 
representation. In this Marville's photograph is an example of what Wollheim has 
described as the pictorial "metaphorization of the body" whereby an image 
"becomes a metaphor for the body, or (at any rate) for some part of the body or for 
something assimilated to the body.'''l When, within this "seeing-in" or 
"representational seeing", the "picture as a whole ... metaphorizes the body ... the 
experience that grounds this relation attributes to the picture the global property of 
corporeality.'''' As Wollheim emphasises, it is not necessary for images to actually 
represent the body in order to metaphorize it, and he takes as his example "pictures 
iOibid., p. 122. 
It ibid., p. 123. 
• Paint;'" fU all Art, London, Thames and Hudson. 1987. p. 30S. 
• ibid., p. 308. 
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that represent architecture or are buildingscapes. "M Of the pictorial metaphorization 
of the body he writes: 
All paintings that metaphorize the body receive some part of their authority to do so from the way 
.they engage with primitive phantasies about the body. Indeed it is the submerged presence of this 
early material - that is. material from the early life-history of the individual - in metaphorical 
paintings that lends support to my claim that, in the profound cases of pictorial metaphor. what is 
metaphorized is the body. However. in the case of pictures that metaphorize the body. not through 
representing the body. but through representing something else. something metaphorically linked 
to the body. the evocation of these phantasies is called for twice over. They are recruited to 
enhance the corporeality of the picture itself. to which we globally respond, but they do this the 
better for already having been recruited to ensure corporeality for what the picture represents. If 
primitive phantasy helps to forge the new metaphorical link. or the link between picture and body. 
this is largely because of the way it reinforces. it has already reinforced. the old metaphorical link -
that is ... the link between building and body. For it is from the old link that the new derives much 
of its strength. much of its vitality ... The investiture of the represented buildings with phantasy 
about the body .... then comes to settle around the picture as a whole. giving the picture a presence 
quite out of proportion to its size and its manifest ambition." 
For Wollheim the "submerged presence of early material" relates to the infant's 
experience of its own corporeality. It is this which provides the material for the 
metaphorical connection between buildings and a sense of mass and movement, 
between inner and outer in the depiction of windows and apertures, of skin and 
textures in the rendering of walls and of phantasies of destruction and restoration. 
However, the "understructure of phantasy" involved in the viewing of Marville's 
photograph is not so much referable to the infant's mapping of its body surface 
(although this may indeed be an element here) but is instead the subject's phantasy 
of itself as a punctual monad. More pertinent here is Wollheim's description of the 
spatial construction in the paintings of Thomas Jones: 
The central device upon which Jones relies to give his pictures the effect of something near and 
prone. or to revive the early vision of the body. is the way he standardly dresses the principal 
building in the painting by the picture plane. and then prolongs the elevation of the building by a 
startlingly wide angle of vision. In this he is licensed. indeed encouraged. by two features of his 
work. FlfSt, there is the horizontal format that he adopts. Second. there is the way he slips from 
linear perspective to orthographic projection, in which all onhogonals are drawn as parallellines.!III 
A similar organisation of pictorial space is established in Marville's Rue .de 
Rivoli (its dramatic convergences, repetitions and fading to infinity) which serves 
to incite a spectatorial presence. Above all, it is the photograph's perspectival space-
its depth of field - which operates as the signifier of the gaze. For while the 
mechanism of emplacement in Marville's photograph is the spectator's look, this 
look is itself incited by the particular spatial organization of the image itself - this 
action being evident also in another photograph by Marville (fig. I. 1 0) in which the 
.. ibid •• p. 338. 
• ibid •• pp. 344-345 • 
.. ibid •• p. 345. 
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axes of the converging streets effectively pinion the spectator in space. Presence is 
produced not just by the picture'S emphatic locating or positioning of the viewer but 
is reinforced through the image's effect of eliding the viewer's body with a specific 
activity of the body - the look - which is both libidinally and socially invested.97 
It is this depth of field (reinforced by the image's clarity of detail and its 
repetitions and recessions) which both solicits or summons a gaze for the image and 
which produces its rea1ity-effect (its supposed convergence with natural vision). 
But this depth of field is also symptomatic of photography's adjustment from its 
inception to the nonnative codes of linear perspective. It is in this sense that Jean-
Louis Comolli's description of the early cinema is as valid for photography: 
Not only is the deep focus in the early cinematic image the mark of its submission to these codes 
of representation and to the histories and ideologies which necessarily determine and operate them. 
but more generally it signals that the ideological apparatus cinema is produced by these codes and 
by these systems of representation. as at once their complement and surpassing them. There is 
nothing accidental. therefore. or specifically technical in the cinematic image immediately claiming 
depth. since it is just this depth which governs and infonns it; the various optical instruments are 
regulated according to the possibility of restoring depth." 
.7 This elision of the body and vision is not. however. synonymous with what Norman Bryson describes 
as Ita disappearance of the body". Bryson says of the Gaze that "spatially and temporally, the act of 
viewing is constructed as the -removal of space and time, as the disappearance of the body: the 
construction of an acies mentis, the punctual viewing subject" (Vision and Painting: The Logic of the 
Gaze, London. Macmillan, 1983, p. 96). As opposed to the "vision disembodied, vision decarnalised" of 
the Gaze, corporeality is entirely a feature of the Glance: "Against the Gaze, the Glance proposes desire, 
proposes the body, in the tlwu of its practical activity: in the freezing of syntagmatic motion, desire, 
and the body. the desire of the body, are exactly the terms which the tradition [of Western painting] 
seeks to suppress" (ibid., p. 122). However, while Bryson appropriates the structure of Lacan's account 
of the gaze as objet a, he then evacuates it of psychoanalytic content. For Lacan. the gaze is the place of 
a radical instability of the subject, an instability which he refers to the drives and the unconscious: 'The 
eye and the gaze - this for us is the split in which the drive is manifested at the level of the scopic field 
(The Four F/UllJQmental Concepts, op.cit. p. 73). Moreover, as he emphasises, "If one does not stress the 
dialectic of desire one does not understand why the gaze of others should disorganise the field of 
perception. It is because the the subject in question is not that of reflexive consciousness, but that of 
desire" (ibid., p. 89). But it is precisely a subject of "reflexive consciousness" which Bryson substitutes 
for Lacan's subject constituted by the drives and through inter-subjective exchange. Not only does 
Bryson return to a phenomenology of a discrete consciousness (which as a stable structure cannot 
acknowledge the dispersal of the gaze across the archive) but the instability both within vision and of 
the subject is reductively codified and displaced as a function of two manichean orders of signification 
which are then conflated within a hegemonic repression of the body by Western traditions of 
representation. Bryson thus reifies what he describes as "the implied dualism of the Gaze and the Glance" 
(Vision and Painting, op.cit, p. 94 ) into two orders of signification, two regimes of the sign. On the 
one hand, there is the Gaze signifying fixity, repression. disappearance of the body and of desire and, 
ultimately, representing the ideological. On the other hand. there is the Glance signifying fluidity and 
the activity of the repressed body and desire - a subversive "flickering, ungovernable" mobility (ibid .• p. 
121). But while Bryson does refer to "the splitting of vision under the impact of the sign" (Tradition 
QIJd Desire. Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 69), this splitting is entirely a function of the sign 
(the "third term" which intervenes in dyadic vision) which remains external to the subject. Instead of an 
encounter between subject and sign. Bryson posits an 'empty' viewing subject. Moreover, not only is 
there some ambiguity as to the status of the body in Bryson's &CCOWlt of vision (i.e .. as "an actual bodily 
presence" of the viewer, the somewhat enigmatic "body of labour" or as the somatic etc.), but the gaze 
(as, for example, the introjection of the Gaze of the Other) as well as the look (Bryson's Glance) are both 
structures of phantasy and desire, of identification and incorporation. Thus while the gaze involves the 
organising or channelling of the libidinal or somatic, this is not a disappearance of the body from 
vision. or ill positioning as it were to just one side of vision. but is instead indicative of the 
fundamental reillion between all vision and the body. 
M "Machines of the Visible" in TM CittemDlic ApPfUallU, cds. Teresa de Lauretis and Stephen Heath, 
London, MacMillan. 1980. p. 130. 
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And, as Comolli adds, "What is at stake in deep focus, what is at stake in the 
historicity of the technique, are the codes and the modes of production of 'realism', 
the transmission, renewal or transformation of the ideological systems of 
recognition, specularity, truth-to-lifeness".99 
The presence of the singular viewing subject, of being as vision, produced by 
this depth of field is here the effect of an identification with the image which 
becomes the projective site for the recovery of a lost narcissistic plenitude in that: 
The drama of the subject.is the experience of its lack-in being .. Jt is because it parries this 
moment of lack that an image comes to the position of bearing all the cost of desire: projection, 
function of the imaginary,'fIO 
More precisely, it is the mastery of the look, rather than the image itself, which is 
invested with desire and phantasy - a fetishisation of vision itself rather than its 
objects. Wh~t takes place here is a "pseudo-identification" which Lacan describes as 
"a suture, a conjunction of the imaginary and the symbolic. "101 Yet this exchange in 
which "the subject [is] the effect of the signifier and the signifier the representative 
of the subject''lO'l also initiates a splitting in the subject in that a division or tension is 
produced between the spectator's self-perception as the origin of an omnipotent 
gaze and the fracturing of this self-sufficient presence by the Other. 
This tension can be located as an effect of the excess of the image itself, its 
reduction to a system of insistent repetitions, in which space reveals itself as a 
construction (screen) and as a codifying supplement to vision. Something of this 
process in cinema is also described by Comolli: 
That is why cinematic deep focus does not slip into the 'naturalness' of linear perspective, but 
inevitably stresses that perspective. accentuates it, indicates its curvature. denounces the visual 
field it produces as a construction. a composition in which there is not simply 'more real' but in 
which this more visible is spatially organised in the frame. dramatised. Deep focus does not wipe 
out perspective. does not pass itself off as the 'normality' of vision but makes it readable as coding 
(exteriorisation of the inceriorised code); it de-naturalises dramatises itl ., 
A similar de-naturalisation is operative in Marville's Rue de Rivoli as the image 
oscillates between being a space with which the spectator identifies (a space which, 
as it were, recognises and confmns a spectatorial presence) and its being a space 
which exists as other to the viewer. As Lacan describes, it is a picture's depth of 
It ibid., p. 133. 
'00 Ecrils (Paris, Seuil), quoted in Stephen Heath. Questions ofCinm&4, London. Macmillan, 1981, p. 
84. 
101 Th4 FoUl' FIUIdamenIal Concepts, op. cit., pp. 117-118. I. Jacques-Alain MUler, "On Suture", Screen, 18,4, 1977-8, p. 33. 
IN "Machines of the Visible", op. ciL, p.137. 
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field which also effaces the geometrical illusion of scopic mastery and which: 
was elided in the geometrical relation - the depth of field. with all its ambiguity and variability. 
which is in no way mastered by me. It is rather that is grasps me. solicits me at every moment. 
and makes of the landscape something other than a landscape. something other than what I have 
called a picture. \04 
In effect. the space of the photograph simultaneously endorses and denies a 
specural identity to the viewer who moves between desire (for presence, plenitude) 
and knowledge or submission to cultural codes - codes which are both necessary 
for phantasy to operate but which also need to be disavowed. In Marville's 
photograph, however, it is because of the excess of these codes that scopic mastery 
is revealed as emplacement as the subject of self-reflexive presence is shown 
instead to be an effect (or positioning) of the signifier. What is at work in the 
photograph is both the self-undermining of the naturalness of the photograph 
(through its self-revelation as a construction), as well as processes symptomatic of 
the oscillations within perception itself (the imbalance between vision and the 
Gaze). It is within this asymmetrical scopic regime that Marville's photograph 
stands as a generic image for the structuring tension, in the relation of photography 
to the city. between the subject's preservation of a narcissistic autonomy and the 
perception of urban space as both other to it and as the potential site of difference. 
loss and disorder. 
1& The FoIU FIII'IlIomDIlaI COtICepts. op. CiL. p. 96. 
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2 
THE PRODUCTION OF PLACE 
analysis will reveal the contradictions of space I 
The insistent spatial construction of Marville's Rue de Rivoli effectively locks the 
spectator into a fIxed point of vision which induces a narcissistic phantasy of scopic 
plenitude. However, this spatial construction, precisely as a result of its insistent 
excess, simultaneously belies the status of perspective as a natural description of the 
physical world. Instead, perspective reveals itself in this photograph as an 
ambiguous construction - albeit as one also which emphatically summons and 
controls the viewer's gaze. In this chapter I shall develop this issue through an 
examination of some uses of photography in the representation of urban space. My 
focus here will be on photography's production and circulation of a typology of 
urban spaces and on the potential contradictions between the various spatial regimes 
produced within this archive. In this, my immediate concern is not directly with the 
status of the spectator but, rather, it is with the discursive inflections and 
instabilities which structure the representation of urban space. This said, however, 
the broad over-view of the photography of the city in this chapter also stands as a 
framing prelude to the question of the precariousness of urban spectatorship (in 
terms of the city's threat to the security of perception) in that the moments of 
perceptual rupture that I shall be discussing in subsequent chapters need to be set 
against the use of photography as a means of producing a coherent and legible 
codification of urban space. 
This chaptet, then, will involve an outlining of a morphology of space and a 
discussion of the connection and interaction of various spatial types or models and 
their mutual articulation. Necessarily this will be rather schematic for this spatial 
morphology in many ways exists only at a descriptive or discursive level and is by 
no means intended to reflect 'real' spatial phenomena. Moreover, having set up 
these models the point is not then to cite them as discrete phenomena but it is 
, Henri Lefebvre, The SlUYiva/ ofCapilalism. London, Allison and Busby, 1976, p. 17. 
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instead to describe them as processes and relations. To begin with, then, I wish to 
briefly outline various spatial forms and models which are pertinent to an 
examination of this question. Among such models one could, for example, cite 
photographic space, created space and symbolic, social and semantic space. But 
beyond this, what needs to be examined here ~s the manner in which such 
defmitions of space not only overlap, interact, and mutually reinforce each other 
but also the ways in which they may simultaneously militate against and undermine 
themselves. 
The city as spatial formation 
At a very general level of course all social systems are also spatial fonnations. 
Whether on a broad level (e.g.the transition from an agrarian to an urban 
industrialised society) or on the level of the particular (e.g. the spatial organisation 
of .the neighbourhood and the street or of the individual house etc.), spatial fonn 
and social organisation are deeply inter-related just as, for example, the descriptive 
terms of urban, suburban and rural also imply their concomitant spatial orders. As 
such, a major problem is one of how to begin to describe and analyse space and 
social processes without imposing an unreal independence upon each. 
Summarising his own approach in Social Justice and the City, David Harvey 
writes: 
The distinction between social processes and spatial form are always regarded as artificial rather 
than real, but in the later chapters the definition is regarded as unreal in a rather different sense. 
Spatial fonns are there not seen as inanimate objects within which the social process unfolds, but 
as things which 'contain' social processes in the same manner that social processes are spatial,2 
It is from this perspective that Harvey rejects any abstracted or ontological inquiry 
into the nature of space as being a mystification. More particularly, referring to the 
question of urbanism he continues: 
An understanding of urbanism and the social-process-spatial-form theme requires that we understand 
how human activity creates the need for specific spatial concepts and how daily social practice 
solves with consummate ease seemingly deep philosophical mysteries concerning the nature of 
space and the relationships between social processes and spatial forms.' 
L A similar is advocated by Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson in The social logic of 
space in which they describe the relationship between spatial and social structures 
as one of "problem definition". Outlining their own theoretical approach by 
indicating the lack of an adequate spatial theory of society, they state: 
a Social Justic. tutd lhe City, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
I ibid., p. 14. 
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The common 'natura1'·seeming definition sees it as a matter of finding relations between 'social 
structure' and 'spatial structure'. However, few descriptions of either type of structure have 
succeeded in pointing to lawful relations between the two. The absence of any general models 
relating spatial structure to social formation, it is argued, has its roots in the fundamental way in 
which the problem is conceptualised (which in turn has its roots in the ways in which social 
theorists have conceptualised society), namely as a relation between a material realm of physical 
space, without social content, and an abstract realm of social relations and institutions, without a 
spatial dimension. Not only is it impossible in principle to search for necessary relations between 
a material and an absttact entity, but also the programme itself is contradictory. Society can only 
have lawful relations to space if society already possesses its own intrinsic spatial dimension; and 
likewise space can only be lawfully related to society if it can carry those social dimensions in its 
very from. The problem definition as it stands has the effect of desocialising space and 
despatialising society. To remedy this, two problems of description must be solved. Society must 
be described in terms of its intrinsic spatiality; space must be described in terms of its intrinsic 
sociality .4 
This argument provides a useful counter to the belief in a 'natural' dichotomy 
between space and social structure, while the call for "a broad theory of the social 
logic of space and the spatial logic of society" has obvious relevance to urbanism. 
However, in the light of Hmvey's remarks, this demand for a "broad theory" can 
itself be seen as rather questionable in that the problem needs to be addressed 
historically. More specifically, cities, as particular types of social formation, 
produce their own spatial orders in that they necessarily involve the organisation of 
different groups and individuals within patterns of congregation and separation, 
mobility and encounter. proximity and visibility. And. just as every city is 
structured by its own buildings, thoroughfares, traffic systems, zoning and patterns 
of residence, so also each develops its own individual and recognisable spatial 
order and characteristics.What is required is an outlining of the operations of 
photography within the spaces of the city both in terms of photography's 
production and reinforcement of the spatial identities of individual cities and of 
localities within them, but also an account of the manner in which photography was 
bound up within the flux and contestation of the city's social space. Through this 
process, the 'visual' identity of each city can be seen as being produced through the 
composite image generated through the cumulative effect of the interplay of a 
multiplicity of apparently discrete images and points of view. 
It is within this framework that I wish to posit the city as a "semantic field" (to 
use Castells's phrase)' or semiotic system. In this discussion of photography and 
urban space there will, therefore, be a distinction made between different types of 
space, e.g. contested space. semantic space, space as a register of social distance. 
a T1t4 social logic of space, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 26. 
I "Theory and ideology in urban sociology", in Urban Sociology: Critical Essays, ed. C.G.Pickvance, 
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space within environmental discourses, public and private etc. although to a great 
extent these distinction can only be made at a descriptive level. More broadly, 
however, my point is to focus on the the importance of space within the meaning of 1\ 
the city and for experiences within it. Given this, the space of the city cannot be 
r¢uced simply to its architectural form alone. As Harvey remarks: 
The city as a built form and wbanism as a way of life have to be considered separately from each 
other for they have become separated in reality. What were once synonymous concepts are no 
longer so.' 
While of course the "built fonn" of the city is important, it does not exhaust the 
spatial processes at work: within urban society nor can it be seen as the originating 
foundation of spatial formations. Nor, too, can the city itself be reduced to its 
spatial structures. As Harvey further argues: 
Urbanism. insofar as it possesses its own transfonnation laws. is at least partially moulded out of 
basic principles of spatial organisation. The distin~tive role which space plays both in the 
organisation of production and the patterning of social relationships is consequently expressed in 
the urban structure. But urbanism is not merely a structure fashioned out of spatial logic. It has 
attached to it distinctive ideologies (urban versus rural images for example) and therefore has a 
certain autonomous function in fashioning the way of life of a people.' 
Following this, a fundamental premise of this study is an assertion of the 
fundamental connection between space and social relations. And it is here that 
Harvey's notion of "created space" (as opposed to "effective space"), as a product 
of industrial capitalism, provides a useful point of departure, i.e: 
But in whose image is space created? We have already acknowledged that the organisation of space 
can affect and reflect social relationships. But created space has a deeper meaning than just that In 
the ancient city the organisation of space was a symbolic recreation of a supposed cosmic order. It 
had an ideological purpose. In pan it is fashioned by the dynamics of market forces which can 
easily produce results which nobody in panicular wants ... Yet created space is an integral part of an 
intricate sign process that gives direction and meaning to daily life within the urban culture .. The 
signs. symbols and signals that surround us in the urban environment are powerful influences.' 
Harvey's discussion of created space is, of course, premised on the argument that 
space is essentially social even when being produced by seemingly abstract forces 
of fixed capital investments, industrial capital and the circulation of surplus value 
etc.- forces which necessarily preclude viewing urbanism as an autonomous 
process. 
The "transitional city" debate 
The question of the relation between urban photography, spatial formations and the 




changing socio-political structure of the nineteenth century city can be further 
clarified by reference to the debate concerning the transitional nature of the Victorian 
city. In basic tenns this debate turns on the issue of whether the nineteenth century 
city displayed essentially 'modern' characteristics (e.g. well-differentiated 
residential areas) or whether, instead, its spatial structure was transitional between 
the pre-industrial and the modem city or town and, as such, marked by social in-
mixing with clear segregation only being found at the extreme edges of society. 
Thus, within this debate, pre-industrial cities are seen as exhibiting minimal 
obvious residential segregation (except, perhaps at the social extremes with the 
wealthy tending to live in or near the town centre), while it is argued that modem 
cities have clear patterns of residential separation with the wealthy moving out to the 
suburbs at the periphery of the city. 
One argument within this debate has been that presented by David Ward who 
argues that the Victorian city was in a transitional state in that it had a more weakly 
defined spatial and social structure than either its pre-industrial precursor or the 
modem city as typified in twentieth century forms of urban structure~ Although, 
Ward argues, the extremes of society were separated, the Victorian city was 
nonetheless marked by an eclectic interspersing and in-mixing among the mass of 
the skilled and unskilled population. Only towards the end of the century was there 
the marked emergence of the 'independent' dimensions of social, familial and ethnic 
status. So too, the separation of home and workplace was, to a great extent, 
consequent upon the centralisation and expansion of employment within 
industrialisation and the growth and improvement of urban transport systems - both 
of which did not fully occur until the end of the nineteenth century. 
Citing those features seen as being intrinsic to the identity of the modem city, 
Ward writes: 
The modem western city displays a mosaic of residential districts. usually well separated from the 
major sources of employment and distinguished from one another by differences in the status. 
income, family size, life style and the racial, religious or ethnic identities of their residents. The 
social areas are not always well dermed either on the ground or in the minds of the urban residents 
who may perceive and judge the same or similar districts in a variety of fashions. In spite of these 
problems of definition, regularities have been recognised in the spatial arrangements of the different 
atttibutes of urban residents. The precise geometric arrangements of these attributes are perhaps of 
less importance than the recognition or assumption of a relationship between the diverse bases of 
sttatification within urban society and the differentiated social geography of the city! 
Ward lists various patterns of urban social traits that have been posited as 
symptomatic features of modern or industrial cities. i.e."overlapping. zonal. 
'"Victorian Cities: How Modem?",JourNJI of Historical Geography, I, 1976, pp. 13S-136. 
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sectoral, clustered and random arrangements." lO However, although the zonal 
separation of social groups was described in the mid-nineteenth century, for 
example, by Engels in Manchester or, to a lesser extent, by Booth in London at the 
tum of the century. these perceptions were. Ward argues. an over-simplification. 
Instead, he claims that: 
considerations of social geographic changes in Victorian cities suggest that until quite late in the 
nineteenth century, 'modem' levels and kinds of residential differentiation were quite weakly 
developed. Engels and other mid-century observers described the dichotomous class division of 
industrial cities and clearly diagnosed the antagonistic implications of this separation but they 
underestimated the internal complexity of the 'working-class' majority. Both the upward social 
mobility and internal stratification of the lower socio-economic groups resulted in a more 
differentiated residential pattern approximating to that described by Booth and Burgess and the 
minor similarities of the spatial arrangements serve to obscure rather than reveal the fundamental 
differences in the degree to which different levels of social stratification were recorded on the 
ground.11 
In short, Ward concludes: 
The kind and level of residential differentiation within Victorian cities displayed the 'transitional' 
attributes that marlced so many aspects of the age and only late in the nineteenth century would the 
appellation 'modem' be appropriate to describe the social geography of nineteenth century cities.'2 
Ward's thesis has, however, been rejected by others. David Cannadine has argued 
that Victorian cities were residentially differentiated and had patterns of segregation 
similar to twentieth century urban centres in both Britain and America.13 Similarly, 
Colin Pooley, citing Liverpool in particular. has also argued that the Victorian city 
should not be treated as a unique phenomenon: 
These studies. and the results from the analysis of mid-Victorian LiverpooL.suggest that rather 
than trying to define the internal structure of nineteenth century towns as a special case, 
uansitional between the pre-industrial and modem city. the similarities to twentieth century towns 
should be stressed instead.14 
He continues: 
The transition to an essentially modem urban form was a gradual evolutionary process with the 
precise timing of change in particular towns being difficult to pinpoint and varying from place to 
place depending on rates of population growth. the level of industrialisation and previous urban 
developmenL Evidence from Liverpool. however. suggests that for the larger industrial town this 
change occurred in the f1l'St few decades of the nineteenth century rather than in the last quarter as 
proposed by Ward. and it is likely that most nineteenth century towns were being fashioned by 
recognisably modern processes for most of the Victorian period ... essentially modern levels of 
residential differentiation occurred in many nineteenth century towns. The processes causing 
segregation were complex and no single theory of residential differentiation is likely to provide an 
appropriate explanation ... many of the processes which characterised the mid-Victorian city are still 
IO'b'd 1 1 • 
" ibid •• p. 151. 
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operational today ... there seems little evidence that we should treat the Victorian city as a special 
case.1S 
Nevertheless, despite the validity of these counter-arguments, there is much that is 
still pertinent in Ward's general observation that: 
the social geographic changes in cities on both sides of the Atlantic during the second half of the 
nineteenth century recoro a transition from wea1cly defined patterns in which some elements of 
either a traditional' or idealised community persisted to one in which a more emphatic level of 
residential differentiation reinforced new and more complex bases of social sttatification.'6 
However, while it is of course legitimate to argue about the precise timing of these 
processes within particular urban areas, the notion of the 'transitional' city still 
provides a useful framework for discussing urban photography. This is especially 
true for London which was also in many respects a unique city displaying 
distinctive patterns of growth and development 
Created space 
Regardless of the debate around its precise chronology, the transitional city was a 
product of the process which Lefebvre has described as capitalism's self-
perpetuation "by occupying space, by producing a space. "17 Within this process 
photography was directly involved in the transformation of the nineteenth century 
city through its mobilisation as document or antiquarian record of the rebuilding of 
the material fabric of the urban environment Here photography was employed to 
record the old structure before its demolition in the wake of what Marshall Berman 
has called capitalism's "innovative self-destruction"1. or what Harvey has similarly 
cited as capitalism's "creative self-destruction" .19 This physical rebuilding occurred 
to some degree in all the major European cities and an ambivalent response to urban 
redevelopment underlies the initiative behind much of this photography. 
It was the Haussmannisation of Paris that no doubt represented the most 
systematic and radical rebuilding of a city and the consequent reshaping of its social 
landscape. Motivated by "the twin ideals of Enlightenment rationality and imperial 
authority" ,"" Haussmann's rebuilding of Paris involved viewing the city as a 
"technical problem" to be solved by means of the conflation of created space with 
" ibid .• pp. 179-180. 
,. "Victorian Cities: How Modem?". ope ciL.p. 149. 
17 The Survival ofCopilalism. op.cit .• p. 21. 
1. All Thtll/s Solid Melts/raiD Ail'. London. Verso. 1983. pp. 98-105. 
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forms of effective space (e.g. the efficient movement of traffic and troops). During 
this rebuilding of Paris under Napoleon ill photography (most notably by Marville) 
was used to record the actual destruction of old buildings and sites during the 1850s 
and 1860s (fig. 2.1). However. Marville's photographs did not at the time have the 
, overtly antiquarian status as did the photographs both commissioned and also taken 
by The Society for Photographing Relics of Old London (figs. 2.2 - 2.4). 
Nevertheless, the use of photography as a 'record' of the old and the historic and of 
the sites of antiquarian and topographical interest was a major cause of the 
mobilisation of the camera within the city. In France the practice of documenting the 
historic sites and architecture of the country, and especially of Paris, started early. 
In 1851 the Commission des Monuments Historiques had commissioned 
photographers such as Gustave Ie Gray, Henri Seq and Hippolyte Bayard to 
undertake this work. And by the 1850s the government had begun to purchase 
complete photographic surveys and collections. 
In its turn this employment of the camera provoked a sustained debate during 
the century and beyond concerning the function and status of the photographic 
image when used as a historical record. Some of the fundamental issues within this 
debate were raised in the directives issued by the Manchester Amateur Photographic 
Society which was formed in 1885 in association with the Manchester Public 
Libraries with the aim of supplying "historical record pictures". 
In his brief history of the Society, Harry Milligan describes as "progressive" 
those members who formed the Society as a break-away group from the original 
Manchester Photographic Society which had already been in existence some twenty 
years. An indication of some of the issues within this debate can be gleaned from 
the statements made in December 1888 by the Rev H. 1. Palmer, President of the 
Amateur Society, in his outline, with reference to a group of buildings known as 
the "Gibraltar" then marked for demolition (figs. 2.5 - 2.6), of a programme of 
action in the club Journal: 
He asked for a systematic endeavour to be made during the coming year to preserve a photographic 
record of the condition of old buildings, and ended with a plea that it is as up-to-date today as it 
was then; that 'now that these ancient tenements are no longer in a state to 'make a picture', I 
desire to suggest to Manchester amateurs that they may well bestir themselves to obtain 
photographic memorials of similar ancient antiquities of the city to be preserved in collected fonn 
among our treasured archives." 
This demand, and subsequent ones, was made in the face of the city's "constant 
i1"The Manchester Photographic Record Survey",Manchuter Review, 8, 1958, p.154. 
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state of transition" as a result of redevelopment. As Milligan relates: 
In the course of a lecture in October 1889 the Rev. H. J. Palmer made another prophetic remark 
that seems to be so up-to-date today as to be shocking. It was this:-"In another and very useful 
direction some of us are making our photography distinctly philanthropic by our efforts to preserve 
for all future citizens a pictured record of those parts of ancient Manchester which still survive the 
ruthless destructiveness of our modern civic and commercial requirements.22 
Having thus been initiated in Manchester in 1890, similar photographic surveys 
were proposed in Binningham, Sheffield, Liverpool and York. In Manchester itself 
a growing list was submitted by members of subjects to be photographed using the 
highly durable Palinotype process. Subjects listed included not only public sites 
such as the Exchange, the Old Town Hall (fig. 2.7), the Infumary, Victoria Station, 
the Palace Theatre, the Assize Courts, City Road) but also scenes of "the business 
life of the city and the habits of the people" not just from within Old Manchester and 
Salford but from the entire city and Borough (figs. 2.8 - 2.12). 
Throughout this survey, permanence and change were the determining criteria 
of photographic value. Milligan quotes a statement made in April 1890 by the 
President of the Survey, Mr. John Wilcock: 
His first point is in answer to the question 'What are we to take?' His reply is really a summary 
of the requirements in one word when he says:-We might as well give an answer and say: 
anything.' He continues:-'The simplest row of jerry-built cottages, rearing each other up like the 
paper scenes of a toy theatre, has the strongest claim to be photographed if only to show the 
morality of the building trade as it exists today' ... He deals with places and institutions which are 
permanent by saying thac'This is seemingly paradoxical. If a place is permanent why photograph 
it? .' But he answers himself by asking what is permanent D 
Aside from providing a useful narrative account of the Manchester Survey, 
Milligan, in his discussion of the "right kind of photograph", makes a distinction 
between "utilitarian" and "pictorial" photography and posits "photographic quality" 
and "Pictorial value" as two implicitly distinct criteria. As part of this distinction he 
lists "four requirements": 
It must be understood ahat what is wanted in a print for reference purposes is information, and 
nothing but information; therefore transient pictorial effects are a waste of time. A perfect print 
for local history work should show quite clearly what the subject is, and where it is. If the 
topographical detail cannot be shown adequately on the main print then a secondary picture should 
be taken that embodies some recognisable part of the main object, and some topographical detail 
that will place the subjects. Next, if possible, and this is rather more difficult, some approximate 
indication of the date on which the picture was taken should appear on the picture ... And fmally. 
and in all probability the most difficult requirement to fulfil, is to indicate just why it was thought 
necessary to take the picture.:M 
Although directed as much towards contemporary (i.e. post-war) photography, 
Ii ibid., p. 195. 
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Milligan's distinction between "infonnation" and "pictorial" value was simply a 
continuation of the debate initiated during the nineteenth century, a debate, too, 
which broadened in scope with the rise of Pictorial photography at the tum of the 
century. 
Glasgow and Edinburgh 
This notion of a kind of photographic conservation work with its concomitant 
emphasis upon an unmediated documentary verisimilitude is also emphasised in 
William Young's Introduction to the 1900 edition of Thomas Annan's photographs 
of The Old Closes and Streets of Glasgow taken for the City of Glasgow 
Improvements Trust in 1868. In the Introduction Young writes: 
The City Improvement Trustees acquired. by act of Parliament. in 1868. the right to alter and 
reconstruct several of the densely built areas of the city. and these operations, it was foreseen, 
would remove many old and interesting landmarks. Before en~g upon their work, therefore, the 
Trustees arranged with the late Mr. Thomas Annan to take a series of views of the closes and 
streets more immediately affected ... Within recent years the Town Council has added a number of 
views. and the whole pictorial record is now submitted in this volume.2S 
As C. M. Allen has noted: "the story of nineteenth century urban development 
and of working-class housing shows a steady progression from laisser-faire to 
municipal initiative.'t26 More particularly: 
The importance of the City of Glasgow Improvements Scheme started in 1866 is that it represents 
the flCSt massive municipal intervention to sweep away the most insanitary and dilapidated and 
archaic centtal urban areas and to replan them on a modem basis. It was the flCSt recognition that a 
free market. and private philanthropy and public health regulations could not provide an adequate 
solution to these problems: that the City Fathers must at least plan and supervise redevelopment 21 
In his Introduction to Annan's photographs, Young outlines a brief history of 
Glasgow, "the commercial metropolis of Scotland, the second city of the Empire",21 
with a stress upon both the historic and strategic sites within the city but primarily 
upon the improvements to the environment as a consequence of the growth of urban 
management. Describing first the loss of many of "many of its oldest, and 
doubtless most picturesque houses"29 as a direct consequence of plague and fITe 
(particularly in the seventeenth century), the Introduction then lists subsequent 
municipal innovations such as street lighting, street hygiene, the early beginnings of 
a police force, plans for river purification, and the need to remedy the smoke 
ATM Old Closu tIIId Strutl ofGltugow, Glugow. Jamea MacLehose and Sons, 1900. 
21 "'The Genesis of British Urban Redevelopment with special reference 10 Glasgow'" Economic History 
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problem: "Were these two great refonns successfully carried out, and the excessive 
noise of the street traffic by some means reduced, Glasgow would greatly add to its 
honourable repute, as a healthy and pleasant place of abode. "30 Annan's 
photographs are finnly situated within this environmental discourse and narrative of 
municipal initiative as depicting all that was undesirable in the city - a polemic 
reinforced by the visual effect of dark and cramped claustrophobia and the 
heightened effects of texture, dampness and airlessness in the photographs of the 
alleys just off the High Street (figs. 2.13 - 2.16) in contrast to the open vistas of the 
High Street itself (fig. 2.17): 
The value of many of the plates embraced in this volume consists in their true representation or 
suggestion of the seamy side of the city's life: in their depicting with absolute faithfulness the 
gloom and squalor of the slums. They afford a peep into dark and dismal dens unvisited by the 
great purifying agencies of the sun and wind, and in surveying them, we instinctively feel that 
human life born, bred or led within their shades is sorely handicapped, and that the day of their 
extinction is the more due." 
While Young's Introduction overtly condones the municipal initiative behind the 
demolition and rebuilding works in Glasgow - even if the slum-dwellers 
themselves did not - another text which was exactly contemporary, but this time 
concerned with Edinburgh, displayed a far more ambivalent attitude to urban 
redevelopment. Published in 1868, the book Picturesque "Bits" from Old 
Edinburgh was comprised of "A series of photographs by Archibald Bums; with 
descriptive and historical notes by Thomas Henderson". This text (accompanied by 
fifteen photographs by Bums and seven anonymous woodcuts) registered a 
distinctly oppositional response to urban 'created space'. Given this, although 
several of Bums's photographs (figs. 2.18 - 2.22) would appear to be very similar 
to Annan's, the semantic inflection given to them is of an altogether different order. 
Essentially an elegiac discourse upon "the picturesque", Henderson's text is, 
however, more than simply an antiquarian or topographical survey of architectural 
sites in "auld" Edinburgh (even though the last chapter is a commentary specifically 
concerning the neo-Gothlc revival) but is, to a greater degree, a polemic against 
urban redev~lopment and municipal improvement: 
One cannot help deploring some of the effects of improvements which necessitate the removal of 
buildings of artistic or historical value; but when there is needless and wanton demolition of the 
old landmarks, it would surely not be too useful an office for even a IOwn-council, to become 
guardians of what is probably quite as much the propeny of the town as are the sweepings of the 
streets ... Now and then the rage for improvement spreads like an epidemic - just now it has attacked 
so ·b·d 23 I I ., p. . 
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the old treeS in our public gardens - and woe betide any vestiges of antiquity that tum up during its 
prevalence.J2 
In a similar vein he continues: 
Of course, in endeavouring to recall the High Street of fonner times, one must conceive of it as 
unbroken by the many wide gaps which now disfigure the stately range of its lofty buildings, and 
interrupt the picturesque array of its gabled roofs: and all the atrocities which ha,ve been committed 
on this unfortunate city under the name of improvement, certainly the neighbourhood we have now 
reached, has been favoured with the greatest share." 
Yet elsewhere, however, Henderson does acknowledge something of the realities of 
slum-life: 
Taking BuU's Oose as a sample, one gets somewhat reconciled to the loss of the picturesque, if 
thereby a better sanitary condition could be induced; and it takes the utmost stretch of the 
imagination, when looking at such hovels, and their present inhabitants, to conceive of them as 
abodes of the gay, the beautiful, and the noble of other days.J4 
This recognition is expressed further when, for example, Henderson describes 
Frier Wynd as being now "most dreary and uninviting" or the route to the present 
Old Com Market, i.e: 
if there is much interest in the past, there is also much pain in the present, - where human beings, 
if not of the highest type, cluster like carrion birds in these deserted carcasses, once alive with rude, 
yet simple and noble, life. Here civilisation seems not to have decreased, but only lowered the ills 
of life, and vice and crime act as executioners, in room of the stake and the gibbet. Here also the 
genial heat of the summer is apt to fructify the seeds of disease, and, life, being always at so low 
an ebb, the salutary cold of winter only opens another door to death." 
Nonetheless, such transfonnations are ultimately cited as indications of a general 
narrative of social decline and are symptomatic of "the changes of time and the 
depravity of human nature - of course as seen in the character of your servants and 
the working classes."" In short, Picturesque "Bits" from Old Edinburgh operates 
as an elegy for a lost and, of course, fictive city of social integration. hierarchy and 
civility. 
This tension between the preservation of the picturesque and the "catalogue of 
horrors" resulting from improvement and modernisation provides the dominant 
textual thread in PicturesqlU! "Bits" • a tension which is evoked across various types 
of spatiality. Thus Henderson explicitly contrasts the old and the new: 
For it is not this Edinburgh of the Nineteenth century we would speak of, with Princes Street for 
its centte - stately, straight, and spacious - but that city over there, beyond the valley ... These two 
towns, divided in situation only by a narrow valley, are in character separated by centuries. The one 
on the north - classical in its features, fonnal, open and fair; the other on the south - Gothic in its 
52 Picturuqru "Bils" from Old Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Edmonston and Douglas, 1868, p. 18. 
• ibid., p. 23. 
14 ibid., p. 48. 
• ibid., p. 55. 
• ibid., p.s6. 
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outlines. rich in light and shade. rugged and old." 
Burns's photographs thus stand in contrast to the images of Princes Street produced 
by George Washington Wilson and William Donaldson Clark (figs. 2.23 - 2.25) 
and instead look back to the topographical photography of Thomas Keith (figs. 
2.26 - 2.27). Not surprisingly Henderson text stresses the innate visuality of the 
city and of particular places within it, while the Old Town itself is described as 
being a ready-made picture: 
On a summer evening, when the setting sun shines through the city smoke, and the old town lies 
piled up in gigantic masses. fringed with spires, and culminating in the castle rock. you have a 
picture worth painting by anybody who can do it well enough.-
Aside from references to Millais and Dore, Henderson lays great stress upon the 
viewer's own imagination to historically recreate a given scene. So also, "by merely 
allowing the influence of the place, assisted by the charm of the hour, to creep over 
you ... you almost lose your own identity .. .in the spirit of the place"." As part of 
this process the text itself becomes, in effect, a series of evocative word-pictures 
which would seem to partly prefigure Pictorialist photography (fig. 2.28) and the 
more self-conscious literary enterprise of. for example. Hillaire Belloc's text and 
Coburn's photographs in London published in 1909 (figs. 2.29 - 2.31). 
The space of the city, too. is not described solely in visual or aesthetic terms 
It 
alone (as picturesque) but is also overtly semantic in that particular places and 
buildings are the bearers of historical and emotional associations and meanings. 
associations which also have the effect of implicitly displacing the more recent class 
identities acquired by a given area (e.g. Cowgate). In this manner the city becomes 
a psychological environment fonned through the affective resonances of specific 
places. Not only is the Old Town itself a kind of palimpsest of overlaid meanings 
but individual buildings whether. for instance, "quaint" or "lofty. dark. and 
somewhat mysterious" can provoke sentimental responses. In order to facilitate this 
process. and depending also upon the required effect. Henderson suggests 
optimum viewing times, e.g. "summer twilight as the season for a sentimental 
excursion in Old Edinburgh •... A bright forenoon as most suitable for a more critical 
inspection'f40 - and also, of course, for the taking of photographs. 
With the text's assertion that "anyone with a sufficiently lively imagination may 
57 ·b·d 9 1 1 ., p. • 
• ibid., p. 46-47. 
• ibid., p. 11. 
40 ibid., p. 14. 
87 
be able to reconstruct for himself the city of former centuries",'u Burns's 
photographs come to have a double-status. On the one hand they are presented as 
images of unmediated mimetic "record" and of "minute description" and accuracy in 
that: 
While the draughtsman can generally chose his own point of view, and may 'humour' his sketch, it 
must be remembered that the photographer has not the same license, and must 'take' things as they 
are, and nothing exclude.42 
However, on the other hand, as an aid to imaginative reconstruction, the 
photographs also have the status of evocative fragments as distinct from being 
close-up images of architectural detail, as suggestions rather than statements. 
Proximity of vision. and not just perspectival clarity and depth. and hence 
suggestive detail and texture is valued as much for its evocative effect. This is 
especially the case in the photograph of Bull's Close (fig. 2.22) which becomes a 
kind of abstract pattern and not just an image of an architectural feature. As such, 
shadows and concealment are as valued as clarity and, indeed, visibility - a quality 
which is acknowledged, too, in Young's praise for Annan's photographs for both 
their "true representation" and for their" suggestion" of their subjects. 
London: from Thomson to Sims 
In the debate over the 'transitional' city, the modem city was defined as having 
well-differentiated residential (i.e. class) areas while the urban structure itself came 
increasingly to be perceived as a distinctive spatial order. By briefly contrasting two 
texts about London, I would suggest that, as the century progressed, the 
photography of London increasingly operated to register and produce an image of \ 
the capital as an essentially spatial organisation patterned into distinct districts, areas 
and suburbs. As part of this development John Thorpson's Street-Life in London, 
published in 1877 (figs. 4.1 - 4.37)43 can be contrasted with the magazine series 
Living London (edited by George Sims) which ran for two years between 1901 
and 1903 and totalled over 1,000 pages when complete. 
What is distinctive about these two texts is their different ways of experiencing 
and representing the city particularly in terms of moving within it - an experience 
that was itself overtly bound up with the transformations in the social demography 
of the city during the later nineteenth century. This transfonnation can be illustrated 
" 'b'd 6 1 1 "p. • 
41 ibid • 
.a See Chapters 4 and S for • discussion of this text. 
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by reference to literature, especially that of Dickens and Mayhew. For both authors 
London signified a complex heterogeneity which proffered the possibility of direct 
personal contacts and relationships that were not bounded by specific areas or 
localities. For both writers the city was marked by what Adrian Poole has termed its 
"epistemological excitement.''''' In part this was a mode of perceiving the city to 
which Street-Life in London was closely bound especially in its use of the 
narrational device of directly, and apparently randomly encountered, 'knowable' 
individuals who obligingly recount their life-stories. In Street-Life, however, the 
urban crowd is broken down into isolated and atomistic units (the individual or 
type) with no articulation of complex inter-relationships. This representational 
strategy can be likened to Nicos Poulantzas's description of the spatio-temporal 
"matrices" of capitalism in which the: 
primal material framework is the mould of social atomization and splintering ... embodied in the 
. practices of the labour process itself. At one and the same time, presupposition of the relations of 
production and embodiment of the labour process, the framework consists in the organization of a 
continuous, homogeneous, cracked and fragmented space-time as lies at the basis of Taylorism: a 
cross-ruled, segmented, cellular space in which each fragment (individual) has its place, and in 
which each emplacement, while corresponding to a fragment (individual), must present itself as 
homogeneous and uniform; and a linear, serial, repetitive and cumulative time, in which the 
various moments are integrated with one another, and which is itself orientated toward a finished 
product - namely. the space-time materialized par excellence in the production line.4! 
It is this linear, serial space which is also produced in Street-Life in London. 
Moreover, the underclass portrayed in Street-Life is not circumscribed by the 
physical or social geography of the city in that the division between East End and 
West End, for example, is not invoked. In Living London, however, the capital is 
presented as being primarily not only a spatial order but it also, unlike Street-Life, 
emerges as a complete entity - an image achieved through a 'zonal', rather than 
segmented or cellular, representation of the city's spaces. This representation can be 
compared to the strategies operative in Charles Booth's social investigations. As 
John Goode has noted, Booth addressed himself to "the social space of the 
demographic process, the structure of the urban universe ... Booth establishes the 
city as a spatial order: urbanisation as a process is analysed in terms of the structure 
it determines, the map it drawS."46 So too, argues Goode, Booth's contemporary, 
the novelist George Gissing, "makes fictions out of the spatial order of the city as a 
totality.'t4'1 Thus, as opposed to the "organization of space in Dickens ... based on a 
U Quoted in John Goode, George Gissirtg: Ideology and Fictio1l, London. p. 92. 
"State, PtMU, Socialism, NLB. 1978. pp. 64-65 . 
... George Gwing: Ideology and Fictiort., op. cit .• p. 97. 
47 ibid., p. 98. 
89 
tension between obscurity and proximity",· space in the London described by both 
Booth and Gissing "is structured to guarantee the divisions on which it rests."49 
A similar representational strategy is operative in living London in terms of its 
codification of the social space of the city. Within this totalising vision, London is 
described as "a stage", a "panorama", and as "a cinematograph". As Sims also 
claims in the Prologue to the series: "All fonns and phases of London life, from the 
highest to the lowest, will be brought before us. For us the gates of the palace and 
the prison will fly open, and the West End and the East shall deliver up their 
mysteries. "50 
However, divorced from the method of direct personal encounter as employed 
in Street-Life in London, the photographed figures in Living London simply 
become motifs or adornments upon the page (figs. 2.32 - 2.34). As the mapping 
out of London displaces both individual and collective histories, people cease to be 
subjects but are here merely actors within the space of the city. Class is implicitly 
predicated as a category of space, and space as a function of class, as the text sets 
up a series of associations between specific places and their social identities. Thus, 
in the chapter entitled "Representative London Streets", one of the contributors, 
Edwin Pugh, writes: 
The 'East-End' and 'the West-End' are phrases indicative of more than mere locality. When we talk 
of 'the City' we do not always mean. strictly the entire area of London over which the Lord Mayor 
rules. We have come to apply these tenns to communities. 'The West-End' could by no stretch of 
the imagination be said 10 include Eating. though logically that is the truer West End of London. 
The City contains within its borders streets utterly commonplace and even squalid; but they have 
no place in the mental picture that those words 'the city' conjure up. London is. in shon. not to 
be rightly understood by a swdy of particular neighbourhoods. but by a swdy of her streets as can 
be said to be truly representative of one distinct phase in her daily life. 51 
Given this perception, the theatrical analogy cited in the Prologue is not altogether 
inappropriate, i.e."All the tragedies and all the comedies of the great city will be 
acted before us by men and women who are merely players"s1 in that it is the urban 
backdrop (in the fann of the reification of social identities and relations within the 
city's spaces) rather than particular individuals that is now the focus of attention and 
surv~y. Furthennore, as John Goode observes with reference to Gissing: 
The social space of the city. insofar as it is created space .. .is partly organized to keep class 
relations to an abstraction - suburbs, ghettos. thoroughfares are aU ways of keeping the 
U ibid .• p. 91. 
• ibid .• p. 99. 
10 Living Loradon. eel. Oeorae R. Sima. London, Cassell and Company. 1901-1903,p. 3. 
It ibid., p. 363. 
12 ibid •• p. S. 
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possibilities of direct confrontation at bay.9 
The most obvious and effective way of mapping the increasingly complex 
environment of the city and its composite spatial identity - this being especially the 
case in terms of London's unplanned and accumulative growth - was, and is, by 
comparison and contrast through the use of visual 'evidence'. In Living London 
textual descriptions and assertions (e.g. "the diamonds of the West will dazzle our 
eyes; the rags of the East will bring tears to them")54 are reinforced by the use of 
juxtaposed photographs such as Piccadilly contrasted with the New Cut in Lambeth 
(fig. 2.35). The same strategy was employed in a magazine series published a few 
years earlier called Round London. Each album consisted of "twenty-four 
remarkably fine views of London, reproduced from photographs taken by some of 
the most eminent photographic firms in the world." Once again London - the 
"Modern Babylon" - is presented as a total experience. As the inside cover extols: 
In speaking of London one is prone to platitudes: one iterates to weariness the overwhelming 
statistics. and one strives - too often in vain - to convey even the faintest impression of the 
wondrous Capital of the proudest and grandest Empire the world has ever seen. Here is a city 
whose opulence and magnitude have passed into proverb among the nations of the earth; a world 
within a world; a city wherein a man owning a single acre of land may be rich beyond the dreams 
of avarice. Our cicerone will not merely show us the world-renowned streets and the buildings of 
the City and the West-End. but will also conduct us into the labyrinths of Seven Dials, 
Whitechapel. and little-known. criminal London. as well as across the breezy heights of Hampstead 
Heath. the sylvan shades of Epping Forest, the many beautiful and rural spots that have not yet 
been reached by the tentacles of that mighty. ever-growing octopus - the capital of the British 
Empire." 
Like Living London, Round London also makes use of the juxtaposition of 
disparate sites within the city. Thus, for example, a photograph of the High Street, 
Borough is adjacent to one of Pall Mall; the New Cut, Lambeth (clearly a stock 
favourite) is contrasted with Marlborough House. What emerges from such series 
in both London and in other cities is the registering and circulation of the different 
spaces of the particular city. Photographs by the London Stereoscopic Society (fig. 
2.36) or of the Houses of Parliament or London Bridge produce an image of 
London the capital defined by its grand public sites and vistas and its places of 
. government and commerce which become the ubiquitous images of a city of both 
tourist attraction and the heart of the Empire (figs. 2.37 - 2.39). 
is George Girs;"g: Ithology tmd Fiction, op.cit .• p. 100. 
M Llv;"g Londota, op.cit •• p. S. 
• ROIUId LotrI:loft, All AIlHun 0/ Pic'.,.u from Pltotograplu of the Chiq Places of Interest in and arowul 
LoMon, London. Georgc NCWRCI Ltd •• c.1898. 
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Mapping the city 
Altogether different from this image of the capital, the photographs taken by John 
Galt, for instance, in and around Bethnal Green at the tum of the century (figs. 
2.40 - 2.43) fulfil a quite separate function and circulate an identity of the 'other' 
London. Here urban space is inscribed within the concerns of philanthropy and 
environmental discourses around sanitation and over-crowding, while the 
photographs themselves reinforce the socio-spatial codification of the city. 
Numerous examples of this codification can, of course, be cited elsewhere such as 
the Old Town of Edinburgh in Picturesque "Bits" contrasted against the city's 
thoroughfare of Princes Street, both of which in tum are implicitly defined against 
the particular identity of Glasgow. Cities such as Liverpool, Birmingham, 
Manchester and Bradford were frequently represented in terms of their commercial 
life and their municipal power with the framing of the massive architecture within 
the photograph so as to achieve an effect of monumentality which dominates the 
spectator (figs. 2.44 - 2.47)." 
By means of the circulation of such images an intricate morphology of urban 
space was both reinforced and produced as the city was broken down into an 
infinite series and overlaps of seemingly discrete spatial zones and functions. As 
Michel de Certeau has argued in his account of the emergence of the city as "a 
universal and impersonal subject", "the city enables us to conceive and construct a 
space on the basis of a finite number of stable and isolatable elements, each 
articulated to the other. 'lSI This process in tum produced a complex semiotics of 
space and place, e.g. the set-piece public scenes and monuments of the city, the 
sites of power, capital and exchange, historic landmarks, the Industrial grand-view 
and an emergent class landscape (figs. 2.48 - 2.52). And, as the terrain shifted, the 
camera was mobilised to register and record. As a consequence of this mobilisation, 
urban photography was to an extent constituted through its being caught within 
what might be described as one of the fundamental dynamics of modernity - the 
tension between fluidity and fixity, stasis and transformation. It was this dynamic 
which motivated much urban photography in the form of the documentation of land 
marked for rebuilding or demolition (figs 2.53 - 2.54) or as the contrast between 
the old and the new particularly in terms of the juxtaposition between the massive 
a See Nicholu Taylor, "Tho Awful Sublimity of the Victorian City" in Tit« Victorian City: Images and 
Realities, eels. HJ.Dyol and Michul Wolff, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, vol. 2. 
17 "Practices of Space" in On Signs, ed. Marshall Blonsicy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, p. 
127. 
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scale of municipal architecture (e.g. Town Halls) and the more intimate scale of the 
older buildings they towered over (figs. 2.55 - 2.60). 
As the created space of the city was continually being reshaped, so also the 
camera was employed to fix and freeze what Baudelaire had described as "the 
gesture of living beings ... and their luminous explosion in space", to frame "the 
moving chaos"" of the modern city. To a degree this utilisation of photography was 
determined within the bourgeoisie's attempts to control urban space, to mould and 
make legible its ideological meanings and to make the entire city visible by 
constructing lines of vision through it - quite literally in the case of Haussmann's 
"grand prospects". As Harvey argues, "Spaces and crowds had to be controlled if 
the bourgeoisie was to maintain its class position and power. '159 It is this question of 
who controlled urban space that is fundamental, for example, to the interaction 
between photography and the Commune of 1871. For, with political power both 
producing and being predicated upon specific spatial relations,15O what is articulated 
across the numerous photographs of scenes from the Commune is a range of 
conflicting attempts to appropriate the centre of Paris. On one level, this use of 
photography was perhaps the frrst openly instrumentalist use of the camera by the 
state. Very simply, the use of photography during the Commune was determined by 
who had access to the camera. Thus, not only were commemorative portraits (fig. 
2.61) of the communards later used by the police for identification purposes but the 
camera was used both to record the suppression of the commune (fig. 2.62) or as 
overt propaganda as in Eugene Appert's use of montage to produce fictive 
'reconstructions' of alleged communard atrocities (fig. 2.63). Ranging from 
souvenir portraits of the communard dead or images of buildings and monuments 
destroyed during the siege of Paris (figs. 2.64 - 2.66) or by the communards 
themselves (fig. 2.67) to the use of photographs for police surveillance, 
photography was employed as a means to both securing and then consolidating 
victory and the traditional values of patriotism (fig. 2.68) over oppositional forces.61 
Intrinsic to the Commune had been an attempt by workers etc. to reappropriate 
Ii Quoted in Marshall Berman. All Thalls Solid Mells 1"'0 Air, op. cit., pp. 145-159. 
It ConsciollS1lU$ GIld the Urban Experience, op.cil., p. 205. 
10 See, for example, Henri Lefebvre, "Reflections on the Politics of Space", A"'ipode, 8, 1976, espec. 
pp.30-33 • 
• 1 See Gen Doy, 'The Camera Against the Comm1D1e", Photography/Politics: OM, eds. Victor Burgin. 
Douglas Lowndes, Stuart Hood and Maggie Murray, Photography Workshop, (no dale). and Donald E. 
English, Political Usu of Photograph, in the Third French Republic 1871-1914. Ann Arbor. UMI 
Research Press Studies in Photography, pp. 21-79. 
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the city centre from which they had to a large part been expelled as a consequence 
of Haussmann's rebuilding. As Harvey describes: 
The dilemma in 1868-71, as in 1848, was that the republican bourgeoisie had to open its space in 
order to achieve its own bourgeois revolution. Weakened it could not resist the rising pressure of 
the working class and revolutionary movements. It was for this reason that the reoccupation of 
central Paris by the popular classes took on such symbolic importance. For it occurred in a context 
where the poor were being chased, in imaginatioo as well as in fact, from the strategic spaces and 
even off the boulevards now viewed as bourgeois interiors. The more space was opened up 
physically, the more it had to be partitioned and closed off through social practice ... Thus did the 
geographical imagination of the bourgeoisie impose sociospatial structuration on a Paris that 
Haussman's works had opened up to closer scrutiny.G 
With the boulevard being both a means and a sign of the bourgeoisie's attempt to 
take over Paris, the structuring spatial dimensions of the Commune can in effect be 
seen as a struggle between the boulevard and the artisans l quarrier. It is this spatial 
division which in part explains the recurrent images of the barricades put up by the 
communards (figs. 2.69 - 2.70). Indeed the frequency and repetition of these 
images - the barricade across the Rue de Rivoli at the Tuileries or the destruction of 
the Ministry of Finances having an almost magnetic pull for photographers - are 
symptomatic not only of the importance of these sites as spaces of bourgeois 
hegemony but are indicative too of what Steve Neale described as "an enormous 
investment in perspective .. [and] an enormous social investment in the centrality of 
the eye." Just as Marville's "Rue de Rivoli" functioned as a space for scopic 
presence, the images of the barricades (with their connotations of blockage and the 
returned look) can be read as an attempt to reassert control and efface these barriers 
to the gaze by mobilising the ideal, homogeneous space of photography against the 
figures of class and social difference. 
For it is within the context of the ambition to transform Paris into a wholly 
bourgeois space that the Commune can be understood as a resistance to the class 
hiera.rchisation of the city's spaces in that what the Commune represented was a 
radical reconstruction of urban space. As Kristen Ross observes: 
The failure of the communards in the 'mature' realm of military and politico-economic efficacy is 
balanced by their accomplishments in the Imaginary or preconscious space that lies outside specific 
and directly representable class functions - the space that could be said to constitute the realm of 
political desire rather then need .. .!f workers are those who are not allowed to transform the 
space/time allotted them, then the lesson of the Commune can be found in its recognition that 
revolution consists not in changing the juridical fonn that that allots space/time (for example, 
allowing a party to appropriate bureaucratic organization) but rather in completely transforming the 
nature of space/time ... The working existence of the Commune constituted a critique pronounced 
against geographical zoning whereby diverse forms of of socio-economic power are installed: a 
breakdown of privileged place or places in favor of a pennanent exchange between distinct places -
• Consciorunus and the Urban Experience, Op.CiL 
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thus the importance of the quartier ••• The breakdown of spatial hierarchy in the Commune, one 
aspect of which was the establishment of places of political deliberation and decision making that 
were no longer secret but open and accessible, brought about a temporal division as well.1l 
It is within these attempts by conflictual class and social groupings to transfonn the 
uses and meanings of }.lIban space that photographs of the Commune need to be 
situated. For while the overt partisanship of propagandist photography is 
unavoidably acknowledged, none of these photographs is in fact just a passive 
record of events or an image which exists somehow outside of the scenes it 
represents. Instead all of these images are symptomatic of and implicated within 
particular spatial regimes and are detennined by the conditions of access for the 
gaze in terms of who controlled or had access to the city. But while the Commune 
represented an attempt to break down the spatial hierarchies of the city, by the turn 
of the century both the boulevard and the security of a classed and proprietorial gaze 
had been restored (figs. 2.71 - 2.73). 
Whether, then, used within strategies of bourgeois socialisation, as in Street-
Life in London, or against the Paris Commune, or, more obliquely, through 
establishing a coherent, ordered and stable identity for the urban environment, the 
camera was an invaluable tool in the bourgeoisie's "endless conquest of space't64 
arriving, too, just at the historical moment when that class "fmally consolidated the 
triumph of space as a concrete abstraction with real power in relation to social 
practices. "65 
However, as in the photographs of the Commune, it is through this use of the 
camera that a tension also emerged: indeed, a contradiction that needed somehow to 
be managed, between the ideal of a universal, homogeneous and measurable spatial 
order (an abstract, Euclidean realm exemplified in the model of photographic space) 
and the actual, lived social fragmentation of space. It is this process of spatial 
fragmentation and universalisation that has been described by Poulantzas in his 
discussion of spatiality as the support and embodiment of the relations of 
production: 
Separation and division in order to unify; parcelling out in order to structure; atomization in order 
to encompass; segmentation in order to homogenize; and individualization in order to obliterate 
differences and otherness.· 
U TM Emergence 0/ Social Space: RimbalUl and 1M Paris COtPIII'IIUIe, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1988, pp. 
39-42. 
14 David Harvey, COMcioIUMU and tM Urbtua ExperWtce, op.cit., p. 12. 
II ibid., p. 13 . 
.. State, Power, Socialism, Ope cit., p. 107. 
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Similarly, as Harvey describes: 
The homogeneity of space is achieved through its total 'pulverisation' into freely alienable parcels 
of private property. to be bought and traded at will upon the market. The result is the permanent 
tension between the appropriation and use of space for individual and social purposes and the 
domination of space through private property and other fonns of class and social power.67 
Moreover, as he continues: 
The response is for each and eveI'J stratum in society to use whatever powers of domination it can 
command (money. political influence. even violence) to try to seal itself off (or seal off others 
judged undesirable) in fragments of space within which processes of reproduction of social 
distinction can be jealously protected." 
Within this context photography not only registered social fragmentation but it was 
also part of the continual efforts to rationalise and unify the city's created space, to 
curb its atomization by containing alternative (and potentially subversive) class 
spaces - in short, the mobilisation of the camera within the process that Foucault 
has described as "the analytic arrangement of space." 
Furthennore, as Michel de Certeau has observed, "The deske to see the city 
preceded the means of attempting to fulfil that desire."69 It was the camera that came 
to be the means of fulfilling that desire or phantasy of scopic omnipotence or of a 
totalising vision - an obvious product being panoramic or aerial photography. And 
it is in the context of this desire to see the city that photography operated, at least 
implicitly, with reference to a notion of the democratisation of vision not simply in 
tenns of access to the camera, but in relation to the promotion of the belief that the 
different spaces of the city were indeed accessible and available to be freely 
appropriated by the camera. In this manner disparate spaces and their various 
identities could be levelled to the apparently unproblematic status of simply being an 
image among an infinite series - a process perhaps somewhat similar to the 
'democracy' of money or capital as described by Harvey in his analysis of money 
as both the great leveller (with everything reducible to commodity status) and the 
source of fragmentation and social division. It was this tension, or continual 
displacement, between one conception of space (as an ideal abstraction) and the 
other (as social and conflictual), that to a great extent in the nineteenth century (as 
today) structured the interaction between the camera and the urban milieu within 
which it was employed. 
i7 ConsciolUPW$ and 1M Urban Experience. op.cit .• p. 13 • 
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3 
THE VIEW ON THE GROUND 
The right to look. or the invention of the other I 
In the previous chapter I argued for the increasing importance of photography in 
the production and circulation of a morphology of urban spaces: spaces which were 
simultaneously defined both as generic types and as specific localities. Essentially, 
the identities of these spaces were determined by their function - for example, 
monumental and civic sites, major public thoroughfares, and areas of particular 
ec<:>nomic activity or class residency. By means of this photographic production the 
legibility of cities was secured through their being mapped out as assemblages of a 
range of identities and usages. By the tum of the century, as evident in a photo-text 
such as Living London, the dominant taxonomies of the major cities (but especially 
of the capital itself) were well established to the point of being banally reproduced. 
A set of representational conventions had been installed which still remain powerful 
in structuring the imaginary cartography not only of contemporary London but also 
of the Industrial (or typically northern) city. 
This classification of urban spaces can be likened to Foucault's description of 
"opinion" as: 
a mode of operation through which power will be exercised by virtue of the mere fact of things 
being known and people seen in a sort of immediate, collective and anonymous gaze. A form of 
power whose main instance is that of opinion will refuse to tolerate areas of darkness.2 
But while photography can be situated within this regime of the gaze, its aims and 
modes of operation - in particular, its construction of lines of vision so as to "bring 
to light" the previously hidden - were by no means unproblematic. Not only was 
the archive structured across the tension between an ideal, homogeneous 
photographic space which was counterposed against the heterogeneity of the city, 
but this tension can be located more specifically in terms of the accessibility or 
resistance of particular spaces to the external gaze. Foucault's account of the 
, Jacques Derrida. Afterword (untidcd) in Droils " Regard, photographs by Marie-Francoise Plissart, 
Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1985, p. xxxvi. 
I PowulKnowkdgc: Essays tmdlntuviews, ed. Colin Gordon, New York, Pantheon Books, p. 154. 
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"imperative to look" needs here to be referred to what Dennis Porter has described 
as "the licence to look"] which was itself partly contingent upon who had a "right to 
the city.'''' Looking was neither an automatic or universal right while it was often an 
activity which c;ould entail specific risks. In the context of the photographic 
production of specural identities for viewers, this tension between disparate spatial 
orders (ideal projective spaces set against those of urban alterity) can be located in 
terms of the potential threats to the spectator's self-reflexive presence (the viewer's 
identification with the plenitude of the gaze) through the disruption of the conditions 
of that gaze with the consequent fracturing of specural security. 
The dangers associated with looking can be more clearly examined with 
reference to the perception and experience by the observer on the street of those 
'shocks' which were particular to city-life and which were perhaps first described 
by Simmel. For it was the city's streets which were most notably the arena for a 
defming feature of modernity - the association between an "unknown realm [and] 
the risk of sudden, shocking confrontations". As one commentator has observed, in 
the "in the more orthodox sociological analyses ofmodernity ... the experience of the 
modem occurred mainly in the public sphere. "5 Yet, while perhaps receiving an 
excess of attention over other realms, such as the domestic, this public sphere 
remained a paramount site of modernity. But arguably as the sites and processes of 
industrial production became more organised, the signs of the modem and the 
potential for shocking confrontations became most apparent on the street itself. For, 
despite incre~ing and often successful attempts to minimise the opportunities for 
inter-class contact (often in conjunction with emergent patterns of urban growth), 
streets always offered the possibility of an unregulated randomness and promiscuity 
of social encounter and exchange (fig. 2.9). 
It is some specific forms of social encounter that could take place on the street 
or, as significant, the management or overt avoidance of such encounters which is 
the issue that I wish to address in this chapter through a reading of a selection of 
mid-century texts by Engels, Mayhew and Baudelaire - a reading which will also 
make reference to Walter Benjamin's account of modernity. My aim, however, is 
not simply to appropriate either these texts or Benjamin's own terms at face value 
but to suggest instead that they to a degree can be situated and read within a 
5 The PIU'8uil 0/ C,iIM, Art GIld I"ology in C,iIM Fiction. New Haven and London. Yale University 
Presl, 1981, p. 241. 
4 Quoted by Kriltin ROIS, The Emugence of Social Space. op. cit., p. 4. 
I .Janet Wolff, "The Invisible Flaneux : Women and the Uterature of Modernity", Theory, Cultu,e and 
Society. 2, 3, 1985, pp. 37-38. 
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psychoanalytic framework. But this is not to construct individual pathologies of 
these authors as discrete monadic consciousnesses. Rather, the 'author' operates 
here as both the name of a collection of texts and, as subject, as the effect of these 
texts.6 
Principally I shall concentrate upon Engels's The Condition of the Working 
Class in England (1845) which was not only one of the flISt major accounts of the 
modem city but it was also a text explicitly marked by the conjunction between an 
"unknown realm" and "shocking confrontations". One chapter from Engels's book 
is especially pertinent here. In this chapter, "On the Great Towns", Engels 
addresses the problem not only of how to set about representing the city but also the 
difficulties of both physical movement and visual registration within it. For, aside 
from the general polemic throughout the chapter, what is at stake in this narrative is 
Engels's maintenance of a position of authorial observation and control. In other 
words, what emerges from the text is an account of how Engels, in what might be 
described as his engagement with difference, adopts various strategies in order to 
secure a position of exteriority as an objective observer who is politically alert and 
sympathetic to the scenes of otherness which he describes but who remains, 
nonetheless, positioned outside of them. 
Dominant among these strategies is the central emphasis given by Engels to the 
issue of spectatorial positionality in tenns of proximity and distance. Associated 
with this is Engels's reading of the city in terms of the organisation of space both in 
the context of the (ir)rationality of the modem industrial city and within what could 
be called a critique of (in)visibility - concerns which are symptomatic of Engels's 
overall attempt to fmd a method and vocabulary adequate to representing the city as 
unified totality beneath its surface chaos. 
It is with reference to some of the discursive tropes employed to describe the 
city within these texts that I wish to draw out particular aspects of urban 
photography by viewing a range of images which for the most part share a common 
identity in so far as they were all produced in association with investigative surveys 
into what might be called the areas of overt social and class difference within the 
city. For while, on the one hand, photography was mobilised for the securing of a 
, See Foucault'l "What is an Author?" in Language, Counter.Memory, Practice. op.cit., pp. in 
conj\Ulction with Derrida'i remarks on 'authorship', i.e. "The 'subject' of writing does not exist if we 
mean by that some lovereip IOlitude of the author. The lubject of writing is a system of relations 
between Itrata .•• the psyche, lociety, the world. Within that scene, on that stage, the punctual simplicity 
of the lovereignty of the clusical subject is not to be found", "Freud and the Scene of Writing", 
Writing and DiJluence ,op.cit., pp. 226-227. 
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coherent legibility for the city through the operations of a panoptic or panoramic 1 
gaze, the coherence of this overview always threatened to collapse at the point of 
direct encounter on the streets. It is within this tension between the panoramic or 
totalising gaze and the perceptual experience at street-level that I shall situate these 
photographs. 
Distant prospects: Engels and Mayhew on London 
This tension can be illustrated here by comparing Engels's account of his arrival in 
London with Henry Mayhew's description of the capital in his Introduction to The 
Criminal Prisons of umOOn (1868). What is striking in these two texts is their use 
of similar narrative devices but so as to achieve quite different representations of the 
same city. Thus, for example, both texts employ the juxtaposition between the 
/ \ grand panoramic view and the experience of walking through the city. Similarly, 
both authors dwell upon a graphic description of the crowd although they register 
the experience of being within it in altogether dissimilar ways. 
In the opening paragraph of ''The Great Towns" chapter Engels draws attention 
to the role of physical distance as a determinate condition for both representing and 
knowing the city: 
I know nothing more imposing than the view which the Thames offers during the ascent from the 
sea to London Bridge. The masses of buildings. the wharves on both sides, especially from 
Woolwich upwards, the countless ships along both shores, crowding ever closer together, until, at 
last, only a narrow passage remains in the middle of the river, a passage through which hundreds of 
steamers shoot by one another; all this is so vast, so impressive, that a man cannot collect 
himself, but is lost in the marvel of England's greatness before he sets foot upon English soil.7 
For Engels the view from the Thames produces a distinct form of visual pleasure 
for the spectator, a pleasure of disruption, in which "a man cannot collect himself 
but is lost in the marvels of English greatness.'" This particular pleasure or 
excitation had, of course, antecedents within accounts of the Sublime and had been 
cited as a consequence of a dramatic contrast between the viewing subject and an 
expansive scene which overwhelmed the gaze. 
The pleasure of the gaze is also explicitly addressed by Mayhew in his chapter 
"A Ball?On View over London" which he opens with the observation that: 
There is an innate desire in all men to view the earth and its cities and its plains from 'exceeding 
high places', since even the least imaginative can feel the pleasure of beholding some broad 
landscape spread out like a bright coloured carpet at their feet, and of lOOking down upon the world 
as though they scanned it with eagle's eyes. For it is an exquisite treat to all minds to find that 
they have the power. by their mere vision. of extending their consciousnesses to scenes and objects 
that are miles away; and as the intellect experiences a special delight in being able to comprehend 
, TM COItdilion O/IM Working Cws ita England, Granada. 1981, p. 57. 
• ibid. 
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all the minute particulars of a subject under one associate whole. and to perceive the previous 
confusion of the diverse details assume the fonn and order of a perspicuous unity; so docs the eye 
love to see the country or the town. which it usually knows only as a series of disjointed 
parts ... become all outlined ... into one harmonious and varied scene ... With the great cities. however. 
the desire to perceive the diverse multitude of houses at one single glance instead of by some 
thousand different views ... is a feeling sttong upon everyone - the wisest as well as the most 
frivolous - upon all. indeed. from the philosopher to the idler about town."' 
Like Engels, Mayhew also emphasises the awe-inspiring effect of the grand view. 
Yet here the "pleasure of beholding" is achieved through a totalising and omniscient 
~ vision for the spectator which effaces both fragmentation and illegibility - lithe 
previous confusion of diverse details" - as well as the pedestrian's dependence 
upon the partial view. Here Mayhew sets up a dense associative chain between 
desire, pleasure, power, vision, consciousness and love which are all cited as facets 
of a "desire to perceive." In turn, this empowering and libidinal economy of the 
scopic is both predicated upon and supports an effacement of the conflictual and 
destabilising visual field of difference - an effacement encoded here as a desire for 
wholeness, unity and harmony. 
This chain of affects, then, becomes the detenninant condition of an omnipotent 
and thus pleasurable position for the viewer. Whereas, for Engels, the image of 
London had been too "vast" to encompass, Mayhew, albeit from the more distant 
and aerial vantage point of a balloon, is able to "grasp it in the eye, in all its 
incongruous integrity, at one single glance."10 In association with this all-
comprehending and God-like gaze is an almost nostalgic feeling of unassailable 
security which comes close to the solipsist structures of primary narcissism: 
to swing in the air high above the petty jealousies and heart-burnings. small ambitions and vain 
parades of 'polite' society, and feel. for once, ttanquil as a babe in a cot, and that you are hardly of 
the earth earthly. as. Jacob-like. you mount the aerial ladder, and half lose sight of the 'great 
commercial world' beneath. where men are regarded as mere counters to play with, and to do your 
neighbour as your neighbour would do you constitutes the first principle in the religion of trade -
to feel yourself floating through the endless realms of space ... and enjoying. for a brief half hour. at 
least, a foretaste of that Elysian destiny which is the ultimate hope of al1.11 
The two forms of pleasure described by Engels and Mayhew need not, 
however, be regarded as being mutually exclusive and in the context of looking at 
photographs can readily coexist. Indeed, it is this coexistence which may in part 
explain the particular appeal of the panoramic or aerial view (figs. 3.1 - 3.3, 3.5). 
For, as the eye scans these photographs, the viewer moves between an empowered 
gaze over the city which is laid out before it and an awareness, evoked through 
• Henry Mayhew and John Bimly. TM C,iminal Prisons of Londort. tJNl Scenu of P,ison Life. London, 
Griffin. Bohn and Co., 1862. pp. 7-8. 
10 ibid •• p. 9. 
It ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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memory and projection, of the inescapable knowledge of the body's physical scale. 
While the pleasure of this (temporary) release from corporeal scale is the more 
powerful sensation here - although for Engels, of course, the sheer scale of the city 
merely drew attention to the spectator's own tiny size - this pleasure is also 
circumscribed by the realisation that this situation is also unreal. Pleasure here 
involves a suspension of knowledge which then allows for a phantasy of scopic 
plenitude. Within this cognitive ambivalence the viewer moves between recognition 
and disassociation: recognition of typical urban structures and perhaps also of 
familiar landmarks but seen now from a vantage point that was previously 
inaccessible - a situation within which, according to Mayhew, the spectator has the 
pleasure of "recognising the different places and objects ... under a wholly different 
aspect."ll 
As part of this production of spaces which displace or suspend the conventional 
anthropocentric dimensions of scale (structured by reference to the body), such 
images often create striking spatial paradoxes. In an anonymous Daguerreotype of ' 
Paris of 1844 (fig. 3.4) such paradoxes become especially striking as the broad 
sweep of the city is contained within an object which the viewer can physically hold 
- a dislocation of scale all the more effective as a result of the fascination evoked by 
the minute detail captured upon the metal surface. 
Such spatial paradoxes become yet more apparent in Nadar's aerial photographs 
of Paris. For while his 1858 view over Montmartre (fig. 3.6) remains within a 
fairly conventional fonnat, his images of the quartier l'Etoile (fig. 3.7) taken a 
decade later produce a dynamic and relative space - an effect all the more intensified 
by the breaking up of the city's structure into a sequence of composite serial views 
as the single grand view is here replaced by an almost cinematic sequence. 
Moreover, through a dramatic tilting of the image which now fills the picture plane -
with which the image is also parallel - Nadar sets up an uncertain relation between 
flatness, surface and depth. Simultaneously, the eye is denied a single fIXed point 
upon which to focus but is instead compelled to track the intricate patterns of the 
streets but only, at times, to fmd itself back where it started. This disruptive effect 
here of repetition across the series militates against the clear legibility of the image -
a legibility, too, which is dependent upon a carefully gauged (i.e. not excessive) 
distance. The reading of this image thus demands sophisticated interpretive skills 
from the viewer for whom seeing now largely makes sense only by explicit 
ta 'b'd 21 1 1 ., p. • 
102 
reference to what is already known. Moreover, instead of a smooth elision between 
vision and cognition, the need for a deliberative decoding of the image opens a gap 
between them. 
As a consequence of this tilting of the image, Nadar produces a novel 
representation of the city which becomes a grid-like structure of gC?Ometric patterns. 
The image thus reads as a virtual blueprint for a Haussmannised Paris - a visual and 
aerial complement to the triangulation of the old city. Indeed, not only did the 
Haussmannisation of Paris produce a more regular pattern for the city, but it was 
only from a high vantage point that the dramatic transformations produced through 
the urban rebuilding could effectively be seen. 
Yet, as Nadar's picture reveals, the aim of depicting the city as a totality or as 
near as was possible, also entailed a risk to the legibility of that image. But for 
Nadar himself photography could potentially be employed as a fonn of aerial 
cartography. Indeed, he had ambitions to photographically map the whole of 
France. Yet it is within the terms of such a project that two potentially exclusive and 
self-defeating tendencies emerge. On the one hand, an ambition to produce the 
ultimate panorama in the fonn of a national survey recording the entire surface of 
the nation. However, on the other hand, the means of achieving such a project 
entailed a radical disruption of conventional representations of space and demanded 
new skills of visual decoding as a result of the effacement of both the gestalt 
immediacy of the image and of the smooth suturing of the viewer. 
Crowds and streets: strategies of observation 
As a consequence of these two tendencies Nadar's photograph of the quartier 
L 'Etoile stands as a limit-point of the panoramic in that it is an image in which the 
(over) ambitious demands of the survey provoke a crisis of the picture's legibility. 
Such a crisis was also implicit in Engels's description of London from the Thames 
although constructed here as a disruptive threat to the hitherto secure observer. In 
the "Great Towns" chapter Engels writes in a similarly hyperbolic vein about the 
distant views of other cities but here he operates within a tradition of topographical 
accounts of the beautiful rath.er than _~f the Sublime. However, Engel's reference to 
- - ------.---.. 
the picturesque is heavily ironic. Dublin he describes initially as "a city the approach 
to which from the sea is as channing as that of London is imposing." However, he 
continues that: "By way of compensation, however, the poorer districts of Dublin 
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are among the most hideous and repulsive to be seen in the world."ll Similarly, he 
writes of Bradford that, "On week days the town is enveloped in a grey cloud of 
coal smoke, but on a fine Sunday it offers a superb picture, when viewed from the 
surrounding heights. Yet within there reigns the same filth and discomfort as in 
Leeds." 
This juxtaposition between a city's distant image and the reality "within" is also 
to be found in Engels's description of London. For, after enthusiastically citing the 
great achievements of the capital, Engels then abruptly changes tone: 
But the sacrifices which all this has cost become apparent later. After roaming the streets of the 
capital a day or two. making headway with difficulty through the human turmoil and the endless 
lines of vehicles. after visiting the slums of the metropolis, one realises for the first time that 
these Londoners have been forced to sacrifice the best qualities of their hwnan nature. to bring to 
pass all the great marvels of civilisation which crowd their city •.. The very turmoil of the streets 
has something repulsive against which human nature rebels ..• The brutal indifference, the unfeeling 
isolation of each in his private interest becomes the more repellent and offensive. the more these 
individuals are crowded together, within a limited space. And. however much one might be aware 
of the isolation of the individual, this narrow self-seeking is the fundamental principle of our 
society everywhere, it is nowhere so shamelessly barefaced. so self-conscious as just here in the 
crowding of the great city. The dissolution of mankind into monads of which each one has a 
separate principle and a separate purpose. the world of atoms. is here carried to its utmost 
extteme.14 
What is significant about this passage is not only Engels's attempt to descriptively 
register the nature of the urban crowd but also his moral and social self-distancing. 
As Walter Benjamin observed: 
Engels is dismayed by the crowd; he responds with a moral reaction. and an aesthetic one as well; 
the speed with which all the people rush past one another unsettles him. The charm of his 
description lies in the intersecting of unshakable critical integrity with an old-fashioned attitude. 
The writer came from a Gennany that was still provincial; he may never have faced the temptation 
to lose himself in a stream of people'" 
In effect, Engels here registers a response and a description which, striking as it is, 
is not really developed further, except for a rather general reference to the "social 
warfare" engendered by capital. The more important aspect of this passage, 
however, is Engels's maintenance of a distance, not only critical and psychical but 
also physical, as evident in his dislike of crowding "within a limited space." 
Engels's response here is hardly that of the flaneur's suspension of the self in 
relation to the crowd - Baudelaire, for example, had written of the flaneur's desire 
"to become one flesh with the crowd. "16 Instead, Engels stresses his feeling of 
complete and detached isolation and his preselVation of a monadic selfhood - the 
\aTM Condition oltM Working Class in England. op.cit., p. 66. 
t. ibid., pp. S7-SS. 
11 Charla BtJlltklaire, A L,ric Poet in 1M Era of H igla Capitalism, trans. Harry Zolm. London, VelSo, pp. 
121-122. 
II Quoted by David Frisby, FraglMllls 0/ Moder,"", Op.CiL, p. 17. 
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very feature of the urban crowd that he is so critical of. 
Engels's description of London and his psychological response to its crowds 
can be compared to Mayhew's text which, while sharing common themes, strikes a 
very different tone. Mayhew writes: 
The thoroughfares of London constitute. assuredly. the finest and most remarkable of all the sights 
that London contains. Not that this is due to their architectural display even though ... as we walk 
along. a kind of architectural panorama glides before our eyes ... [the] London thorough-fares arc. 
simply. the fmest of all sights - in the world we may say - on account of the never-ending and 
infinite variety of life to be seen in them. 
Beyond doubt. the enormous multitude ever pouring through the principal metropolitan 
thoroughfares strike the nrst deep impression upon the stranger's mind; we ourselves never 
contemplate the tumultuous scene without feeling that here lies the true grandeur of the Capital -
the distinctive mark. that gives a special sublimity to the spot. 
Travellers speak of the awful magnificence of the great torrent of Niagara. .. But what is this in 
grandeur to the vast human tide - the stupendous living torrent of thousands upon thousands of 
restless souls. each quickened with some different purpose. and for ever rushing along the great 
leading thoroughfares of the Metropolis ... of the several emotions and wills stirring each of the 
homuncular atoms comprising that dense human stream. 
There is no scene in the wide world, indeed. equal in grandeur to the contemplation of the 
immensity of this same London traffic .. .!f the desert is the very intensity of the sublime for the 
feeling of tragic loneliness - of terrible isolation that it induces - from the awful solemnity of the 
great oceans of desolation encompassing the traveller. surely this monster Metropolis is equally 
sublime, though from the opposite cause - from the sense of the infinite multitude of people with 
which we are surrounded. and yet of our comparative. if not absolute. friendlessness and isolation 
in the very midst of such an infinite multitude." 
As opposed to Engels's defensive reaction to the crowd which he perceives as 
alien, for Mayhew it is this crowd which is the awesome and sublime 'sign' of 
London. Within this account the city provides a constant visual spectacle and both 
the crowd, and the isolation of the observer within it, are seen as neither threatening 
nor unpleasant but as phenomena to be wondered at. 
Engel's, however, was not to be unique in voicing his particular response to the 
city and the theme of the individual's isolation within the city's crowds was to be 
taken up by others, and perhaps most markedly by Dickens. Engels's account also 
prefigures many features of Simmers description of the predominance of the blase 
attitude and of private reserve as both a means of maintaining social distance and as 
a defence against the constant bombardment of the individual by the rush of images, 
shocks and collisions experienced within the city. However, within the chapter as a 
whole, Engels's more specific purpose is to highlight the contrast between the I ¥ 
I 
grand vista or prospect, with all its artistic associations, and the reality on the streets \ 
and, more particularly, in those areas just off from the main public thoroughfares. 
As Engels remarks, "the sacrifices which all this has cost become apparent later." 
However, that reality can only "become apparent" by Engels reversing those social 
and physical barriers of distance which he had maintained in his initial response to 
It 1M Criminal PristHu of LotuJon, op.CiL, pp. 53-54. 
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the crowds on London's streets. Instead of maintaining distance, Engels now 
adopts as a deliberate strategy a mode of exploring and experiencing the city based 
upon close physical proximity and an active, critical searching for evidence. 
Mayhew, too, despite his celebration of the crowd, is still faced with the 
problem of how to represent it For its sublime quality is essentially a function of 
distance. Mayhew thus extols the view from St. Paul's from whence: 
the monster sublimity of the city stretched out before us. It was utterly unlike London as seen 
below in its every-day bricken and hard-featmed reality, seeming to be the spectral illusion of the 
great Metropolis ... as the vast Capital lay beneath us, half hidden in mist, and with only a glimpse 
of its greatness visible, it had a much more sublime effect from the very inability of the mind to 
grasp the whole in all its literal details'" 
Just as Mayhew invokes the "illusion" of distance - but, unlike Engels, without the 
subsequent exposure of what this distance disguises - so too, his attempt to "grasp 
the whole in all its literal details" parallells Engels's strategy. But while Engels 
moves from the general impression while simultaneously reversing his self-
distancing, Mayhew's method is to "descend to particulars"l' and to produce an 
encyclopaedic inventory of streets and their characteristics: in effect, an attempt to 
define what he calls the typically "Londonesque" by means of an exhaustive 
catalogue produced through a cumulative compilation of details and statistics.20 
Engels's strategy of moving from the grand, public vista and the general 
impression to descriptions of the local and particular is most evident in his 
description of Manchester which begins with a detailed account of the city's 
geographical location. But it is in response to Manchester's streets that his critical ) 
methodology fully emerges. For within Engel's social pathology of the city, streets j 
and houses are indices of the whole social order. As he comments, "the manner in 
which the needs of a shelter is satisfied furnishes a standard for the manner in 
which all other necessities are supplied. "21 
As Engels's develops his typology of Manchester's streets in terms of their use 
and function i.e. the commercial district, middle class suburbs etc., a number of 
key themes emerge. Engels's himself appears to be particularly struck by the 
patterns of class visibility within the city. As he remarks: 
The town itself is particularly built, so that a person may live in it for years, and go in and out 
daily without coming into contact with a working-people's quarter or even with workers, that is. 
so long as he confines himself to his business or to pleasure walks ... And the finest part of this 
arrangement is this, that the members of the money aristocracy can take the shortest road threat the f, I 
middle of all the labouring districts to their places of business, without ever seeing that the'Yare in I 
ti ·b·d 24 1 1 ., p. . 
,. ibid., p. 54. 
:ao ibid., espcc.,pp. 53-63. 
21 TM Condition of tM Worki", Class in ElIglaIId. op.cit., p. 99. 
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the midst of the grimy misery that lurks to the right and the left. For the thoroughfares leading to 
the Exchange in all directions are lined, on both sides, with an almost unbroken series of 
shops ... [which] suffice to conceal from the eyes of the wealthy men and women of strong 
stomachs and weak nerves the misery and grime which form the complement to their wealth .. .! 
have never seen so systematic a shutting out of the working-class from the thoroughfares, so 
tender a concealment of everything which might affront the eye and the nerves of the bourgeoisie, 
as in Manchester.22 
. However, as Engel's notes, the invisibility of the poor and the working classes is 
not wholly the consequence of deliberate planning. For, as opposed to many 
'liberal' moralising and philanthropic discourses upon poverty, Engels argues that it 
is the structure and functions of the city itself which both create and maintain the 
poverty, inequality and class divisions which he describes. In particular, it was the 
invisibility of the poor which had long been as source of the fear of them. Ed win 
Chadwick, for example, had argued in 1842 that it was necessary to remove the 
spatial and architectural barriers which allowed the "immoral" to be "secluded from 
superior inspection and from common observation. "23 In the same year W. Cooke 
Taylor had observed of Manchester that "its narrow streets, its courts and cellars, 
have been abandoned to the poorest grade of artisans. There they live, hidden from 
the view of the higher ranks by piles of stores, mills warehouses, and 
manufacturing establishments, less known to their wealthy neighbours."24 
Similarly, the Select Committee of 1838 had claimed that: 
There were districts in London through which no great thoroughfares passed, and which were 
wholly occupied by a dense population composed of the lowest class of persons who being entirely 
secluded from the observation and influence of better educated neighbours exhibited a state of moral 
degradation deeply to be deplored .. the moral condition of these poor occupants would necessarily 
be improved by communication with more respectable inhabitants.2S 
Such sentiments were commonly voiced. And it was this perception of the 
invisibility of the poor or the residuum (yet often within a situation of close inter-
class residential adjacency) which was also a motivating source for bourgeois fears 
and anxieties. However, as Engels argued regarding the poor, their social isolation 
and invisibility were structural consequences of capitalism itself and, as such, could 
not simply be removed or legislated away - an event which, for Engels at least, 
would only come about through class revolution. Not surprisingly, this analysis 
contrasts with Mayhew for whom urbanism, as epitomised by London, was read as 
a self-congratulatory narrative of civic progress, municipal pride and "abundant 
2i ibid., pp. 78-80. 
U Quoted by Peter Stallybrus and Allon White. TM Politic, tmd Poetic, 0/ Transgres,ion, Methuen, 
1986, p. 126. 
24 Quoted by Steven Marcus, Engel" MIJIICM,tu, tuu:l tM Working CllJls. London. Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson. 1974, p. Sl. 
21 Quoted by Gareth Stedman Jones, OraclJIt London, A Stlldy in tM Relatiofllhip Between Clas,es in 
Victorian Soc~ly, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984, p. 166. 
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charity.'f26 Similarly, Mayhew had identified the urban population in tenns of its 
endless diversity. This was represented, for example, in his enumeration of the 
different social "types" to be found in London and in his description of the "strange 
and incongruous" contrasts which produced the capital's identity as "a city of 
antithesis. "%7 For Engels, however, there are only two classes or two antagonistic 
polarities, who exist in a state of near manichean opposition. 
In his description of Manchester's streets, Engels produces a detailed survey of 
the city's spatial topography which operates both, horizontally or laterally (e.g. in 
tenns of patterns of class residence) as well as vertically - as evident, for example, 
in his particular fascination with cellars (fig. 3.8). This spatial typology or counter-
pointing is itself part of Engels's attempt to impose some fonn of coherent order 
upon the apparent chaos of the city. Indeed, the tension between the seeming 
irrationality of the city when seen close up and the search for a method to register 
this, while also fonnulating an historical account which can make sense of the city's 
disparate identities, is fundamental to Engels's project in "The Great Towns" I 
chapter. 
For Mayhew, the legibility of the city is never in doubt. For despite his 
emphasis upon the sheer scale of the city and upon the endless variety of its 
population which the "mere pedantry of statistics"211 cannot adequately capture, it is 
these differences which in fact produce an image of the city as a composite totality. 
And it is in order to read this totality that Mayhew employs a variety of strategies 
and discourses ranging from the language of tourist guide-books (for example, the 
emphasis upon national landmarks and the reiteration of the West EndlEast End 
division) to a spatial and functional taxonomy of the city's streets and from a 
description of "the principal social and moral contrasts to be noted in London 
town"» to an ethnographic and "scientific classification"30 of its residents. Through 
such devices and framed within Mayhew's spatialising gaze - as he goes both 
"beneath the moral surface" of the city while also seeking to "contemplate it from 
above"" - London and its crowds are seen as being accessible to systematic 
investigation and are as a result ultimately both ordered and knowable. 
Engels, however, throughout his own text, frequently remarks upon the 
5 TM C,imiMl P'UOM o/I..ondota. op.cit., p. 41. 
17 ibid., p. 28. 
• ibid., p. 11. 
• ibid., p. 28. 
ao ibid., p. 45. 
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irrationality of the city both in tenns of its socio-economic functioning and in tenus 
of its legibility. He comments, for example, when describing London, that, "one 
can only wonder that the whole crazy fabric still hangs together.'lll In Manchester, 
when describing the Old Town, he remarks upon "the irregular cramming together 
of dwellings in ways which defy all rational plan" and upon "the irrational mann~r 
in which the entire district is built"" He compares the "chaos of buildings" as 
opposed to a "plan" and laments the "totally planless confusion and layout of the 
courts and backyards."34 In the New Town the situation deteriorates further as "all 
the features of a city are lost"35 and more than once he refers to the city as a 
"labyrinth"36 and as "Pandemonium" (sic.) while also implicitly comparing himself 
to "an explorer.'1l7 
Within this narrative Engels often refers to the risks of complete disorientation: 
He who turns to the left here from the main street. Long Millgate is lost; he wanders from one 
court to another. turns countless comers. passes nothing but filth. nooks and alleys until after a 
few minutes he has lost all clue and knows not wither to turn." 
Later on he comments: 
The lanes run now in this direction. now in that. while every two minutes the wanderer gets into a 
blind alley. or, on turning a corner, fmds himself back where he started from; certainly no-one who 
has not lived a considerable time in this labyrinth can find his way through it." 
This commentary upon the disorder, chaos and irrationality of the city (a confusion, 
however, which is often the effect of a monotonous and repetitive uniformity) 
extends to his description of the construction of the houses themselves: 
We have seen in the Old Town pure accident determine the grouping of the houses in general. 
Every house is built without reference to any other. and the scraps of space between them are called 
courts for want of another name. In the somewhat newer portions of same quarter, and in other 
working-men's quarters, dating from the early days of industrial activity, a somewhat more orderly 
arrangement may be found The space between two streets is divided into more regular, usually 
square courts. 40 
Yet he adds in the next paragraph that: 
These courts are built in this way from the beginning, and communicate with streets by means of 
12 The Condition 0/ the Working Class in Englarul, op.cit .• p. 58. 
33 ibid., pp. 81-82. 
M ibid .• p. 87. 
lIibid. 
• ibid., p. 8S. 
a7 ibid •• p. 94. 
• ibid., p. 84. 
• ibid.. p. 85. See also Lynch's remarks here on urban disorientation. i.e. "To become completely lost is 
perhaps a rath.crrarc experience for most peoplc in the modem city. Wc arc supported by the presence of 
othcrs and by special way-rmdins devices •• .But lct thc mishap of disorientation once occur, and the 
sense of anxicty and cven terror that accompanies it revcals to us how closely it is linked to our sense of 
balance and well-beina. The vcry word "lost" in out language means much more than geographical 
uncertainty; it carries overtones of complete disaster". The iml.Jge o/the City. op.cit .• p. 4. 
• ibid •• p. 88. 
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covered passages. If the totally planless confusion is injurious to the health of the workers by 
preventing ventilation. this method of shutting them up in courts surrounded on all sides by 
buildings is far more so. The air simply cannot escape as the chimneys of the houses are the sole 
drains for the imprisoned atmosphere of the courts. and they serve the purpose only so long as flre 
is kept buming.41 
While refonnist commentators claimed, according to Engels, "that these courts are 
the masterpieces of municipal architecture, because, like a multitude of little parks, 
they improve ventilation'141 , in effect, however, the most recent types of back-to-
back housing (often short-life and speculatively built) were worse in terms of 
ventilation than than the older houses which preceded them. As Anthony Vidler has 
observed: 
The critical archaeology of dwelling that Engels provided, together with the social conditions 
which he described, thus constitute the frrst systematic attack on the Enlightenment vision of 
progress, couched precisely in the Enlightenment's own terms. The planless chaos, the dirty, 
twisting streets, have been encountered before, from Rousseau onward: but it was always 
understood that the imposition of a rational plan. the development of a uniform mode of housing, 
would naturally shape the mores of the new inhabitants. Engels disposed of the myth and turned it 
right about, placing the blame for conditions squarely on the economics of the industrial system 
that created them.43 
For Engels it was, to a great extent, the street itself (as a physical environment) 
which was both the cause and the consequence of the deplorable social conditions 
which he described. In effect. Engels's whole polemic here could be called anti- 1..----/..-
street. Yet, paradoxically, this critique would seem, by implication at least, to 
support the arguments for the 'Haussmannisation' of Paris and other cities which 
Engels was to attack almost thirty years later in his articles on "The Housing 
Question."44 More significant, however, in the present context, is the fact that, 
while Engels in his account of Manchester breaks with the distancing at work in his 
response to London's streets, he nonetheless still retains a hostility to the street 
although this is now no longer based so clearly upon moral or aesthetic criteria (as 
Benjamin described them) but upon a forcefully argued and graphically illustrated 
social and economic analysis. 
It is reference to these issues of proximity and distance, and of the spatial 
formation, social visibility and the 'irrationality' of the city that one can begin to 
situate Engels's use of 'shock' images. The lengthy description of the area known 
as Little Ireland is a typical example. Here Engels relates how: 
The cottages are old. dirty. and of the smallest sort, the streets uneven, fallen into ruts and in part 
without drains or pavement; masses of refuse lie around standing in pools in all directions; the 
atmosphere is poisoned by the effiuvia from these. and laden and darkened by the smoke of a dozen 
4' ibid. 
Gibid . 
.. "The Scene. on the Street: Transfonnations in Ideal and Reality. 1750-1871". op.ciL, p. 76. 
44 The Housing QllUtion, (1872), Moscow, Progress Publishers. 1979, espec., p. 20. 
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tall factory chimneys. A horde of ragged women and children swarm about here, as falthy as the 
swine that thrive upon the garbage heaps and in the puddles. In short, the whole rookery furnishes 
such a hateful and repulsive spectacle as can hardly be equalled in the worst court of the Irk ... This 
race must have really reached the lowest stage of humanity. This is the impression and the line of 
thought which the exterior of this district forces upon the beholder .45 
But the most striking of these 'images' is all the more effective due to the minimal 
simplicity of Engels's language as he recounts how in Salford: 
I found a man, apparently sixty years old, living in a cow-stable. He had constructed a sort of 
chimney for his square pen, which had neither windows, floor, nor ceiling, and had obtained a 
bedstead and lived there, though the rain dripped through his rotten roof. This man was too old and 
weak for regular work, and supported himself by removing manure with a hand-cart; the dung-
heaps lay next door to his palacet46 
Such graphic visual tableaux are fundamental to Engels's method of exposition and 
critique. Moreover, this emphasis upon visual experience signals a departure from 
his previous statement, when describing London's crowded streets, that "it occurs 
to no man to honour another with so much as a glance." Engels in effect replaces 
the casual, indirect glance with an overt and critical gaze. It is this gaze which is 
also at work in the mobilisation of photography to investigate the living conditions 
of the urban poor. The photographic surveys made in Binningham (figs. 3.9 -
3.12) - including an extensive survey made by James Burgoyne in 1875 of the area 
due for clearance under Joseph Chamberlain's Improvement Scheme, the 
employment of photography by John Foster in Leeds (figs. 3.14, 3.36 ) and by 
John Galt'" in London and within Public Health surveys such as the one conducted 
by Peter Fyfe, Glasgow's Chief Sanitation Officer, at the turn of the century (figs. 
3.19 - 3.23) all share Engels's strategies for investigating the hitherto hidden 
regions of the city and of subjecting the "mysteries" of the city to an increasingly 
interventionist and professionalised gaze. 
This use of photography as evidence is also prefigured by the way in which 
Engels's looks at and describes urban life in that the role of the visual is to support 
his essentially negative critique of the city while his method very simply involves 
the the juxtaposition of of selective journalistic and historical documentation - "the 
testimony of my opponents" - with a series of eye-witness accounts: in short, a 
combination, as stated on the title page, of "Personal Observation and Authentic 
Sources." This, then, is no purposeless wandering or "a lounging excursion. 1141 
a TM Condition of tM Working CItw in England, op.cit., p. 93. 
46 ibid., p. 96 . 
• 7 Galt wu • lay preacher who arrived in London &om Scotland. Between 1893-4 he took photographs 
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wu entitled Thrilling Talu 0/ Loradora Life. 
41 Charles Dickens, "The Prisoners' Van",SutcM8 by BOI, London, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 
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Instead, Engels is deliberately searching and seeking out. He recounts, for 
example, how: 
Immediately under the railway bridge there stands a court, the filth and horrors of which surpass all 
the others by far, just because it was hitherto shut off, so secluded that the way to it could not be 
found without a great deal of trouble. I should never have discovered it myself without the breaks 
made by the railway, though I thought I knew this whole region thoroughly.4t 
Aside from the whole question of the city exposing itself through its own 
development and expansion (in this case through the railways), what is notable 
about this passage (and others) is its emphasis, with reference to the question of 
invisibility, upon Engels's mode of perception which is adopted through necessity 
in order to overcome the spatial barriers within those cities which he visits. 
Moments of (uncanny) encounter 
Engels's narrative tableaux can be likened to Walter Benjamin's "dialectical images" 
of which it has been observed that they: 
functioned like switches, arresting the fleeting phenomena and starting thought in motion, or, 
alternatively, shocking thought to a standstill and setting the reified objects in motion by causing 
them to lose their second nature familiarity.so 
Although not altogether sharing the same cognitive function and status of 
Benjamin's dialectical images, Engels's own spartan and highly graphic accounts 
operate in a similar fashion. His images are intended to be quite literally shocking as 
he relentlessly piles on the cumulative catalogue of horrors with its attendant effect 
of endless repetition - a process marked, too, by a combination of both excess and 
monotony. For, unlike Mayhew t Engels does not portray the city by means of the 
standardised conventions of topographical accounts nor by reference to either the 
picturesque or historical associations of place. Instead, he implicitly evokes these 
conventions but only to then subvert or expose them as ideological tropes. But 
more pointedly Engels mobilises a series of shocking images which are themselves 
symptomatic of his attempt to register the abrupt spatial disjunctions and 
discontinuities which at times during his urban itineraries work against his finding 
any coherent legibility within the industrial city. 
It is at this point that Engels's strategy of seeking out direct encounters within 
the "labyrinth" of the city and of bringing to light and to the realm of visibility that 
which was formerly concealed begins to parallel the practices and discursive 
contexts of urban 'documentary' photography. This is further reinforced by 
a TM Conditio,. of 1M WOI'king Class in England,op.cit., p. 84. 
10 Susan Buck-Mons, TM Origin o/Negative Dialectics, Harvester Press, 1977, p. 106. 
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Engels's emphasis upon the empirically particular (as distinct from purely abstract 
notions of social relations) and, above all, in his belief in the unproblematic status 
of visual 'evidence'. Moreover, just as Benjamin was to claim of photography that 
"a touch of a finger now sufficed to fix an event for an unlimited period of time. 
The camera gave,the moment a posthumous shock as it were'','! a similar process 
occurs with Engels as he focuses in on and freezes particular scenes and images 
within a series of descriptive snap-shots. 
An unsigned account, published in The Sun newspaper during 1881, of Jacob 
Riis's night flash-photography in New York (figs. 3.23 - 3.27) reveals some of the 
similarities between the practices of urban documentary photography and Engels's 
expositional strategy: 
With their way illuminated by spasmodic flashes. as bright and sharp and as brief as those of 
lighming itself. a mysterious party has lately been startling the town o'nights. Somnolent 
policemen on the street. denizens of the dives in their dens. tramps and bummers in their so-called 
lodgings. and all the people of the wild and wonderful variety of New York night-life have in their 
turn been frightened by the phenomenon. What they saw is three or four figures in the gloom. a 
ghostly tripod. some weird and uncanny movements. the blinding flash. and then they heard the 
patter of retreating footsteps. and the mysterious visitors were gone before they could collect their 
scattered thoughts and try to find out what it had all been about ... The pany consisted of members 
of the Society of Amateur Photographers of New York experimenting with the process of taking 
instantaneous pictures by an anificial flashlight and their guide and conductor. an energetic 
gentleman. who combined in his person. though not in his practice. the two dignities of deacon in 
a Long Island church and a police reporter in New York. His object in the matter. besides the 
interest in the taking of the pictures. was the collection of a series of views for magic lantern 
slides. showing. as no mere description could. the misery and vice that he had noticed in his ten 
years of experience. 52 
This account in part echoes several of the discursive tropes at work within Engels's 
own narrative: the expedition by socially aware amateurs into the unknown quarters 
of the city, a particular emphasis upon light, darkness and and knowledge (in Riis's 
case the revelatory nature of flashlight photography) and with it the intention of 
making visible the previously unseen." Also shared is the assertion of the 
inadequacy of "mere description" in conveying the full truth of an image - a point 
also made by Engels: "On re-reading my description I am forced to admit that 
instead of being exagerrated, it is far from being black enough to convey a true 
impression. "54 This is not merely a figure of speech or rhetorical cliche on the part 
of Engels for, as Steven Marcus remarks of Engels's description of Long MiUgate: 
ii Charles Bautklaire, op.ciL. p. 132. 
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he has run out of superlatives before he has barely begun; the language itself is giving out on him. 
In none of which inadequacies was he alone; indeed, one of the saving functions of language 
honestly used is that it should collapse before such realities, that it should refuse to domesticate 
these actualities with syntax and imagery ... There is only one course open. and Engels promptly 
takes it. He begins to specify." 
The repetition of the common tropes around investigative photography and the 
assertion of the inadequacy of verbal pictures alone occur also in an account similar 
to the description of Riis's activities. In this article, "Hand-Camera Experiences in 
East London" (1899), the author, cited only as lM.W, prefixes his narrative with 
the observation that: 
I had intended to illustrate this article with photographs taken by myself when on this expedition, 
but on second thoughts have decided that however interesting they might be. from our point of 
view, it would not be wise to do so, as to my mind it is always as well to exercise extreme 
caution in these matters." 
Within the text itself the author employs by now commonplace narrational devices. 
Investigative photography is described as "the most enjoyable and risky business" 
while later he again couples "leisure" with "investigation."57 The whole operation 
is likened to an "expedition" with the need of a guide to "pilot me through the 
district" of Commercial Road and Whitechapel. As with Engels, personal 
authentication is cited to fill in for the inadequacy of the image or, rather in this 
case, the verbal image. However, while the aim of the "expedition" is to "obtain 
some real "life" pictures for the truth of which I can personally vouch for" the 
author remarks further on that "I cannot adequately describe what I saw and felt. "SS 
What becomes apparent also in this text is that "the objects of our expedition" 
are defmed as being ready-made pictures or as being inherently picturable - this 
representation of the poor as a ready-made spectacle for the camera being illustrated 
in George Cruikshank's frontespeice (fig. 3.28) for a text by 'Shadow' entitled 
Midnight Scenes and Social Photographs published in 1858." Thus referring to one 
subject the author describes how he "succeeded in obtaining two very passable 
pictures of him. "60 In another example this notion of the ready-image is overlaid 
with a notion of shock: 
We moved forward. and descrying another specimen further on. we watched him for a short time, 
when. to our mingled surprise and disgust. we actually saw him pause. walk into the middle of the 
roadway. stoop down and pick up a pear. which I suppose had either fallen or had been thrown from 
&5 Engels, Manchuter and tM Working Class. op.cit •• p. 182. 
M TM Optical Magic Lantern JO/UNl1 and Photographic Enltuger. 10, 116, January 1899. p. 8. 
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a streetmonger's barrow. and begin to eat ravenously. cautiously looking round to see if he was 
unobserved (which of course he was not?). I was so taken aback by this action of his that I forgot 
what an excellent picture he would have made. but recovering myself a few moments later. I 
'snapshotted' him whilst taking a bite at his toothsome morsel. I do not believe that I shall ever 
forget this scene until my latest day.11 
As significant within this account is the activity of obselVation itself. In this 
example it is both the photographer (as in Cruikshank's drawing) and the (secretly) 
photographed subject who avoid being obselVed. What is at work here is a 
resistance to the photographic gaze. This is more explicitly referred to elsewhere in 
the piece. Thus, at one point, the author remarks that, "it was almost impossible to 
get a really good view of any of the subjects that I wished to obtain owing to the 
sharp look out that these men keep against observation. "61 Later on the narrator and 
his guide, "Spotting two 'out 0' works' ... stopped in a doorway, under the pretence 
of photographing some building works going on opposite ... [and] succeeded by this 
means of obtaining a fair view of these two men." Outside a Mission Hall, "We 
surreptitiously obtained a snapshot of the men waiting." In a further situation the 
resistance to the gaze comes close, according to the author, to physical violence: 
On stopping to arrange in my finder the picture which I desired to take. I was startled by an 
exclamation from my companion. and on looking up found that some half-dozen men had started 
across the road with the loudly expressed intimation that they weren't "going to be took anyhow" 
and that if I didn't want "a punch in the 'ed" I had better "clear out". this of course being mixed 
with a great deal of slang which was quite unintelligible to me. My guide. however. succeeded in 
quieting them by promising not to allow the picture to be published in any of the papers. The 
reason. as one poor fellow stepped aside to tell me. being. that he and most of the others had seen 
better days. and did not want their friends to see what had befallen them." 
In concluding his account the author of this piece remarks: 
for what nobler use can science be put than to help. in however small away. those poor fellows 
who have "gone down in the social scale". To those who have the necessary time, money and 
inclination. I strongly recommend this work of investigating the state in which our poor destitute 
live. or rather exist, and die. in this great London of ours." 
While operating within a terrain of extreme social difference which is at times 
perceived as being overtly shocking or threatening, photography is depicted here as 
means of minimising the threat of difference. In part this is achieved through the 
activity of picturing the poor (despite the possible risks entailed) as a strategy of 
making them both visible and supposedly knowable. This strategy of recuperating 
difference is further reinforced by the author's own observations regarding the 
social aspirations of the poor who not only have a natural hierarchy - "the 
Aristocrats" in the Mission Hall - but whose "dirty exteriors, in many instances, 
Ii ·b·d 9 1 1 •• p. . 
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cover a truly noble nature, and a forgiving and kind spirit't6.S and who are for this 
reason seen, for the most part, as deserving "cases". 
However, such a conclusion ultimately sets up a contradiction which remains 
unresolved in that, while the photographic activity promoted here is provoked, 
extreme social difference, the author simultaneously wants the poor to be seen as 
being fundamentally no different - just unfonunate. Given this, the text posits two 
representations of the poor. On the one hand, as shocking, resistant to the outside 
gaze and wholly other yet also both accessible and articulate. And it is across these 
two representations of the poor that much street photography was to operate. But 
more immediately, the photographic activities of Riis and others can be framed 
within both Engels's method of exposition and the narrational devices employed to 
describe investigative photography. Thus, in a Barnardo's publicity photograph, 
"The Raw Material As We Find It" (fig. 3.29), there is a similar device to Engels's 
of the direct encounter recorded as it happened (although of course clearly 
reconstructed), the image of a staged 'chance' encounter presented as corroborative 
evidence66 while several other photographs use the same painted back-drop of a 
street (figs. 3.31, 3.33). 
While these pictures attempt to recreate encounters on the streets, other 
photographs of the city are marked by a fascination with entering into and focusing 
65 ibid . 
.. This photograph was in fact one of those which was cited as an "artistic fiction" by The Rev. George 
Reynolds who charged the Bamardo Homes on various counts of misconduct in 1876. Barnardo took the 
case to the Arbitration Court. As part of this action he published a defence of his photographs in N i g h t 
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Material As We Find It" he wrote that it was criticised "not so much ... on account of the picture itself as 
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claimed to be deceptive in that it was alleged that their clothes had been deliberately tom or they were 
given props etc. But Bamardo's general defence was that the photographs were always intended to be 
"representative or typical" portraits, i.e."We have nothing further to remark on this subject of 
photography, except that no intention to mislead in the slightest degree ever crossed our minds for a 
moment. We held, and still do, that not one single case of porttaiture in our published list is without its 
real representative in hundreds of stteet children to be found on every hand, either among those still 
homeless and friendless, or amongst those already rescued by us ... Of such representative or typical 
photographs, only four have ever been issued, and not one of them was published so as to imply that it 
showed a particular child whose name was IO-and-SO, and whose case and condition was such-and-such. If 
it had not been for certain unavoidable hindrances, due to foggy weather and other similar causes, which 
prevented the pictures of individuals being made at the time, even these four typical would never have 
been published, as we should, of course, have preferred in these, as in all other instances, to have 
photographed the identical children, in the actual dress the wore at the time of reception. But, for the 
reasons, liven. this was rendered impossible, and 10 not to lose the picture altogether, a 'ypical case 
was prepared a few days later" (ibid., p. 126). 
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close upon areas and spaces which were previously invisible (at least to the camera 
before the use of flash photography). Just as Atget's photographs of the "Zoniers" 
districts of Paris present a negative mirror-image of the city - in the form, for 
example, of what might be described as the anti-boulevard (fig. 3.35) - so too, 
these images' of sl~m interiors (figs. 3.36, 3.37, 3.39,3.41 - 3.43) stand almost as 
parodying inversions of the security, stability and property not only of the 
bourgeois interior (figs. 3.38, 3.40) but of domestic space itself (figs. 3.44, 3.45). 
An analysis of the interstitial nature of these photographs (in the sense of their 
simultaneous reference to but dissolution of the stability and identity of the domestic 
interior) might well begin with Freud's paper "The Uncanny". Freud's essay 
begins with an extensive etymological survey of the meaning of the word 
"uncanny" (das Unheimliche) and a number of his observations are directly 
pertinent to these photographs. Freud thus begins by pointing out that, "The 
German word 'unheimlich" is obviously the opposite of 'heimlich ,[,homely], 
'heimisch Tnative'] - the opposite of what is familiar. ,t67 Not only does das 
heimlich relate to domestic space or to those qualities "belonging to or pertaining to 
the home, [the] familiar," i.e."Intimate, friendly, comfortable; the enjoyment of 
quiet content, etc., arousing a sense of agreeable restfulness and security as in one 
within the four walls of his house,"· but its opposite, the uncanny, signifies its 
obverse, the "strange [and] unfamiliar." More specifically, with reference to 
Engels's sense of disorientation, Freud notes that the uncanny was frequently 
related "to intellectual uncertainty; so that the uncanny would always, as it were, be 
something one does not know one's way about in. The better orientated in his 
environment a person is, the less readily will he get the impression of something 
uncanny in regard to the objects and events in it" And, as Freud also points out. 
intrinsic to many uses of the word "uncanny" is the notion of concealment and of 
being "kept from sight", i.e. "everything is unheimlich that ought to have remained 
secret and hidden but has come to light. "69 However, having outlined these 
distincti9ns (i.e. between the familiar and the unfamiliar or strange, and between 
the homely and the unhomely), the direction of Freud's discussion is to argue that 
these opposites are in fact represented by the same terms or phenomena. Thus: 
What interests us moSL •. is to find that among its different shades of meaning the word 'heimlich' 
exhibits one that is identical with its opposite. 'unheimlich '. What is heimlich thus comes to be 
unheimlich ••• Thus unheimlich is a word the meaning of which develops in the direction of 
ambivalence. until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich .Unheimlich is in some way 
i7 "The Uncanny". SlaNIaTd Edition, vol. XVD. p. 220 • 
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or other a sub-species of heimIich 70 • 
Freud's claim is that the uncanny "is related to what is frightening - to what 
arouses dread and horror ... [or] what excites fear in generaL.[and] feelings of 
repulsion and distress. "71 Such feelings are themselves a function of the identity{ 
uncanny as a site for the projection or 9bjectification of unconscious fears, anxieties 
and desires; in effect, the return of the repressed. Freud himself summarises "the 
gist of this short study" by arguing that: 
if psychoanalytical theory is correct in maintaining that every affect belonging to an emotional 
impulse, whatever its kind, is transformed, if it is repressed, into anxiety, then among instances of 
frightening things there must be one class in which the frightening element can be shown to be 
something repressed which recurs. This class of frightening things would then constitute the 
uncanny; and it must be a matter of indifference whether what is uncanny was itself originally 
frightening or whether it carried some other affect In the second place, if this is indeed the secret 
nature of the uncanny, we can understand why linguistic usage has extended das Heimliche 
[,homely] into its opposite, das UnheimIiche; for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, 
but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated 
from it only through the process of repression. This reference to the factor of repression enables 
us, furthermore, to understand Schelling's defmition of the uncanny as something which ought to 
have remained hidden but has come to light71 • 
As Freud further observes, "the unheimlich is what was once heimisch, familiar, 
the prefix 'un' is the token of repression. "73 Not only does this connection between 
the uncanny and repression have some bearing on Engels himself whose position of 
analytical mastery and psychical exteriority is constantly threatened, but never 
irredemiably so, by disorder, chaos and the absence of meaning or legibility 
(Engels in effect maintains his analytical mastery by conceptually framing and 
explaining this chaos thereby disavowing any real threat it might pose to own 
identity and interpretive abilities),74 but the 'meaning' of these slum interiors is 
produced through what Helene Cixous, referring to textual narrative, has described 
as "the effect of uncanniness ... [as] a relational signifier. Unheimliche is in fact a 
composite that infiltrates the interstices of the narrative and points to gaps we need 
to explain. "75 
Moreover, as Cixous also notes, "the Unheimliche presents itself, frrst of all, 
only on the fringe of something else .. .it is a unit in the 'family' but it is not really a 
member of the family. '176 In a similar fashion, while these photographs contain the 
70 ibid., p. 224 - 226. 
" ibid., p. 219. 
72 ibid., p. 241. 
13 ibid., p. 245. 
74 Of relevance here is Kristen's discussion of analytical mastery and interpretation in "Psychoanalysis 
and the Polis" in TM K,istew:a R~tJth" ed. Toril Moi, Blackwell. 1986. 
71 "Fiction and III Phantoms: A Reading of Freud's Du Unheimliche (the 'uncanny')" New Literary 
History, 7, 1976, p. 536 
71 ibid., p. 529 
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signifiers and objects of the domestic they fail to produce the signifieds of 
homeliness but, in effect, invert them. What is at work in these photographs is not 
only an "infmite game of substitutions,'m but also a "displacement, the insidious 
movement, through which opposites communicate. It is the between that is tainted 
with strangeness."ia While, for eixous the "between" that the uncanny represents is 
ultimately the place of absence and of death,19 the "between" or absence that is made 
present in these photographs (through a defamiliarising of objects and 
environments) is the gap (the arbitrary relation) between signifer and signified. This 
infiltrative disruption of the sign is akin to what Derrida describes (in relation to the 
uncanny and undecidability) as "the paradoxes of the double and of repetition, the 
blurring of the boundary lines between 'imagination' and 'reality', between the 
'symbol' and the 'thing it symbolizes,."ao For not only do these photographs 
represent th~ repressed other or 'double' of a bourgeois social order (its antithesis 
existing on its fringe or boundary), but they also reveal the contingency of that 
order by making explicit its hidden repressed and by revealing the"relational" and 
constructed status of the signs which establish it .. 
As with Engels's investigations in Manchester, these Glasgow photographs 
also involve a necessary degree of proximity with their subjects. As such, their 
uncanniness is also a function of distance or, rather, the lack of it. This question of 
distance and proximity becomes more delineated when contrasted against the 
methods and images of Pictorialist photography at the tum of the century. For it 
was the Pictorialists, not the 'documentary' photographers, who inherited the 
flaneur's mode of perception. As Benjamin described it, the flaneur did not perceive 
the reality and the full horror of the city since: 
For the flAneur there is a veil over the picture. This veil is the mass; it billows in 'the twisting 
folds of the old metropolises'. Because of it horrors have an enchanting effect Only when this veil 
tears and reveals to the flAneur 'one of the populous squares ... which are empty during street-
fighting' does he, too, get an unobstructed view of the big city.·l 
In the photographs of Stieglitz. Coburn and others distance is essential. So too, 
dark and dusk are favoured over sharp lighting. Stieglitz, for example, refused to 
use 'artificial' flash or mechanical lighting so as not to undermine the 'natural' 
77 ibid., p. 536. 
71 ibid., p. 543 
71 "The relationship to death reveals the highest degree of the Unheimliche .•. Our unconscious makes no 
place for the representation of our mortality. As an impossible representation. death is that which 
mimes, by this very impossibility, the reality of deathlt goes even further. That which signifies without 
that which is signified ... The strange power of death moves in the realm of life as the Unheimliche in the 
Heimliche, as the void fills up the lack", ibid., p. 542-543. 
10 "'The Double Session", Di88eminalion, op.cit., p. 220, n. 32. 
" Quoted by David Frisby, Fragmen18 of Modernity, op.cit., pp. 250-251. 
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authenticity of the image. Silhouetting, blurring and soft-focus (the practice of 
greasing the lens) were all favoured over sharpness of image. These, however, 
were not mere stylistic or technical features but need to be seen as having the effect. 
of keeping social relations to an abstraction. In these photographs, the picturesque 
city on a grand scale (a favourite Pictorialist motif) becomes a formalist or 
subjective interior and ceases to be a social environment just as the urban crowd 
within the city loses its particularity and specific class identity. 
This Pictorialist privatisation of perceptual experience echoes both Simmel's 
contemporaneous description of modernity as the experience of the inner world and 
as the cultivation of extreme subjectivism as well as Benjamin's account of the 
development of inner, lived-out existence (Erlebnis) over historically specific, 
concrete experience (ETjahrung) in part as a defence against the shocks experienced 
within the city. Yet while the Pictorialists' abstraction of social relations and their 
perception/representation of the 'real' were achieved by means of particular fonns 
of distancing (which recall Engels's response in London), the question of distance 
is more complex than this. Stieglitz's theoretical concept of the "Equivalent" 
involved the proposition that an image could embody an emotional equivalent 
between the artist or photographer and the scene depicted. As such, the equivalent 
can be seen as inheriting the Romantic quest for the fusion of subject/self and 
object. For the Pictorialists, this subjective identity is necessarily predicated upon a 
specific gauging of distance and space. Documentary' photography, on the other 
hand, more usually operated in tenns of close physical proximity which, as with 
Engels in Manchester, was the register of a relation of non-identity between subject 
and object For it is proximity which here underwrites and reinforces a relation of 
(acknowledged) social distance and difference. 
The crowd, the aura and the dissolution of distance 
These issues can be further discussed with reference to Walter Benjamin's notion 
of the "aura" and of "shock" which usefully signal important aspects of visual 
perception and representation within the city. Benjamin's concept of the aura is 
used both in his writings on Baudelaire and in his essay "The Work of Art in The 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction." In both these texts the term "aura" remains 
rather nebulous but its various meanings broadly involve a conflation of notions of 
authenticity, origin, authorial presence, symbol, historical trace or residue, 
uniqueness and tradition. Referring to works of art, for example, Benjamin writes: 
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The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging 
from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced. Since the 
historical testimony rests on the authenticity, the former, too, is jeopardised by reproduction when 
substantive duration ceases to matter. And what is really jeopardised when the historical testimony 
is affected is the authority of the object ... One might subsume the eliminated element in the term 
"aura" and go on to say: that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the 
work of arL •. One might generalise by saying: the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced 
object from the domain of tradition.a 
Further on, having argued that" the mode of human sense perception changes with 
humanity'S entire mode of existence", Benjamin writes: "And if changes in the 
medium of perception can be comprehended as the decay of the aura, it is possible 
to show its social causes."83 Here Benjamin gives an example of the aura: 
The concept of the aura which was proposed above with reference to historical objects may 
usefully be illustrated with reference to the aura of natural ones. We defme the aura of the latter as 
the unique manifestation of a distance. however close it may be. If, while resting on a summer 
afternoon, you follow with your eyes a mountain range or a branch which casts its shadow over 
you, you experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch. This image makes it easy to 
comprehend the social bases of the contemporary decay of the aura. It rests on two circumstances, 
both of which are related to the increasing significance of the masses in contemporary life. 
Namely, the desire to bring things "closer" spatially and humanly. which is just as ardent as their 
bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction. Every day 
the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object by way of its likeness, its reproduction ... To pry 
an object from its shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception whose 'sense of the 
universal quality of things' has increased to such a degree that it exacts it even from a unique object 
by means of reproduction." 
It is not my concern here to either pursue or assess Benjamin's line of argument 
regarding the consequences of the reproducibility of the work of art but, instead, I 
wish to follow up his connection between the aura and distance. For, not solely an 
aspect of the work of art, the aura (or, rather its disintegration) is associated with 
the experience of social life. Commenting upon Baudelaire, Benjamin notes that: 
Of all the experiences which made his life what it was, Baudelaire singled out his having been 
jostled by the crowd as the decisive, unique experience ... Baudelaire battled the crowd with the 
impotent rage of someone fighting the rain or wind. This is the nature of something lived through 
(Erlebnis) to which Baudelaire has given the weight of experience (Erfahnmg). He indicated the 
price for which the sensation of the modem age may be had: the disintegration of the aura in the 
experience of shock. IS 
Not only was the experience of being jostled by the crowd the "decisive, unique 
experience" for Baudelaire but this experience was for him the sign of modernity 
itself. However, Baudelaire's relation with the crowd is essentially ambiguous. 
For, despite his exhortation for the flaneur to "become one flesh with the crowd", it 
remained necessary to maintain a certain psychical distance from it. As Benjamin 
U"'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", in/llumi1UJlions, op. cit., p. 223. 
IS ibid., p. 224 . 
.. ibid., p. 226. 
II Charles BtUUlelaire. op.cit., p. 154. See also Richard Wolin, Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of 
Redemption, New York, Columbia University Press, chp. 7. espee. pp. 226-236 and David Frisby, 
Fragrrwatl 0/ Modernity, op. ciL, espec. pp. 230- 236. 
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comments on the relationship between the flaneurlBaudelaire and the "image of the 
big city crowds": 
If he succumbed to the force by which he was drawn to them and , as a fUneur, was made one of 
them, he was nevertheless unable to rid himself of their essentially inhuman make-up. He becomes 
their accomplice even as he disassociates himself from them. He becomes deeply involved with 
them, only to relegate them to oblivion with a single glance of contempt There is something 
compelling about this ambivalence when he cautiously admits to it ~ 
Baudelaire's relation with the crowd is, in effect, marked by a process of 
identification and disavowal, a desire both to project and disperse himself within the 
crowd while also maintaining a sovereign autonomy against it with the poet 
remaining an "exile". Something of the complexity of this relationship with the 
crowd is evident in Baudelaire's essay on the artist Constantin Guys, "The Painter 
of Modem Life", in which Baudelaire writes: 
The crowd is his element, as the air is that of the birds and water of the fishes. His passion and his 
profession are to become one flesh with the crowd. For the perfect fl!neur, for the passionate 
spectator, it is an immense joy to set up house in the heart of the multitude, amid the ebb and 
flow of movement, in the midst of the fugitive and the infmite. To be away from home and yet 
to feel oneself everywhere at home; to see the world, to be at the centre of the world - such are the 
few pleasures of those independent, passionate, important natures which the tongue can but 
clumsily define. The spectator is a prince who everywhere rejoices in his incognito ... Thus the 
lover of universal logic enters into the crowd as though it were an immense reservoir of electrical 
energy. Or might we liken him to a mirror as vast as the crowd itself, or to a kaleidoscope gifted 
with consciousness, responding to each one of its movements and reproducing the multiplicity of 
life and the flickering grace of all the elements of life. He is an "I" with an insatiable appetite for 
the "non-I", at every instant rendering and explaining it in pictures more living than life itself, 
which is always unstable and fugitive.11 
Baudelaire's here describes an essentially narcissistic relation between the crowd 
and the subject/self as the subject (as a "mirror") is simultaneously displaced onto 
and reconstituted through images of the external world. In a similar fashion, the 
flaneur's losing of himself in the crowd becomes the very means which enables the 
re-affrrmation of his identity. This contrasts with Engels who, despite reversing his 
self-distancing from the crowd, maintains a constant position of exteriority in 
relation to it However,the possibility of the flaneur's identification with the crowd 
is dependent upon that crowd being "fixed" at a distance and upon its mass identity 
remaining undefined. As Benjamin remarks, "Baudelaire insists on the magic of 
distance. ". Baudelaire's strategy for registering and representing the crowd is thus 
to focus on isolated individual or types who then become the site of his projected 
identification." 
II ibid. p.128. 
17 TM Painter of Modem Life and O,hu Essays, trans. and cd. Ionathon Mayne, Phaidon, 1964, pp.9.10. 
• ChlJrlu BtlIIIklmn, op. cit., p. 152. 
II See Marc Bli Blanclwd, Ira Search 0/1114 City, Anma Libri, 1985, cspcc.pp. 77-79, 85-87 and 103. 
106. 
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The imaginary nature of this narcissistic relation to the world (in the sense of 
the subject's identification with external symbols) is indirectly referred to in 
Baudelaire's description of vision and subjectivity in the context of childhood. 
Recounting an anecdote told to him by a friend, "now a famous painter", 
Baudelaire writes: 
But genius is nothing more than childhood recovered at will - a childhood now equipped for self-
expression with manhood's capacities and a power of analysis which enables it to order the mass of 
raw material which it has involuntarily accumulated. It is by this deep and joyful curiosity that we 
explain the fixed and animally ecstatic gaze of a child confronted with something new whatever it 
be ... A friend of mine once told me that when he was a small child. he used to to be present when 
his father dressed in the mornings, and that it was with a mixture of amazement and delight that he 
used to study the muscles on his arms, the gradual transitions of pink and yellow in his skin, and 
the bluish network of his veins. The picture of extemallife was already filling him with awe and 
taking hold of his brain. He was already being obsessed and possessed by form.to 
Here Baudelaire associates the child's viewing of the world (framed in terms of a 
relation with the Father - the sign of the Symbolic and of the realm difference) with 
a description of the child being overwhelmed by external forms. In effect, ,-j 
Baudelaire provides an 'account' of the child's entry into the Symbolic - moving 
from "childhood" to "manhood's capacities" - which can be read as the transition 
from an ego-libido (narcissism) to an object-libido (attachment to loved objects). 
This displacement of a stable and discrete subjectivity is also fundamental to the 
phenomenon of inspiration: "I am prepared to go even further and assert that 
inspiration has something in common with a convulsion, and that every sublime 
thought is accompanied by a more or less violent shock which has its 
repercussion in the very core of the brain."'1 Significantly, too, Baudelaire (once 
again using the term "violently" to suggest a dramatic disruption of a stable identity) 
refuses to call Guy a dandy because of his "insatiable passion" to lose himself in the 
crowd. For it is through his refusal to remain "insensitive" (Le. detached and self-
contained) that Guy "parts company decisively with dandyism. "92 
Returning the gaze 
For Baudelaire the experience of shock, in terms of the individual's negotiation of 
the crowd. undermines the aura which itself can be likened to a form of a 
"Proustian" recollected experience (Erfahrung). But Benjamin also argues that, 
while the aura is dependent upon distance, it is equally dependent upon the returned 
look. Yet it is exactly the returned look which would seem to be a threat to the / 




Imaginary plenitude of auratic experience. Writing of the daguerreotype, Benjamin 
claims: 
If the distinctive feature of the image that rises from the memoire involuntaire is seen in the aura, 
then photography is decisively implicated in the phenomenon of the 'decline of the aura'. What is 
inevitably felt to be inhuman, one might even say deadly, in the daguerreotype was the prolonged 
looking into the camera since the camera records our likeness without returning our gaze ... To 
perceive the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with ability to look at us in return. 
This experience corresponds to the data of the memoire involuntaire ... they lend support to a 
concept that comprises the unique manifestation of a distance." 
Benjamin is here writing of the returned look from the camera. However, if this 
argument is cited in tenns of the look from the photograph, then the returned look is 
no longer the source of the aura but instead can at times be a threat to it. For in such 
contexts the returned look can operate as a sign of a (potentially threatening) 
difference which fractures the plenitude and self-identity of the Imaginary. 
Moreover, the returned look highlights the subject's own lack in that the subject can 
never look from or occupy the place of the Other or the object of the loo~ (figs. 
3.46 - 3.48). It is this, in conjunction with the returned look, which accounts for 
--
the "deadly" character of the daguerreotype or photograph rather than the image's 
inability to return our look. While Benjamin is correct to claim that the camera 
cannot return our gaze (although it is difficult to see quite how it could), the action 
of posing in front of it (like the photograph) itself evokes the subject's own lack in 
that the sitter can never see him or herself from the viewpoint of the camera (except 
through the photograph) - a realisation which forcefully highlights the 'gap' across 
which vision is constituted." 
While not being a site of difference, therefore, the camera can be a sign of lack. 
And it is with reference to difference (in its multiple representations) and to lack that 
it is possible to re-interpret Benjamin's concept of "shock" (the antithesis of the 
is Charles Baudelaire, op.cit., pp.147-148 . 
.. This is the gist of wan's anecdote in Th4 FoIU FlII&daIMnlal Concepts 01 Psycho-ATI4lysis, op.cit., 
pp. 95-96. Of relevance here also is Jean-Paul Sartre's discussion of the look of the Other in Being and 
Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological O"tology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, New York, 
Philosophical Library, 1956, espec:.pp. 252-302. 
15 Benjamin himself implies this (with reference to Lack and the insatiability of desire) in his comments 
upon Valery's delCl'iption of the work of uc"Ac:c:ording to this view, the painting we look at reflects 
back at us that which our eyes will never have their fill. What it contains that fulfils the original desire 
would be the very lame ltuft' on which desire continuously feeds"(BtJlUklaire, op.cit., pp.146-147). This, 
however, is only an attribute of painting for Benjamin continues:"What distinguishes photography 
from painting is therefore clear, and why there can be no encompasing principle of 'creation' applicable 
to both; to the eyes that will never have their fill of a painting, photography is rather like food for the 
hungry or drink for the thirsty"(p. 147). Similuly, in lllllll'linations, Benjamin contrats the 'shock-
effect' of ftlm to painting:"The painting invitel the lpec:tator to contemplation; before it the spectator 
can abandon himself to his usociations"(p. 240). Although Benjamin is here writing of the temporal 
qualities of the two mediums (i.e. film's continuous narrative versus the still image), his comments echo 
his view that the effect of photol'aphy is one of shock while painting maintains the aura in terms of the 
subject's suspension of self. 
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aura) as that which disrupts the plenitude of the punctual subject Moreover it is this 
lack (in vision) which itself becomes the origin of the desire to see, to look, and to 
examine - the epistemophilic imperative. This process itself recalls Baudelaire's 
account of how the image/sign of the father aroused the child's initial visual 
"curiosity" while simultaneously displacing its undifferentiated self-perception. It is 
within this model of vision, too, that the fascination with the poor in the nineteenth 
century, for example, can be understood not simply as a matter of an instrumentalist 
.J, . social control but instead was symptomatic of the fundamental psychical structures 
of perception itself - in short, the greater the difference, the greater the desire or 
need to look.96 
More particularly, it is within the context of the returned look and of proximity 
and distance that one can situate Baudelaire's critical hostility to photography. Not 
only does Baudelaire accuse photography of disrupting hierarchies (both social and 
artistic) but he also counterposes the "exactitude" of photography against 
"imagination"." This notion of "exactitude" can perhaps be read in tenns of 
photography's dissolving of auratic distance and in tenns of its fracturing of what 
Benjamin calls "the smoothness of the stare."" Benjamin himself also suggests 
the disruptive possibilities of photography in the sense of the individual 
photograph's random traces of the real which propel the image from a distant past 
into our own immediate present: 
No matter how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed his subject. the beholder 
feels an essential urge to search such a picture for the tiny sparks of contingency, of the Here and 
Now, with which reality has so to speak seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where 
in the immediacy of that long-forgotten moment the future subsists so eloquently that we, looking 
back. may rediscover it" 
Ii A striking literary example of this is provided in Edgar Allen Poe's short story, '''The Man of the 
Crowd" in which the narrator, sitting all day until nightfall in a London Coffee-House and"absorbed in 
contemplation of the scene without", initially observes the crowd with "an abstract and generalizing 
turn" (Selected Tales, cd. Julian Symons, Oxford University Press, 1985. pp. 98-99) but then spots "a 
decrepid old man .•• a countenance which at once &nested and absorbed my whole attention, on account of 
the absolute idiosyncrasy of its expression" (ibid., p.l01). The narrator, feeling "singularly aroused, 
startled and fascinated" then pursues this figure across the city throughout the night until dawn. Aside 
from the central motif in the story of different modes of looking and narrator's travels across a variety of 
urban spaces, the compUlsion to follow the old man is provoked by his difference. Thus, while the 
narrator describes him as "the type and genius of deep crime" (ibid., 104), the old man has in fact 
committed no actual crime. Instead, his "crime" is his unknowability and the fact that the narrator cannot 
classify him within the familiar categories of urban types. For a discussion of Poe's story as "a critique 
of the interpretive strategies of the flineur", see Dana Brand, "Reconstructing the 'Flineur: Poe's 
Invention of the Detective Story", Genre, xvm, Spring, 1985 and his TM Spectator and tM City: 
Fantasies 0/ UrblJll Legibility ifNiMteenlh Cent",,, England and Amuica, Yale University, Ph.D.thesis, 
1981, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International), espec. chp. IV. 
17 "The Salon of 1859" in Art in Ptuis184S-62. SalOlLf and DlMr Exhibitions, trans. and cd. Jonathon 
Mayne, Phaidon, 1965. pp.149-155 . 
.. Charla Btuldelaire, Op.CiL, p. 150 • 
.. "A Small History of Photography", op.cit, p. 243. Benjamin'. comments here strikingly prefigure 
Barthes's notion of the "punctum" in CanteraUtcida, op.cit., espec. pp. 43- 45. 
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In a similar fashion, Benjamin claims that photography reveals "what happens 
during the fraction of a second when a person steps out"l00 while also revealing "the 
physiognomic aspects of visual worlds which dwell in the smallest things, 
meaningful yet covert enough to find a hiding place in waking dreams. "101 
It is with reference to these comments that one can better understand Benjamin's 
comment that " a touch of the fmger now sufficed to llX an event for an unlimited 
period of time. The camera gave the moment a posthumous shock, as it were." In 
effect, Benjamin here draws out and celebrates those very features of photography 
that Baudelaire had found so "startling and cruel" - in other words, photography's 
fracturing of temporal and psychical distance and its making visible, if only 
implicitly at least, moments within the construction of subjective identity. 
Both Baudelaire's response to the urban crowd and his critical reception of 
photography can be read as a refusal of differe!lce. As Colin Mercer has 
commented: "holding back from the crowd and the dissemination of his subjectivity 
in the persona of the flaneur, Baudelaire resists what Lacan has called 'the entry 
into difference'. He attempts to avoid the abandonment to difference, to other 
menacing significations."101 While Baudelaire's position may perhaps be rather 
more ambiguous than this, he does nevertheless seek to preserve auratic distance 
from both the threat of the crowd and from photography. Indeed, a similar 
ambition to preserve the aura is evident both in Baudelaire's Symbolist aesthetics 
and in his etemalisation of the present.103 
A psychoanalytic reading of both Baudelaire and of Benjamin's concepts of the 
aura and of shock helps reveal Baudelaire's strategy of preserving an Imaginary 
narcissism against the threat of difference. However, the relation between 
photography and the Imaginary is not antithetical but is instead more complex. For, 
through a reading of Baudelaire,t04 it is possible to cite two registers of the
l
, P",I''''' 
Imaginary - narcissism and paranoia - both of which are fundamental to the 
construction of subjectivity through difference. In effect, this involves both the 
narcissistic appropriation of the world (Le. through projection, identification) or, 
alternatively, a representation of difference as threat or "other" with both strategies 
100" A Small History of Photography", op.cit., p. 243. 
101 ibid. pp. 243-244. 
loa "Baudelaire and the city: 1848 and the inscription of hegemony" in The Sociology Of 
LituallUe:1848, eels. Francis Barker et aI., University of Essex, 1978. 
103 See David Frisby, Fragnwflls of Modernity, op.cit., pp. 16-20. 
104 Of particular relevance here is Leo Bersani's BtIIItklalre and Freud. University of California Press, 
1977,espec. pp. 106-124. 
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being pertinent to the photography of the urban crowd and the poor. 
Citing this framework it is possible to trace the fracturing (through the dialogic 
exchange and circulation of the look across the crowd) of the monologic gaze of the 
subject and a dispersal of its presence and identity through its encounter with 
difference. Yet, simultaneously, there is both a recuperation of difference yet also an 
attempted restoration to the viewing subject of a coherent identity through strategies 
of disavowal and non-identification - the "not-I". Within these psychical 
manoeuvres photography needs to be seen as both producing and operating within a 
psychical space involving the complex interplay between proximity and distance, 
identity and difference. As such, it is not a question of counterposing the 'realist' 
status and project of photography against its imaginary spaces. Instead, what needs 
to be explored is their mutual enfolding. 
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4 
REPRESENTATION AND REGULATION 
The gaze is alert everywhere I 
In Burgoyne's photograph "The Gullet" (fig. 3.46) the image is structured by the 
overt intrusion of the other within the field of vision. The possibility of the returned 
look is here dramatically enacted, an event which highlights not only the identity of 
the gaze (as the look of the spectator) as a function of alterity but also the framing of 
~at look by the Gaze. Moreover, not only is the particular locus of alterity here, an 
urban crowd, a barrier to the uninhibited movement of the viewer's gaze, but the 
precise social identity of the assembled figures is itself ambiguous and, indeed, 
potentially threatening. For, although quite possibly just interested onlookers, the 
terms of the exchange of looks across the image radically shift when the 
photographer is read as both the bearer of an external gaze and as the agent of an 
interventionist municipal authority. 
It is the representation of social difference - in conjunction with the 
simultaneous management of any potential threat to specural security - that I wish to 
discuss here with reference to Street-Life in London (figs.4.1-4.37). Not only was 
Street-UJe among the first (or at least among the earliest surviving) photographic 
surveys in Britain of the urban poor themselves, rather than just their habitat, but it 
was also a survey which combined photography with an extensive textual 
commentary.l Street-UJe thus offers itself as the most systematic and self-articulate 
photographic engagement with the urban poor in Victorian Britain and for this 
reason stands as a paradigmatic point of reference for any discussion of the 
relationship between photography, the city and the poor during the nineteenth 
century. 
t Michel Foucault, Discipline aNl Punish. op.cit •• p. 195. 
I Street-Life in London was published in serial fonn by Sampson Low. Marston, Searle and Rivington in 
twelve monthly instalments begiming in February 1877. Each issue consisted of three photographs and 
their accompanying texts (which included eye and ear-witness statements and commentaries. contextual 
information etc.) which were co-authored by 10hn Thomson with the journalist Adolphe Smith. For 
convenience. however. I shall refer simply to Thomson. while also calling the text Street-Life. An 
abridged book version called Strcetlncilhnts was later published in 1881. 
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In this chapter I shall read Street-life in London as a hegemonic project of 
representation or, more precisely, as an attempt to control the disruptive effects of 
alterity which, as in "The Gullet", potentially threaten the cohesion of the gaze. For 
this purpose I shall situate Street-Life within its contemporary discursive 
environment by reference to arguments concerning surveillance and the social as a 
prelude to then examining its particular strategies of representation. These strategies 
may themselves be seen as working across a double-manoeuvere of difference and 
incorporation through the imposition of a normative subjectivity upon that section 
of the population designated as being 'the poor'. This, however, is only part of the 
story. For, in the next chapter, I shall argue, with reference to just one photograph 
from the series, for the internal instability, and consequent partial failure, of this 
project of incorporation. 
Text, image, fixity 
Fundamental to this reading are issues issues relating to the procedures of historical 
investigation arising in the construction of a non-reductive and non-instrumentalist 
reading of Street-Life in London. This reading of Street-Life (both as a text and as 
a set of photographs) involves an examination of its determinate conditions of 
emergence and existence as a means to then begin unravelling both the structuring 
constraints upon its legibility and signification and its inscription within relations of 
power. As such, this chapter necessarily addresses itself to the question of reading 
both in terms of the analysis of one specific text but also in terms of the relationship 
between the writing of history (itself a representational and discursive practice) and 
the real. 
My aim, then, within this chapter is to outline and apply certain methods of 
historical analysis with reference to Street-Life before locating it within the context 
of London in the 1870s. For this purpose certain prescriptive procedures and 
objectives of analysis can be briefly stated here.· Primarily, the concern of this 
reading of Street-UJe is to uncover the strategies operating within the text and 
across the photographs rather than reductively imposing a set of coherent or unified 
meanings upon them. Allied to this question of interpretive closure is the need to 
avoid seeing Street-Life as merely reflecting discourses, ideologies and 
representations already constituted elsewhere or as epiphenomena which can be 
schematically retraced through a causal sequence to an originary source. Nor should 
a status of representative typicality be ascribed to Street-Life. Instead, through 
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employing Foucault's notion of "eventalisation", Thomson's text needs to be read 
as a specific and non-reducible discursive "event" and not simply as the expression 
of a broad historical fonnation. Such a strategy of genealogical analysis thus aims 
to preserve the text's singularity through recovering the multiplicity of factors and 
processes which constituted i~ ~reby negating the ascription to it of an immanent 
identity and intelligibility. As Foucault states: 
eventalisation means rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of 
forces. strategies and so on which at any given moment establish what counts as being self-
evident. universal and necessary. In this sense one is indeed effecting a sort of multiplication of 
causes ... Causal multiplication consists in analysing an event according to the multiple processes 
which constitute it' 
According to this fonn of genealogical analysis or "effective'" history, historical 
events and developments are not to be viewed as the necessary results of historical 
processes, agencies or intentions. Instead, they constitute episodic manifestations 
of a play of subJugations and dominations. Events are thus conceptualised as being 
marked by a play of forces for which no individual subject may be held 
responsible. Furthermore, as Jacques Donzelot has argued: 
A reading of a text is no longer a question of assessing its coherence and detecting its hidden 
intents or the interests which it betrays. It is to identify the relation which it establishes between a 
knowledge which it produces and a power which it programmes. it is to evaluate its strategic 
functioning within a field of forces. S 
Such a reading involves both an "archaeology" of the text's "rules of formation" 
(i.e. the conditions for its production of knowledge)6 together with an analysis of 
its inscriptiQn and circulation within productive relations of power: in effect, its 
production of "reality ... domains of objects and rituals of truth.'t7 This is not. 
however, to posit a programmatic model of power. Equally, it is important to avoid 
any schematically functionalist account of Street-Life for it is necessary to be alert 
to the possible non-correspondence between discourses, representations and their 
effects. Thus, this analysis of Street-UJe is not concerned about the intention or 
motivation 'behind' power but, rather, it is focused upon the issue of the 
application of power and processes by which subjects are constituted (interpellated) 
as effects of both power and of regimes of representation. In short, while Street-
S "Questions on Method", Ideology and ConscioU$Mss, 8, 1981. p. 61. 
4 See "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in LanglUlgl!. COlUIIl!r-Mmaory. Practice: Selected Essays and 
Interview" op cit 
''''The Poverty of Political Culture", Ideology and COfllCWlISrlUl, S, 1979. p. 74. 
• "Archaeological territories may extend to 1iteruy' or philosophical texts, u well u scientific ones. 
Knowledge is to be found not only in demonsttations. but it can also be found in fiction, reflection, 
narrative accounts, institutional regulations and political decisions", Michel Foucault,The 
ArchMology of Knowledge. ttans. Alan Sheridan, London, Tavistock. 1977. pp. 183-184. 
7 Discipline and PlUluh, op.cit.. p.194. 
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Life needs to be situated within a "field of forces" and while, as a singular event, it 
provides access to a wider social order, this is not to claim that Thomson's text is 
ultimately reducible to this macro-realm. 
Central to this discussion of the production of a "reality" or set of referents in 
Street-Life is, of course, the status and signification of the photographs 
themselves. For, just as the text of Street-Life c.annot be read simply as the passive 
vehicle for discourses already existing fully formed prior to its emergence, so too 
Thomson's photographs cannot be viewed as readily legible documents or records. 
For not only does Street-Ufe incite, mobilise and rework existing discourses, but it 
is also the irreducible constitutive site for the formation of its own specific 
knowledges and representations. However, fundamental to this production is an 
anxiety about the limits of representation. This anxiety, which of course is never 
openly voiced as such, can be located around a recurrent concern with 
representation and fixity. In other words, the constraints upon defming, containing 
and immobilising through particular strategies of representation. 
This negotiation around the possibilities and limitations of the work of 
representation is, to put it rather schematically, evident at several levels within 
Street-Life in London. Firstly, it is apparent in relation to the potential instability or, 
rather, the vacuity of the photographs themselves in terms of their lack of semantic 
autonomy. In part, this is an historical issue for, by the 1870s, the status of 
photography and the terms of photographic 'realism' were still emergent and 
uncodified despite the confidence voiced in the series's Preface about 
photography'S ability to mimetically reproduce the real. Secondly, this question of 
representation and fixity was constituted around the urban poor themselves who, 
throughout the nineteenth century, were recurrently described as a vast, seething, 
mobile and independent mass which was both potentially threatening and constantly 
evading regulation, containment and control (themselves forms of 'representation'). 
Finally, but closely allied to this, was the problem of how to represent the city and 
especially the "World Gty"of London whose population was to be over five million 
by the turn of the century. For as Raymond Williams has observed of Victorian 
London: "its miscellenaity, its crowded variety, its randomness of movement, were 
the most apparent things about it, especially when seen from inside. ". 
This heterogeneity was, in many respects, a structuring sign of London or, to 
be more specific, of the ''Londonesque'' as, for example, it had been for Mayhew. 
'The CO/Ullry tuIIl lite City. New York. Oxford University Press. 1982, p. 154. 
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Indeed, because this heterogeneity or urban activity (fig. 2.39) was perhaps the 
dominant signifier of London's specific visual identity (as the boulevard was in 
Paris), it was all the more important that this highly condensed complex of 
signifiers not only signify but that its meanings should also be both legible and 
manageable. Part of the problematic of Street-Life, in i,ts particular construction of 
an urban ethnography, was how to register, let alone organise, this "miscellenaity 
and randomness" particularly in relation to what Williams cites as "the experience of 
the streets.'" And it is here that Street-life both partakes in and fonus part of the 
conjuncture in the latter nineteenth century involving the application of the novel 
technology of photography and the development, contestation and representation of 
the city's spaces. 
Throughout the nineteenth century the city had been the locus not only of civic 
pride but also for the playing out of many class anxieties and ambivalences 
concerning the processes of industrialisation, especially in relation to the possible 
social disruption brought about in its wake. In the mid-century it had been the great 
industrial cities of the North - especially the "shock" city of Manchester in the 
1840's - that had largely been the sites of such concerns. But, as the century wore 
on, Manchester and the other Nonhero cities gave the appearance (particularly 
within the context of the decline of Chartism) of both stability and improvement. 
Indeed, it was the industrial North that was increasingly seen as representing the 
respectability and independence of the working-class in tenus of institutions. such 
as the Friendly Society, embodying self-help, temperance, sobriety and traditions 
of religious dissent. Conditions in London, however, often remained not only 
appalling but seemed to many commentators to be both rapidly degenerating and 
beyond solution. As Asa Briggs has commented: "The rapid growth of London. 
both in area and population, was fascinating in itself because it seemed to obey no 
known laws ... Certainly "industrialisation" by itself provided no adequate 
explanation. "10 
Within such a perception, Engels's description of London had not been 
untypica1: 'ithe very turmoil of the streets has something against which human 
nature rebels ... The brutal indifference, the unfeeling isolation of each in his private 
interest becomes the more repellent and offensive, the more these individuals are 
crowded together, within a limited space. "11 Similarly, although writing from a 
• ibid., p. 157. 
1°Viclorian Cilia, Odhams Prcss, 1963. p. 323. 
"T1t4 Conditiora olllle Working Cltu, in England. op.cit .• pp. 57-58. 
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very different political perspective, e.F.G. Mastennan at the turn of the century 
also described the deadening effect of urban life and referred to the Imperial city of 
London as "the Abyss". Furthennore, in common both with with many anxious 
liberals and conservatives alike, Mastennan feared the emergence of "a new 
race ... the city type ... stunted, narrow-chested, easily wearied, yet voluble, 
excitable, with little ballast, stamina or endurance - seeking stimulus in drink, in 
betting, in any unaccustomed conflicts at home or abroad"11 - a new breed of city 
dweller who, it was feared, would fall as easy prey to incitement by political 
radicals. 
Justifying their own reasons for yet another survey of the urban poor, the two 
authors of Street-Life in London argue in their Preface that: lithe subject is so vast 
and undergoes such rapid variations that it can never be exhausted."13 This 
photographic investigation of the city was complemented during the nineteenth 
century by the use of photography in the exploration and expansion of the Empire 
ranging from the photography of the Grand Tour to anthropological surveys.l. 
Photography was thus employed throughout the breadth of the Empire and within 
its very centre, the capital. Both the sites of particular class residency in London 
and of indigenous ethnic populations from the farthest regions of the Empire were 
constructed within discourses and regimes of representation that bore a striking 
similarity. Often framed within an evolutionist and hierarchical discourse, each was 
seen as different, foreign and unknown. Thus Mayhew, for example, could say of 
London that: 
In passing from the skilled operative of the West-end. to the unskilled workman of the Eastern 
quarter in London. the moral and intellectual change is so great. that it seems as if we were in a 
new land. among another race.1S 
Not only did these potentially threatening populations within the city and the 
Empire have to be Christianised and 'civilised', but each had to be ethnographically 
described and categorised. Just as Mayhew made a crude anthropological 
12 "Realities at Home" in Heart tithe Empire. ed.idem.London. Fisher Unwin. 1901. pp. 13-14. 
IS Street-Life ill LoradoII, Harenberg. Die bibliophilen Tasc:henbOchcr. 1981. p. 81. 
14 Thomson himself was a Fellow of the Royal Geographic:a1 Society and from 1862 had travelled widely 
in the Far Eut. Among his boob of photography were The A"'iqllil~s ofCombodia (1867) illustrated 
with albumen prints; a four-volume work including 200 photographs (including many of street traders) 
called IlllUlralioras ofCIIUua tutti its People (1873-4) and The Straits of MalQcca, II1do-China and China: 
or Tell Years Travel, Adventures tII'Id Residence Abroad (187S) illustrated with engravings from his 
photographs. In 1879 Thomson also published Tltrough Cyprus with a Camera while his last travel 
project wasTltrOflgla China witla a Camera (1898) illustrated by many of his wet collodion photographs 
from the 1870.. 
\I LoMma Lobo", DNlIM Lotulora Poor, (4 yola). 1861. yolo 3. p. 233. 
133 
distinction between "wandering" and "civilised" tribes,16 so too the authors of 
Street-Ufe employed a similar taxonomy in their description of "London Nomades" 
(fig.4.1 ): 
In his savage state, whether inhabiting the marshes of Equatorial Mrica. or the mountain ranges of 
Formosa. man is fain to wander, seeking his sustenance in the fruits of the earth or the products of 
the chaSe. On the other hand, in the most civilised communities the wanderers become distributors 
of food and of industrial products to those who spend d1eir days in the ceaseless toil of city life. 
Hence it is that in London there are a number' of what might be termed, owing to their wandering. 
unsettled habits, nomadic tribes. These people, who neither follow a regular pursuit, nor have a 
permanent place of abode, form a section of urban and suburban street folks so divided and 
subdivided, and yet so mingled into one confused whole, as to render abortive any attempt at 
systematic classification. The wares, also. in which they deal are almost as diverse as the families 
to which the dealers belong. They are the people who would rather not be trammelled by the 
usages that regulate settled labour, or by the laws that bind together communities." 
With its implicit reference to representation and fixity, it is this opening paragraph 
of Street-Life (with its talk of "systematic classification" and regulation) which 
very much sets out the terrain within and against which particular strategies of 
representation were to be mobilised. 
Governmentality: the state and the social 
One strategy for reading Street-Ufe in London is to situate it in relation both to the 
historical fonnation described by Foucaul~ Donzelot and Deleuze (among others) as 
the "social" and in relation to Foucault's notion of "governmentality". The social is 
not to be understood as an ahistorical concept of society but, rather. it was a 
specific historical formation involving the constitution of the social body as both an 
object of knowledge and as a site for intervention through the exercise of multiple 
technologies and tactics of power. In the nineteenth century this power was 
particularly exercised around a number of central concerns such as the crisis of 
political economy, the demography of population, the limits and failures of 
philanthropy and the issue of public health. As Deleuze has argued, the social 
should not be reduced to or confused with either the juridical or the economic 
sectors. Instead: 
it invents an entire social economy and lays new foundations for marking the distinction between 
rich and poor. 'Nor does it merge with the public sector or the private. since on the contrary it 
leads to a new hybrid form of abe public and the private, and itself plXluces a repartition, a novel 
interlacing of interventions and withdrawals of the Slate. of its charges and discharges. The question 
is not whether there is a mystification of the social. nor what ideology it expresses." 
Ii ibid., vol. 1. pp. 1-2. 
17 Strut-Ll/e in London. op.cit., p. 83. 
""The Rise of the Social" in Jacques Donzelot. Tu Polic;n, 0/ Families. London, Hutchinson, 1979. 
p.x. . 
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Reacting with other sectors, the social emerged as "a new hybrid form" through 
the intersection of multiple practices, or "little lines of mutation", as it in turn 
produced new relationships between the public and private and between 
instititutional practices and social relations such as the juridical and administrative 
systems, wealth and poverty, medi,cine, education, and the family., More 
particularly, Donzelot, arguing that the social was originally understood as "the 
problem of poverty, the problem of others '11' has claimed that: 
For the social is not society understood as a set of material and moral conditions that, characterize 
a form of consolidation. It would appear to be rather a set of means which allow social life to 
escape material pressures and political-moral uncertainties; the entire range of methods which make 
the members of society relatively safe from the effects of economic fluctuations by providing a 
certain security.'JD 
An important consequence of positing "the emergence of the 'social' as a 
concrete space of intelligibility'tll is a decentering, indeed suspension, of the State 
as the ultimate reference point within critical social analysis. This contrasts with 
recent Marxist theorisations, notably those of Louis Althusser21 and Nicos 
Poulantzas,23 for whom the State remains the privileged site for the initiation and 
exercise of power - for example, through its securing (by means of repression and 
ideology) the reproduction of the relations of production and class domination. 
A number of criticisms can be levelled against this theorisation. Firstly, both 
Althusser and Poulantzas retain a model of the exercise of power which Foucault 
has called "juridico-discursive", i.e. a model of both "descent" and "sovereignty" 
with the ruling class in effect occupying the position of the Absolute Sovereign. 
Power is thus conceptualised as being reducible to a subject (the State) and as being 
the possession of a sovereign agent thereby eliding the multiple forms by which 
power may be exercised. Secondly, both Althusser and Poulantzas present the State 
as a unified and homogeneous entity or concept. Functioning as a monolithic bloc, 
the State is posited as an external unity existing in a position of externality and 
autonomy from capitalist relations of production and social exchange but, 
nonetheless, able to impose itself upon them. Thus, even though traversed by 
contradictions, the State remains a coherent entity. 
This relation of externality remains undissolved by Althusser's Ideological State 
I. The Policing of Familia, Ope cit., p. xxvii. 
III 'b'd . I I ., p. XXVI. 
It ibid. 
12 See cspcc. '1deology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in unin and Philosophy, London, New Left 
Books, 1971. 
III See Political Power tutd Social Classes, London, NLB, 1973 and Slate, Power, Socialism, NLB, 1978, 
Op.Cil. 
135 
Apparatuses since the repressive/coercive State is still retained within this account. 
Moreover, this account is itself posited within a model of the State's modes of 
operation which, despite its sophistication, still ultimately amounts to no more than 
'repression plus ideology'. Furthermore, there remains a latent functionalism and 
economism within these accounts in that, for example, ruling clas~ ideology is still 
constituted and given unity at the level of the economic. As such, aside from the 
employment and hypostatisation of general, ahistorical models of 'production', 
'ideology', and indeed of 'the State' itself (in conjunction with a fmal recourse to 
"determination in the last instance" and the oxymoron of "relative autonomy"), there 
is an elision of economic and social forces and relations and of the State and the 
social. 
Poulantzas, despite his attempts to go beyond Althusser in decentering the 
State, also retains an ultimately reductive economistic and functionalist analysis. 
This is in spite of his rejection of the possibility of either a general theory of the 
economy or of the Statel' and despite, too, his rejection of a position whereby the 
relationship between the State and the economy is necessarily one of mutual 
externality. Poulantzas thus attempts to construct a model of the institutional 
materiality of the State in which the relations of power extend beyond the couplet 
'repression plus ideology'. Thus he argues, for example, that ideological relations 
are already present in the actual constitution of the relations of production.25 Yet, in 
the final analysis, power can, for Poulantzas, still only be a class possession. 
Within his globalising notion of a social totality, social forms and relations have an 
overall cohesion and determinate identity but these only acquire "legitimation" or 
significance within an essentialist account of the class struggle. 
One effect of this reading is that it leaves no space for those political, ideological 
and economic forces which are not specifically class forces or which operate across 
classes. For, within this account, it still remains the class struggle which generates 
the conditions of existence and forms of representation for these extra or trans-class 
forces.26 Furthermore, there is a tension or contradiction between Poulantzas's 
acceptance, following Foucault, that power relations are dispersed throughout the 
social body and his replication of a model whereby the State has an essential class 
identity which then penetrates other power relations. For, in the last instance, the 
very foundations of power would seem to rest with the repressive State apparatus 
i4 SIGle, Power, Socialism. Op.CiL, p. 20 . 
.. ibid., p. 17 • 
.. ibid., p. 44. 
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(the police, army, judiciary etc.) which has the means to employ violence. As such, 
despite his notion of the State's "isolation effect" and his utilisation of Foucauldian 
notions of individualisation and normalisation, Poulantzas ultimately misreads 
Foucault's analysis of the operations of power. 
While the accounts of both Althusser and Po~antzas still retain their usefulness, 
it is possible, however, to operate a reversed reading of the operations of the State. 
For, rather than assuming the domination of 'society' by the State (with both terms 
being assumed to be self-evident) and from there proceeding to analyse various 
State apparatuses, their modes of functioning and the forms and means for the 
representation of ruling-class interests, it is instead possible to argue that the State 
can only be understood through an analysis of the tactics and techniques of 
government by which its effects are produced. In other words, the State is not to 
be seen as the sole and unitary point of origin for strategies of intervention and 
social management. Instead, it is to a degree itself the cumulative effect of these 
multiple and non-reducilble strategies and techniques of government and of local 
exercises of power. As Donzelot has argued: ''Thus the State would never be a 
subject of history as such but a support for technologies and a resultant effect of 
governmental strategies. "Z7 
Similarly Foucault, writing on the question of governmentality, makes a 
distinction between sovereignty and government. It was the sixteenth century 
which, Foucault argues, first witnessed the emergence of the problematic of 
government as a debate around two alternative positions. On the one hand, 
government was conceptualised as being equivalent to the form of rule exercised by 
an individual sovereign over a principality. However, alternative debates around 
the "art of government" sought to provide a rationality for government (and the 
State) which was independent of any conception of the interests of the sovereign 
ruler. 
Foucault here makes a categorical distinction between one mode of the exercise 
of power, i.e. sovereignty, which has as its objective the preservation of a 
principality or "a territory and the submission of the people to the (sovereign's) law 
as opposed to another form of government for which the target is "the complex unit 
constituted by men and things. "21 Thus with sovereignty the aim of government 
and the State is the preservation of sovereignty itself (with the principal mechanism 
D "The Poverty of Political Culture", op.cit., p. 78. 
II "Govemrnentality", I tholo,y and COtLfCiolUM88, 6, 1979, p. 11. 
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for this being the authority and operation of the sovereign's law), while in the case 
of government the focus of attention and intervention is the relationship between 
people and things e.g. the production and disposition of wealth and resources, the 
organisation of ways of living, and the management of the contingencies of life - in 
short, "a plurality of sp~ific aims ... A whole series of specific finalities, then, 
which are to become the objective of government as such. "29 And, above all, it is 
"the population" which is the catalyst for the development of the problematic of 
government beyond models based upon either the individual sovereign or upon the 
family: 
whereas the end of sovereignty is internal to itself and possesses its own intrinsic instruments in 
the shape of its own laws, the finality of government resides in the things it manages and in the 
pursuit of the perfection and intensiftcation of the processes which it directs, and the instruments 
of government, instead of being laws, now come to be a range of multifonn tactics.-
Organised around the problem of population, the aim or end of government is the 
welfare and management of that population "in its depths and its details.'t31 Yet it is 
also a relation of interest: 
The population now appears more as the aim of government than the power of the ruler; the 
population is the subject of needs, aspirations but it is also the object in the hands of government, 
aware vis-l-vis the government, of what it wants, but ignorant of what is being done to it. 
Interests, both at the level of each individual who goes to make up the population, and also the 
interest of the population as such, regardless of individual interests and aspirations, this is the new 
target and the fundamental instrument of the government of population. The birth of a new art, or 
at any rate of a range of absolutely new tactics and techniques.12 
This is not, however, to posit a linear or evolutionist account of the exercise of 
power (i.e. as the successive displacement of one form by another). For population 
is the site for the operation of the triangular configuration of sovereignty- discipline-
government in the formation of the social order although this is not to say that the 
three elements are equally weighted. None of them, however, is entirely absent. 
For example, sovereignty remains allied to the legal foundation of the State and the 
legitimation of techniques of government. 
Foucault further describes the constitution of this triangular configuration 
"which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism 
apparatuses of security"" as being focused upon the three elements of 
government, population and political economy, i.e. a relation between: 
the deep historical link between the movement that overturns the constants of sovereignty in 
B ibid., p. 13. 
10 ibid., p. 19 
at ibid. 
• ibid., p. 18. 
• ibid., p. 19. 
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consequence of the problem of the choice of government; the movement that brings about the 
emergence of population as a datum, as a field of intervention, and as an objective of governmental 
techniques; and that which focuses on the economy as a specific sector of reality, and on political 
economy as the science and the technique of intervention of the government on that field of reality. 
Three movements: government, population, political economy, which constitute from the 
Eighteenth Century onwards on a solid series, which even today is assuredly not dissolVed.'" 
In short the State is the composite effect of the multifonn tactics and techniques 
mobilised within the triangular relation of sovereignty-discipline-government. As 
Foucault concludes: 
maybe, after all, the State is no more than a composite reality and a mythical abstraction whose 
importance is a lot more limited than many of us think ... A governmentalisation of the State 
which is a singularly paradoxical phenomenon, since if in fact the problems of governmentality 
and the techniques of government have become the only political issue, the only real space for 
political struggle and contestation, this is because the governmentalisation of the State is at the 
same time what has permitted the State to survive, and it is possible to suppose that if the State is 
what it is today, this is so precisely because of this governmentality, which is at once internal and 
external to the State, since it is the tactics of government which make possible the continual 
definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the State and what is not, the 
public versus the private, and so on; thus the State can only be understood in its survival and its 
limits on the basis or the general tactics of govemmentaltity." 
Complementary to Foucault's discussion of the "govemmentalisation of the 
State" is Donzelot's notion of "the socialisation of politics" (e.g. as in his 
discussion of "insurational technologies")." Furthermore, in The Policing of 
Families Donzelot has outlined how the family became not only the site of 
governmental intervention but how it also became an instrument of government and 
was no longer cited as a model for it. 
Through utilising an analytical framework based upon governmentality and the 
social, the nineteenth century can now be seen as witnessing the dissolution of 
many major political struggles into a series of administrative strategies and 
solutions. The 'political' realm (including the State) thus became a series of 
technical and administrative questions and issues organised around social 
management. And it is through this management that government shares the 
characteristics of a "savoir" as described by Giovanna Procacci: 
A savoir is a discourse which occupies a crucial position in the discursive universe: as an 
exchangeur (exchanger) it operates the mediation between the analytico-programmatic levels of 
discourse elaborated by the 'sciences' and the exigencies connected with direct social intervention -
whether the intervention is imaginary or real matters little in this contexl ... the object of savoir is 
no longer pre-eminently scientific, but an object upon which par excellence intervention is 
possible." 
sa 'b'd I I • 
• ibid., p. 20. 
M "The Poverty of Political Culture", Op.ciL, p. 80ff. 
17 "Social Economy and the Government of Poverty", Ideology and ConsciOIlsr&US, 4, 1978, p. 60. 
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The science of police and political economy 
Not only does the notion of governmentality provide a framework for a reading of 
the general historical conditions of emergence and existence of Street-Life in 
London, but the text can be situated as one particular instance (albeit a highly local 
one) of govemmentality at work. For it, too, is structured around the constitution 
of the population (or rather one section of it) as both an object of examination and 
knowledge and as the target for the intervening exercise of power. More 
specifically, Street-Life falls within the realm of the "science of police" as defmed 
by Pasquale Pasquino. 
pasquino argues that the term "police" has not always denoted just the legal-
juridical order and the surveillance and control of the "dangerous classes". Instead, 
it was more broadly referable to the maintenance of the "public good" and thus, 
representing itself in terms of public concern or "interest", it incorporated a widely 
dispersed range of 'objects' or sites· of operation. Given its multiple functions the 
"Science of Police" constituted: "a great labour of formation of the social body, or 
rather a labour whose principle result is what today we call society or the social 
body and what the Eighteenth Century called the good order of population. "38 
Marking the beginnings of the exercise of administrative powers over the social 
body, this science of police was founded upon two basic aims; firstly, the 
attainment of information and, secondly. the cultivation of happiness. As Foucault, 
quoted by Pasquino. states: ''The business of police is everything which concerns 
maintaining and augmenting the happiness of the citizens omnium et singulorum, of 
all and of each."" 
This construction of police around the double imperative of 
surveillance{mformation and the cultivation of happiness is clearly applicable to 
Street-Life which operates as an exercise in information gathering and journalistic 
reporting organised around the issues of both security and happiness - a discursive 
mediation which produces its own specific knowledges together with 
representations of the social. This concern with "happiness" (for example. in the 
form of financial security) and with self-protection against the vagaries of economic 
life is recurrent throughout the text in the form of constant references to the need for 
prudence within domestic economy and the desirability, indeed necessity, of 
51 "'Theatrum PoUticum: the genealogy of capital - police and the state of prosperity", Ideology and 
COruciOIUM",~, 1978, p. 47. 
• ibid., p. 49. 
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savings. An except from "Covent Garden Labourers" is typical: 
The labourers employed by their tradesmen who have shops or stalls at Covent Garden are divided 
into job-workers and the regular hands. The fonner are by far the most numerous, and, but for 
their improvidence, might be as well off financially as those who receive regular salaries .. Jf, 
however, they were able to strike an average in their earnings, never spend more, and save from the 
prosperous season to meet the exigencies of the less busy months, they would lead a life of 
comparative comfort But such prudence would be altogether foreign to their natures. Resisting the 
temptation to spend the money actually in hand would be considered a far greater hardship than the 
privation to be subsequently endmed. 411 
Recalling Donzelot's definition of the social as "the set of means which allow 
social life to escape material pressures and politico-moral uncertainties", the broad 
theme of security is constantly returned to in Street-Life. This is particularly 
apparent in the accounts of flooding, i.e. "Sufferers from the Floods" (figA.5); 
disease, i.e. "Public Disinfectors" (fig.4.6) and "Flying Dustmen" (figA.35); 
personal injury, i.e. "Hookey-Alf of Whitechapel" (figA.30) or theft, i.e. "The 
Crawlers" (fig.4.31) as well as the more general accounts of poverty and 
unemployment which are interspersed with repeated exhortations for individual 
self-discipline and self-reliance as a means of protection against life's vicissitudes. 
More particularly, as Giovanna Procacci has described, the' theme of happiness 
(as "prosperity") is inscribed within the context of political economy and social 
reconciliation: 
at its heart 'happiness' becomes the technical means for resolving the new problem; the 
reconciliation of social groups which the economic project unites through the expansion of wealth 
but which are incapable of refraining from antagonism.·1 
These discourses of political economy occupy a structuring role in Street-Life 
although the text never overtly registers any crisis of confidence in laisser-faire 
political economy e.g. its creation of poverty, the inadequacy of philanthropy and 
the recognition of the need for systematic intervention - a situation which had at 
least been acknowledged by Mayhew. And, while in Street-Life there is a limited 
recognition of the 'exploitation' of certain members of the poor and working classes 
(e.g. the situation of the Covent Garden flower sellers or the cabmen's hiring of 
their cabs) together with the recognition of the existence of genuine victims of the 
free market, any examination of the deeper structural causes of poverty is both 
displaced and resolved through the constant demands for individual self-reliance, 
initiative and thrift. Poverty, unemployment or destitution are thus represented as 
problems of the individual and not as economic symptoms. 
Furthennore, poverty itself was rarely questioned in the nineteenth century but 
ao Strut-ut, ill London • op.cit •• p. 132 . 
.. "Social Economy and the Government of Poverty", op.CiL, p. S9. 
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was viewed as part of the natural order. Rather it was pauperism and destitution that 
were the areas of both anxiety and inquiry. As Procacci states: "Having made his 
entrance with full rights onto the stage of the economy. the 'pauper' starts to 
become a new scientific object"4Z And. while poverty and inequality (as 'natural' 
conditions) were not themselves an inherent threat to the social order. pauperism 
was, i.e: "Pauperism is ... poverty raised to the level of social danger; the spectre of 
the mob. a collective phenomenon. essentially urban. "43 If poverty was "a 
fundamental yet unanalysable. 'unmanageable' given" which "figured as a 
counterpoint, destined to be denied", pauperism: "appears as 'anti-natural' as well 
as anti-social. a manifestation of deformity which insinuates itself in the folds of the 
natural order which political economy. the discourse on wealth. aims to found. '144 
So too, in Street-life it is pauperism and destitution - or rather the possibility 
of falling into that condition - which is the focus for concern rather than the 
condition of simply being poor. As Procacci states: "the elimination of social 
inequality is not the purpose of the discourse on pauperism."4S Indeed, Sismondi's 
statement, quoted by Procacci from hiS Nouveaux principes d'economie politique 
of 1819. is pertinent not only to Street-Life but also to the wider discourse on 
philanthropy. As Sismondi states: "It is not in fact equality of all conditions but 
happiness in all conditions which should be the legislator'S aim. "46 
The potential 'otherness' of pauperism within the natural order is itself 
represented within a moral rather than a purely economic discourse. Procacci. for 
example, cites Donzelot's description of the "systematic grafting of morality onto 
economics"47 which allows entry to the social which is itself defined as forms or 
patterns of behaviour: 
Morality does not stand here for ideology, nor for strategy; one should not be misled into thinking 
that the social economists are pedantic moralists, caught in the grip of nostalgia for the past. 
'Morality' here signifies a discursive mediation which allows a whole range of technologies to gain 
access to the social as behaviour.-
It is thus the behaviour of both the group and the individual which is constitutes as ! \ r ' 
the site and signifier of difference - or integration: 
if it is nOl poverty which the discourse on pauperism takes as its object of attack, if it not towards ( \t' 
the disappearance of the poor - the indispensable suppon for the existence of the rich - that this .. 
Gibid. 
43 ibid., p. 62. 
44 ibid., p. 63. 
41 ibid. 
"ibid. 
47 ibid., p. 61. 
"ibid. 
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discourse is tending, what is its purpose? Its object is the elimination not of inequality but of 
difference. And here 'moral' language finds its exact meaning. With the tenn 'difference' I want in 
fact to underline that the essential significance of the category of 'pauperism' consists in indicating 
a series of different fonns of conduct. namely those which are not amenable to the project of 
socialisation that is being elaborated. ., 
This representation, or imaginary projection, of the poor as the bearers of a 
threatening and unnatural difference and of their resistance to socialisation has been 
succinctly summarised by Stedman Iones in his description of Victorian slum 
literature, according to which: 
London workers were 'heathen'. 'Civilisation' had not reached them. The poor lived in inaccessible 
places, in 'dens', in 'swamps', in the 'deeps', in the 'wilds', or in the 'abyss'. The 'Light' of 
civilisation did not shine upon dlem because they dwelt in the 'shadows', 'the shade'. 'the nether 
world', the 'darkest' regions. When missionaries from 'civilisation' ventured into that 'Babylon', 
they were confronted by 'terrible' sights, and if struck by guilt of fear, they recalled the stories of 
Dives and Lazarus or Jacob and Esau. The terms, 'working classes' or 'toiling masses' carried no 
positive cultural connotations for they signified irreligion, intemperance, improvidence or 
immorality. Indeed, it was often diffICult for dlese strangers from the 'civilised' world to discover 
where the 'working classes' ended and where the 'dangerous classes' began. For crime, prostitution, 
disorder and sedition were also thought to lurk in these poor regions, hidden from the gaze of the 
well-to-do and when left to fester in this 'nether' world could suddenly break out and threaten the 
town ... The working class lacked 'civilisation' because it was hidden away from it so 
Surveillance and representation 
pasquino states that: ''To be exercised power needs to know; knowledge then, but 
also - and this is the other side - a force for public happiness. "51 It is within this 
double register that Street-Life is inscribed. And just as Foucault has cited a politics 
of power implicit within the discursiveness of all forms of knowledge, so too he 
has argued that the epistemophilic desire and imperative to examine human reality is 
itself pervaded by a gaze of surveillance. It is with reference to surveillance and 
discipline that one can begin to locate a general strategy of visual and textual 
representation which is employed within Street-Life - a strategy, however, that is 
not reducible to anyone single photograph or chapter but which is instead produced 
across them as a series. Writing specifically of police, Pasquino argues that: 
To put it simply, and at the risk of over-general ising, I would say that what police regulations 
regulate or try to regulale, is everything which in the life of this society ... goes unregulated, 
everylhing ... that lacks order or form. II 
Pasquino here implicitly conttasts a realm of regulation/representation (as order 
and fonn) against one which escapes control or surveillance (themselves forms of 
representation), an issue which Procacci also raises with specific reference to 
a'b'd 64 • I ., p. • 
• "Workina-Clua Culture and Workina-Clus Politics in London: Notel on the Remaking of. Working 
Clan", in hil LtutgIUJ,U o{CIau, Cambridae Univenity Presl, 1983, pp. 183-184. 
I' "Theatrum Policic:um", op.ciL, p. 51. 
• ibid., p. 47. 
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pauperism: 
The definition of pauperism ..• does not work essentially through economic categories; rather than a 
certain level of poverty, the representation of pauperism, lays emphasis chiefly on images of 
fluidity, of indefmiteness, on the impression, at once massive and vague, which is left by a crowd, 
and which makes for its menacing character." 
The production of such a representation of the poor can be seen in James 
Greenwood's The Seven Curses of London published in 1869 - Greenwood's 
"sketches of low-life" themselves being cited in the Preface to Street-Life. 
Discussing the statistics for vagrant criminals, Greenwood claims that: 
When. however, we come to regard the long column that at a glance reveals the figures that pertain 
to vagrant committals for fifty successive years, a decided damper is thrown on one's hopes that the 
trade of the shifting roving vagabond is becoming slowly though surely extinguished. As might 
be expected of a class so erratic in its movements, it would be difficult to measure them by any 
fixed standard; but one is scarcely prepared to discover the awful amount of uncertainty that 
prevails as regards the going and coming of these impostor tramps, when there is a dearth of them, 
and when their swarming may be expected. They are like the cholera, or like plague, and have 
their seasons of sloth, and again of general prevalence and virulence. The laws that govern the 
movements of the professional beggar are inscrutable. You may make war on him and thin his 
ranks, and prosecute him and persecute him, and by the end of the year be able to show in plain 
unmistakable figures that he is not half the formidable figure that he was last year; that you have 
blunted his sting and decreased his dimensions. You still prosecute the war of extermination and 
next year you are in position to reveal in black and white further glorious results. The thousand 
have become seven hundred, and again the seven hundred four. At this rate, ere two more years are 
elapsed, you may strip the rags from your last beggar's back and hang them on the city's gate as a 
scarecrow and a caution against a revival of the detestable trade. 
But alas for our delusive hopes! Come another year - that which showed our seven hundred 
beggars reduced to four - and without any apparent cause the enemy, crippled more than half killed 
it seemed, reappears on the stage hale and sound, and with years of life in him yeL The four 
hundred has grown to six. There are no means of accounting for iL Depression of trade and 
poverty widely prevailing will not do, for such are the times of prosperity and faltening with the 
professional beggar. When 'giving' is the order of the day, and benevolence, sickening at the sight 
of privation and distress that seems endless, shuts her eyes and bestows her gifts on all comers, 
then is the cadger's harvest, then may he pursue his shameful avocation with comparative 
impunity.54 
Framed within a moralising discourse, Greenwood here constructs a series of 
images of the 'otherness' of the vagrant poor ("the enemy") in terms of their erratic 
mobility, unpredictability and resistance to regulation. For, at one moment 
numerically visible ("swarming'), they are next seemingly on the decline and absent 
- if only temporarily. At one moment apparently controllable, they are subsequently 
rampant The "inscrutable" laws of their movements bear no correspondence with 
either fixed standards or with orthodox forms of measurement and are beyond 
systems of rational explanation and causality. Not simply an internal disturbance 
within the social order, these vagrant poor exist both outside it and outside of 
conventional systems of representation and patterns of behaviour. Indeed, so 
perverse or inverted is the world of the beggar, according to Greenwood's logic, 
is "Social Economy and the Government of Poverty", Op.ciL, p. 62. 
14TMSevDI CIUSU ofLondm&, London. Blackwell. 1981, pp. 144-14S. 
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that they actually thrive during economic depressions and periods of widespread 
poverty. Thus, rather than being in part the consequences of economic fluctuations, 
these poor are depicted as free agents who parasitically exploit economic decline. 
Likened to a contagious disease (significantly those of epidemic character and 
proportions), these roving vagabonds must be persecuted and wiped out.55 
Producing an image of urban vagrancy, Greenwood's text simultaneously 
posits the professional beggar as existing outside conventional categories of 
representation and beyond fonns of regulation. This question of how to represent 
what is either resistant to representation or what is posited (at an imaginary level) as 
being beyond representation is implicit in another contemporary text, London: A 
pilgrimage by Gustave Dore and Blanchard JelTOld published in 1872, in which 
standard representations of public and private break down or are inadequate when 
applied to the East End poor. This representation and registering of the poor as a 
vast, amorphous flux is recurrent throughout Victorian literature but is not one 
which is visibly produced in Street-Life although it is necessarily part of its 
problematic. Rather, its particular strategy of representation involves a breaking 
down of any collective and anonymous identity of the urban crowd into an atomistic 
sequence of isolated and 'knowable' individuals. 
In this Street-Ufe partly adopts the conventional procedures of a tradition of 
Victorian empirical social investigation, e.g. classification, taxonomy, and the 
minute morphology of both individuals and types of which Mayhew's own 
investigations (acknowledged in the Preface) were the major precedent. This mode 
of investigation recalls the techniques of surveillance as described by Foucault, i.e. 
exclusion, differentiation, individuation - in other words, "a fonn of surveillance at 
once global and individualising ... carefully separating the individuals under 
surveillance. ,," Citing the model of the Panopticon, Foucault has described this 
process of differentiation: 
Rather than the massive binary division between one set of people and another, it called for 
multiple IeJ)8l8tions, individualising distributions. in organisation and depth of surveillance and 
control. an inccnsification and a ramifacation of power ... The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of 
multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced 
by a collection· or separated individualities ... it is replaced by a multiplicity that can be numbered 
and supcrvised ... Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.'" 
D See allo Foucault'l discullion in DLrcipliu aNI Pullirlt of the plague, the leper and the city, 
eapec.,pp. 195-200, i.e. "the plap u. fonn. at once real and imaginary. of disorder had u iu medical 
and political correlative discipline. Behind the disciplinary mechanillRl c:an be read the haunting 
memory of 'contaaiOlll' of the plaaue. of rebellions. crimel. vagabondage, delertions, people who 
appear and diaappt*, Uve and die in diJorder" (p. 198) • 
.. "Tho Eye of Power" ,S.".w,UlC. 3, 2. p. 6. 
17 Di8cipUnc tlItd P/UIUJa , op.c:it., p. 198. 
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This separation of individuals in Street-Ufe has important consequences in that 
"the poor in London" are not seen and represented as constituting a cohesive group, 
let alone either a class or a threat - a threat that is acknowledged in London: A 
Pilgrimage (even if only in the context of the narrator's personal safety).s, But 
while the poor are still, on one level at least, represented within a grid of difference, 
there is no engagement in Street-Life with the almost eschatological imagery as 
described by Stedman Jones. Significantly, too, Street-Life is not focused upon 
the East End (with its traditional identity of total 'otherness') but mainly upon 
central London and the West End (e.g. Holbom, Covent Garden, St. Giles') with 
only one foray into the East End (Le. ''Hookey-Alf of White chapel"). 
London in the 18708 
However, while Foucault provides a necessary counter to reductive analyses of 
power/knowledge, his own accounts and operative terms such as surveillance and 
discipline need, at times, to be used with care and, indeed, if cited as generalisable 
concepts they can themselves become a potential obstacle to historical investigation. 
Thus, for example, while Foucault argues that power is dispersed throughout the 
social body and while he has sought to abandon a model of power based upon 
sovereignty and possession, it is nonetheless the case that power is unequally 
distributed. Foucault may claim that "where there is power, there is resistance"S9 
but the various individuals in Street-Ufe are entirely laCking in powers of self-
determination. Despite their spoken statements quoted in the text, they never 
represent themselves but are always represented by others. Equally, the uses and 
availability of photography are premised here upon a wholly uneven distribution of 
power. For such reasons, specific historical investigation is needed as a means of 
avoiding the potentially totalising notions of power and surveillance provided by 
Foucault. The purpose of such investigation is to reveal the particular configuration 
of Street-Life's conditions of emergence and circulation rather than reading it as 
just one more example of the operations of disciplinary society. Street-Life thus 
needs to be situated within a historically specific "field of forces" comprised both of 
a heterogeneous set of discourses and of a particular range of institutional practices 
and their rationalities. For it is only within this field of forces that Street-Ufe takes 
• Gustave Dor6 md Blanchard Jerrold. Lontlora: A Pilgrimage, New York. Dover, 1970, pp. 141-150. 
IITM History ofSuuo.lity. Volwne I. Pelican. 1981. p. 95. 
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on significance and meaning. As Derrida has remarked: 
A text is henceforth no longer a finished corpus of writing, some content enclosed in a book or its 
margins, but a differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than 
itself, to other differential networks .... 
It is this "differential network" which is the constitutive site for the production of 
meaning through intertextual movements of both difference and deferral. But while 
Street-Life can be located in r~lation to a widely dispersed and variable set of 
responses to the problem of urban poverty, this is not·to impose a homogenising 
reading upon them. 
This field of discourses and practices was in particular focused around the 
issues of 'casual' employment, endemic poverty, pauperism. mendicancy. crime 
and the 'demoralisation' of the working classes and residuum. These issues were, 
of course, themselves bound up with specificity of London's economy and its 
particular industrial pathology and social demography. As Stedman Jones has 
observed, London's economy was essentially "pre-industrial" and was dominated 
by "non-industrial forms of capital."61 Unlike many of the towns and cities of the 
North which had arisen around large factories and one or two dominant industries, 
London remained a centre of specialist skills and small workshops organised 
particularly around 'finishing' and consumer trades. In short: 
The extensive survival of small scale production in Victorian London detennined its economic 
structure and political character, and its patterns of poverty remained largely distinct from those of 
the other nineteenth-century industrial regions. II 
The few large-scale industries that had existed in London prior to the 1850s 
had, by the tum of the century, largely moved elsewhere due to lack of space. steep 
rents, the scarcity of raw materials as well as London's infamously high industrial 
wage rates. Thus while engineering. printing and tanning (to cite a few) all moved 
out to the provinces, London became a centre of specialist trades concentrating on 
the manufacture of goods for the London market and, in particular, for a West End 
clientele. 
Above all, it was the cycles of demand and depression allied to seasonality and, 
as important, the weather which determined the particular patterns of employment 
and meuopolitan distress for London's working class and poor. Dependent to a 
large extent upon the West End season and fashion, the cycle of employment for 
many people (including a significant proportion of those represented in Street-UJe ) 
iO Quoted in Untying 1M Tm: A Post-StrKCI",,,lisl Rcadu, ed. Robert YOWlg, London. Routledge and 
Kelln Paul. 1981, p. 29. 
It OlllCtUI Lorulon, Peregrine, 1984, p. 239. 
II ibid., p. 32. 
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reached its peak in mid-June. fell during August and rose again in October with a 
slump throughout the winter months. Seasonality also effected London's few major 
industries such as shipbuilding and coal. Coal, grain and timber imports to the port 
of London were all seasonal while the city's other major industry. building. also 
slackened off to a virtual standstill during the winter. The effect of these. factors was 
a permanent blight of 'casualisation' and unemployment producing a concomitant 
social and economic insecurity. Nearly a quarter of those employed in coal-
portering, for example, were a 'casual' (or, at least. underemployed) surplus with 
the ratio being even higher among the dockers. But even in the more traditionally 
skilled industries such as shipbuilding there were similar patterns of seasonality as 
artisans with a specialist trade found themselves dependent upon meagre casual 
earnings.1i] 
An over-supply of unskilled labour (far in excess of demand), often dramatic 
changes in seasonal demand and low flXed capital were all determining aspects of 
London's economy. Yet aside from these structural features there was an imbalance 
between the demand for juvenile over adult labour. a constant supply of workers 
displaced from skilled or permanent jobs (due to general economic factors and 
structures of employment within particular trades), the temporary influx of 
outsiders into the casual labour market during periods of cyclical and seasonal 
unemployment coupled with rural migration and foreign immigration of unskilled 
labour into London. 
Allied to this and the decline of some trades (for example. Thames shipbuilding 
which collapsed in 1867) and of employment conditions within them. there were 
also specific features of employment patterns in London such as the system of 
irregular short engagements which effected some 10% of the city's working 
population, low wages in many trades, the practice of "sweating" and the 
intensification of work methods. Above all, it was the East End and the centre of 
the city - the "inner industrial perimeter"64 - that was most effected by these 
is I am of course using the terms working classes, the poor, the casual poor etc. very loosely here. 
Clearly there were significant differences between. for example, artisans and labourers or between the 
wholly destitute and those in employment (even if only on an irregular basis). However, the broad 
distinction I wish to make is to differentiate these groups from an industrial, and specifically factory, 
proletariaL For a detailed examination of the labour market. see Outcast London. Op.CiL, espec. Part 1 
and James Treble. Urban Poverty in Britain 1830-1914, London, Batsford. 1979, espec., chapters 1 and 
2. and The poor and the city: the English poor law in its urban COlllel, 1834-1914, ed. Michael Rose. 
Leicester University Pren, 1985, espec. ROle'llntroduction. pp. 2-17. 
14 The term "inner indUltrial perimeter" is used by Stedman Jones in Outcast London to describe an area 
north, east and louth of the city that runs north of the Thames from Holbom to St. Saviours through 
Bethnal Green and Mile End to Rotherhithe and Bennondsey lOuth of the river. Areas such as Hackney, 
hlington, Greenwich. Lambeth and Camberwell are beyond this perimeter. 
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conditions as chronic urban poverty arose, especially subsequent to the middle-
class exodus from these areas to outer London and the suburbs. 
Entry into the casual labour market almost inevitably meant a descent from a 
more skilled trade to a less skilled one with unskilled workers, for example 
dockers, often resorting to reliance upon fonus of casual employment, the income 
of their wives or else charity and the Poor Law - a descent which also often 
provoked a 'crisis' of masculinity.60S The obvious consequence of this pattern of 
descent was to maximise the pressure upon the least skilled sections of the labour 
market. Aside from the particular factors resulting from an individual's descent into 
the casual labour market from more lucrative and appealing forms of employment 
e.g. injury, sickness, collapse of the employer's frrm, lack of adequate references, 
offensive behaviour etc., descent was essentially due either to the general 
movement of of the economy (for example, cyclical depression) or else due to the 
specific employment structures and patterns within particular trades. Cabmen, 
retired or ex-soldiers and boardmen, all figuring in Street-Life (figs.4.2, 4.4, 
4.26), as well as groups such as ex-servants, were all caught up in the particular 
contingencies of their professions and often found it impossible to re-enter the 
mainstream labour market. 
Mayhew had been particularly alert to this movement of descent and had made a 
sharp distinction between those who "were driven" to the streets as distinct from 
those who either "took" or were "bred" to them: 
In most cases, I am convinced, it is adopted from a horror of the workhouse, and a disposition to 
do, at least something for the food they eat Often it is the last struggle of independence ... Some 
have been reduced from their position as tradesmen or shopmen; others have been gentlemen's 
servants or clerks; all dragged down by a series of misfortunes, sometimes beyond their control. 
and sometimes brought about by their own imprudence or sluggishness ... but a still larger class 
than all, are beaten out mechanics and artisans, who from want of employment in their own trade, 
take to make up small things (clothes horses, tinware, cutlery, brushes, pails, caps and bonnets) 
on their own accounts." 
The story of "Scotty" in ''The Crawlers" is typical of many narratives of 
descent, through misfortune, to the streets that are given in Street-Life coupled 
with an assertion of independence and self-reliance, i.e: "Imbued with a pride that 
U Thi. anxiety about the 10 •• of manhood through unemployment due to an inability to fulfil the 
traditional 'mascUline' role of provider for the family and because of exclusion from a (male) working 
environment is evident in the narrative of "Hookey AIr" whose amputated left arm becomes a sign of his 
'castrated' impotence. Throughout the commentary there is an overtly empathetic gender identification 
between Adolphe Smith and Hookey Alf, i.e. "this good-natured, honest man, feels that he ought to be 
lupporting his mother and lilter. while in reality he is often living on their meagre earnings. The 
polition i. certainly trying, and it is difficult to malce poor "Hookey" understand that an epileptic 
cripple cannot be expected to fulfil the same duties u a man in soWld health" (p. 161). 
" LoNJon LDbmu tIIId the London Poor, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 322-323. 
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does honour to her nationality. Scotty has stubbornly rejected all suggestions as to 
her entering the workhouse and does not, I believe, condescend to beg. "61 
However, while none of the individuals in Street-ute represent a direct threat 
to the existing social order nor do any of them voice dissent or opposition to the 
free market, the possibility that they might become a threat, due primarily to 
extremes of pauperism, is implicit throughout the text. Thus, for example. street 
advertising is described as giving "employment to many destitute individuals who 
would otherwise become burdens to the parish or swell the list of our criminal 
classes."" As such. it was the possibility that the 'honest' poor and 'respectable' 
working classes might fall into the class of unregenerate poor (alternatively known 
as the dangerous classes, the casual poor or the residuum) which was an issue of, 
at times, urgent concern and attention. 
The residuum itself was seen as a permanent potential threat and as representing 
the worst aspects of urban life which, if left unchecked, could disrupt the stability 
of the social order itself. Recalling Masterman's description of the 'city type', 
Alfred Marshall voiced much orthodox opinion in his characterisation of the 
residuum as "those who have a poor physique and a weak character - those who are 
limp in body and mind."· Similarly, writing in 1885, Arnold White argued that 
while 20% of the unemployed were "genuinely unemployed", the other 40% were 
totally degenerate: "physically, mentally and morally unfit, there is nothing that the 
nation can do for these men except to, let them die out by leaving them alone. "70 
Once again, it was not poverty itself that was at issue within the subjective 
psychologising of both Marshall's and White's descriptions in that both were 
moralising responses rather than being descriptions based upon structural or 
economic analysis. Such characterisations of the residuum were themselves 
symptomatic of a more general representation of pauperism which was perceived as 
difference and threat in terms of improvidence, drunkenness, intemperance, bad 
language and disrespect for authority. 
Moreover, it was London which was identified with the problem of the 
residuum. And, although never reaching the alann of the 184Os, this identification 
was fuelled by periodic crises. The period of 1866 to 1872, for example, not only 
witnessed the Second Refonn Bill (and the Paris Commune) and fears of potential 
., Street-Life in London., op.cit., p. 165. 
M ibid., p. 72. 
• Quoted in OlllctUt Londora. op.cit., p. 11. 
7'0 "Tha Nomad Poor of London", Contemporary Review, vol. XLVU, May ISSS, p. 71S. 
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_ working class republicanism but, in London high food prices coinciding with high 
unemployment provoked public marches and demonstrations. Furthermore, there 
were major outbreaks of cholera, scarlet fever and smallpox. As distinct from the 
national scene, there was also a dramatic rise both in pauperism and vagrancy (with 
both being consequences of unemployment) with "plagues of beggars" roaming the 
streets. During such conditions, begging, crime and political disorder were seen as 
being closely linked - links which were themselves in no small part fuelled by 
alarmist and sensationalist journalism such as Greenwood's investigations into the 
"wilds" of London.71 
Class anxieties did, however, lessen in 1873 with the return of an economic 
boom and the realisation that the social order was not on the verge of collapse. 
Compared with London: A Pilgrimage - a text overtly marked by an anxiety about 
the radical otherness of the East End - Street-Life (published some five years later) 
displays a more relaxed attitude towards the poor. However, the return of economic 
prosperity and social stability did not remove the problem of the residuum even if it 
now seemed rather less urgent and the 1870s saw a wave of religious, philanthropic 
and political activity directed at 'civilising' the city and moralising the urban poor. 
In particular, this activity was provoked by what was diagnosed as the 
demoralisation of the poor of which social disorder was the logical symptom. This 
demoralisation (framed in terms of idleness, dissipation, lack of independence etc.) 
was read as the consequence both of the geographical separation of classes (itself 
again especially a feature of London) with a resultant collapse of local 
administration and a lack a direct inter-class acquaintance. This situation was further 
coupled with what was seen as the unequal operation and abuse of "indiscriminate" 
private charity and the Poor Laws with the latter, it was argued, no longer 
functioning as a deterrent 
Within this context, the 1870s witnesses the emergence of a wide set of forms 
of guidance aimed at inculcating the virtues of labour, thrift and self-help among the 
urban poor. These techniques of guidance took the form of both legislation to create 
a physical environment which would discourage undesirable working class habits 
7' Greenwood's KC01U1ts of London were KCuscd of sensationalism by contemporaries and there is often 
a sense of titillating voyemism in his descriptions of the extreme 'otherness' of certain Ireas of the city. 
And although the two authors of Street.Life stress the accuracy and factuality of their own 
investigations, their text is not entirely imm1U1e to a milder from of melodramatic sensationalism. Thus 
the series begins with "the story of the mysterious death of Mary Pradd [which) will hlrdly bear 
repeating in detail" (p. 84). This was probably a ploy to attract prospective readers and subscribers but 
the fact that the Mary Pracld is in the accompanying photograph for "London Nomades" (fig. 4.1) adds a 
certain voyeuristic interest to the image while also 'conrmning' certain representations of the lives of 
gypsies and the poor. 
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and attitudes, while private charity aimed to induce a moral refonnation of the poor. 
The legislative use of the immediate needs of the urban poor as a means of 
securing their moral refonn, active social control and discipline is evident in the 
spate of refonns initiated from the 1870s onwards. The Sanitary Commission of 
1869.-71 led to the fonnation of the Local Government Board in 1871. 1872 saw 
the Public Health Act to be followed by the Public Health Act of 1875 which 
divided the country into rural and urban sanitary districts each with clearly defmed 
duties. The Artisans and Labourers Dwelling Improvement Act, also led to the 
demolition of slums and "rookeries", and the subsequent dispersal of their 
inhabitants - a process which occurred within the St Giles' district which was one 
of the major sites of investigation in Street-Life.71 As slums were demolished, 
model dwelling companies and philanthropic trusts provided what they considered 
to be more appropriate housing - Octavia Hill's housing experiments which began 
in the 1870s being a notable example. 
This creation of a new physical environment for the urban population involved 
both the 'discrete' regulation of the working classes in part through seeking to 
inculcate what Booth was to call the "habits of cleanliness and order.''13 In London 
especially there was also a series of attempts to break the physical and social class 
polarisations that had emerged across the city. These attempts to cultivate direct 
personal relations ranged, to cite just a few examples, from Edward Denison's 
residence in the East End, the settlement movement and plans to create a new urban 
squirearchy through the appointment of Guardians, to the practice of "visiting" the 
poor and the fonnation of the Mission Hall. 
Such efforts at the moral reformation of working class behaviour and manners 
were often marked by a convergence of utilitarian and evangelical traditions 
frequently based upon the most vulgarised tenets of political economy and the 
majority of critics and reformers of the 1870s remained oblivious to the structural 
aspects of the economy and unaware of the specific nature of London's labour 
72 Writing in 1860, Renton Nicholson had described this transformation of the once infamous St. Giles's 
district: "'The city of cadgers is not what it was. Formerly its boundaries were lawless, like Alsatia .. .It 
was a refuge for the desperedo, the thief, the cadger and the prostitute; it now scarcely aCfords a home for 
the latter two classes. The introduction of a police station in the immediate vicinity has perhaps caused 
this revolution in the precinct of the classic ground. The operations of the Mendicity Society have 
naturally decreased the number of beggars in the Metropolis. These and other multiplied causes have had 
the effect of reducing the population of SL GUes'. as well as altering for the better the character of the 
inhabitants. Wotkin, people employed in selling fruit and other thin,s in the streets, and labourers in 
the markets, are the principle occupiers of the tenements in the 'rookery' at present", quoted in "Working 
Class Culture and Working Clas Politics", op.ciL, p. 194. 
71 U/e tutd lAbour of 1M People t{ London , Religious Influences Series 3, vol. 2. 1902. p. 54. 
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market. Mayhew's enlightened understanding, almost two decades before, of the 
behaviour of the London poor in the context of the capital's economy remained a 
precedent which was almost universally ignored. For, as Mayhew observed, the 
reason for the absence of thrift among casual workers and the poor was readily 
obvious in that, "Regularity of habits are incompatible with irregularity of 
income. U'74 
Throughout the 1870s, however, poverty and pauperism were widely seen as 
signs or effects, rather than as causes, of demoralisation. Those middle class 
writers who promulgated normative ideals of behaviour for the working class 
assumed that these classes had an income which was sufficient not only for 
providing them with adequate standards of feeding and housing etc. but which also 
enabled them to provide themselves with cover, through savings banks and friendly 
societies, against the contingencies of life. Once again Mayhew, in his 
differentiation between "good and bad wages", was a virtually isolated exception in 
his promotion of a national minimum social wage: 
the test for the bare sufficiency of wages is, such a rate of remuneration as will maintain not only 
the labourer himself while working and when unable to work, but support his family, and admit of 
the care and education of his children; and as those wages may be termed good which admit of more 
than this being done, even so are they bad which admit of less." 
The goals of self-sufficiency, thrift and self-help as the surest paths to working 
class independence were usually severely out of joint with economic reality while 
poverty and destitution were often seen more as the results of individual "moral" 
failings rather than as the consequence of exogenous forces such as economic 
pressures and social environment. However, against the assumption that "good 
wages" were the norm for the working classes or, at least, were readily available, 
Thomas Wright had argued in 1873 that: 
it is making liberal allowance on the favourable side of the matter, to say that not more than one 
in twenty of the working class get within the standard of comfort we have sketched - who have 
always sufficiency of food and clothing, and a decent and healthy home; and who, when too old to 
fmd employment in a market in which employers have a choice of younger men, can maintain 
themselves without having 10 to seek public charity or becoming dependent upon relatives who, 
being themselves in straitened circumstances, generally regard such dependence as a burden, and 
make it very bitter.· 
But it was the view voiced by the Charity Organisation Society in its Annual 
Report of 1876 which best represented much middle class opinion on the subject 
when it proclaimed that: 
fa London lAboI,rr tJNl lhe l..onIJon Poor, op.cit., vol. 3, p. 309. 
71 Quoted in E.P. ThomIon mel E. YeoTI&e Unbtown Ma,l&ew, Penguin. 1973, p. 565. 
71 Ow New Mastus, 1873, p. 43. 
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the principle is, that it is good for the poor that they should meet all the ordinary exigencies of 
life, relying not upon public or private charity, but upon their own industry and thrift, and upon 
the powers of self-help that are to be developed by individual and collective effort. T7 
And it is the Charity Organisation Society (C.O.S.) which provides a crucial point 
of reference not only for understanding the moralisation of the poor in London 
during the 1870s and beyond, but also for a reading of Street-Life in London. 
The Charity Organisation Society 
Founded in 1869 for "Organising Charitable Relief and Repressing Mendicity", the 
C.O.S. sought to advance the cause of "scientific charity" and to remoralise the 
poor who, it was claimed, had been the recipients of indiscriminate donations of 
cash, gifts and charity. Functioning as a clearing-house for applications for charity, 
the character of the C.O.S. was, as one commentator has put it, "professionally 
pioneering but ideologically reactionary.'t7I In part this was a result of the the 
Society's particular class disposition. For, established by a group of individuals 
drawn from the ranks of professional London, the C.O.S. has also been described 
as "a product of the fears expressed by a particular sector of wealthy London in the 
1860s about the separation of classes and the defonnation of the gift '179 
Promoting a philosophy that was aggressively individualistic, the C.O.S. 
expounded and circulated many of the assumptions of nineteenth century social 
refonn often in the guise of a nostalgic myth of a visibly organic class community 
which shared a common value system. As one of the most influential C.O.S. 
writers commented: 
The separation between rich and poor in our large towns, and more especially in London, has often 
been pointed out as one of the most characteristic and threatening signs of the times. On the one 
hand, it is said, we have a large number of wealthy people, living an idle, luxurious life in their 
own quarter, and knowing or caring little about anything outside; on the other hand, we have a 
much larger number of poverty stricken people herded together at the opposite extreme of town, 
with all their energies exhausted in the futile endeavour to secure a tolerable existence.to 
As a response, the C.O.S. greatly stressed the role of direct personal influence 
as a means to regenerating the poor and remedying the effects of urbanism. To this 
end C.O.S. workers were encouraged to view their working locality "not as a 
chaotic agglomeration of atoms, but as an organic whole. "II Through such 
" Quoted in W.H.B. Court. British Economic History 1870·1914. COl'llnlDllary and Docwraellls, 1965. 
p.373. 
71 D. FrIUl', TM Evolution o/tM British Welfare State. London, 1974, p. 121. 
71 OlllCtuI London. op.cit., p. 2'7. 
10 Mrs. Bernard Bosanquet, RicJa tJNl POOl', London. 1898, p. 3. 
It ibid., p. 6. 
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strategies "the specialisation which is an indispensable feature of modem life shall 
not isolate us from the citizen spiri~ the pulse-beat of the social heart. "11 
Rejecting both unregulated philanthropy and collective social welfare, the 
C.O.S. stressed a concept of personalised welfare which was seen as a specialist 
and quasi-professional activity.13 Cen!Tal to its practice was the individual case-
history and a nonnative model of human behaviour based upon a specific notion of 
"character". As one C.O.S. report stated: "Charity takes account of character, and 
selects those cases in which assistance will lead to self-support; the possession of 
some resources makes a case more suitable for charity.'''' 
Evidence of individual"character", assessed through detailed case-work, home 
visits, interviews with neighbours etc., was the major determinant of whether an 
applicant would receive assistance and in what form. "Character" was thus revealed 
through an investigation of an individual's past history while aid was conditional 
upon points of merit such as the evidence of previous attempts to save money. 
Above all, the ideal character possessed those attributes which facilitated the smooth 
functioning of a capitalist economy. Habits of temperance, forward planning, 
economic independence and restraint were stressed. It was this model of character 
that was contrasted against what was seen as the typical personality of a member of 
the residuum: 
The true type of his class lives in the present moment only: not only is he without foresight, he is 
almost without memory, in the sense that his past is so completely past that he has no more 
organised experience to refer to than a child. Hence his life is one incoherent jumble from 
begiMing to end; it would be impossible to make even a connected story out of it. for every day 
merely repeats the mistakes. the follies and mishaps of yesterday; there is no development in it; all 
is aimless and drifting.1S 
Against this was counterposed the ideal of thrift: 
thrift is the characteristic of the steadfast mind, reflecting the unity and necessity of life and the 
universe. and exercising self-control in the present for the sake of enSuring that the future shall at 
any rate approximate to it in value. The mind which yields easily to the temptation of pawning, 
on the contrary. is one to which the future is merely an uncertain chance. good only to be robbed 
for the sake of the present" 
Just as the C.O.S. imposed rigorous behavioural norms upon deserving 
applicants, so too a similar construction of ideal character is operative within 
U Bernard Bosanquet, "The Duties of Citizenship", in Aspects of tM Social Problem, ed. idem, London, 
1985, p. 26. 
a See Judith Fido, "The Charity Organisation Society and Social Casework in London 1869-1900" in 
Social Control in Nineteenth Century Britain, ed. A.P. Donajgrodski, London. Croom Helm. pp. 207-
230. 
M Quoted in Fido, "The Charity Organisation Society", Op.CiL, p. 214 . 
.. Helen Bosmquet (Mrs. B. Bosanquet publishing \Ulder her own name), 1M Standard of Life, London. 
1906, p. 169 • 
.. Mrs. B. Bosanquet, Ric" tutd Poor, op.cit., p. 99. 
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Street-life. For, rather than being a representation of a wide variety of street types 
and personalities, Street-Life ultimately comes to function as a discourse about just 
one individual or type. Emerging as a cumulative and composite textual effect, this 
ideal type is a projected image of what the poor should be and of how they ought to 
behave.. Like the ideal type of the C.O.S., what emerges is an industrious 
individual who is both thrifty and forward-looking; who saves, is temperate and 
ideally teetotal; who is socially responsible and independent; who would refuse any 
fonn of assistance no matter how destitute; who seeks upward social advancement 
but is not overly-ambitious or critical of the class structure. In short, Street-Life 
operates to produce a model of the "honest" or "respectable" poor and working 
classes - a socially responsible subject who identifies with the existing social order. 
It is this nonnative type which is particularly apparent in the description of the 
Italian ice-sellers, in "Half-Penny Ices", in terms of their display of the habits of 
subsistence and a "spirit of economy": 
the Italian ice-man sets an example of steady perseverance. economy and foresight which is at once 
the envy and marvel of the English poor who live around ... the example of their lives is useful in a 
country where the poor classes have no notion of economy. are guilty of continuous daily waste, 
and are ever betraying their interests and selling their substance for the sake of a drink.1'7 
Ultimately. this normative subject is constructed in tenns of owning property - for 
example, as the desire and fmancial ability of the ice-sellers to buy property back in 
Italy. 
The study of character was thus a strategy employed both within attempts to 
remoralise the poor and as a structuring narrational device and discursive figure 
within Street-life in the fonn of individual case-histories and as the fabrication of a 
nonnative type. Photography is here mobilised in the examination and construction 
of the individual case-history. Employed in the production of what Foucault has 
described as "the total visibility of bodies, of individuals and of things before a 
centralised eyesight"," photography was used to bring everyday individuality 
above "the threshold of description": 
For a long time ordinary individuality - the everyday individuality of everybody - remained below 
the threshold of description. To be looked at, observed, described in detail, followed from day to 
day by an uninterrupted writing was a privilege. The chronicle of a man. the account of his life. 
his historiography. written as he lived out his life fonned part of the rituals of his power. The 
disciplinary methods reversed this relation. lowered the threshold of describable individuality and 
made of this description a means of control and a method of domination. It is no longer a 
monument for future memory. but a document for possible use ... This turning of real lives into 
writing is no longer a procedure of heroisation. it functions as a procedure of objectification and 
subjection ... The examination as the fIXing. at once ritual and scientific of individual differences. as 
the pinning down of each individual in his own particularity •.. clearly indicates the appearance of a 
" Street-Lile in London. op.cit •• pp. 135-136 • 
.. "The Eye of Power" Op.ciL. p. 6. 
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new modality of power in which each individual receives as his status his own individuality, and in 
which he is linked by his status to the features, the measurements, the gaps, the 'marks' that 
characterise him and make him a 'case'.-
In its emphasis upon "character" Street-life parallells many of the methods of 
investigation and classification employed by the C.O.S. Through journalistic 
investigation (to which the status of scientific accuracy was ascribed) and 
photographic "document",Street-Life shares the C.O.S. goal, as described by 
Bernard Bosanquet, of "entering into the minds, habits and feelings of the classes 
under consideration, and of comprehending their lives from the beginning to the 
end"90 - a goal, however, not only of comprehension but also of the transformation 
of character. Like much C.O.S. case-work, Street-Life is marked both by 
individual sympathy and by manipulative social control. Yet it was in order to 
combat the abuse of spontaneous sympathy or compassion, that the C.O.S. put 
such stress upon organisation rather than relief and upon systematic charity and 
casework rather than upon any imaginative thinking on the issue of poverty. 
Similarly, it is necessary to examine the power relations at work within the 
representational strategies of Street-Life, rather than reading the text at the level of 
Thomson's and Smith's empathy for their individual interviewees. 
Furthermore, it was practical fieldwork which revealed the ideology of the 
C.O.S. in operation. For, as Stedman Jones has argued, the C.O.S. "represented 
the aspirations of a distinct social group - the middle and upper ranks of the more 
conservative employers" with a virtual absence of the large industrial employers: 
As far, then, as the Society expressed the outlook of one social group, it was that of the elite of 
professional London. This makes intelligible the aspirations of those active in the fonnation of the 
C.O.S. to fonn a new urban gentry.tI 
This new urban gentry which had been alanned by the disorders of the l860s 
had, however, no natural economic or social contact with the poor and were almost 
completely lacking in the experience necessary to understanding their behaviour. 
Instead, perceiving their own social position as having been achieved by means of 
the cultivation of the virtues of austerity: 
they were prone to view the poor, not with the undemanding paternalism of the established rich, 
but with a hard-headed severity born of strong aversion to those who stood condemned of 
fecklessness, indolence and lack of resilience. With this background, the equation between virtue 
and vice, success and failure was fairly easy to make.t2 
C.O.S. committees consisted almost entirely of businessmen, clergy, civil 
• DiscipliM and Punish, op.cit., pp. 191-192. 
to "The Duties of Citizenship", op.cit., p. vi. 
II Outcast London. op.cit., p. 269. 
• ibid., p. 270. 
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servants, ex-army officers and wealthy women - people with no direct ties with the 
poor and working classes." In this, the C.O.S. was one instance of an emergent 
urban gentry in London and it is to this diffuse and by no means homogeneous 
grouping that Street-Ufe can be referred. 
However, both the C.O.S. and Street-Life were particular responses to the 
issue of urban poverty with each having its own effectivity and both need to be 
situated within a diverse discursive field which formed their conditions of operation 
and intelligibility. This discursive and institutional field ranged, to give a few 
examples, from the traveller'S tale genre of James Greenwood to the extensive 
tradition of Victorian social investigation (notably Mayhew) and from particular 
fonns of government legislation to an institutional infrastructure comprised of the 
Poor Laws, private charities, "make-work" projects and a range of unemployment 
funds. 
Just as Street-Life was itself one instance of the simplification and 
dissemination through a range of minor publications of the message of thrift and 
self-help for a mass audience, it can also be referred to an emergent liberal ideology 
which was being voiced from the 1860s onwards. This liberal ideology was 
particularly evident in the writings of Alfred Marshall, T.H. Green and Arnold 
Toynbee in their rejection of the general pessimism of classical economics about the 
possibility of working class progress. Although these figures represented a 
vanguard of liberal thought in the 1870s and were not representative of the opinions 
of the majority of the middle classes or employers, there are nonetheless significant 
coincidences between Street-Life and this new liberal characterisation of the 
working class.1M 
is However, it would be misleading to impose a single homogeneous identity upon the C.O.S. As 
Stedman Jones argues, "It would be incorrect however to situate the C.O.S. either in the old or the new 
liberalism. For the society itself was a heterogeneous collection of individuals whose reasons for 
participation varied greatly', ibid., p. IS, n. 43. 
tI4 Just as Street.Life asserts the possibility of upward social mobility and integration. so too Alfred 
Marshall described the possible levelling of social rank. i.e. "whether progress may not go on steadily 
if slowly, till the official distinction between working men and gentlemen has passed away; till by 
occupation at least, every man is a gentleman" (TM Future 0/ the Working Classes. Cambridge reform 
club, 1873, p.3). Noting that "All ranks of society are rising" he said of artisans, "how all are rising, 
how some are in the true sense of the word becoming gentlemen (ibid., pp. 18-19). In a similar fashion 
T.H.Green noted that "in the well paid industries of England, the better sort of labourers do become 
capitalists to the extent often of owning their own houses and a great deal of furniture, of having interest 
in stores and of belonging to benefit societies through which they make provision for the future" (quoted 
in outcast London. op.ciL, p. 9). Even members of the C.O.S., whose ideology was often no more than 
a form of vulgar political ec;onomy, shared this new hope about workina class respectability and the 
obliteration of clus distinctions. C.S.Loch, the Society'. long-.tanding Secretary, hoped that charity, 
in its dissolution of class distinctions. would "create what in a sense might be called a great friendly 
society" (quoted in Judith Fido, "The Charity organisation Society", op.cit., p. 224). 
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Within the context of the economic boom of the early 1870s, Street-Life shared 
the new optimism throughout the decade that the working classes could be 
integrated. This more relaxed attitude to the working classes contrasts with the often 
millenarian representations of them produced in the 184Os. More specifically, 
however, Street-life can be situated between the crisis of the 1860s in London, 
and its aftermath, and the return of economic crisis during the 1880s. This latter 
decade was marked by a shift of attention away from the pauperism of demoralised 
individuals to an investigation of chronic poverty which was seen as the 
consequence of the 'degeneration' of the conditions of urban life - a new appraisal 
of poverty being evident particularly in Booth's investigations.'s 
However, like Marshall, the authors of Street-Life believe not only in 
benevolent progress and in universal rationality and morality, but also in the value 
of labour as a means of creatively developing character. It was within this 
redemptive and evolutionist framework of moral and material progress that attention 
was focused on the residuum which was seen as a minority enclave that had to be 
controlled or removed. While not producing the alarmist representations of the class 
of casual workers, the concern of Street-Life is that they be kept within or be 
recruited into the 'respectable' working classes rather than their falling into the 
threatening realm of the residuum - in the next decade Booth was also to make a 
sharp distinction between the "true working class" and the casual residuum. 
Indeed, Street-Life depicts many of the street characters of London as in fact 
actively seeking integration and respectability. 
But this is not to claim that Street-Ufe merely passively reflects or expresses 
the respective ideologies of either the C.O.S. or the new liberal thinking or indeed 
any other representations thereby collapsing its own specific identity. Rather, it is 
to cite these ideologies and discourses as constitutive elements within the discursive 
terrain in which Street-Ufe operated and was read Furthermore, the particular 
class formation of the urban gentry and liberal intelligentsia should not be viewed as 
a static and fixed social grouping exercising an increasingly manipUlative social 
control but was instead formed through a mobile, shifting and often contradictory 
interplay of social and class relations. 
This mutable class identity was constituted and overdetermined across multiple 
levels and sites of representation (both discursive and institutional) and was not 
simply an automatic reflection or holistic expression of the economic level - an 
• SeeOlllCtlSl London. op.cit., pp. 281-314. 
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assumption which would involve the reduction of classes to 'interests' already 
externally determined elsewhere (ultimately at the level of the economic) and 
therefore existing always-already constituted prior to and outside of widely 
disparate forms of representation and practice. And while, to put the case very 
crudely, Street-Life can be read as one specific instance within a particular class 
hegemony (in the form of the mobilisation of consent to the reproduction of 
capitalist relations and bourgeois values) and as one specific instance within the 
ceaseless production and redefinition of class boundaries, membership and 
positionality across relations and representations of identity and difference, this is 
not, however, to cite hegemony as the logical outcome of the subjective intentions 
of the ruling class or of particular class fractions. Nor is it to return to an 
instrumentalist or functionalist account of social control. L Instead, it is possible to 
see major forms of social domination as the 'hegemonic effects' emerging from a 
multiplicity of non-reducible micro-p,owers. Equally, instead of producing a 
schematic conspiratorial account of power whereby its mechanisms, techniques and 
procedures are invented by the bourgeoisie (Le. were simply the creation of a class 
seeking dominance), it is possible to argue that specific techniques and tactics of 
power were employed only once they revealed a potential political or economic 
utility for the bourgeoisie." 
More specifically, however, strategies of moralisation were never simply one-
way for "moralistic initiatives or movements came from all classes ... Equally, 
resistance crossed class lines."9'7 Moreover, it is unwarranted to assume a necessary 
correspondence between class interests and representations or between practices 
and their effects. The C.O.S. itself was a particular instance of the latter in that 
while its ideology had a wide currency, it singularly failed to reform the poor as it 
had wished. Furthermore: 
How far had this middle-class onslaught changed or influenced work.ing-class attitudes or 
behaviour? Certainly not in the way it had been intended. By the Edwardian period it had become 
inescapably clear that middle-class evangelism had failed to create a working-class in its own 
image. The great majority of London work.ers were neither Christian, provident, chaste or 
temperate." 
It is in the light of this qualified understanding of hegemony that Street-Life can 
A "It is only if we &rup these techniques of power and demonstrate the economic advantage or political 
utility that derives from them in • given context for specific reasons, that we can understand how these 
mechanisms come to be effectively incorporated into the locial whole", Michel Foucault, 
PuwerlKnowkdge: Sekcled Interview, tI1Id O,her Writing', ed. Colin Gordon, Brighton, Harvester Press, 
1980, p. 101. 
., A.P. Donaj&rodski. Social CDlllrol in Nind"",1a Ccnt"" Britain, op.cit., p. 20. 
• "Working Clus Culture and Working Class Politics in London", op.CiL, p. 196. 
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be read as an example of what Robert Gray has described as the creation of an 
"ideological environment"" to which the working class and the residuum had to 
adapt in order to survive. Above all, it was the wage relation itself which was the 
essential element of this environment. This promotion and naturalisation of the 
wage relation is fundamental to Street-Life and should not be ignored th,rough an 
exclusive emphasis upon external agents of social control and surveillance. As 
Stedman Jones has stated: "The greatest 'social control', if one wants to use the 
word, available to capitalism is the wage relationship itself - the fact that, in order to 
live and reproduce, the worker must perpetually resell his or her labour power. "100 
It is a repetitive insistence upon this "necessity to obtain work, to remain fit for 
work and to make ends meet"101 which structures Street-Ute as the 'good' citizen is 
ultimately defined in terms of his or her relation to work as productive labour. 
And, as Gray further argues: 
The urban gentry sought .. to resolve the problems of capitalist society by a network of direct or 
indirect controls designed to refonn the individual behaviour of the working classes ... The most 
effective ideological influence came. not from the evangelical social refonn that sought to eradicate 
working class identity altogether. but from more complex and more indirect agencies. through 
which fragments of dominant ideology were 'spontaneously' reproduced by the working clasS.I02 
This spontaneous reproduction of dominant ideology is operative within 
Street-Ute not only in the form of particular individuals identifying with the social 
order (for example, the Italian ice-sellers) but also in its overall construction of a 
community of the streets which, in its own localised fashion, is represented as a 
mirror-image of laisser-faire capitalism with its own aspects of free enterprise, 
commercial initiative, self-help and the pursuit of profit coupled with a 'natural' 
hierarchy and labour aristocracy. In this hierarchisation of individuals in relation to 
each other around a normative ideal, Street-Life partakes in what Foucault has 
called the political dream of "a pure community ... a disciplined society ... the utopia 
of a perfectly governed city."IOl It is in this way, too, that Street-Life, in its 
formation of lines of vision through and across the city, operates as one example of 
the opening up and domestication of urban space. 
But in its circulation of these norms of rational and responsible conduct, 
Street-Ute is also marked by the contradictions inherent in the work of the C.O.S. 
" "Bourgeois Hegemony in Victorian Britain" in Class, Hegemony and Party. ed. J. Bloomfield, 
London. Lawrence and Wishart, p. 85. 
100 "Class Expression versus Social Control? A Critique of Recent Trends in the Social History of 
Leisure" in his LanglUlgu o/Cws. op.cit •• p. 87. 
101 ibid. 
102 "Bourgeois Hegemony in Victorian Britain". op.cit •• p. 87. 
101 discipline and Punish.op.cit •• p. 198. 
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and other refonn agencies in that the working classes and the poor are urged to be 
independent through self-help but are still to be contained within relations of social 
deference, kinship alliances and, above all, within the demands of the labour market 
and economy. Furthermore, within the parameters of capitalism, the didactic 
imperative of Street-life can never be, about the elimination of poverty as such. 
Rather, its concern is with the inculcation of particular fonns of behaviour among 
the poor so as to eliminate both their difference and their potentially subversive non-
confonnity. The aim, then, of Street-life, within the context of London, is the 
imposition of order and regularity upon "that whole lower region, that region of 
irregular bodies, with their details, their multiple movements, their heterogeneous 
forces",I04 and the making of "useful individuals".IOs As Foucault states: 
"Generally speaking, it might be said that the disciplines are techniques for assuring 
the ordering of human multiplicities ... to increase the docility and utility of all the 
elements of the system."106 
Mobilised within the accumulation of both men and capital, "discipline is the 
unitary technique by which the body is reduced as a 'political' force at the least cost 
and maximised as useful force ... The growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the 
specific modality of a disciplinary power."lIn And, it was in order to produce its 
own fabrication of an image and 'subject'I01 of and for the urban poor that Street-
Life employed specific forms of representation and visibility, e.g. strategies of 
individualisation, separation and isolation, and forms of characterisation and 
classification which themselves produced particular effects of identification and 
docility. 
These general strategies were not, of course, unique to Street-Life and are 
evident for example in the history sheets produced by the Barnardo Homes (figs. 
4.38, 4.39). A more overt example of the operation of these disciplinary strategies 
in the "reduction" of a body as a means to producing a subject can be seen in a 
Ragged Schools Union case-book from around 1860 of boys from London 
admitted to a collecting centre at Walton-on-Thames prior to their emigration to 
Canada. Consisting of forty-nine individual case-histories accompanied by fifty-
loa 'b'd 208 1 1 •• p, . 
101 ibid .• p. 211. 
101 ibid.,p. 218. 
107 ibid.,p. 221. 
10. Foucault'l term for lubjectification (assujetislement) bearl a double connotation here as 
lubjectification through disciplinary normalisation and u the constitution, through the operations of 
power, of the subjectivities of both the agents and subjects of power relations. 
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nine photographs (both of groups and of individuals), the most extensive entry 
refers to one George Gander (or "Gandy") who is described as being "Admitted on 
probation April 10 1857 - aged 17 or 18. Mother dead. Father living. A street 
vagrant from infancy. Imprisoned sixteen times almost always for vagrancy. May 
3rd - discharged at his own request." Accompanying the only full-length portrait of 
the series (fig. 4.40), the entry from the Minutes book reads: 
George "Gander", or probably Gandy, about 18 years of age. Known to the writer for four or five 
years as one of the most notorious vagrants in London. He was admitted into the refuge at 
Bloomsbury in 1853 at the request of Mr. Hall the Police Magistrate at Bow Street Absconded 
several times, and brought back as often either by the police or some of the inmates. Was at length 
taken before a Magistrate for the offence where he was sent to prison for two months. The first he 
had to serve in solitary confinement On his discharge he was re-admitted at his own earnest 
application, Mter a stay of ten months at the Refuge he was outfitted for admission on board the 
H.M.S."Waterloo" but failed to pass the doctor who reported him "weakly defonned" - Having 
again absconded he was refused admission, he having given much trouble with but little hope of 
reclamation - He used to get his living by crossing sweeping and begging, tumbling to the 
neighbourhood of eharing Cross. He would roll himself up into a ball and tumble thro' the mud 
across the street much to the amusement and surprise of all beholders. He had been imprisoned 
sixteen times, always for vagrancy. Having met him at his post last Jan. (1857) and being accosted 
by him, he being in a deplorably wretched state, he was asked if he thought he could and would 
work for his living if he had an opportunity offered him once more. He begged very earnestly for 
"another chance" which was promised him when a vacancy [would] occur. He walked down April 
10th barefooted and in rags covered in x x x x. He appeared overjoyed with his prospects, was 
cleansed, and began to work •.. with great anxiety to please and to get on. He was engaged in 
setting potatoes, which work suited him very well, but when he had to handle the spade and the 
hoe he began to repine his lot and to be full of complaints. "He did not have enough to eat!". "The 
work was too hard". "He did not want to go abroad". "He did not like the place" and would be glad 
if his discharge was given him. Seeing that it would be useless to battle with all his complaints he 
was discharged after a trial of three weeks. It was hoped that his admission from such misery into a 
new scene to him might be the means of rescuing him, of saving him from a life of wretchedness, 
of relieving society of such a nuisance. But it was now evident that he prefers a life of vagrancy to 
honest industry. and so long as he and others are encouraged by the public to continue the 
avocation by the legislature. there will ever-exist a class of such that will cost the public twice as 
much as ought to support them, in idleness and wretchedness. and if not rescued by some legal 
enactment and compelled to work for their living will remain in the same state to their lives' end. 
This lad's intellect is rather below the average. yet he is very aafty and ready witted. Like all 
his class there is no dependence on the account he gives of himself. He will never speak the truth 
when he can substitute a lie. In many respects he seemed to promise of great amendment, till his 
restless habits would not admit of the experiment being fairly tried.'Of 
What is at work here is the production of a subject through a conflictual field of 
forces in that what emerges from this short biography is a narrative of discipline and 
resistance organised around a series of structuring oppositions - vagrancy and 
honest industry, idleness and restless habits versus the compulsion to work. 
independence and accountability, dirt and cleanliness, earnestness and deceit, 
wretchedness and reclamation, the granting and withholding of admission, liberty 
of movement and restraint, the individual and society - in short, the social 
management of a subject-body through the interventions of police, medical 
10. London Boys from th~ Ragg~d Schools Union, Guildhall Library, unpublished manuscript 
(MS.s7S4). p. 124. 
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surveillance, the legislature and charity. As Deleuze, citing Nietzsche, argues 
regarding the constitution of a body through a play of forces of domination and 
subordination or "relations of tension": 
What defmes a body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of 
forces constitutes a body - whether it is chemical, biological, social or political. Any two forces, 
being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relationship. This is why the body is 
the fruit of chance in the Nietzschean sense, and appears as the most 'astonishing' thing, much 
more astonishing than consciousness or spirit. But chance, the relation of force with force, is also 
the essence of force. The birth of a living body is not therefore surprising since every body is 
living, being the 'arbitrary' product of the forces of which it is composed. Being composed of a 
plurality of forces the body is a multiple phenomenon, its unity is that of a multiple phenomenon, 
a 'unity of domination'. In a body the superior or dominant forces are known as active and the 
inferior of dominated forces are reactive. Active and reactive are precisely the original qualities 
which express the relation of force with force ... This difference between forces qualified according to 
their quantity as active or reactive will be called hierarchy. III 
But while the story of George Gander is a story of the inscription of a subject 
within a hierarchy of forces (but of forces which also admit to their own failure), 
the question remains, as framed by Donzelot, as to "How was it possible to ensure 
the development of practices of preservation of the population while at the same 
time detaching it from any directly political role and yet applying to it a mission of 
domination, pacification and social initiative?"lll In Street-Life in London this is 
achieved not through strategies of direct or coercive control but instead it is attained 
by presenting a series of normative role models of the honest poor who are to be 
admired, and possibly identified with, for their spirit of independence and self-help. 
In effect, the aim of the text is to endow this normative subject with what Jeffrey 
Minson has called a "promotional aura": 
As a general fonn of assistance, philanthropy auempted to establish a relation of 'enticement' with 
its beneficiaries that was much more than a simple 'carrot-and-stick' approach. Philanthropy 
endowed the norms with which one was meant to comply (at the cost of evading tutelary 
supervision) with a promotional aura. The idea was to make these nonns of hygiene, saving etc. 
along with the domestically based autonomy that that they would make possible, positively desired 
as conducive to a heUer, fuller life ... Closely bound up with this component of 'social promotion', 
philanthropy fostered and played on individual family members desire for autonomy.1I2 
It is this "promotional aura" and the cultivation of autonomy as a desired goal 
which is produced not only across Street-Life but which also underwrites the use 
of photography in, for example, the Barnardo homes. In a telling exchange from 
. one of his promotional tracts, Barnardo himself relates how he used photographs of 
a socially-endorsed and desired-for identity (e.g. fig. 4.41) as an enticement to 
bring children from the streets into care: 
iIO NietzscM and Philosoph,. trIllS. Hugh Tomlison. London, Athlone Press, 1984, p. 39. 
Ht TM Policing 0/ Familia, op.cit., p. SSe 
ttl GeMalogiu of Morals. NietzscM. Fouctudl. Donzeiot and 1M Eccentricity 0/ Elhics, MacMillan, 
1985, p. 191. 
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By what means could I induce Bridget to come with me to the Home? I had fonneely tried every 
argument likely to succeed; what new plea could I urge now. 
Just then putting my hand in my coat pocket, I felt something stiff against my finger and 
suddenly recollected that I had there what might prove a more powerful argument than any I had 
previously adduced. 
But I advanced cautiously, for your true street arab is often a very shy fish, and will not always 
take even the most alluring baiL •• 
There was no reply. I hoped Bridget was thinking over what I had said. Pulling out suddenly 
from my pocket the object referred to, I held before Bridget's eye a photograph of a young girl 
neatly dressed as a domestic servant, with white wristbands and collar, with neat little white cap 
and apron, in print dress, and holding in one hand a house-broom, in the other a dustpan, in which 
she was about to gather the dust from the floor she had been sweeping, her bright smiling face 
raised from the work and wmed full at the spectator, presenting on the whole a very attractive 
picture. 
"Oh myl", was the admiring exclamation that burst from Bridget's lips. "Ain't she smart." 
Having allowed a few minutes for examination of the picture I asked -
"Wouldn't you like to be like her? Better, I should think, to be dressed in that way than to wear 
the things you have on", pointing to her ragged dress. 
"I should think it wor", she replied,"but I ain't got such luck, you see." 
"Nonsense", I replied."you may be just as well dressed and as comfortable as she is if you 
chose." 
Bridget looked at me with a surprised air. Now it was my tum to expJain.\IJ 
The status of photography 
Aside from examining this incorporation of photography within a "system of 
permanent registration",1l4 Le. as "the assignation to each individual of his 'true' 
name, his 'true' place, his 'true' body", 115 it is also necessary to focus upon the 
relation between text and image within Street-Life as it is the text which provides 
the immediate conditions of existence for Thomson's photographs. For while in 
Street-life two signifying systems operate together, this is not to say that each 
system has equal authority or status. However, in their Preface, the two authors 
claim that the photographs are the sites of readily legible meanings. For both, 
photography functions as evidence, document and witness: 
And now we have sought to portray these harder phases of life, bringing to bear the precision of 
photography in illustration of our subject The unquestionable accuracy of this testimony will 
enable us to present true typeS of the London Poor and shield us from the accusation of either 
underrating or exaggerating individual peculiarities of appearance.'" 
This essentially positivist view of photography - for example, its mobilisation 
within the accumulation of 'facts' and regimes of classification - is predicated upon 
liS" A City Waif; how I FlShed for and Caught her". London. J.F.Shaw and Co .• 1883, pp. 19-21. 
'" DiscipliM and PIUlisIa • op.cit •• p. 196. 
m ibid., p. 198. 
". Street.Life in Londo ... op.cit •• p. 81. Defending photography against engraving. Thomson made 
similll' claims in his IllllStralions of ClaiM twllts People, i.e.,"1 feel somewhat sanguine about the 
success of the undertaking, and I hope to see the process which I have applied adopted by other 
travellers; for the faithfulness of the pictures affords the nearest approach that can be made toward 
placing the viewer actually before the scene which is represented". quoted in Carrington L. Goodrich and 
Nigel Cameron. The Face of ClaiM: As seen by PlaoIograpMrs and Travelkrs. 1860-1912. London. 
Oordon Fruor. 1978, p. IS3. 
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a belief both in the self-sufficient iconic plenitude of the photographic image and in 
its inherent truth status. In this 'window on the world' account, photography is 
presented as being a literal transcription of reflection of the real. 
Yet the confident assertion made in the Preface is constantly undennined by the 
activity of the written text or commentary, the necessary excess of which 
compensates for a fundamental lack or inadequacy in the photographs themselves. 
For the relation between text and image within Street-Life is not merely an example 
of the textual policing or repression of an innate polysemy of the image but, rather, 
it is marked by a production, at the level of the text, of meanings for the 
photographs. Lacking semantic autonomy, the photographs never, as it were, speak 
for themselves. but are always spoken for. Indeed, this often appears in the form of 
the textual description and explanation of indexical or denotational referents with the 
typical phrase "the accompanying photograph represents" being recurrent 
throughout the text. 
This verbal activity is evident, for example. in the explanation of facial 
expression and physiognomy in the commentary on "Hookey Alf' (fig.4.30): 
There is a metropolitan mixture of good and evil in the countenances that may here be 
studied ... Thus in the photograph before us we have the calm undisturbed face of the skilled anisan, 
who has spent a life of tranquil, useful labour. and can enjoy his pipe in peace, while under him 
sits a woman whose painful expression seems to indicate a troubled existence and a past which 
even drink cannot obliterate. By her side, a brawny, healthy "woman of the people.l17 
Yet while Thomson's photographs often do provide an abundance of minor. if 
apparently insignificant, detail of the kind that Roland Barthes has called "the very 
raw material of ethnographical knowledge"l11 - itself an element of the "studium" of 
the photographs1l9 - they are necessarily inscribed within a textual field or support 
which is itself the generative site of meaning. Marked by semantic vacuity. it is 
precisely self-evident meaning which is absent from the photographs. 
In Street-Life. therefore, the textual does not simply function as anchorage. i.e. 
as the restricting of a multiplicity of possible meanings with the provision instead of 
preferred readings, but, rather, due to its dominance and its production of narrative 
information, the text's status is more akin to relay as "the setting out, in the 
sequence of messages, meanings that are not to be found in the image itself."l20 
Given the dominance of the text, it is the photographs which have the secondary 
!If Slre".Life ill London. op.cit., p. 160. 
n. CanteI'GLMcida, Op.CiL, p. 28. 
n. 'b'd "en 1 1 ., p. ~U. 
tlO Roland Barthes, "'The Rhetoric of the Image". in imagc·MlUic.TI!JCt. trans. Stephen Heath, Fontana. 
1977, p. 41. 
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function of anchorage. This relationship, however, is not wholly one-way for a 
relation of mutual support - a "reciprocal mirror-effect"l21 - is produced between 
text and image. Thus, for example, the commentary on "Tickets, the Card-Dealer" 
emphasises his Frenchness, his "comparatively good education" and the "frugality 
and sobriety which generally distinguishes a Frenchman",l22 while the photograph 
(fig.4.15) - the only interior shot in the series - presents him as a thoughtful and 
introspective artist in his studio - this characterisation itself being part of the 
construction within Street-Life of a natural hierarchy among the poor. 
Contrary, then, to the claims of Smith and Thomson, the extensive textual 
support of the photographs is indicative of their non-production of knowledge and, 
more particularly, it reveals the inability of single photographs to construct or 
provide narratives. Instead, this activity (e.g.biography) is a function of the text. 
For, while the photographs may spark off or condense a series of narrative 
questions - questions which the text both responds to and produces - they 
themselves can provide no resolution. Instead it is the text, ranging from its 
provision of signifieds projected onto the images (e.g. facial expression) to its 
existence as a broad discursive field, which determines how the photographs are to 
be read and what they may mean. This relation is in part symptomatic of the relation 
between vision and textuality, i.e. of the way in which "writing supplements 
perception, before perception even appears to itself. "1%1 
Constructing itself as a discourse founded upon empiricism and objectivity, the 
text of Street-Life supplies narrative context and meaning for the photographs 
which themselves serve to underwrite the authority and objectivity of the text The 
'having been there' phenomenological status of photographyl:M or its capturing "of 
the Here and NOW"l2.5 thus grounds and supports the truth-status and 'factuality' of 
the textual representations. This reciprocal, indeed tautological, relationship of 
mutual support also operates within the text itself as the spoken discourse of the 
various individuals interviewed - recorded, Smith and Thomson repeatedly (indeed 
almost neurotically) claim, "word for word in the original language in which it was 
delivered"l26 :. functions to legitimise and authenticate the representations and 
ill Stuart Hall, "The Determination of News Photographs", Working Papers in Cultural Studies, no. 3, 
Birmingham, 1972, p. 8S. 
112 Strut-Lif, in London, op.cit., p. 122. 
IU "Freud and the Scene of Writing", op.CiL, p. 224. 
tl. "The R.hetoric of the huge", op.cit .. p. 44. 
tUWalter Benjamin. "A Short History of Photography", op.cit., p. 243. 
til Street.Lif, in London, op.cit., p. 85. 
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opinions produced within the commentary. Reported speech is here posited as the 
site of truth and presence, with a privileging of the phonic over the graphic sign, 
speech over writing. Within this logocentric framework, both speech and 
photography become signs and guarantors of objectivity, meaningfulness and self-
presencel27 while the photographs themselves, existing in a reciprocal relation to the 
text, are presented as the sites of a literal and self-present meaning and as the 
bearers of both reality and plenitude, content and reference. 
Functioning within an idealist metaphysics of presence, Street-Life constructs 
an unequivocal logic of identity or "proper-name effect"l21 between text/voice, 
photography and the real. The real itself is cited as an external and anterior origin 
or reserve of pre-existent meaning operating independently outside of the 
continuous productivity of representation while photography is seen as making 
present something that is or was in fact present but elsewhere (from the actual 
photograph). As Rosalind Coward and John Ellis argue with reference to realism: 
realism has as its basic philosophy of language, not a production (signification being the 
production of a signified through the action of the signifying chain) but an identity: the signifier is 
treated as identical to a (pre-existent) signified. The signifier and signified are not seen as being 
caught up together in a process of production, they are treated as equivalents: the signifier is 
merely the equivalent of its pre-established concepL It seems as though it is not the business of 
language to establish this concept, but merely to express or communicate iLI2t 
For the authors of Street-Life, too, photography represents the real through a 
process of metonymy as the photograph stands in a relation of equivalence and 
identity for the person or scene represented. The photographic sign here marks an 
absent presence with the self-sufficient signifier being viewed as the being-present 
of the referent and signified. 
This process of metonymy also extends to the construction of typicality. For 
many of the individuals photographed in Street-Life are represented both as 
specific personalities and case-histories but also, through a relation of 'standing in 
for', as representatives or types of a specific class of labour. This operation is itself 
signalled in the Preface which speaks of the conflation of "true types" and 
,21 "The notion of the sign ... remains within the heritage of that logocentrism which is also 
phonocentrism .... bsolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice 
and the ideality of meaning, We already have a foreboding that phonocentrism merges with the 
historical determination of being in general u presence, with an the subdetenninations, that depend on 
this general form ... (presence of the thing to the sight, presence as substance/essence/ 
existence) ... Logocentrism would thus support the determination of the being of the entity u presence", 
01 GrtllrU1lQlolo", op.cit .• pp. 11-12. 
'28 Derrida describes the proper-name u "every signified whose signifier can neither vary nor be 
translated into another signifier without 1011 of significance. suggests a proper-name effect", "Coming 
into One's Own", in P81Choanalysis anti 'M QUslu,n O/IM Text, ed. Geoffrey Hartman, Johns Hopkins 
University Pren, Baltimore and London. 1978. p. 127. 
,It Language aM Materialism, London. Roudedge and Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 47. 
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"individual peculiarities" within the photographs. And elsewhere Thomson had also 
written of the need to preserve the individuality of the sitter. 
Every portrait so far as the work of the photographer is concerned should be a work of art. No 
matter how rough or uninteresting the face he has to deal with, he ought to start with the 
conviction that there is something good in it - some redeeming characteristic - which may be 
bought out by his manner towards, and his ~unent of, the siuer.llG 
Yet it is the individuality of many of the subjects within Street-Life that is 
effaced through their being represented as types. This latent tension between the 
individual and the type is itself related to the notion of 'character' operative within 
Street-Life, for 'character' is constituted both as the ideal subject produced for the 
poor but also as character connoting eccentricity or individualism. Figures such as 
the Italian ice-men, for example, function as types of normative 'character', while 
individuals such as "Caney, the clown" (fig.4.11) or liThe Dramatic Shoe Black" 
(fig.4.14) are presented almost as Dickensian oddities or curios of the streets.l3l 
Metonymic signification is perhaps most apparent in the photograph of "The 
Crawlers" which, aside from its immediate denotational features, potentially 
signifies wider notions such as poverty and destitution - these connotations of 'the 
condition of being poor' in part recalling Barthes's neologisms such as 
"Italianicity."131 In relation to the other photographs in Street-Life, the image of 
"The Crawlers" comes to function as a kind of limit-point in its representation of a 
nadir of poverty which would appear to be little removed from being an image of 
death - an issue decorously skirted around in Street-Life. 
However, there is another aspect to this image. For, on one level, th~ 
photograph is directly 'about' the gaze of the spectator. Here the pose, framing and 
angle of vision produce (or at least appears to produce) a direct relation or effect of 
spectatorial dominance over the passivity and subordination of the depicted woman 
which, in turn, operates to displace the threat of poverty. Poverty and 
powerlessness are here overtly framed around the gender of both the subject and the 
viewer. This would seem, however, to be in conflict with another possible reading 
of the photograph formed, for example, at the perfonnative level of intended 
,SO The British JOlUNJI of Photography, vol. 13, October 12th, 1886, p. 487. 
111 These vignettes of bizarre or eccentric characteR also recall Mayhew's London Characters published 
in 1870. Many of the illustrations in Mayhew's London LaboIU t.Utd lhe London Poor were woodcuts 
based on forty daguerreotypes (now lost) by Richard Beard which could not of course be reproduced. 
SIrut-Life wu one of the fust examples of the use of photography within this form of social survey and 
indicative of photography's gradual rise over the graphic arts in the representation of urban life. But 
with reference to 'CharlCter', photopphy lacked the potential of the graphic arts for characterisation 
and clI'ic:ature to illustrate these personalities and alain it wu the text which had to generate the 
pll'ticular connotations of individuality. 
'12 Roland Barthes, "The Rhetoric of the Image''. in Im4ge-MlUic-Tut, op.cit. 
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meaning or of pictorial reference and association (e.g. Mother/Madonna and child) 
whereby the image may evoke pity and sympathy. Yet it is in part this mother and 
child reference which in fact allows for the disavowal of poverty along the axis of 
sexual difference}33 
A similar docility or passivity of the represented subject is also produced, for 
example, in the photograph of "The Temperance Sweep" (fig.4.13) who is textually 
represented as a particularly ennobling example of an individual's self-reformation -
again, an example of character. The ~weep is depicted full-length and confidently 
: ~. t' • 
upright (with suggestions even of a ~o around his head). His body frontally 
positioned and squarely centred within the frame;34 he is openly available to the 
gaze for close inspection and approval while his social identity is defined by the 
emblematic tools of his trade and by the activity of his labour. Through this framing 
he functions as a visual counterpart to the textual definition of the normative subject 
as a productive worker. 
This framing of the body and the inscription of identity through emblematic 
references (e.g. to particular tools) also operates in the photographs, for example, 
of the "Covent Garden Flower Women" (fig.4.3), "Public Disinfectors" (fig.4.6), 
"The Water Cart" (fig.4.27), "Flying Dustmen" (fig.4.35). Of these, the 
photograph of "Public Disinfectors" is particularly interesting due to the inclusion 
of a supervising Inspector overseeing the disinfectors who, like the Temperance 
Sweep, are somewhat awkwardly and formally posed as representative types before 
the camera. 
In these photographs the individuals are defined as tokens or emblems of a 
particular activity or, rather, it is their particular labour which defines them. Given 
these strategies of representation, it is not surprising that the Court Circular 
referred to the "Capital Specimens" in Thomson's photographs while The Lancet 
thought that they would be of interest to "the sanitarian, the citizen and the 
philanthropist. "ISS 
However, aside from the relation between representation and surveillance, a 
151 The issue of power and looking in relation to this photograph is, in fact, more complex than simply 
being a relation of dominance and is discussed in the next chapter. 
t34 Frontality also carried class connotations. As John Tagg has argued. "Rigid frontaltiy signified the 
bluntness and 'naturalness' of a culturally unsophisticated class and had a history which predated 
photography ••. in the course of the nineteenth century the burden of frontality wu passed on down the 
social hierarchy. as the middle classes secured their cultural hegemony", "A Democracy of the Image: 
Photographic Portraiture IIld Commodity Production". TIw Bruu" of RqrucllUJlion, op.cit •• p. 36. 
til Both quoted in 1111 Jeffrey. Photography: A COlICisc Hi8fory. London. Thames and Hudson, 1981. p. 
6~. 
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general and pervasive effect of passivity or docility is produced across all the 
photographs marking in part a conjunction of their technical and discursive 
constraints. Thomson was limited by the bulky and cumbersome wet-plate process 
which necessitated long exposures and the need for a portable darkroom. As a 
result, all his photographs are posed simulations of 'real-life' situations. 
Thomson's somewhat static scenes of street life resulting from the slowness of the 
wet collodion process contrast with the "candid" or "snap shot" photography of, for 
example, Paul Martin in the 1880s and 189Os136 (figs. 4.42 - 4.45) with their 
features of movement and spontaneity - Martin's photographs being closer to 
Raymond Williams's description of nineteenth century London, i.e. "its 
miscellenaity. its crowded variety. its randomness of movement". For Martin's 
photographs were produced in the context of the technical revolution of the 1880s 
which saw the introduction of the dry-plate process and the hand-held camera -
developments which also allowed for the easier use of a disguised camera. 
However. the technical limitations which Thomson faced are not merely extrinsic 
factors in the production of the photographs but are themselves constitutive 
elements in the production of photographic meaning. 
But while Thomson's photographs may lack the apparent spontaneity of those 
of Paul Martin they nonetheless helped to establish the operational procedures of 
much subsequent street life photography. Thomas Burke's street photography in 
Liverpool in the 1890s (figs. 4.46, 5.4, 5.7). for example. or Edgar Lee's 
documentation of the Sandgate area of Newcastle (figs. 4.47 - 4.51) or the 
photographs taken by John Galt all had Street-Life in London as a precedent for the 
photographing of urban communities. And, like Street-Ufe. these surveys all 
produced what David Harvey has described as "images of knowable or affective 
communities [which) can also be marketed as commodities."137 Similarly. the 
photographs taken under the instigation of the Baptist preacher Charles Spurgeon in 
Greenwich (figs. 4.53 - 4.56) for use in lantern-slide lectures share Street-Life's 
representational strategies of isolating, individualising and typifying as a means to 
registering the social mix and activity of the streets (fig. 4.52). 
But the point to be made when discussing both these and Thomson's 
photographs is not to posit them as the hennetic bearers of a latent or immanent 
iii See Roy Flukiniller, Larry Schaaf and Meechun Standish. Pol Marlin: VklOl'ian Photographer, 
London, Gordon Fruer and University of Texu Preu. Austin. 1978. 
117 COII8CiounuI GNl tile UrbQII EJrpuiarc.., op.CiL, p. lSS. 
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'visual' meaning bu~ rather, it is to argue that their 'meaning', instead of being 
inherent within the image is produced upon, around and across them. Thus the 
issue of historical investigation is not one of how 'true' or 'adequate' a 
representation Thomson's photographs are but, rather, it is to examine how they 
were utilised and circulated within the production of a wider network of 
representations. The 'truth' of Thomson's photographs - their 'realism' - is not a 
pre-given constant which they embody nor is it reducible to any single strategy of 
representation. Rather, as a constituted effect, it is the product of a totality of 
discourses. III For this reason the photographs cannot be viewed as 'signs' of the 
real but only as the effects (even at the level of denotation) of the play of multiple 
connotations produced within this field of forces. Indeed, the classical 'binary' 
notion of the sign (signifier/signified) must be suspended, founded as it is within a 
logocentric science of presence. Instead, the photograph can perhaps be likened to 
Derrida's "trace". In other words, the identity of the sign is constituted through 
syntagmatic relations of difference with the trace being the sum of all possible 
relations (of alterity) which inhabit and constitute the sign. Rather than seeing the 
sign as being produced within relations of identity and equivalence, it can instead be 
cited as a structure of difference, repetition and substitution, i.e. as constantly 
relating to other signs and texts. It is in this way that meaning and the real are 
produced through a constant textual movement of difference and deferral.139 
The issue of 'truth' is pertinent not only to the status of Thomson's 
photographs but is clearly apposite to the discursive field which gives them 
meaning. Moreover, the question for historical investigation cannot simply be one 
of how 'true' a representation Street-Life provides of the urban poor. For this 
would be to assume the existence of an extra-discursive historical reality which can 
be objectively reconstructed as a reference point by which to judge the text's 
lSi See Colin MacCabe's description of the "classic realist text" as "one in which there is a hierarchy 
amongst the discourses which compose the text and this hierarchy is defmed in terms of an empirical 
notion of truth", "Realism and the Cinema: Notes on some Brechtian Theses". Screen, 15,2. 1914, p. 8 . 
• ,. "'The play of differenCCl supposes. in effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment, or in 
any sense. that a simple element be in and of itself. referring only to itself. Whether in the order of 
spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to another element 
which itself is not simply presenL .• Diff&ance is the systematic play of differences. of the traces of 
differences. of the spac:ina by means of which elements are related to each other •.. there is no presence 
before and outside of semiological difference •• .In the extent to which what is called "meaning" (to be 
"expressed") is already. and thoroughly. constituted by a tissue of differences, in the extent to which 
there is already a text, a network of textual referrals 10 other texts. a textual transformation in which each 
alleaedly "simple term" is marked by the trace of another term. the presumed interiority of meaning is 
already worked upon by its own ellteriority ••• there is no lignification unless there is Iynthesis, 
syntagm. diff&lnce and tellt". "Semiology and Grammatology" in Positions. op.cit .• pp. 26-33. 
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adequacy or distortions. In other words, it would be to assume that a knowable 
reality exists independently outside of discursive mediation and that there can be an 
unequivocal identity between representations and the real. Not only would such a 
view negate the fact that the writing of history is itself premised upon the reading of 
'sources' which are themselves discursive mediations but, more specifically, it, 
would be to accept that it is possible to separate the ideological or discursive from 
the real. A reading of Street-Life thus raises the question of whether the real can be 
counterposed against the discursive. In short, whether it is possible to clearly cite 
an economic or social reality which exists not only behind or prior to the ideological 
both as a real situation or problem which is 'deformed' by ideology but which is 
also the condition of existence of that ideological (mis)representation . Within this 
juxtaposition of the real and the ideological or discursive, historical investigation 
becomes a process of demystification based upon the belief that ideologies are false 
deformations or abstractions of a real object or problem (e.g poverty, casual 
labour). 
To raise these questions is not, however, to dismiss the possibility of historical 
reconstruction or 'proof altogether. The endless references in Victorian literature to 
the mobility of the labouring classes and the poor, for example, were clearly 
distortions and exaggerations. Indeed, these groups were usually highly 
irnmobile.l40 But, beyond, such refutation, the questions which also need to be 
posed relate to why and how such representations were produced, circulated and 
privileged and, indeed, why they were believed to be true. For these reasons, my 
concern here has not so much been an inquiry into how adequate or truthful Street-
Life was (i.e.how it may have ideologically defonned the real) but rather it has 
been to examine how a certain 'reality' or set of referents were produced through 
the mobilisation of specific strategies of representation and, furthermore, how these 
representations already had or were given a discursive currency. 
My concern, then, has been to look at certain strategies at work within Street-
Life rather than gleaning the text and photographs for a set of fixed or self-evident 
meanings. Rather than, for example, debating and contesting the truth of Street-
Life or of Greenwood's texts or the C.O.S.'s representations, the issue that needs 
to be investigated is under what conditions or "rules of fonnation" were these 
various representations seen to be true and how effectively they fulfilled certain 
tao See Eric Hobsbawm. wnte N"meteenth Century Labour Market" in LondOll: Aspects 0/ Change. ed. 
Ruth O1asl et aI., Centre of Urban Studies, 1964. 
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functions.141 For instance, although Greenwood's images of the poor in The 
Seven Curses of London were in some sense 'distortions', what is perhaps of 
more importance is that they provided an imaginary representation which played 
upon and fulfilled certain class anxieties and fantasies while also serving to 
legitimate strategies of social intervention. In this fashion, the t~xt (as a form of 
"savoir")141 literally operated as a pre-text for policies of regulation and control in 
that an image of the residuum was produced which, as it were, then required the 
appropriate regulative response. What was involved here was thus something of a 
circularity in that intervention produced and circulated images of the poor which 
then functioned to legitimise that intervention which could then present itself as a 
'response' to a particular social problem. 
But to c1aimthat such representations are not simply referable to an independent 
historical reality or already-constituted referents is not to ascribe an autonomous or 
relativist randomness to them. For, within the context of London in particular, these 
rep"resentations and discourses had historically determinate constraints and 
conditions of existence which were not merely extrinsic background. For, aside 
from its indirect relation to various institutions and practices, Street-Life was 
inscribed within existing regimes of sense and truth and within a non-reducible 
"differential network" of other discourses and representations which in part served 
to conftrm its own 'truth'. To seek, then, to read Street-Ufe simply in terms of the 
adequacy of its own representations is to miss the point. For meaning and truth are 
not attributes inherent in either the text or the photographs but are instead produces 
across them through the articulation of a series of determinate levels of 
W Jeffrey Minson argues along similar lines in his critique "from Donzelot's point of view" of the 
juxtaposition of the economic and the ideological in Outcast London., i.e. "Outcast London locates the 
major causes of metropolitan pauperism in the casual, seasonal employment structure peculiar to London 
trades, and in the consequent paucity of appropriately sited housing ... What may be questioned here are 
the the implications of according this economic component the status of a structural cause, and then 
employing it as a benchmark against which the ideology of philanthropy can be evaluated as such. 
Philanthropy is ideological insofar as it mislocates the origins of East End pauperism, housing 
conditions and insurgency in a set of moral causes, ranging from degenerate character to urban anomie 
(demoralisation). Small wonder that this 'private' initiative was supplanted by Slale social security and 
assistance systems. Philanthropy both misrecognised the material, structural source of the problem and 
as private initiative lacked the financial and organisational means to so much as grasp the scale of the 
problem, let alone resolve iL Philanthropy failed because of what it failed to see ... To this argument, 
Donzelot could respond that, concentrating as Stedman Jones does on what the philanthropists failed to 
see, he fails to attend sufficiently to what they actually attempted to do, particularly with respect to the 
reformation of working class domestic life. The consequence of this failme to grasp the complexities of 
philanthropic strategy is an underestimation of its effectivities, which cannot be gauged merely by the 
degree of success or unsuccess of the nineteenth century philanthropic movement ... the philanthropic 
solutions to the problem of indigency and insurgency have the merit of a complexity and subtlety which 
must be weighted against the pbilm1hropists' theoretical and organisational limitations. It cannot be 
reduced to a ideology vainly seeking to service the needs of capitalism", Genealogies of Morals, op.cit., 
pp. 190-193. 
141 "Social Economy and the Govenunent of Poverty" op.cit., p. 60. 
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representation and through the text's inscription within a historically specific field 
of forces. Rather than positing Street-Ufe in London as a self-sufficient text, it is 




THE ATTRACTION OF REPULSION 
To each ego its object. to each superego its abject I 
While Street-life in London can legitimately be read as a hegemonic project of 
representation, such a reading also entails the risk of citing this particular text as 
just one more instance of a totalising surveillance. It is in this sense that Peter 
Dews's criticism of Foucault, that "throughout his work the omnipresent look 
reduces alterity to identity III stands as a pertinent warning against a reading of 
photography as both the unproblematic evidence of a pervasive disciplinary 
surveillance and as the function of a (successfully) repressive and irreversible 
panoptic Gaze. For what also needs to be examined are not only the potential 
contradictions within any political project or initiative but also the potential 
instabilities between such projects and the representations mobilised in order to 
secure their aims. Despite the usefulness of accounts. such as Foucault's, of a 
rationalising imperative, it is important to recognise not only a degree of psychical 
autonomy but also to acknowledge what Jacqueline Rose has referred to as "the 
attempt of the social order to secure its own rationality, and its constant failure to do 
SO."3 To a great extent this failure turns upon the effects (rather than intentions) of 
representation. As Rose also points out, "One of the key characteristics of both 
identification and the image is their tendency to operate in a contradictory fashion -
which means psychoanalytically that there is no stopping the potential range of their 
aberrant causes or effects.'''' 
It is one instance of such aberrant effects within Street-Life that I shall be 
discussing here, an instance (among others potentially) which undermines the 
hegemonic knowledge of the poor which the text aims to produce. More 
, Julia Kristen, Powers 0/ Horror: An Essa, on Abjeclion. trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1982, p. 2. 
2 "Adorno, Poststructuralism and the Critique of Identity", in TM Problem 0/ Mtxkrnity: Adorno and 
Benjamin, ed. Andrew Benjamin, London, Routledge, 1989, p. S. 
a "Margaret Thatcher md Ruth Ellis", New Formations, 6, Winter 1988, p. 8. 
4 ibid., pp. 5-7. 
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specifically, the wayward effects of representation crucially inflect upon the status 
of the viewing subject itself. For if Street-Life's project of producing a nonnative 
representation of the poor in part rests upon the employment of photography as a 
literal transcription of presence, this presence - which might here be called realism 
(although, of course, never a tenn used as such by the authors of Street-Life) - can 
be described as a system of exchange of signifiers between subjects. The terms of 
this exchange has been outlined by John Tagg who, describing dominant realist 
discourse as "the creation of an identity between signifier and signified", argues 
that: 
this whole process could only operate by placing the consumers - the readers - of the texts in an 
imaginary position of ttanscendence in relation 10 the system in order that the texts should be 
intelligible. Just as Marx has shown that recognised. socially fixed positions are necessary for the 
exchange of commodities which functions through a system of equivalences. so realism fixes the 
position of its readers in order that the transaction between signifier and signified may take place. 
Realism sets its subjects in place at the point of intelligibility of its activity, in a position of 
observation and synthesis which cannot be questioned by the flux of the text and which cannot be 
thrown into process by the sliding of signifiers that disestablishes social positionality.' 
And, as Derrida also argues, both the classic model of communicative exchange 
and "the 'semiological' project itself and the organic totality of its concepts", 
presupposes identifiable subjects between whom objects (signifiers) are circulated: 
communication .. .implies a transmission charged with making pass, from one subject to another. 
the identity of a signified object, of a meaning or of a concept, rightfully separable from the 
process of passage and from the signifying operation. Communication presupposes subjects 
(whose identity and presence are constituted before the signifying operation) and objects (signified 
concepts. a thought meaning that the pas.sage of communication will have neither to constitute, 
nor, by all rights, transform). A communicates B to C. Through the sign the emitter 
communicates something to a receptor, etc.' 
Yet while realism operates through the process of fixing subject positionality, 
this fixing is nonetheless precisely a process and there is no reason to assume that it 
is always successful. 'Realism' is not only a contingent mode of representation, it 
is also a potentially unstable one.' As such. while itself of course operating through 
the exchange of signs between subjects. Street-Life also initiates an unfixing of the 
subject by opening an undecidable rupture or breach within its attempt to secure 
knowledge and positionality for the reader. Fundamentally this rupturing turns 
upon phantasy. For while Street-Uje, like 'realist' discourse, mobilises psychical 
investments (such as identification) so as to achieve its representations, it is the 
i The B/U'un of Repruelllalion, op.cit .• pp. l00-10l. 
I Positions, op.cit., pp. 23-24. 
7 I have discussed the concerns of these opening remuks at greater length in "The Subject of 
Photography", op.cit. 
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psychical which also militates against the text - an instance, perhaps, of the text's 
own failure of self-regulation. 
It is this self-undermining which I shall be discussing in this chapter by 
focusing on Thomson's photograph "The Crawlers" (figs. 4.31, 5.1). This 
discussion will take as its starting point my remarks on Engels's account of 
Manchester. There are two aspects of this account that I wish to follow up here. 
Firstly, Engels's implicit foregrounding of the question of spectatorial positionality 
(in terms of proximity and distance) and, secondly, what might be called his use of 
the 'shock' image. For. with reference to Engels's text, "The Crawlers" can be 
cited as an example of the dangers of proximity. But what I also wish to discuss 
here some of the psychical dimensions which structure the ambivalent responses to 
the poor during the nineteenth century. This ambivalent response to the poor can be 
described more precisely by the phrase "the attrac~on of repulsion" - a phrase used 
by Charles Dickens to describe his own fascination with the 'other' of the 
bourgeoisie, i.e. extreme poverty, dirt, decay etc. This fascination was recounted 
by Dickens's biographer John Forster who himself employed the term in his 
description of the writer's childhood: 
To be taken out for a walk into the real town, especially if it were anywhere about Covent Garden 
or the Strand. perfectly entranced him with pleasure. But, most of all. he had a profound attraction 
of repulsion to SL Giles's. If only he could induce whomsoever took him out to take him through 
Seven Dials. he was supremely happy. 'Good Heavensl' he would exclaim. 'what wild visions of 
prodigies of wickedness. want, and beggary. arose in my mind out of that place. '. 
But while it has been observed that bourgeois responses to both the city and the 
poor or working-classes within it were simultaneously marked by fear and 
fascination there has been little commentary upon the mechanisms at work within 
such responses and little specific analysis of the intersection of the psychical and 
the social.' 
As regards the dangers of proximity, in my discussion of the "Great Towns" 
chapter I argued that fundamental to Engels's account of the industrial or 'modem' 
city was his demonstration of the wa~s in which the physical structure of the city 
(itself in part a product of economic and ideological forces) imposed particular 
modes of movement, encounter and perception upon the observer walking through 
it. Engels, however, does not begin his account with this realisation. Instead, this 
• Ule 01 DicUrLf, quoted by Philip Collins in "Dickens and London" ;I'M Victoria" City, op.cit., p. 538. 
• See. however. Peter Stallybrus and Allon White. Tilt! Politics GIld POt!tics of Transgrt!uioJt, op.cit., 
espec. chp.3. pp. 125·148. 
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discovery was, as it were, forced upon him as he describes how that, in order to 
give a "truthful" account of the scenes that he witnesses in Manchester, he must go 
up close thereby reversing the strategy of self-distancing that he initially maintained 
in his response to, and description of, London's crowded streets. However, while 
Engels adopts a method of observation based upon physical proximity, this 
operated to reinforce a psychical distancing, i.e. a relation of non-identity between 
Engels and the subjects of his investigation. This particular relation between 
spectatorial and social positionality was counterposed with Pictorialist photography 
in which an identification between the photographer and the depicted scene was 
predicated upon a necessary, and deliberately gauged, physical separation. It is 
within this context that 'The Crawlers" can be cited as an example of the potential 
risks involved when the observer goes up too close to particular urban subjects. 
By taking up Engels's narrative, it is possible to refer urban, and particularly 
street life photography, to the structure of the city itself which produces specific 
modes of encounter and vision. The consequences of what might be called this 
'spacing' between subjects, in conjunction with the experience of shock (as the 
fracturing of narcissistic autonomy), in the formation of inter-subjective relations 
and identities (with reference here to particular images) can be usefully opened up 
through a reading of "The Crawlers" with reference to Julia Kristeva's account of 
abjection. I do not intend here to summarise Kristeva's often highly opaque account 
of abjection. Nor do I wish to respond to the criticisms made of the political 
implications and consequences of her work.lO However, a brief outline of the salient 
features of her argument will be necessary here. Instead, I wish to focus upon 
several features of Kristeva's account of abjection which seem especially pertinent 
to the present context. Firstly, there is the relation between the abject and processes 
of spatialisation whether physical, psychical or social. Secondly, there is the 
fundamental relation, for Kristeva, between the abject and the female body and, 
more particularly, the maternal body. Finally, I wish to discuss the question of 
subjectivity in terms of the representation of abjection - an issue that raises 
questions regarding the psychical mechanisms upon which the very possibility of 
any system of representation is predicated and, perhaps especially, the possibility of 
photography itself. 
16 See especially 1ennifer Stone, "The Horrors Of Power, A Critique of Kristen" in The Politics of 
Theory, eel. Francis Barker et aI., University of Eascx. 1983. 
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Kristeva on abjection 
In Powers of Horror Kristeva, focusing upon the phenomenon of abjection, sets 
out to describe the primary processes of separation, division and exclusion which 
underpin the fonnation of (patriarchal) society: the realm of the Symbolic., More 
particularly, using examples from literature (especially Celine), Kristeva's concern 
is with the individual subject's experience of these processes. Kristeva's 
fonnulation of abjection remains nebulous throughout her book but from the start 
she defines it as that which does not "respect borders, positions, rules" and as that 
which "disturbs identity, system, order". 
Basic to Kristeva's project is an account of how the abject, as a source of horror 
and revulsion yet also fascination, operates as a means of separating the human 
from the non-human and the fully constituted subject from the partially constituted. 
Central to Kristeva's account throughout the book is the role of ritual and religion 
as strategies which evoke the abject so as to disavow it- "the demarcating 
imperative"- i.e. pagan rites of defilement, biblical abomination, social taboos, 
Christian interiorisation etc. Through these practices the subject is spoken through 
the abject as the subject's identity is constituted through a relation of difference 
against the abject. However, the abject is not specific solely to these cultural 
manifestations for, necessarily prior to these, it is bound to the maternal function 
itself: it is "rooted historically (in the history of religion) and subjectively (in the 
structuration of the subject's identity) in the cathexis of the maternal function -
mother, woman, reproduction."ll 
Before discussing this further, however, it is useful to look briefly at Kristeva's 
initial description of the abject. She writes: 
When I am beset by abjection,the twisted braid of affects and thoughts I call by such a name does 
not have, properly speaking a defmable object. The abject is not a an ob-ject facing me, which I 
name or imagine .•. The abject has only one quality of the object- that of being opposed to I. If the 
object, however, through its opposition, settles me within the fragile texture of a desire for 
meaning, which, as a matter of fact, makes me ceaselessly and infinitely homologous to it, what 
is abject, on the contrary. the jettisoned object is radically excluded and draws me to the place 
where meaning collapses •• .lt is thus nOl lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but 
what disturbs identity. system. order. What does not respect borders, positions. rules. 12 
As the place where "I" (as a SUbject) do not occupy and as a threat against life itself, 
the abject must be expelled - "radically excluded" - from the realm of the living 
subject and positioned on the other side of an imaginary border which separates the 
Ii Powcn of Horror, op.CiL, p. 91. 
12 ibid., pp. 1-4. 
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subject's "own and clean self' - Kristeva also frequently refers to the "clean and 
proper body" - from that which threatens it. However, while the abject must be 
excluded it can never be so totally for it must be allowed to exist so that the subject 
may be defin~ and constituted, i.e. the subject cannot exist without the co-
existence of the non-subject, the not-I. 
Early on Kristeva cites various situations in which the abject is experienced. 
One of these is food loathing, "perhaps the most elementary and archaic form of 
abjection."" Kristeva gives the example of the skin on the top of some milk which 
she was offered by her parents as a "sign of their desire" yet also a sign signifying 
the separation between her world and theirs and a sign which she refuses: "But 
since the food is not an "other" for me, who am only in their desire. I expel myself. 
I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which 'I' claim 
to establish myself' ."14 
Other examples of the abject exist from biological bodily functions to the extreme 
example of the corpse. From all of these the body/subject removes and separates 
itself so that it may continue to live: 
Such wastes drop so that I might live. from loss to loss. nothing remains in me and my entire 
body falls beyond the limit - eader, cadaver. If dung signifies the other side of the border. the place 
where I am not and which permits me to be. the corpse. the most sickening of wastes. is a border 
that has encroached upon everything. It is no longer I who expel, 'I' is expelled. IS 
Kristeva further argues, but does not really substantiate, that the abject takes on a 
more social manifestation when any individual breaks the law or when an individual 
is a liar, traitor or hypocrite: "Any crime because it draws attention to the fragility of 
the law, is abject. "16 And it is corruption, above all, which provides the most 
"socialised appearance of the abject "17 
Such examples are perhaps the clearest cases demonstrating a basic feature of 
the abject - its highlighting of the "fragility of the law" and the Symbolic. As such, 
while the abject must always be expelled, it always remains as the place where 
meaning and the Symbolic collapse. The subject, constituted through language and 
the Symbolic and the desire for meaning, is thus also spoken by the abject as the 
place of non-meaning: the site "of the excluded, the outside-of-meaning, the abject. 
is ·bod 2 1 1 0, po ° 
I. ·bod 3 1 1 ., p. . 
" °b·d 9 1 1 •• po • 
"obod 4 1 1 0, po • 
17 ibido, p. 16. 
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Atopia.ma This, Kristeva argues, is the reason for the constant evoking by the 
subject of the abject, which both fascinates and repels it, as a defence against its 
own annihilation. Moreover the abject is always ambiguous and it is this which 
accounts for the tension of desire and repulsion felt by the subject for the abject: 
We may call it a border, abjection is above all ambiguity. Because while releasing a hold, it does 
not radically cut off the subject from what threatens it - on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it 
to be in perpetual danger. But also because abjection is itself a composite of judgment and affect, 
of condemnation and yearning, of signs and drives. Abjection preserves what existed in the 
archaism of pre-objectal relationship (sic.), in the immemorial violence with which a body 
becomes separated from another body in order to be.I ' 
It is through this "archaism of pre-objectal relationship" that the abject is identified 
with the maternal function. All individuals, according to Kristeva, experience 
abjection during their frrst attempts to break away from the mother. Not only is this 
period one of conflict- as the child struggles to leave the mother who is unwilling to 
release it - but it is also marked by a prohibition upon the mother's body. The 
maternal body now becomes the site of conflicting desires - a relationship 
complicated by the mother's desire to retain the child as a validation of her own 
existence which itself remains ambiguous in relation to the Symbolic:"The difficulty 
the mother has in acknowledging (or being acknowledged by) the symbolic realm-
in other words, the problem she has with the phallus that her father or husband 
stands for - is not such as to help the future subject leave the natural mansion. "20 
As the child rejects the mother for the symbolic authority of the father, it is the 
mother who now becomes an abject. Abjection of the mother thus opens the way 
for the father's role of initiating the young subject into the Symbolic. At this stage, 
too, the child experiences two contrasting feelings: a desire for a dyadic unity with 
the mother (reinforced by its fears of separation) but also a fear of losing its own 
identity through continued bonding. The role of religion, Kristeva argues,has been 
to resolve this situation.21 Kristeva here claims that rituals of deftlement are referred 
back to the mother as a prohibition against contact with the maternal body. 
Within these rituals, polluting objects fall into two categories: excremental 
(objects which threaten the subject's identity from outside) and menstrual (those 
which threaten from within). The child's frrst learning about polluting objects is 
itself associated with its frrst experience of authority, i.e. a maternal authority as the 
\i·b·d 22 1 1 ., p. . 
It ibid., pp. 9-10. 
ao ibid., p. 13 .• 
Z1 ibid., p. 64ff. 
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child learns from its mother about its own body. This Kristeva calls this the "primal 
mapping of the body", also the "semiotic. Fundamental here is Kristeva's 
distinction between maternal "authority" and paternal "laws" in that "Maternal 
authority is the. trustee of that mapping of the self's clean and proper body; it is 
distinguished from paternal laws within which, with the phallic phase and the 
acquisition of language, the destiny of man will take shape. '121 
The initial phase of this "primal mapping" under maternal authority is marked by 
the experience of "authority without guilt" whereas submission to the law of the 
phallus initiates not only guilt and shame but also desire. The sight, for example, of 
bodily wastes provokes a split between these two orders, i.e. on the one hand, as 
threat to the subject (now constituted through the Symbolic as "whole and proper") 
and thereby evoking a response of disgust and revulsion yet, on the other hand, as 
pleasurable by evoking a time of the "fusion of mother and nature", a time without 
embarrassment and shame. In a similar fashion, food is abject only if it signifies the 
border "between two distinct entities or territories."D Such experiences not only 
involve the breaking of (symbolic) taboos but also, by highlighting the realm of the 
body, incite memories of the world of the mother - the world repressed with the 
subject's entry into the Symbolic. As such, for example,it is the function of 
defilement rites to indicate and reinforce the "boundary" between semiotic maternal 
authority and paternal law. 
"The Crawlers": maternal collapse 
While it is not my immediate concern here to assess the validity of Kristeva's 
account, it is useful to look at the underlying frameworks of her argument. Two 
aspects are particularly significant Firstly, Kristeva starts from the premise that 
both society and language are constituted around the axis of sexual difference. 
More specifically, sociality and the Symbolic are defined through the exclusion of 
the woman to society's edge, its outer limit, where she is situated as a cultural 
absence. As Elizabeth Cowie has also remarked: "Motherhood is ... a positioning not 
a role.'Being a mother' is a coming into a place ... across a series of psychical 
investments themselves by no means outside the social":M - a positioning which is, 
ill ibid., p. 72. 
II ibid., p. 7S. 
:M "Introduction to Post-Partum Document", mil, 5/6, 1981, p. 118. 
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however, reversed in "The Crawlers". Secondly, I wish to focus upon the 
fundamental role of spatial ising processes within Kristeva's account. For this 
account of abjection is loaded with a "spatial" or topographical tenninology, i.e. 
notions of inside/outside, exclusion, expulsion, separation, margin, boundary, 
border and outcast. 
Both these frameworks are directly pertinent to "The Crawlers" for it is not 
altogether accidental that the most extreme image of "abject misery" (to quote the 
text) in Street Life is framed within the context of motherhood just as the 
photograph itself overtly foregrounds the question of spectatorial positionality and 
power. Indeed, part of the s~?Ck effect of Thomson's photograph lies in its 
activation of a sp~tatorial po_wer (through a subjecting and disempowering gaze) 
under which the woman's passive body seems almost to visibly acquiesce. 
Inanimate, powerless, unengaged with the bearer of the gaze and virtually a 
phantom corpse, the anonymous child-minder is framed as a personified metonymic 
emblem of the demoralised condition of the poor. Although not, perhaps, 
provoking the sometimes extreme horror and repulsion in Kristeva's examples of 
abjection, a controlling and fascinated gaze, free from the threat of the returned 
look, is nevertheless mobilised through its ability to both examine up close this 
particular pauper while also lingering over the details of surfaces, textures and 
random objects within the picture. 
... 
An image of such extreme demoralisation would seem at first to undermine the 
confident liberal rhetoric in Street-Life about the poor particularly given the 
iconographic and cultural associations of Mother and Child at work in the 
photograph. Yet it is precisely this mother/child couplet, in conjunction with the 
woman's extreme passivity and subjection, which allows for a disarming of the 
(potential) threat of poverty. For, despite its disturbing effect, "The Crawlers" is 
/' '. -. 
not a unique image within the representation of poverty. For, more often than not, 
not only is it is images of women and children which constitute the image of the 
urban poors (figs. 5.2 - 5.6) but recurrent within these images are photographs of 
old and destitute women (figs. 5.7 - 5.10). Indeed, it would be hard, if not 
impossible, to find an image of an adult male similar in effect to that of "The 
Crawlers". One needs, for example, only to compare this photograph with that of 
''Hookey Air' who, despite his unemployment (through injury) remains articulate 
B See Andrea Dworkin'. remlJ'ks here regarding poverty u "a humiliating, and therefore a feminizing, 
experience" in 0" Porno"."'. London, The Women'. Press. 1981, p. S9. 
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and heroically defiant about his economic situation while remaining framed as the 
central figure within a familial group. 
This framing of poverty in "The Crawlers", and the possibility o!. its disavowal 
through sexual difference, has, I would suggest, correspondences with Kristeva's 
-
account of abjection. For instead of being an image of a mutually absorbed mother 
and child, "The Crawlers" is marked by the collapse of maternal authority (in part 
through the upsetting of traditional connotations of mother and child through the 
implication of the mother's inadequacy and self-withdrawal) and the simultaneous 
intercession of the Law-of-the-Father through the spectator. For here the spectator 
is positioned in the place of the third term (the phallus) thereby fracturing the 
mother/child dyad and disempowering the mother. 
In effect, the image of motherhood and (or as) poverty in "The Crawlers" 
operates to produce a position of exterior subjectivity for the viewer through a 
relation of alterity. As such, "The Crawlers" functions as a site, however localised, 
within the constitution of a bourgeois social identity for the spectator as a negative 
identity (the not-I) through a grid of difference. Within Street-Life's project of 
incorporation and its homogenising imperative or recuperation of difference (both 
through its production of a single normative subjectivity for the poor and through 
its reinforcement of bourgeois self-identity), the woman in "The Crawlers" is 
positioned on the other side of an "imaginary border" - effectively expelled as waste 
outside the circuits of social production and exchange. Here, too, Kristeva's notion 
of the abject as that which must be excluded (but never fully can be) has parallels 
with responses throughout the Nineteenth Century to the residuum, poverty and 
\ 
criminality, i.e.the notion of an "other"within the social body which can never be 
expelled and which always threatens to erupt and infect - a spatial positioning of 
poverty which made redundant previous forms of spatialisation such as the 
expUlsion (e.g.of beggars) beyond the city walls.311 
This double imperative at work within Street-Life of both exclusion and 
recuperation is not, however, simply the intentional or reflex action of an 
instrumentalist social control. For this discourse of conttol was itself predicated 
upon the psychical structures underlying perception and subjectivity in that it is 
difference (as image) which evokes both a spectatorial fascination and the desire to 
look (attraction) but also a disavowal (repulsion). For while difference is evoked, 
Ii See Foucault's discussion of the "rituals of exclusion" and "the space of exclusion of which the leper 
wu the symbolic inhabitant" in Discipline and PIUIisIa , op.cit., espec. pp. 195-200. 
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as both a potential threat and as the sign of the spectator's own lack. it must also be 
banished. This banishment takes the form of a reverse introjection as described by 
Freud in his paper "Negation": "the original pleasure-ego wants to introject into 
itself everything that is good and to eject from itself everything that is bad. What is 
bad, what is alien to the ego and what is external are, to begin with, identical. "27 
Within this scenario identity is produced through either an affmnation or negation 
(introjection or expulsion) that is essentially spatial. 
It is in this sense. too. of expulsion or exclusion that the regulating gaze of 
surveillance is itself grounded upon the structures of aggressivity (and paranoia) as 
outlined by Lacan - structures which are themselves referable to the mirror-stage. 
Within this scenario subjective identity, as the Imaginary ego. was essentially a 
function of otherness as the subject appropriated or takes as its own an identity that 
is both external and other to it (the idealised mirror-image). Initially. at least, the 
ego was literally an other. The subject must, as it were, make this image its own in 
that the image provides the subject with an ideal identity (as a unified and coherent 
totality) which it does not in fact have. Moreover, this unity of the self can only 
achieved by the imposition on the other of an idealised self-image - as Lacan states: 
"aggressivity ... [is] a correlative tension of the narcissistic structure in the coming-
into-being of the subject"21 (a remark with relevance, perhaps, to the relation 
between charity and forms of social control). Similarly, Lacan also remarks upon 
"the evident connection between the narcissistic libido ... and the aggressivity it 
releases in any relation to the other. even in the most samaritan of aid. '129 It is this 
inter-relation between narcissism and aggression which explains both "the effusion 
of the subject towards an object without alterity"30 and the aggressivity which is 
provoked either with the loss of an ideal object or when the idealised identity of 
unity between self and other is threatened by irrecuperable difference. As Kristeva 
also remarks:"The phobic has no other object than the abject."3l 
Lacan does, however, suggest that primordial aggressivity can be overcome but 
only through the Oedipus complex, i.e: "the Oedipal identification is that by which 
the subject transcends the aggressivity that is constitutive of the primary subjective 
Z'"N ." . 237 egatlon , op. Cit., p. • 
- "On Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis" in &rits, op. ciL, p.22. 
-"Th' ". 6 e muror stage , op. CIL, p. • 
-"On A .. " . 24 ggresSlvlty , Op.Clt., p. • 
'1 PowusofHorror, op.cit., p. 6. 
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individuation. "n More specifically this takes the fonn of an identification with the 
image of the father which is adopted as an ego-ideal. In the context here of the 
simultaneous evocation and displacement of the threat of difference in "The 
Crawlers" this Oedipal identification is achieved by returning the viewer as witness 
to the primal scene of maternal castration - the scene of sexual difference within 
which the viewer is then positioned from the place of the father. 
This reading of Thomson's photograph raises further questions concerning 
spatialisation and representation since for both Lacan and Kristeva, as also for 
Freud, identity and inter-subjectivity are predicated upon separation, gaps and 
divisions (Le. processes of spacing). So too, following both Lacan's account of 
the scopic and spatial constitution of the subject and the implications of Kristeva's 
wider theoretical work, the question to be addressed here is perhaps not so much 
one of who or what is the subject (a question of identity) but, rather, where is the 
subject (a question ofpositionality). 
Representation, repetition, (un)pleasure 
This formation of identity across a "gap" (or division or lack) can itself be referred 
back to the formative period of the infant's separation from its mother. It is this 
moment - between the infant-subject not yet being an ego yet also not being an 
object - that Kristeva calls the abject. This is the moment also named by Freud as 
"primary narcissism", i.e. the period after the infant's initial auto-eroticism but prior 
to any fixed object-cathexis. Kristeva herself writes that "Abjection, with a meaning 
broadened to take in subjective diachrony is a precondition of narcissism " and 
refers to it as "a kind of narcissistic crisis."" Fundamentally, too, this is the 
moment marked by the introduction of the third term - the phallus or law of the 
father. Narcissism (primary or otherwise) here involves the child's identification 
(via an ego ideal) with the father (the sign also of the mother's desire). Kristeva 
describes this conflict of choice for the child, between the mother or father, as, "this 
abjection, which threatens the ego and results from the dual confrontation in which 
the uncertainties of primary narcissism reside."" The precise status of the father-
image within this scenario (i.e. as an Imaginary father or as paternal metaphor) is 
not the feature that I wish to draw attention to here but, rather, the crucial role of a 
sa "On Aggressivity", op.cit., p.23. 
SlPtlWersojH«ror, op. ciL pp.13-14. 
14 ibid., p. 63. 
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transference involving both a spatialisation (between the separate figures of mother 
and father) as well as the child's emergent conception of itself as a separate 
individual. 
This process can be further illustrated by reference to Freud's discussion, in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, of the /ortlda game. Here Freud recounts how his 
young grandson re-enacts his mother's departure and subsequent return by the 
throwing out of his cot of a cotton-reel with a string attached to it. The 
disappearance of the reel is accompanied by the child's utterance of the sound 
"fort", which both Freud and the child's mother interpret as the word "gone", 
while, on the recovery of the reel, the child "hailed its reappearance with a joyful 
"da" [there]. " Freud comments on this process that: 
This, then,was the complete game - disappearance and return. As a rule one only witnessed the flfst 
act, which was repeated untiringly as a a game in itself, though there is no doubt that the pleasure 
was attached to the second act" 
Freud cites the /ortlOO game as one of three examples of what he calls the 
"compulsion to repeat" what would seem to be unpleasurable experiences - in this 
case, the mother's departure from the child. His frrst example is the dreams of 
patients suffering traumatic neuroses as a result of life-threatening war experiences 
or injuries, dreams which "repeatedly take the patient back into the situation of his 
accident, a situation from which he wakes up in another fright.,,36 The third example 
Freud cites is the compulsion to repeat, by analysands within psychoanalytic 
transference, those experiences which not only cannot bring any pleasure but 
"which can never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction even to instinctual 
impulses which have since been repressed."37 Freud purpose here is to ask what lies 
behind this impulse to repeat unpleasurable experiences - an activity involving the 
repetition of unpleasant encounters which returns us to our point of departure: tIthe 
attraction of repulsion". 
Freud's frrst response is to interpret the game as an example of an instinct for 
mastery as the child transforms his passive role into an active one: 
At the outset he was in a passivt situation - he was overpowered by the experience; but by 
repeating it, unpleasurable as it was, as a game he took on an active part These effons might be 
put down to an instinct for mastery that was acting independently of whether the memory in itself 
was pleasurable or not." 
U"Beyond the Pleasure Principle", op.ciL, p. 15. 
M ibid., p. 13. 
If ibid., p. 20. 
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Freud then offers "still another interpretation" - which would seem, however, to be 
an expansion of the fmt. The game is now interpreted as a form of revenge in that 
the child, as it were, preempts his mother's departure by sending her away himself. 
Within this account, the initial displeasure'or pain of separation is transformed into 
the pleasure of a game. Moreover, the dimension of revenge now introduces an 
affective or libidinal charge into the desire for mastery. For, in the gesture of 
symbolically expelling the mother, the child indulges in a pleasure which is both 
sadistic (through the expUlsion and punishment of his mother) yet which is also 
masochistic (in that he denies himself her presence by repeating the moment of their 
separation - a moment which, as Freud observes, is repeated more often than that of 
her return). This gesture of expUlsion would, then, seem to combine the 
gratification of a fantasy of narcissistic omnipotence in conjunction with a 
masochistic reactivation of the child's initial feelings of loss and, as such, enacts in 
a condensed form the process of maternal abjection. And it is at this moment, too, 
itself one of many, that this symbiotic interrelation between pleasure and unpleasure 
threatens to dissolve the specificity of the very phenomenon - the existence of an 
independent pleasure principle - which Freud is attempting to describe. 
Within the present context, the fonlda game itself perhaps signals a moment 
within which the subject/child, by fracturing its dyadic relation with the mother, 
enacts a gesture of self-constitution across the gap opened up by the experience of 
separation and loss." For, as Freud comments in "Negation": "a precondition for 
the setting-up of reality testing is that objects shall have been lost which once 
brought real satisfaction'l4O - a comment which is also clearly pertinent to a reading \~ 
of "The Crawlers" as an image of the (post-Oedipal) 'lost' mother. This deliberate 
reactivation, in the fortlda game, of unpleasurable experiences operates here 
perhaps as a form of testing-out by the subject of its own identity and mastery (its 
own reality) through a narcissistic self-differentiation and self-representation - an 
activity which is itself also predicated upon a masochistic excitation. Moreover, 
within Freud's two other examples, this masochistic stimulation threatens the ego , 
56 Derric:la has made an extensive reading of theforUda game as an activity of supplementation in which 
the child not only makes himself an object of (self) representation but which also displaces Freud's 
assumed position of exteriority as Objective observer, i.e."Just as Ernst, in recalling the object (mother, 
thing. whatever) to himsel£. immediately comes himself to recall himself in an immediately 
supplementary operation. 10 the speculating grandfather. in describing or recalling this or that, recalls 
himself"'. "To Speculate. on Freud" in TM Post Card. From SocrDlu to Freutl and Beyond. op.cit .• espec. 
pp. 320·321. 
40 "Negation". op.cit .• p. 238. 
189 
at least potentially, with its own destabilisation and even annihilation. 
Lacan, in his gloss on the fort/da game interprets it as the child's attempt to 
overcome the gap created by separation from the mother by uttering signifiers (fort 
and da ) which evoke the mother's presence although she is in fact absent. 
Referring to Freud's description of ~s grandson's game of throwing a cotton-reel, 
Lacan remarks that they are, "repetitive games in which subjectivity brings together 
mastery of its dereliction and the birth of the symbol. "41 
Following both Lacan's interpretation and Freud's remark (again in 
"Negation") that "all presentations originate from perceptions and are repetitions of 
them":1 it is perhaps possible to cite the fort/do. game as an operation which not 
only initiates the compulsion to repeat in the unconscious but which also signals the 
origins of the mechanisms of representation. For the gesture of expUlsion can be 
seen as the moment in which the drive itself (of aggression or expulsion) is for the 
fIrst time able to be represented or, rather, is able to represent itself. As Lacan 
remarks: 
When Freud grasps the repetition involved in the game played by his grandson, in the reiterated 
fort-da, he may indeed point out the that the child makes up for the effect of his mother's 
disappearance by making himself the agent of it .. The activity as a whole symbolises repetition, 
but not all of that of some need that might demand the return of the mother and which could de 
expressed quite simply in a cry. It is the repetition of the mother's departure as cause of a 
Spaltung [split] in the subject - overcome by the alternating garne,fort-da, which is here or there, 
and whose aim, in its alternation, is that of simply being the fort of a da, and the da of a fort. It 
is aimed at what, essentially, is not there, qua represented - for it is the game itself that is the 
Representanz of the Vorstellung [idea, thing-presentation]~) 
For Lacan, the/ort/da game marks a moment of "primal symbolisation" which is 
both linguistic and scopic. While not rejecting Freud's interpretation of the game as 
an act of representation and mastery, La.can claims that the game goes beyond the 
mere satisfaction of a need (i.e.for the return of the mother), in that it reveals, and 
41 £Crits, op.cit., p.l03. For a complementary discussion of the relation between sadism, phantasy and 
symbolisation see Melanie Klein, "The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the 
Ego", in Love. Guilt and Reparation and other works 1921.1940, London, Virago, 1985, pp. 219-
232,the wholly undeveloped ego is faced with a task which at this stage is quite beyond it - the task of 
mastering the severest anxiety ... Since the child wishes to destroy the organs (penis, vagina, breasts) 
which stand Cor the objects, he conceives a dread of the latter. This anxiety contributes to make him 
equate the organs in question with other things; owing to this equation these in turn become objects of 
anxiety, and so he is impelled constantly to make other and new equations, which form the basis of his 
interest in the new objects and of symbolism ... Thus, not only does symbolism come to be the 
foundation of all phantasy and sublimation but, mote than that, it is the basis of the SUbject's relation to 
the outside world and to reality in general. I pointed out that the object of sadism at is height, and of the 
desire Cor knowledge U'ising simultaneously with sadism, is the mother's body with its phantasised 
contents. The sadistic phantasies directed against the inside of her body constitute the fust and basic 
relation to the outside and to reality." (pp. 220-221). 
4Z"N ." • 237 egatl0n , Op.Clt., p. . 
.aTM Four F~ COfICeplS, op. CiL, pp. 62-63. 
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indeed prcxiuces, a splitting of the subject (as the throwing of the reel represents the 
child's expulsion of part of himself) with the subject not just an initiator but also an 
effect of signification. As Lacan remarks, the repetition of the two phonemes (fort 
and da ) is "aimed at what, essentially, is not there qua represented." In short, the 
reel in the game symbolises a lack (of the mother). 
However, within this account of the game as a playa metonymic signifiers, the 
relation of signifier/signified to the subject is not one of identity or correspondence 
but is one of discontinuity which provokes a splitting (alienation) in the subject. 
Within this playing of the/ortlda game, the subject does not function as a point of 
origin or identity but is instead the spatial and tautological effect of a repetitive play 
of the signifiers of absence and presence."" As Lacan explains: 
In the two phonemes are embodied the very mechanism of alienation ... The function of the exercise 
with this object [the game itself] refers to an alienation, and not to some supposed mastery, which 
is difficult to imagine being increased in an endless repetition, whereas the endless repetition that 
is in question reveals the radical vacillation of the subject 4.5 
Within this scheme it is, argues Lacan, the intervention of the Name-of-the-Father 
which replaces the absence of the mother and which initiates the primal repression 
(of the world of the maternal ) through the threat of castration ( itself the ultimate 
symbolisation of lack). It is this lack and splitting which installs desire in the form 
of the desire for the other and as the desire for speech and communication. 
My point here is that the /ortlda game, narcissism and abjection all involve 
processes of spatialisation and the necessary recognition of the existence of an 
"other" extem~ to the subject. So also, it is within this nexus of key psychical 
moments that perhaps the very possibility of representation emerges - Freud himself 
at the close of his discussion of the fortlda game makes a connection, with 
reference to the representation of the unpleasurable, between "the artistic play and 
artistic imitation carried out by adults" and the activity of playing.46 Moreover, as 
Kristeva remarks:"If, on account of that Other, a space becomes demarcated, 
separating the abject from what will be a subject and its objects, it is because a 
repression that one might call "primal" has been effected prior to the springing forth 
U As Freud remarks in a footnote which prefigures Lac:an's account of the mirror-phue, the game also 
involved the child's own body: "It soon turned out that during this long period of solitude the child had 
found a method of making himself disappear. He had discovered his reflection in a full length mirror 
which did not quite reach the ground, so that by crouching down he could make his mirror-image 'gone' .. 
(BeyoNl 1M Plea",e Prillcipie. op.cit., piS). 
45 TM FOfU' FlI1IIlome1IIal ConceptI, op.cit., p. 239 • 
.. Beyond 1M Pleos",e Prillcipk. op.cit.,p. 17. 
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of the ego, of its objects and representations. "41 It is within this scenario of the 
origins of a "mimetic logic" (Kristeva) that it may be possible to adapt Derrida's 
citing of "an originary spacing ... on the very threshold of what we persist in calling 
perception"'" (seen now in terms of the subject's relation to the other) by reference 
to Kristeva's description of the abject as "a space out of which signs and objects 
emerge. '149 
It is this relation between play, the "space of symbolisation" and the emergence 
of the subject which is also the central focus of Winnicott's description of the 
"transitional object" and "potential space". In his account of the early relation 
between the child and its mother, Winnicott describes an "indetenninate area of 
experience" for the young infant which involves its first differentiation between its 
own body as distinct from non-body objects - an exploration through toys, dolls, 
blankets etc. (transitional objects) of the boundary between the "me" and the "not-
me". As, initially, a form of defence against separation from the mother, the 
transitional object, within the context of inter-subjective play, functions as a bridge 
between the inner world of the child's psychical reality and an outer world of an 
external reality. It is this indetenninate area of play involving transitional objects 
which forms the basis for the subsequent emergence of potential space. Among his 
various definitions of potential space Winnicott writes: 
Potential space ... is the hypothetical area that exists (but cannot exist) between the baby and the 
object (mother or part of mother) during the phase of the repudiation of the object as not-me, that 
is. at the end of being merged with the object'" 
Elsewhere, Winnicott's description of potential space as that which both joins and 
separates the child and the mother (object) would seem, partially at least, to 
complement Kristeva's account of abjection.s1 
Potential space thus emerges during the child's departure from the "holding 
environment" of the mother/child dyad during which the mother had fulfilled all the 
child's needs. It is this space of containment which is identified, according to 
Winnicott, as being a moment of an indivisible and harmonious unity between 
mother and child while it is the infant's playing within the inter-subjective space 
47 Pow~rsofHo"«. op. cit., pp. 10-11 . 
.. "Freud and the Scene of Writing", op. cit. Derrida also argues here that '7cmporalization presupposes 
the possibility of symbolism, and every symbolic synthesis, even before it falls into a space 'exterior' 
to it. includes within itself lpQCing as diffu~nt:e" (my emphasis) • 
.. Powers ofH«r«, op. ciL, p.l0. 
10 "The place where we live" in Playing and Reali", London. Tavistock. 1971. p. 107. 
It "Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena" in Pla,ing and Reali", op.cit., pp. 1-25. 
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between itself and its mother which leads to its dawning perception of itself as a 
distinct individual. Within this narrative of loss from the merged state of mother-
infant unity to a relation of mother and infant. the transitional object functions as a 
symbol within a dialectical process of unity and separation while it also. as 
Winnicott observes: "gives room for the process of being able to accept difference 
and similarity. ,~~ 
Brought into use before the subject's awareness of externality ( or exteriority). 
the transitional object exists prior to object usage proper ( which is itself predicated 
upon the recognition of difference) and. as such. is still tied to the infant's sense of 
a limitless and totalising wholeness. It is object usage and the recognition of the 
"wholly other" which fonns the foundation for what Winnicott calls "the unit self' 
(a concept perhaps similar to. but not in origin. to Lacan's imaginary self). 
Winnicott describes the individual's journey to this moment as a process of 
"destruction" (but not in the sense of hostile aggression - unlike Lacan) in that, 
while the object (or other) is destroyed as an object in fantasy (as a site or object 
solely of the subject's own projections), it is nevertheless reciprocally recognised 
, as having its own irreducible an4independent reajity. Destruction, through its 
displacing of the psychical structures of introjection and projection, thus creates or 
brings into being not only externality (reality) but also the ability for empathetic 
recognition. As Winnicott describes: 
the subject does not destroy the subjective Object (projective material), destruction turns up and 
becomes a central feature so far as the object is objectively perceived, has autonomy, and belongs 
to a shared reality. D 
Originating. then, as a space of mutual play, potential space (in its many variable 
forms) becomes part of the discrete individual's own everyday space of engagement 
and interaction with others. Potential space is thus premised upon and produced by 
the individual's recognition of an external area, space or reality (which includes the 
existence of others) and which is beyond its own intentional control. 
Fundamentally, too, for Winnicott, potential space, as the boundary between reality 
and fantasy, involves the individual's creative and cultural use of symbols. What is 
paramount here is the activity of symbolisation rather than the ascription of an 
identity to either the self or the object Above all, it is within the interpretive activity 
of the subject - the ability to differentiate between the symbol and the symbolised 
a'b'd 6 1 1 ., p. . 
II "'The Use of an Object and Relating through Identification" in Playing and Reality. op.cit .• p. 91. 
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(signifier and signified) - that the true significance of potential space lies. 
However,to claim, with reference to both potential space and the example of the 
fortllla game, that any system of representation is necessarily grounded upon a 
psychical and inter-subjective 'spacing' would seem to cast doubt as to whether the 
abject is itself representable or, indeed, knowable.For if the possibility of 
representation arises from a transitional stage between an archaic, pre-Oedipal state 
and the subject's accession to the Symbolic, it is also a space to which the subject 
can never return. In this context it is questionable as to whether the abject can ever 
be fully knowable (in the sense that it was fust experienced) even on a subjective 
level for by then the (post-Oedipal and post-objectal) subject perceives of itself as a 
fully differentiated subject. Nor can the abject be representable, even within 
language, for representation and discourse are grounded upon a spacing itself 
predicated upon the existence of subjects. Indeed, much of my purpose in citing the 
narrative of narcissism and the fortlda game etc. is that they involve the 
contiguous emergence of both space and subjects: in effect, no space without a 
subject and no subject without spatial structures. 
To argue, however, that the abject cannot be represented is merely to question 
Kristeva's ascription of social, and seemingly personified, identities to the abject 
when, for example she writes of criminality. For here Kristeva would seem to be 
contradicting her opening statement that the abject is not "a definable object ... (nor) 
an ob-ject facing me which I can name or imagine."54 Instead, the abject can only 
involve subjective psychical processes (e.g. a memory trace, an emotional response 
etc.) which both disrupt and confmn the individual's self-identity. 
The supplement: castration 
My argument here, then, is that "The Crawlers" would seem both to re-enact a 
scenario of maternal abjection while also inscribing the spectator within a network 
of psychical and social difference the constitutive foundations of which are traceable 
back to the subject's experience of abjection during the transitional stage of 
narcissism. For it is during this moment of its history that the subject, is first 
inscribed within the relations of difference and spacing which are operative in "The 
Crawlers". 
What is significant here is that this inscription of the subject is from the start 
i4 Powers of Horror • op. CiL. p. 1. 
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initiated in relation to sexual difference. In thefortlda game, too, the emergence of 
the discrete subject within the subject/object division is played out across the mother 
(as absence). Similarly for Winnicott, despite the limitations of his account,55 the 
fonnation of both inter-subjective and representational space (i.e. of symbolisation) 
is achieved through the terms (signifiers) of gendered difference. Within these 
accounts space, subject/object separation and signification - the founding elements 
of representation - are produced simultaneously with the subject's knowledge of 
difference. Sexual difference, then, is not simply the object of representation (as 
referent only) nor is it solely inscribed within the forms of representation (e.g. 
fetishism) but, rather, it underwrites the very possibility of representation itself. 
And, conversely of course, a radical disruption within the terms of difference can 
itself threaten the stability of that representational order. 
Through the aggressive gaze of surveillance or disciplinary society, this order 
of spacing is essentially one of exclusion with the circulation of both the look and 
spectatorial presence across the binary oppositions or the "violent hierarchy"S6 of 
phallus, presence, power and of castration, absence, submission. Not only would 
"The Crawlers" appear to be a paradigm example of the unequal distribution of the 
look between the male (as its bearer) and the woman (as its object), but Thomson's 
photograph can be referred more specifically to Luce lrigaray's account of 
specularisation. Within this account female castration operates as the narcissistic 
sign (for the male) of presence (as phallus). Through this specular logic of the 
same, the image of the woman is admitted - but only as a negative mirror-image of 
the male - so as to both confmn and secure phallic identity (as possession of the 
phallus). As Irigaray remarks:''To castrate the woman is to inscribe her in the law of 
the same desire, the desire for the same. "57 What is significant, too, within 
Irigaray's polemic (itself directed at Freud's account of femininity) is the 
determinate role of looking (for the male child) and of the visual 'affumation' of 
lack. Inde~ as Freud himself also notes with reference to "the substitutive relation 
between the eye and the male organ" in his paper on "The Uncanny", the power to 
gg For a useful critique of both Winnicou and object-relations theory see Elizabeth Wright 
Psychoanalytic Criticism: TMDry in Practice. London. Methuen. 1984. chp. 6. Two further reservations 
which I would also indicate here relate. fIrStly. to Winnicott's assumption of maternal adequacy (the 
"good enough mother") and. secondly. while the object/other may be expelled. I would argue that it is 
not. however. destroyed in phantasy. 
-Jacques Derric:la. Posiriolll. Ope cit •• p. 41. 
17 Quoted in Torn Moi. Sa"allTat"al Politics, London. Methuen. 1985. p.133. See also Luce lrigaray, 
Tlals sa which ill not OM. New York. Cornell University Press. espec. chp. 3. 
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look is itself an affinnation of phallic power.5I 
Similarly in ''The Crawlers" the production of spectatorial presence can be seen : I r " 
as being achieved through the securing of an Oedipal identification for the viewer in 
part by means of an image of the other not as the site of irrecuperable difference but 
as the confmnatory sign of a self-same specural identity. However, this securing 
of an OedipaVphallic mastery exacts a heavy and, perhaps, ultimately excessive toll 
of repression from the spectator. For the image of "The Crawlers" can be read as 
both securing and disrupting the binary oppositions of difference across which the 
Oedipal gaze is mobilised. Here again Freud's essay "Negation" provides a clue. 
For while in this essay Freud himself remains tied to a dualist model of opposites 
and exteriority (of inside/outside, internal/external) he also suggests that, in fact, 
nothing ever is excluded - it is simply ~pressed. As he states "we never discover a 
'no' in the unconscious."" 
By expanding upon Freud's remark with reference both to the/ort/do. game and 
to Winnicott's account of potential space, as well as with reference to the Kristeva's 
account of abjection, I wish to suggest here the possibility of framing Thomson's 
photograph (and the gaze which it summons) within an "interspace" of fantasy and 
ambivalence, a space of "ambiguous opposition" (Kristeva) and undecidabilitytiO - in 
other words, not just as the space of a binding and fixed positionality for both 
subject and object but one instead of an interdependent enfolding between them. 
For while (post) Oedipal identity is, perhaps, the dominant psychic mode of 
subjectivity, it' is arguably also the most precarious. Secured through the tortuous 
51 'The Uncanny", op.cit. p. 231. Freud also remarks that, "A study of dreams, phantasies and myths has 
taught us that anxiety about one's eyes, the feu of going blind, is often enough a substitute for the fear 
of being castrated. The self-blinding of the mythical criminal. Oedipus, was simply a mitigated form of 
the punishment of castration"(ibid). See also here Samuel Weber's discussion of "the relation of 
castration and ocular anxiety" in "The Sideshow, or: Remulcs on a Canny Moment", Modern Language 
Notes, 88, 6, 1973, i.e "Not merely do the eyes present the subject with with the shocking 'evidence' of 
a negative perception - the absence of the maternal phallus - but they also have to bear the brunt of the 
new state of affairs, which confronts the subject with fact that it will never again be able to believe its 
eyes, since what they have seen is neither simply visible or invisible. The particular relation of 
castration to the eyes is thus not primarily based on a genetic fact or experience, the actual moment of 
non-perception, however important this may be; instead what is involved here is a restructuring of 
experience, including the relation of perception, desire and consciousness, in which the narcissistic 
categories of identity mel presence are riven by a difference they can no longer subdue or command.The 
peculiar evidence of castration is peculiu because it is both too evident and never evident enough. It 
robs the eyes of the desired phenomena and thus alters the structure of perception; yet even more 
important, it carries a threat of enormous violence directed at the body and its self-image, narcissistic 
basis of the subject, since the perception of the 'incompleteness' of the maternal body includes and 
implies a threat to the child's notion of the totality of its own body" (ibid., p. 1113). 
II"N ." . 239 egatlon , op.CIL, p. • 
eo Undecidability can perhaps be counterposecl here against Derrida's notion of the "proper" name. 
Unlike undecidability, the proper name rests upon a closed identity or equivalence between signifier and 
signified. 
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vicissitudes of negation, exclusion and repression, Oedipal identity always 
threatens to collapse under the internal strain of maintaining the repressions 
necessary for its continued maintenance. At best, Oedipal identity is both a 
compromise and contingent identity and for this reason is always open to the 
possibility of its own radical destabilisation from within the terms of its own 
emergence. 
Thus while the return of the castrated mother in "The Crawlers" affmns a post-
Oedipal identity for the viewer, it is also this return which threatens that identity. 
For not only does the image of castration evoke its opposite - for example either the 
phallic mother or the idealised image of the maternal as the body of unity, provision 
and plenitude (figs. 5.11 - 5.12) - but there also exists the possibility of an 
identification between the spectator and the image. This need not, of course, be a 
literal identification but instead involves the re-activation of the memories of 
primary emotional objects or original cathexes (i.e. those prior to object-choice). 
More particularly, since the ego was initially an-other, the primal identification with 
the maternal is itself never lost but is only repressed (as a precondition for accession 
to the Symbolic). More generally, as Melanie Klein observed: 
the external mother too is cathected with libido. In various connections Freud has described this 
process and some of its implications: for instance, referring to the idealisation in a love relation, 
he states that "the object is being treated in the same way as our own ego, so that when we are in 
love, a considerable amount of narcissistic libido overflows to the object .. We love it on account 
of the perfection which we have striven to reach for our own ego" .. .ln my view, the processes 
which Freud describes implies that this loved object is felt to contain the split-off, loved, and 
valued part of the self, which in this way continues its existence inside the object It therefore 
becomes an extension of the self.6I 
In the light of Klein's remarks, such an identification need not involve a 
'regression' from a (post) Oedipal to a pre-Oedipal moment but exists instead as an 
ego-identification which takes its form perhaps as the re-activation of the memory-
traces of lost (repressed) ego-objects. 
However, while identification (in the unconscious) remains a possibility here, 
this Oedipal hegemony is perhaps nowhere else more threatened than in the space of 
fantasy (itself at work of course in identification) - a fantasy which is operative in 
"The Crawlers" both as a consequence of the photograph's recalling of the 'lost' 
and castrated mother but also due to the immediate gestalt excess of the image itself. 
Initially, however, specural identity is secured against the other through a 
., "On Identification"(19SS) in Envy and Oral;t_ and OIlier works 1946-1963, London, Virago, 1985 
p.145. 
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relation in which alterity signifies as an inverted mirror image: feminine 'lack' 
confrrms masculine 'presence'. As Toril Moi remarks,"In patriarchal culture the 
feminine as such .. .is repressed; it returns only in its 'acceptable' form of man's 
specularized Other."62. However, this statement would seem to imply not only that 
patriarchy operates exclusively at the level of the super-ego but that it is also 
successful in its censoring of which forms of the feminine are permitted (Le. the 
'acceptable'). Yet admittance of any image of the other always involves a risk for 
the choice can never simply be one of either/or (acceptable/unacceptable) for the one 
cannot be evoked without at least implicit reference to the other in that the 
acceptable is only definable in relation to or against the unacceptable. 
The unacceptable,then, always exists as supplement to the permitted other. In 
the "The Crawlers" what is permitted (represented) is an image of social and sexual 
alterity (as abjection) which affmns a spec ural mastery through an identification 
with the phallus. Yet the image of "The Crawlers" is also marked by the evocation 
of the repressed supplement (castration) - an evocation which strikingly produces 
both the photograph's disturbing effect and its anomalously disruptive status both 
within the textual sequence and within Street-Life in London's overall ideological 
project. For far from being an image of empowerment or reassurance for the 
spectator, the photograph ultimately re-evokes the very phenomenon that it needs to 
efface - the possibility of lack for the phallic (Phallus identified) subject. 
In part, the image's extremity of effect is produced through its implicit but 
displaced reference to the culturally acceptable iconographic nonns of motherhood 
(as plenitude, security etc.) - nonns which, however, the image also so totally 
denies. But far more significantly, this image of maternal abjection, while standing 
as a graphic visual reminder of the possibility of castration, at the same time allows 
no means of disavowal for the spectator, for example through fetishism,63 except, 
perhaps, via the reified fetishistic economy of representation itself. As a 
consequence of this denial to the spectator of the means of fetishistic disavowal (for 
example through an over-idealisation of maternity or through the exchange of 
looks)" and its offering instead of just the direct acknowledgement of castration (the 
sight of which the spectator can at best only physically tum away from), the picture 
i2 SexlUJUfextual Politic .. Ope cit., p. 134. 
13 See "Fetishism", Standard Edition. vol. XXI. In many respects the fortilla game involves the same 
psychical investments u fetishism with the cotton-reel itself being a kind of proto-fetish. 
"See John Ellis, "Photography/Pomography/Art/Photography", Screen, 21. 1. p.10t who argues that 
the fetish can also be located in the confmnatory gaze of the mother/woman. 
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tips over from being an image of security to being one of threat. Through "the 
differance of the absolute excess"6S (primarily of castration here but also of death), 
any security of phallic identity is denied to the spectator at the very moment of 
apparent empowerment. Moreover, with the image's failure to recuperate the threat 
of castration through its denial of disavowal, the response to this threat involves a 
rupturing of identity in tenns of a splitting of the viewing subject or, rather, the re-
opening of an original splitting, as a means of renegotiating the threat of castration. 
It is this relation between the 'splitting' of the subject and the knowledge of 
sexual difference which is the concern of Freud's unfinished paper entitled 
"Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence." Remarking upon whether "what I 
have to say should be regarded as something long familiar and obvious or as 
something entirely new and puzzling. But I am inclined to think the latter",66 Freud 
discusses an incident from the childhood of a male patient to illustrate an example of 
the prohibition upon an instinctual demand.The case Freud cites is explicitly 
focused upon the acknowledgement/disavowal of castration by the child as a 
consequence of a paternal prohibition upon masturbation. As Freud remarks, the 
initial sight of female genitals (those of an older girl) in itself causes no anxiety for 
the boy. So too, "a threat of castration by itself need not produce a great 
impression" for the child simply chooses not to believe it. Indeed, "whatever 
uneasiness he may have felt was calmed by the reflection that what was missing 
would yet make its appearance: she would grow one (a penis) later.'~ However, 
~he situation radically changes subsequent to the edict of paternal prohibition. 
In that case the threat [of castration by the father] revives the memory of the perception (of the 
female genitals] which had hitherto been regarded as harmless and finds in that memory a dreaded 
confmnation. The little boy now thinks he understands why the girl's genitals showed no sign of 
a penis and no longer ventures to doubt that his own genitals may meet with the same fate. 
Thenceforward he cannot help believing in the reality of the danger of castration." 
Freud then claims that the "normal" resolution ohhis crisis is one in which "the boy 
gives way to the threat and obeys the prohihition ... In other words, he gives up, in 
whole or in part, the satisfaction of the instinct." However: 
our present patient found another way out. He created a substitute for the penis which he missed in 
females - that is to say. a fetish. In so doing. it is true that he had disavowed reality, but he had 
saved his own penis. So long as he was not obliged to acknowledge that females have lost their 
penis, there was no need for him to believe the threat that had been made against him : he need 
have no fears for his own penis. so he could proceed with his masturbation undisturbed. This 
U Jacques Dcrrida, "Cogito and the History of Madness" in Writing and Difference. op.cit., p. 62 . 
.. "Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence", Standard Edition, vol. xxm. p. 275. 
17 ibid .• p. 276 • 
.. ibid •• pp. 276·277. 
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behaviour on the part of our patient strikes us forcibly as being a turning away from reality.'" 
The splitting of the ego which Freud describes here thus involves the conscious 
acknowledgement of the castration complex but in conjunction with the 
simultaneous disavowal of it as a possibility for the male subject by means of the 
creation of a fetish object '7OlWith "The Crawlers", however. it is precisely the ! ' j 
option of unconscious disavowal that is denied to the spectator who is instead 
forced to acknowledge the possibility of castration. It is in this sense that a form of 
symmetrical mirroring is in effect established between viewer and image as the 
possibility of lack for the former echoes the scene of maternal castration. But, 
unlike Freud's patient who is split between knowledge and belief, the viewing 
subject here is split between acknowledgement and the frustrated desire for 
disavowal. Moreover, while it is disavowal, or the repression of undesirable 
knowledge, which allows for the sight of the unpleasurable to become, in fact, 
pleasurable, it is the denial of disavowal which produces a situation in which the 
potential unpleasure of looking calmot be displaced. As Moustafa Safouan has 
observed of repression: 
The unpleasure that motivates repression is not in the repressed representation. This unpleasure is 
in the ego as it comes to know of the repressed or each time it threatens to approach it. Not only 
is the repressed not an element productive of unpleasure, it is actually a representation productive 
of pleasure ... so long as it is unknown .. " 
In "The Crawlers" it is castration which cannot be made "unknown" but. as 
both Safouan and Freud imply, the unpleasure is not necessarily intrinsic to the 
image/sight itself but is instead a function of the ego. Here castration is the abject " 
of the super-ego which, for Freud, was not only the product of the castration 
complex but which was also more pronounced in the male. But what is also 
significant in Freud's account is that the splitting of the subject/ego turns upon 
sexual difference, rather than the two processes simply being parallel, in that the 
development of the subject is predicated upon the learning (via the castration 
complex) of the meaning of sexual difference. Indeed, the splitting of the subject is 
the consequence of the splitting of the sexes. Castration in this sense operates as the 
sign of sexual difference (through the closing down of pre-Oedipal polymorphos 
Ii ibid., p. 277. 
70 Freud does concede, however, that, despite his creation of a fetish, the patient "developed a symptom 
which showed the he did nevertheless recognise the danger [of cutrationl ... in aU the to and fro between 
disavowal and acknowledgement, it was nevertheless castration that found the clearer expression" 
(pp.277-8). 
71 Pleasure and Being: Hedonism form CI Psychoanalytic Point of View, trans. Martin Thorn, London. 
M.cmUlan, 1983, pp. 31-32. 
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difference) yet it is also more than this in that comes to figure any threat to the 
plenitude of the self-present subject: 
In splitting the subjectivity of the subject disappears. The horror is about the loss of oneself into 
one's own unconsciousness - into the gap. But because human subjectivity cannot ultimately exist 
outside a division into one of two sexes, then it is castration that finally comes to symbolize the 
spliL The feminine comes to stand over the point of disappearance, the loss ... the trauma captured 
in splitting is that one is isn't there; the same trauma that castration comes to symbolize is that 
one is incomplete .•. the loss can only be fllied Up.12 
In its disruption of a secure and coherent positionality for the viewer, "The 
Crawlers" is marked by the deeply ambiguous status of the castration complex itself 
which is both the adaptive mechanism for the designation of gendered difference 
but which is also the process or 'event' which, in its returning of the subject to that 
moment of difference as a learned and conditional construction, potentially disturbs 
any stable position in relation to the phallus. For while, on the one hand, prooucing 
a position of mastery for the viewing subject (over the abjected woman/mother), the 
image's simultaneous evocation of undisavowed castration reveals phallic identity 
as essentially a defensive identity (as evident in the necessary recourse to 
fetishism). The absolute status of the phallus is thus compromised through being 
revealed as the compensatory sign of plenitude covering over the subject's lack. 
For, if the power of the phallus rests upon its veiling,7] when confronted with 
castration a gap is opened up between the penis and the phallus, a gap across which 
the omnipotent pretensions of the latter are exposed as both fraudulent and 
inadequate. As Kaja Silverman argues: 
the attributes of the Symbolic are infinitely relocatable, and exist purely at the level of 
signification. The distance between the phallus and the penis cannot be bridged; the latter is cut off 
from the fonner, relegated to the domain of inadequacy. But because the inadequacy of the male 
subject must never be acknowledged, oW' culture attempts at every point to blur the distinction 
between that subject and the Symbolic; to foster the belief that the penis is the phallus, and that 
the gaze of the male subject coincides with the Gaze of the other. This meconnaissance can only be 
sustained through the female subject, whose castration and guilt, endlessly perpetuated through 
displacement. thus become the topics of s compulsive restatement.'" 
In terms of the social ideology of Street-life, one representation or assertion of 
the phallus is the imperative to self-reliance and autonomy that is repeatedly voiced 
in the text. Yet it is this imperative that is undermined by the ''The Crawlers" which, 
in returning the viewer to a scene recalling his own maternal dependence, belies the 
promotion of an asocial self-sufficiency which can exist independently of a network 
72 Juliet Mitchell. "The Question of Femininity and the Theory of Psychoanalysis", in Women: The 
Longest Revolution. London, Virago, 1984, p. 307. 
n See Jacqueline R.ose. "Feminine Sexuality - Jacques Lacan and the ~le freudienne". in Suuality in 
the Field O/Vi8iott. Op.CiL, espec. pp. 61-64. 
74 "Muochism and Subjectivity". FrtJnteWOrk.. 12, 1984, p. 8. 
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of supportive social relations. 
This fracturing of ideology and social positionality is in part effected through 
the dimensions of a fantasy in which the subject/object division is dissolved. As 
Laplanche and Pontalis have argued:, 
Fantasy is not the object of desire [and, one might add, of abjection]. but its setting. In fantasy 
the subject does not pursue the object or its sign: he appears caught up himself in the sequence of 
images. He forms no representation of the desired [or abjected] object, but is himself represented as 
participating in the scene although in the earliest form of fantasy, he cannot be assigned any fixed 
place in ie .. As a result, the subject, although present in the fantasy, may be so in a 
desubjectivized form, that is to say, in the very syntax of the sequence in question.15 
Within this account (which recalls the fortlda game) the scenario of fantasy 
overrides any fixed identification. Indeed, as Freud argued in "A Child is Being 
Beaten",76 identification in fantasy is always mobile. It is this mobility (as the 
reversibility of male/female positionality) which allows the phallic subject, when 
confronted with the spectacle of abjection, not only to imagine castration as a real 
threat to itself through an identification (involving a splitting within the ego rather 
than a splitting-of 0 but also to actively seek identification with the 'feminine'.77 
n "Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality", reprinted in Formations of Fanlasy, eds. Victor Burgin, James 
Donald and Cora Kaplan, London and New York. Methuen, 1986, p. 26. 
71 Standard Edition, vol. XVill. 
77 As Silverman argues regarding (repressed) identification, Freud's "sexual dialectic" involves "a 
classification which rests upon binary opposition (masculinity = aggressivity, sadism, voyeurism; 
femininity = passivity, masochism, exhibitionism) ... [and which] leaves unchallenged the notion that 
for the male subject pleasure involves mastery" ("Masochism and Subjectivity", op.cit., p. 2). However, 
just as in thefortlda game, in which unpleasure is made pleasurable, there is also the possibility that the 
masculine subject may identify with the feminine. Not only would this be a case of what Silverman 
describes as "that familiar Freudian territory where pleasure for one system means unpleasure for 
another" (ibid., p. 3), but "the repetition of situations in which the element of pain is conspicuous (the 
castration crisis and the Oedipal complex represent only the most obvious examples) generates pleasure. 
This pleasure is not, as Freud would have us believe, the pleasure of mastery. Rather it is the pleasure of 
passivity, of subject - ion" (ibid.). Similarly, the psychical investments of attraction and repulsion 
operative in "'The Crawlers" would be an example of Silverman's claim that "it is always the victim - the 
figure who occupies the passive position - who is really the focus of attention, and whose SUbjugation 
the subject (whether male or female) experiences as a pleasurable repetition of his/her own history. 
Indeed, I would go so far as to say that the fascination of the sadistic point of view is merely that it 
provides the best vantage point from which to watch the masochistic story unfold" (ibid., p. 5). Not 
only does "'The Crawlers" offer an image of lac1clcastration but it is also a possible site for masculine 
identification. Thus, as Silverman explains, "the mother's 'lack' constitutes so powerful a castration 
threat that the child may resort to verlW!inllng - to a denial of the mother's lack through fetishism. 
Mulvey susgests that this moment of threat is continually neutralized through establishing the woman·s 
guilt or sickness. However, I would like to argue that what provokes the crisis is not so much the horror 
at the mother's 'ack' as an ideralifU:alion with her - an identification which culture attempts to deny at 
the manifest level by widening the moral distance between male and female subject ... it is not that I am 
like my mother. but that she is like me" (ibid., pp. 5-6). Within this scenario, -rhe Crawlers" can also 
be cited as an instance of what Silverman calli "voluntary exhibitionism" (of lack, castration), a 
"voluntary exhibitionilm [which) does not call into question the passivity of the female subject. Rather, 
it jeopardisel the illusion of masculine activity. It poses. much more profound castration threat than 
Freud wu willing to acknowledge, for by mlkin& overt the distance between the gaze and the Gaze, and 
by revealing the ratal attractiveness of the feminine/masochistic position, it quite literally cuts off the 
masculine ladistic position (ibid., p. 6) while also "dramatising the lure for both male and female 
lubjecta of negation, paslivity and lOll" (ibid •• p. 8), 
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While not claiming, however, that Street-Life in London effects a 
desubjectivization of the spectator - indeed, far from it - nor does it, of course, do 
away with representation, it is the case that, in its restaging (in the tradition of 
Mayhew) of supposedly direct encounters with the "other" of the urban poor, 
Street-Life, but more notably "The Crawlers", both generates and operates across a 
space of speculative fantasy and the Imaginary - a space of uncertain boundaries or 
borders in relation to which the spectator is unable to occupy a position of complete 
exteriority .78 
This process can be further referred to repression. For if the fixing of 
positionality and the possibility of the production of stable meanings (signifieds) 
accessible to the subject is premised upon the workings of repression, the inability 
to effect a repression (for example as disavowal) entails both a crisis within the 
economy of representation itself while also thwarting the subject's desire or drive 
,) 
for mastery (through a controlling knowledge). Within this crisis a non-metonymy! e'\' 
is generated in which the image no longer stands as the lost object for the viewing l 
, ,l 
?,,( 
subject in that now it is withdrawn from the network of substitute identifications I \i '( 
through which it (the image) returns an identity of presence and totality to the 
viewer. 
With the return of castration in "The Crawlers" the spectator is instead inscribed 
within a movement of difference or, rather, differance in the sense here of an 
unresolved deferral and displacement of any ultimately secure position or 
knowledge in relation to the image. Furthermore, with the breakdown of the 
subject/object division - the division which, for example, Engels had sought to 
maintain - difference here is not simply a matter of subjective presence 
counterposed against an external "other" but is internal to the subject itself as the 
7i Of related interest here regarding the non-metonymic, unappropriated excess and the untenability of 
mastery (as exteriority) is Derrida's essay "Economimesis", Diacritics, 11, (1981). Here Derrida 
examines Kant's discussion of the hierarchy of the ugly, repellent and disgusting (the un-aesthetic). 
Derrida argues that Kant is indicating the "absolutely heterogeneous" which subverts any system of 
negative oppositions in that, being outside any concepts or naming, it exists beyond logical and 
grammatical description and is outside the frame (i.e. it is parergonal). As Derrida argues: "The absolute 
excluded does not allow itself even to be granted the status of an object of negative pleasure or of 
ugliness redeemed by representation. It is unrepresentable. At the same time it is unnameable in its 
singularity. IT one could name it or represent it, it would begin to enter the auto-effective circle of 
mastery or reappropriation. An economy would be possible .•. .By limitlessly violating our enjoyment, 
without granting any determining limit, it abolishes reprU~rIlativ~ distanc~" (my emphasis), p. 22. 
This notion of the unnameable is also adopted by Kristeva, i.e. "What we designate as 'feminine', far 
from being a primeval esae1lCe, will be seen as an 'other' without a name, which subjective experience 
confronts when it docs not stop at the appearance of identity. Assuming that any other is appended in 
the triangUlating function of the paternal prohibition, what will be dealt with here, beyond and through 
the paternal function, is a coming race to face with an unnameable otherness" (Powers or Horror, op.cit., 
p.58-9). 
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ego (saved only via a splitting) threatens to collapse into its own otherness. As 
Barbara Johnson observes: 
the selfs difference from others inevitably becomes the story of its own unbridgeable difference 
from itself. Difference is not engendered in the space between identities: it is what makes any 
totalisation of the identity of the self or the meaning of a text impossible." 
In "The Crawlers" difference/dif/erance is directly consequent upon the image's 
generation of an excess (castration), a surplus supplement, which remains 
unrecuperated - a failure of restoration which undermines the logocentric aspirations 
of the text. Throughout Street-Life in London the logocentric identity of 
photography (as promoted in the Introduction's claim for the the images's 
unmediated presence) is belied by the continual textual propping-up of the 
photographs through an intrusive authorial direction of the viewerlreader. In "The 
Crawlers", however, this collapse of (phal)logocentrism is dramatically enacted 
through the explicit entry of the "other" into the rea1~ of spectatorial presence. As 
distinct from any 'natural' revelation of photographic meaning and the securing of 
spec ural cohesion, this entry of alterity underwrites the image's resistance to 
anchorage through the initiation of an instability or oscillation of identity for both 
image and viewer thereby upsetting the traditional function of the portrait as one of 
social emplacement. 
While, within the terms of its own project, Street-Life in London reveals the 
necessity of the summoning of the other in the production of identity, it is this 
summoning that puts at risk the possibility of that project. As such, a reading of 
Street-Life as a text producing an unproblematic regime of social exclusion and 
incorporation is inadequate. For although often positioned on the margins, or even 
outside the frame, the other or alterity, once summoned, can never then be made 
absent again. As Kristeva remarks: "from its place of banishment, the abject does 
not cease challenging its master.'" 
""'The Critical Difference" in Untying tM Text: A Post-Struc,uralist Reader, ed. Robert Young. London. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 166. 
10 Powers of Horror, op.cit., p. 2. 
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6 
THE PERSISTENCE OF VISION 
The gaze is at stake from the outset I 
"The desire of presence" writes Derrida,"is ... bom from the abyss (the indefmite 
multiplication) of representation."2 It is this abyss which comes into play in "The 
Crawlers" as a consequence of the image's refusal to affIrm or mirror a narcissistic 
phallic presence to the viewer. Instead, the impossibility of fetishistic disavowal 
transfonns lack (castration) from being both a negative and complementary (and 
thus confmnatory) sign of phallic plenitude into its being a threat to the continued 
maintenance of security of a mastering gaze. It is this transfonnation of the status of 
lack which opens an abyss - a destabilising mise en abyme 3 - as the splitting and 
disappearance of a subjectivity predicated upon the perpetuation of the binary 
polarities of presence/absence. Refusing to (re)enact 'passive' castration, "The 
Crawlers" undoes this specular logic of identity' by displacing it through "the 
indefInite process of supplementarity [which has] always infiltrated presence, 
always already inscribed there the space of repetition and the splitting of the self. "s 
CIt is the infiltrative effects of supplementarity within the logocentrism of 
photography which has been the theme of this thesis. The asymmetries of vision in 
Marville's "Rue de Rivoli", the uncanny doubling in the Strathc1yde archive, the 
fIgural visibility of the other in "The Gullet" and the abject's disruption of the fIxity 
of hierarchised difference in "The Crawlers" have all been cited as examples of 
1 Luce lrigaray, Spec",lum of the Other Wonum, trans. Gillian C. Gill, New York, Cornell University 
Press, 1985, p. 47. 
2 Of Grammalology, op.cit., p. 163. 
3 See Alan Bus's translator's notes on Derrida's use of the term en abyme, i.e." En abyme is the heraldic 
term for infinite. reflection, e.g. the shield in the shield in the shield ... Derrida has used the term 
frequently"; "Ell abyme is Derrida's usual expression for the infmite regress of a reflection within a 
reflection, etc. The term originally comes from the heraldic notion of an escutcheon within an 
escutcheon; Derrida plays on abyme and abfme, abyss", The Post Card. From Socrates to FrelUl and 
Beyond, op.ciL, pp. 304 and 511. For an application of this term within a discussion of mirroring and 
doubling in photographs, ICC Craig Owens, "Photography ell abyme tI, October, 5, Summer 1978. 
4 See Spec"'um of the Other Woman, Op.ciL, pp. 32-34 and 133-146 and Toril Moi's commentary in 
Sex",allTatMaI Politics, op.cit., pp. 129-143. 
I Of Grammalology, op.CiL 
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instability and displacement within photography's attempted securing of pres~nce. 
In each instance, difference does not operate to afftrm the stabilising boundaries of 
identity but instead incites an epistemological anxiety by signifying the dissolution 
of identity and the potential loss of integrated selfhood] 
Saving the subject 
Clearly, other examples of dissolution could be found within this archive but in this 
chapter, and by way of a conclusion, I wish to briefly develop my remarks on 
Pictorialism by arguing that its particular project can be read as an attempt to 
'restore' to photography a plenitude or purity of vision untainted by difference, the 
other, supplementarity etc. This project was exemplified most consistently perhaps 
in the work of Stieglitz who, while later repudiating Pictorialism's visual 
techniques, nonetheless continued to expound its aesthetic ideology. This is not of 
course to argue that Pictorialist photography was a conscious or direct response to 
those moments of rupture within the archive such as I have been describing. But 
what does emerge across this body of work is, fIrstly, the employment of a range 
of strategies for representing the city and, ultimately, an almost complete 
withdrawal from the urban environment (especially from street photography), a 
withdrawal which can perhaps be read as registering the incompatibility between 
the city and the securing of presence through what Stieglitz called "straight 
photography. " 
Frequently taking the city (usually New York) as his subject, Stieglitz's early 
photographs share the aestheticising devices of contemporary Pictorialist 
photography (e.g. Coburn's) such as the use of mid-distance or distant points of 
view, soft focus, the avoidance of detail, low or indirect lighting and the lack of any 
direct engagement with people. The blurring effects of steam in "The Terminal" 
(fIg.6.1), the dissolution of the crowd into a play of reflective surfaces in "Wet Day 
on the Boulevard, Paris" (fIg. 6.2), or a similar attention to artificial light and 
reflections in "Reflections, Night, New York" (fIg.6.3), or the depiction of the city 
as an arrangement of geometrical shapes and planes as in "From My Window" 
(fig.6.4) or within the tropes of the modem industrial or urban sublime, e.g."The 
City of Ambition" (ftg.6.S), can all be viewed as means to aestheticise the city and 
of denying (through abstraction) its constituent social relations. Transformed into a 
set of visual effects, this depiction of the city becomes the precondition for 
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ascribing overtly subjective or symbolic meanings to it. Thus, for example, 
Stieglitz himself described "The Terminal" as an image of his own sense of 
alienation on his arrival in America from Germany: 
There was snow on the ground. A driver in a rubber coat was watering his steaming horses. There 
seemed to be something related to my deepest feelings in what I saw, and I decided to photograph 
what was in me. The steaming horses, and their driver watering them on a cold winter day; my 
feeling of aloneness in my own country, amongst my own people, seemed, somehow, related to 
the experience I had when seeing Duse in Camille . I felt how fortunate the horses were to have at 
least a human being to give them the water they needed. What made me see the watering of the 
horses as I did was my own loneliness.' 
The culmination of this self-referential aestheticising of the world, in 
conjunction with a retreat from the city, was the sequence of small photographs of 
clouds, The Song of the Skies, which Stieglitz titled "Equivalents" (figs.6.6 - 6.8). 
Referring to them as "Straight photographs, all gaslight paper, except one 
pallidiotype", Stieglitz described his "cloud photographs ... [as] equivalents of my 
profound life experience, my basic philosophy of life ... [they] are tiny photographs, 
direct reflections of a man's world in the sky - documents of eternal relationship -
perhaps even a philosophy.'" 
A similar relation between image and subjective affect is posited in Stieglitz's 
account of how he took the photograph "The Steerage" of 1907 (fig.6.9), an 
account which has acquired something of the status of a manifesto: 
In June 1907, my small family and I sailed for Europe. My wife insisted on going the "Kaiser 
Wilhelm n", the fashionable ship of the North German Lloyd at the time ... How I distasteful I 
found the atmosphere of the fll'St class on the ship. One couldn't escape the nouveaux riches ... 
On the third day I couldn't stand it any longer. I had to get away from that company. I went as 
far forward on the deck as I could ... 
As I came to the end of the deck, I stood alone looking down. There were men and women and 
children on the lower deck of the steerage. There was a narrow stairway leading up to the upper 
deck of the steerage, a small deck right at the bow of the steamer ... 
The whole scene fascinated me. I longed to escape from my surroundings and join these 
people ... 
I saw shapes related to each other. I saw a picture of shapes and underlying that the feeling I 
had about life. And as I was deciding, should I try to put down this seemingly new vision that held 
me - people, the common people, the feeling of ship and ocean and sky and the feeling of release 
that I was away from the mob called the rich - Rembrandt came into my mind and I wondered 
would he have felt what I was feeling 
I had but one plate holder with one unexposed plate. Would I get what I saw. what I felt? . .1 
knew if I had. another milestone in photography would have been reached, related to the milestone 
of my "Car Horses" [The Terminal) made in 1892. and my "Hand of Man" made in 1902, which 
had opened up a new era of photography. of seeing. In a sense it would go beyond them, for here 
would be a picture based on related shapes and on the deepest human feeling, a step in my own 
evolution, a spontaneous discovery.' 
i Quoted in Dorothy Norman's Introduction to Alfred Stuglitz, Aperture. New York, 1976, p. 6. 
7 ibid •• p. 12. 
'Quoted in Allan Sekula. "On the Invention of Photographic Meaning", in Photograph, Against the 
Grain, op.cit., pp. 13-14. A slightly different venion of this account is also quoted by Dorothy Norman 
in Alfred St~glilz. op.CiL, pp. 9-10. 
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Aside from the overbearing egotism of this anecdote and Stieglitz's 
identification of himself with, indeed as, the evolution of photography, this text 
reiterates the well established tenets of a mystificatory expression theory 
constructed here as the circular causal relation between the alienated, 'creative' artist 
(as privileged sensibility) and visual form as the expressive vehicle of that 
sensibility. More specifically, as Allan Sekula has cogently argued: 
this text is pure symbolist autobiography. Even a superficial reading reveals the extent to which 
Stieglitz invented himself in symbolist clichts. An ideological division is made; Stieglitz 
proposes two worlds: a world that entraps and a world that liberates. The first world is populated 
by his wife and the nouveaux riches, the second by the 'common people' ... The possibility of 
escape resides in a mystical identification with the Other ... But the final Symbolist hideout is in 
the Imagination, and in the fetishized products of the Imagination. Stieglitz comes back to his 
wife with a glass negative from the other world. 
For Stieglitz, The Steerage is a highly valued illustration of this autobiography. More than 
an illustration, it is an embodiment; that is, the photograph is imagined to contain the 
autobiography. The photograph is invested with a complex metonymic power, a power that 
transcends the perceptual and passes into the realm of affecl The photograph is believed to encode 
the totality of experience, to stand as a phenomenological equivalent of Stieglitz-being-in-that-
place. And yet this metonymy is so attenuated that that it passes into metaphor. That is to say, 
Stieglitz's reductivist compulsion is so extreme, his faith in the power of the image so intense, 
that he denies the iconic level of the image and makes his claim for meaning at the level of 
abstraction. Instead of the possible metonymic equation: common people = my alienation, we 
have the reduced, metaphorical equation: shapes = my alienation. Finally by a process of semantic 
diffusion we are left with the trivial and absurd assertion: shapes = feeling.' 
In the "Equivalents" all (social) reference, narrative or anecdote have been 
effaced. Stieglitz no longer identifies with the "common people" of "The Steerage" 
but with "the sky and the feeling of release." What was implicit in the account of 
"The Steerage" is made explicit in the "Equivalents" as pure, abstract or significant 
fonn becomes the sole referent of the images (which are themselves compared to 
music). But fonn is only significant in so far as it can be subjectively invested: 
"Shapes, as such, do not interest me unless they happen to be an outer equivalent 
of something already taking place from within me. "10 Moreover, effacement of 
reference not only becomes the precondition for this identification but it is also the 
precondition, for Stieglitz, for the elevation of photography into being an art form 
(as fonnalist vehicle of feeling and sensibility) rather than a mechanistic medium. 
But while the aesthetic discourse around the "Equivalents" has its roots in the 
Pictorialist phase of Stieglitz's career, they are also symptomatic of his devaluation 
what he described as Pictorialism's manipulation of the image.ll Furthermore, as 
• "On the Invention of Photographic Meaning", Op.CiL, pp. 14-15. 
10 Alfred Stieglitz, op.cit., p. 14. 
" Rejecting "manipulated, hybrid" images, Stieglitz claimed lbat "Personally, I like my photography 
straight, unmanipulatecl. devoid of all tricks; a print not looking like anything but a photograph., living 
through its own inherent qualities and revealing its own spirit", quoted in Alfred Stieglitz, op.cit., p. 18. 
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Rosalind Krauss has observed, one aspect of this move away from overtly 
Pictorialist techniques was Stieglitz's recognition "that framing - or perhaps 
enframing - was a concomitant issue. "11 For intrinsic to Stieglitz's promotion of 
photographs as "vehicles of aesthetic transformation", was "a recognition of the 
, cut, the crop, the fact that if photography duplicates the world, it does so only in 
pieces.tlll In the "Equivalents" it is the relation between the photograph (as 
fragment) and the frame that is paramount: 
For these are works that are most radically and nakedly dependent upon cutting, the effect of 
punching the image, we might say, out of the continuous fabric of the sky at large. That they are 
so dependent is due in part to something about the sky itself - or rather to something that Stieglitz 
makes evident in these images. This is not simply that the sky is so vast and the photograph is 
only a limited part of it, but that the sky is essentially composed. In these photographs there is a 
sense not merely of found or fortuitous composition, the luck of some accidental arrangement 
There is, rather, a sense of the object's resistance to internal arrangement, a positing of the 
irrelevance of composition .. .Relationship cannot mean anything here that is much to do with its 
conventional meaning within the traditional arts ... these images, which come to us as unanalyzable 
wholes, stake everything on the single act of cutting something out - the gesture that makes them 
by cutting ... Stieglitz is not interested in leaving it at that. What these photographs do again and 
again is to insure that the impact of that cut, that dislocation and detachment, will resonate 
through every internal point of the work. The incredible verticality of these clouds as they rise 
upward along the image creates an exttaordinary sense of disorientation - almost to the point of 
vertigo ... we feel it as something ripped away from us, as no longer the possible extension of our 
experience of our own physical occupation of the world that photographs had always seemed, 
dependably, to be ... These are images without grounds .. .In their verticality the clouds echo or 
double the initial meaning of the cut, or rather. each displays the world only by an image that is 
radically cut loose from its moorings. an image that is about being unmoored.14 
As Krauss argues, the effect of the "Equivalents" is to transform the clouds "into 
unnatural signs (into the "cultural language of the photograph") by setting up a 
"symbolic relationship" between the sky and the photograph which is dependent 
upon "the medium of the cut. " However, as she continues: 
In calling this series EquivalenlS, Stieglitz is obviously invoking the language of symbolism, 
with its notion of correspondence and hieroglyph. But what is intended here is symbolism in its 
deepest sense, symbolism as an understanding of language as a form of radical absence - the 
absence, that is, of the world and its objects. supplanted by the presence of the sign.1S 
But while this analysis importantly focuses on the formal properties of the cut or 
frame, what it does not address is the identification which (as in the early 
photographs) Stieglitz posited as existing between himself (and presumably the 
viewer) and the photographs. For it is wit\rln these identifications and investments 
that the effects of framing and absence in the "Equivalents" can also be situated. 
Ii "Stieglitz/Eq";"aklllS -, October. 11, Winter 1979, p. 134. 
11 ibid., p. 133. 
1. ibid •• pp. 134-13S. 
11 ibid., p. 140. 
209 
Framing narcissism: the screen, the sublime 
A notion of "radical absence", not only of language but of the sign itself (as the 
effacement or suppression of both reference and the figurality of signification), is 
implied in Stieglitz's own claim that: 
The true meaning of the Equivalents comes through without any extraneous pictorial factors 
intervening between those who look at the pictures and the pictures themselves ... [they] are a 
picture of the chaos of the world, and of my relationship to that chaos. My prints show the world's 
constant upsetting of man's equilibrium, and his eternal battle to reestablish it." 
Here the belief in the unmediated exteriorization of the interior self ultimately rests 
upon the notion of a photography without signification and of a vision without text. 
It is this absence in Stieglitz's "Equivalents" - an absence which raises the question 
of "what he had to expel in order to make them work"" - in association with what 
Sekula describes as the desire for "a mystical identification with the Other" (or 
rather, perhaps, recuperation of the Other), which can be referred to the structures 
of narcissism. For if II Stieglitz's career represents the triumph of metaphor in the 
realm of photographyll,1. the IIEquivalents" can be viewed as metaphors of a 
narcissistic relation to the external world. 
This narcissistic structure (which is clearly not to be confused with particular 
personality traits) can be better illustrated by reference to Bertram Lewin's notion of 
the "dream screenll. Indeed it is the idea of a screen which perhaps best describes 
the "Equivalents". Referring to the dream screen as the blank background of 
dreams rather than their visual content, Lewin writes: 
The dream screen, as I define it, is the surface onto which a dream appears to be projected. It is the 
blank background. present in the dream though not necessarily seen, and the visually perceived 
action in the ordinary manifest dream contents takes place on it or before il Theoretically it may 
be part of the latent or manifest content, but this distinction is academic. The dream screen is not 
often noted or mentioned by the analytic patient, and in the practical business of dream 
interpretation, the analyst is not concerned with ill' 
This screen is related to the wish to sleep while it also a representation of the breast 
or the infant's relation to the breast: 
When one falls asleep, the breast is taken into one's perceptual world: it flattens out or approaches 
flatness. and when one wakes up it disappears, reversing the events of its entrance. A dream 
appears to be projected on this flattened breast - the dream screen - provided, that is, that the dream 
is visual; for if there is no visual content the dream screen would be blank, and the manifest 
content would consist solely of impressions from other fields of perception.-
Ii Alfred Stieglitz, op.cit., p. 14. 
11 "Stiealitz/EqKivalellt$", op.cit., p. 140. 
\I "On the Invention of Photoaraphic Meanina", op.cit.. p. IS. 
""Sleep, the Mouth. and the Dream Screen", TM P.f1ChoaMl"ic QlUlTlerly , 15, 1946, p. 420. 
10 ibid., p. 421. 
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Whether the dream screen is in fact a literal representation of the breast or not is 
of little consequence here. What is more noteworthy is the narcissism which 
supports it. Likening the dream screen to "a hypothetical intrauterine stage of 
elementary narcissism", Lewin describes it as a "copy of primary infantile sleep", a 
state of "pure fulfIlment", "without content", which "represents the breast situation 
in a nearly pure state."u This description of a monadic state has obvious similarities 
with Laplanche's reference to primary narcissism as "a kind of hypothetical initial 
state in which the organism would form a closed unit in relation to its 
surroundings."n Moreover, involving the repetition of an "orally defined infantile 
situation,"%] the "hallucinated breast", and the infant's relation to it, can be 
compared to Lacan's objet a and to Freud's and Baudry's respective accounts of 
the subject's desire to return to a state of primary narcissism and "archaic 
satisfaction." 
A number of other related features of the dream screen are also pertinent here. 
Firstly, a suspension of the ego and, secondly, the predominance of oral libido (as 
libidinal aim or gratification) over object relations. As Lewin argues, "In the primal 
dream, the ego takes no part and does not exert its distorting influence"24 while "ego 
boundaries are lost" as "the body ego disappears in sleep. "15 What replaces these 
boundaries is the desire for fusion between subject and object, a phantasy of return 
to the mother or "union with [her] in visually blank sleep", i.e: 
the sleeper has lost his ego boundaries because when he went to sleep he was reunited with the 
breast. .. To rejoin the mother. whether inside or out. appears to rest on the oral pattern and to gel 
its basic mold from the earliest oral experiences ... The fantasy of returning to the mother's body is 
a secondary fantasy, combining the idea of union with the mother at the breast and later 
impressions.211 
Here the subject's self-identification as "a retro-projected neonate" rests not 
only upon "an oral act, an ingestion of the world" but also upon feelings of 
envelopment or absorption (of being eaten), i.e. "the two polar ideas of eating and 
being eaten and their interchangeability. This interchangeability is intrinsic in oral 
psychology. The effect of eating is an identification with the thing eaten ... there is 
primarily no appreciation in the baby of the distinction between itself - that is, its 
Ii ibid .• p. 422. 
22 Life tIIId DeDI" in Psychoanalysis. op.cit .• p. 71. 
za "Sleep. the Mouth and the Dream Screen". op.cit.. p. 420. 
14 ibid •• p. 424. 
II ibid •• p. 427. 
• ibid., pp. 427-428. 
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skin and mouth - and the surface of the mother's breast "27 It is in this phantasised 
state of boundaryless fusion (prior to what Laplanche described as the "first 
cleavage" of difference and signification) which can be likened to the "neutral 
surface" of the dream screen which, as a blank screen or empty frame, is devoid of 
dream content. While "intruding preconscious or unconscious wishes that threaten 
to wake the sleeper form the visual contents .. .lose their place in the sleeper's ego 
by being projected on to or before the dream screen,"2.1 the screen itself or "blank 
dream" is like a "blank page ... [and] contains no representatives of the unconscious 
or preconscious disturbers and wakers [of sleep]. It represents solely the wish to 
sleep predicated by Freud as entering into all dream formation. "29 
It is to this "blank sleep of oral satiety", a "pure infantile dream without visual 
content", that the "Equivalents" can be compared. For Stieglitz's description of 
photography as the restoration of an equilibrium "without any extraneous pictorial 
factors intervening" recalls the dream screen's lack of "intrusive representatives of 
the unconscious." But, beyond this, Stieglitz's normative idea of what constituted a 
photograph can be likened to primary narcissism's screening of the constitutive gap 
of signification. As Kristeva has outlined, the separation between infant and mother 
is one which is subsequently mapped onto the experience of the 'arbitrary' nature 
of language, i.e. the gap or bar between signifier and signified and the non-
coincidence of sign and meaning. It is this primal separation, blankness or 
emptiness (vide) between mother and child - "this vide constitutive of beginnings 
of the symbolic function [which] appears as the frrst separation between what is not 
yet an ego and what is not yet an object "30 - which the subject also experiences in 
language. The function of primary narcissism is, in effect, to both screen or cover 
over, but also to protecr1, and thus make bearable, both this separation and the 
primal gap of difference experienced as the subject's lack-in-being and its alienation 
in its encounter with the sign. 
Initiating a similar psychical screening, Stieglitz's "straight" photography and 
the "Equivalents" can be read as an attempt to suppress the gap of signification by 
27 ibid., p. 428. 
at ibid., p. 433. 
at "Inferences from the Dream Scrcen",lnterraalional JOIlrnal of Psychoanalysis, 29, 1948, pp. 225. 
30 "L'Abject d'amour", Tel Q~l, 91, Summer 1982, p. 19. 
11 As Kristova notes, "Narcissism protects the yide, maintains its existence and thus, u the reversal of 
this yide, UlureS a primal separation. Without this union between the yide and narcissism, chaos would 
obliterate all possibility of distinction, of trace and of symbolisation, entailing the confusion of the 
limits of bodies, of words, of the real and the Symbolic" (ibid., pp. 19-20). 
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effacing the fortlda (as absence, loss and substitution) which constitutes all 
representation31 by returning the viewer to a narcissism in the fonn of "a regression 
to a position set back from the other, a return to a contemplative, conservative, self-
sufficient haven")) - a narcissism which, acting like a shield, protects the "subject 
threatened with sinking into the void. "34 
This recourse to the solipsist structures of primary narcissism can be viewed as 
a defensive strategy adopted in relation to the Other and the sign. More specifically, 
it can be seen as a consequence of the failure of secondary narcissism. Arising in 
part as compensation for the loss of primary narcissism, secondary narcissism can, 
for example, operate as the attempted appropriation of or identification with the 
other. However, an excessive heterogeneity of the other or irrecuperable 
disconsonance between subject and object (sign), provokes a reaction as an attempt 
to completely efface or evacuate alterity. This reaction, or reaction-fonnation, is not 
only symptomatic of continual thwarting of the goal of desire in its objects (the 
object always being an inadequate substitute or surrogate for the 'original' 
phantasised object) but it also functions as a preemptive defence against the 
knowledge that present signification, especially as excess, entails the possibility of 
future deprivation or denial. As Thomas Weiskel has argued regarding the Sublime: 
In the face of anxiety the stranded ego withdraws its attachment to objects in their irreducible 
otherness and thereby hopes to reproduce the primal state before otherness became the experience 
of frustration. This leads to regression as one major defence against the anxiety of deprivation. The 
regression intends the state of primary narcissism but necessarily results in the secondary 
narcissism we so often find in the egotistical sublime.3S 
In their attempted effacement of irreducible otherness the "Equivalents" share 
many of the characteristics of the Sublime. For as Kristeva also observes: 
The abject is edged with the sublime ... For the sublime has no object either ... The 'sublime' object 
dissolves in the raptures of a bottomless memory ... the sublime triggers - as it has always triggered 
- a spree of perceptions and words that expands memory boundlessly. I then forget the point of 
departure and fmd myself removed to a secondary universe, set off from the one where 'I' am ... the 
sublime is always something added that expands us, overstrains us,and causes us to be both here, 
as dejects, and there, as others and sparkling ... A divergence, an impossible bounding.16 
It is in their relation to the object or the other, and in particular to the closure of the 
52 As Derrida notes, "What we know is that every step (discursive or pictorial in particular) implies a 
fortlda. Every relation to a pictural text implies this double movement doubly interlaced to itselr', The 
Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian Mcleod, University of Chicago Press, 1987. p. 357. 
»PowersofHorror, op.cit., p. 14. 
M ibid., p. 51. 
1& The Romantic SlAblilM: Stlldies in the StructlU'e and Psychology of TrQILfCentknce , Baltimore and 
London, Johns Hopkins Univenity Press, 1986, p. 139. See also Neil Hertz's The End of the Line: 
Essays on PsycMaNJlysis and ,he SlAb lime, New York, Columbia Univenity Press, 1985, espec. Chp. 3. 
• Powers of Horror, op.cit., pp. 11-12. 
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gap in vision (thereby enabling the subject to be both "here" and "there"), that the 
"Equivalents" share many of the features of the "positive" or "egotistical" sublime 
as described by Weiskel, a form of the Sublime which "would subsume all 
otherness, all possibility of negation" through a non-dialectical and transcendent 
"totalising consciousness ... [which] subverts the negativity which is the ground of 
the 'other' by ignoring its consequences. 1131 
Sharing the undifferentiated perception or unmediated vision of the egotistical 
sublime and couched within a regressive circularity in which the meaning of objects 
is the meaning conferred upon them by the subject, the "Equivalents" similarly 
obliterate difference by effacing the distinction "between what the mind confers and 
what it receives. "31 In the "Equivalents" this virtual obliteration of objects is 
achieved by means of the photographs' status as blank screens or apertures which 
frame an infinite, boundaryless space within (fig.6.10). Evacuated of reference, 
these spaces are then projectively f11led by the viewer. Not so much images of a 
vertiginous dislocation, these are images of a neutral void. And, while the defining 
feature of these images is the cut or crop, this cut does not secure a fetishising or 
fragmenting gaze" but instead produces a sequence of imaginary spaces for an 
unmediated vision of scopic libidinality or drive with neither objects nor unity.40 
37 The Romanlic Sublime, op.cit., pp. 49-50. 
31 ibid., p. 51. 
311 In fact this gaze is at work in Stieglitz's portraits of Georgia O'Keefe produced currently with the 
"Equivalents". While Rosalind Krauss refers to the cloud photographs "as providing a context for the 
exttaordinary portraits of Georgia O'Keefe's hands, which are also about the image's severance from a 
body that might, in life, support it, substituting for this body the plane of the photographic 
print"(Stieglitz/Equivalenls", op.cit., p. 140), Stieglitz also produced a series of nude portraits of 
O'Keefe (but of her breasts and/or torso only). It is this compUlsive investigation of the signs of sexual 
difference which arguably provides the context for the "Equivalents" in that both sequences of images 
occupy opposite but related positions in terms of the representation of difference: on the one hand (in 
the portraits), a fragmenting and fetishising gaze, and on the other (in the "Equivalents") an effacement, 
or displacement onto the porttaits, of the signs of difference (overtly sexual otherwise) thereby allowing 
a return to a pre-Oedipal and pre-Symbolic space of indifferentiation. 
40 Of relevance here are Lyotard's remarks on the film screen and "the imperative of unification", i.e. 
"the real problem, missed by Lacan due to his Hegelianism, is to know why the drives spread about the 
polymorphous body must have an object where they can unite .•. We will have to ask ourselves how and 
why the ~cuUu waU in general, and thus the cinema screen in particular, can become a privileged space 
for the libidinal cathexis ... A libidinal economy of the cinema should theoretically consttuct the 
operators which ... channel the drives into the apparatus. It is not clear that narcissism or masochism are 
the proper operators: they carry a tone of subjectivity (of the theory of the Self) that is probably still 
much too strong", "Acinema", ttans. Paisley N. Livingston, WideAlIg~, 3, 2, 1978, p. 57. As opposed 
to the Symbolic's "libidinal normalization ... [as) the subordination of all partial drives ... to the unity of 
an organic body" (ibid) and to "fixed references and identification" (p. 55) - an action analogous perhaps 
to the binding in of the gaze in Marville's "Rue de Rivoli" - Lyotard describes a "lyric abstraction" in 
which "the represented ceases to be the libidinal Object while the screen itself, in aU its most formal 
upects, takes its place" (p.59), a libidinal economy "which would escape identification, recognition 
and the mnesic fixation" (p.S7) and which, evading both immobility and "the same rule absorbing 
diversity into unity, the same law of the return of the same" (p. 55), would instead produce an "intense 
pleasure ... [through) the decomposition of ... [the) organism" (p. 59). 
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Presence, absence and the death drive 
Not only are the ''Equivalents'' a culmination of the belief in the transparency of the 
photograph (as an image without signs) but they also represent a limit point in the 
quest for presence. For, given both the impossibility of a signifier of pure presence 
and the fact that the securing of any discrete identity necessarily entails the adoption 
of a position in relation to the Other or sign, this quest must ultimately entail a 
dissolution of the subject itself. In the "Equivalents" it is the conjunction of the 
empty screen and the absent signifier which leads finally to the absent subject. As 
with the (apparent) paradox of the excess of lack in "The Crawlers", the 
unmediated presence of an absolute self-reflexivity is predicated upon a "radical 
absence" not only of the object/sign but also of the subject which instead seeks its 
own self-annihilation as "non-ego, drive and death."41 For, to be in the "haven" of 
primary narcissism, or of an unalienated desire (as libidinal aim only), is to be in a 
state of "Pleasure itself, without symbol or supplement ... which would accord us to 
pure presence itself, if such a thing were possible, [which] would only be another 
name for death."41 And if the empty screens of the "Equivalents" can be likened to 
the dream screen, it is to the "undisturbed, blank sleep ... the probable state of mind 
of the satiated infant" which also existed, in one of Lewin's case-histories, as "the 
prototype of..[the] wish for death."'" 
This particular connection is symptomatic of a broader association in that, as 
Lewin acknowledges, "death and sleep are equated psychologically.'144 Lewin's 
clinical observation that "the wish to die represented the infantile wish to sleep in 
union with the mother" is indicative of a deeper relation between the dream screen 
and the death drive, between narcissism and "the primary, inwardly directed death 
impulse."45 In the ''Equivalents'' it is the oceanic fusion between subject and image 
produced through the dissolution of the structures of difference - a dissolution 
which culminates in the reduction of the subject itself to a zero point - which reveals 
the operations of the death drive which here takes the fonn of the Nirvana Principle 
as described by Freud: 
The dominating tendency of mental life, and perhaps of nervous life in general. is the effort to 
reduce, to keep constant, or remove internal tension due 10 stimuli (the Nirvana Principle ... ) - a 
tendency which finds expression in the pleasure principle; and our recognition of that fact is one of 
d Powers of Horror. op.cit., p. IS. 
G 0fGrQlMlQlolog" op.CiL, p. ISS. 
a "Sleep, the Mouth, the Dream Screen", op.ciL, p. 431. 
44 ibid., p. 430. 
41 ibid., p. 432. 
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our strongest reasons for believing in the existence of the death instincts." 
For Freud, the Nitvana Principle is an aspect of the principle of constancy - the 
subject's "tendency toward stability": 
It will be remembered that we have taken the view that the principle which governs all mental 
processes is a special case of Fechner's 'tendency towards stability', and have accordingly attributed 
to the mental apparatus the purpose of reducing to nothing, or at least of keeping as low as 
possible, the sums of excitation which flow in upon iL Barbara Low has suggested the name of 
Nirvana Principle for this supposed tendency. and we have accepted the term. But we cannot claim 
that the Nirvana principle (and the pleasure principle which it is supposedly identical with) would 
be entirely in the service of the death instincts, whose aim is to conduct the restlessness of life 
into the stability of the inorganic state ... But we must perceive that the Nirvana principle, 
belonging as it does to the death instinct, has undergone a modification in the living organism 
through which it has become the pleasure principle, and we shall henceforward avoid regarding the 
two principles as one ... The NirvanD Principle expresses the trend of the death instinct; the 
pleasw'e principle represents the demand of the libido; and the modification of the latter principle, 
the reality principle, represents the influence of the external world.47 
While, as Freud recognised, excitation could produce pleasure, the pleasure 
principle itself, as Jean Laplanche notes, is "situated on the side of constancy. It is 
'its most radical form' or its 'beyond' which, as the Nitvana principle, reasserts 
the priority of the tendency toward an absolute zero or the 'death drive'. "48 
It is this entropic drive of the subject to reduce itself to a zero or vacancy (a state 
of homeostasis) which operates across the "Equivalents", a drive symptomatic of 
the "urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things't411 and which 
represents an end-point in the subject's endlessly deferred quest for presence in the 
image. For if, as Lacan comments, "the mirror would do well to reflect a little more 
before returning our image to US",50 what the images discussed in this thesis return 
to the viewer is often something quite different from that which was sought in 
them. It is within this interplay of presence and absence, of loss and restoration - an 
interplay described by Stieglitz in tenns of photography's place within "the eternal 
battle" to restore equilibrium over chaos - that these photographs can be situated. 
For while the image proffers the possibility of presence, it status as sign 
simultaneously denies that presence. As Derrida remarks, "One cannot help 
wishing to master absence and yet we must always let go. "S1 
a Beyond the PleaslU'e Principk, op.cit., pp. 55-56. 
47 "The Economic Problem of Masochism" (1924), Slandard Edilion, vol. 19, pp. 159-160. 
48 Life and Death in PSJChotmalysis, op.cit., p. 117. 
48 Beyond lhe PkaslU'e Principle, op.cit., p. 36. 
10 "The Freudian thing, or the meaning of the return to Freud in psychoanalysis", Ecrils, op.cit., p. 138. 
It OIGrammlllology, op.CiL, p. 142. 
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2. 1 Charles Marville, Avenue de l'Opcra, Paris, c.1876. 
2. 2 A. and 1. Bool, the Cloth Fair, London, 1877. 
2. 3 Henry Dixon and A. and J. Bool, Old Houses, Bermondsey Street, Southwark, London. J 75. 
































2.12 R. A. PaLtrieoux , Shudchill Poultry MarkcL, Manchester Survey, 1880s. 
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2.19 Archibald Bums, Picturesque "Bits"from Old Edinburgh, 1868. 
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2.25 William Donaldson Clark, 11lc National Gallcry and Royal Illstitution, Ellinburgh, c.1 ~SH. 
2.26 Thomas Keith, Southside of Grassmarket, Edinburgh. 1854-6. 

























































the saltman may n t be popular irl l ~, but 
fr mac mmcrcial IX1i nt of "ie\\' their pI s i-
ti un is imprc~nable, Th~ milkman labou rs 
und r the imput -ltiun f sla,'ishly imitating 
the early rising habit,; f the lark , .. -\ :; leep)' 
age mi ght forgi \'e hi m the plagiari sm; II hOlt 
excites its \\'I'ath is the spirited I' ,'ei lle h 
per~ rms " 'ith hi s tin ans n th area 
rail ings, 
the eyes of his patron ,.;, 
In thi s r espect h e 
d iffers from all hi s 
ri,'als, In Farringdon 
Street, Fleet treet. the 
Strand, Ludgate Hill, 
and many other tho- FL.-\G-S AXD \\,I:-'D~I!LLS, 
:'I o..:t of th se \\'ho culti-
Yat ' a -treet industry arlh~rc 
ab::olutely t n l1e Ii ".:; uf 
bu.~ine:,-;, Take the ITl e:1 II hI) 
ha \I'k hats - and th cre art:; 
many o f them - th y ne, 'cr 
think of bartering an)' ( ther 
article of dres:i, A\Il1 (,. ;1I1\' 
day nc COln buy a brand 
nc\\' silk hat for fiye o r s ix 
sh illings in certain ~treets, 
The :;cller is usual I)' al ~.) the 
maker. ,\'hich accollnts fur its 
cheapness, Its pattern might 
rough fares pedestrians 
are tem pted " 'i th nougat and .-\ merican 
caramels, Turkish delig ht, and other mys-
terious compounds set out on handcarts 
" 'ith orne pretence at artistic effect, 
Be -ides the street confecti ners and 
fruiterers, \\'ho pander, o f course, to mere 
luxur) ', there is a Ieg i n f ITl en al c1 \I'omen 
\\'ho make a li"ing ou t o f the sale of h mely 
delicaci es, S me f these are nearly as ,,'ell 
\.;nO\\' 11 as though their names figured in 
beautiful gi lt l et t~rs O\'er a shop in Piccadil ly 
or xforcl Street. \'-a tercreS5 is much 
fa\'oured by L n loner,;, an I th e numberless 
hall'kers \\ 'ho trade in it find a 
rearh- sale ~ . r thei r stock The 
shrimp - sellers harcl1~' command 
such extens i,'e patronage but the) ' 
ne,'ertheless cater largely for the 
m etropolitan tea-table, In man~ ' 
quarters there i:.-; a brisk demand 
for muffins and crumpets; nor is 
there any lack of clistomers fo r 
fritt ers, The fi sh ha\\'ker is a 
retiular feature of street life, In 
the eastern districts especially hi s 
hand-cart is a great aid to the 
humble housekeeper in \'arying 
the daily menu, 
not be the theme of uni,'e rsal 
laudation at a church parade; but hats are 
\\'orn at o th er places, Then there is th e 
yendor of hats th a t ha,'e seen th eir zeni th, 
and in the autumn of th ei r da),s are glad 
to fin d a rest ing place on anybody's head, 
SALT, 
The baker, the milkman, and BRE,-\D, 
They are at the 
best second-hand; 
and at the \\'o rst, 
goodness kno\l's 
ho\\' many hands 
tht'y ha , 'e pa~sec1 
through, But the 
best as \\'e ll as 
the \\'orst go for 








of th limited liability 
compa ni es whi ch 
ex is t ~ r pu rposes of 
W:\T EI~CRE~S. 
use are ha"'ked from \\"1" DO\\" -cLEA"["G. th i,; trade. There IS, 
house to house in the 
poorer neighbourhoods, ,,·hile many an honest 
penny is turned by th e sale of plants suitable 
for suburban gardens. 
T o one man, at all e\'ents, L ondon ne\-er 
metes out ha rd times. It is alwa),s the 
ha n 'est of the chimney-s" 'ee p, \\"hose familiar 
cry brings hi s callin ~ \\'ithin the cate:;ory 
of Street 1 nd ustries. One sees him e\'ery-
,,·here. and the ri chness of his \\'orkaclay 
complexion seryes as well as an auditors' 
report to demonstrate his prosperity. On 
Sundays he often dri\'es out \\"ith his famil) ', 
happy in the consciousness th a t neither \\'ar 
nor pest il ence can eliminate soot from this 
beauti ful \Yorld. The window-cleaner is 
almost equally happy so far as business 
is concerned, for the climate is 
his faithful all~ · . Sometimes he 
is a. permanent servant of one 
h .-,\\·e \·e r quite an 
army of windo\\'-cleaners \\'ho \\"()rk for 
th emseh·es. These are often J ad:s-of-all- ~. 
trades, ready to put in a pane of ~lass as 
\\-e ll as to poli sh it. 
The coal ma n is knO\\"l1 by hi s cry. As 
be leads hi s horse throu[;h the streets he 
occasionally cun-es his hand roun d h i - mouth 
and indulges in a demoniacal yell, \\'hich is 
dou btless his professi(lnal renderin g of " oal! 
Coal!" :\obody understands him ; e \'erybody 
hea rs him! Another fam iliar street trader is 
the greengrocer, \\"h o carts hi s stock from door 
to doo r, and \\"ho-e bri -k business many a 
shopkeeper might em)'. The china-mender 
is a less striking fi gu re in th e streets tha n 
the chair-mender. \Vh en the latte r is at 
\\'ork a contingent of children 
belonging to the neighbourhood 
generally act as his o\-erseers. 
LO~DO~ 'S STREET I NDCSTR IES. 
aristocrat amongst those \\"ho make a living 
in the streets. T he engra\·er on g lass find s 
his patrons mainl y amongst publicans, though 
crlass ware has now become so cheap that hi s 
b 
sen ·ices are little needed. 
One's sympathies go out to the shoeblack 
more than to any other 
class of street industrial-
ist, xcept perhaps the 
fl 0 " . e r - g i r I. Lit tIe 
\Yonder; for his life is a 
hard one, hi s earnings are 
sometimes precarious, and 
yet he is al\\·aY::i civi l, 
and apparently cont nt 
\\" ith a small payment. 
T he shoeblacks, following 
the example of more 
im portant crafts, ha\·e 
trade societies. Of these the 
oldest and most important 
belongs to the City. Its mem-
bers, like those of the Borough 
organisa tion, \\·ear red jackets. 
Blue is the colour of the 
fraternity in East London. In 
i\Iaryleb ne they affec t white, 
-r 
in the trade. A most worth\· cat she is in 
" 
all respects, her one fault being a pronounced 
spic of yanity. At a word f praise, such as 
one might let dr p as a matter of curse wi th-
out any thought of flattering a reprehensi ble 
\\·eakness, she a rch s her back and rubs 
agains t your ank les, purring in an c!ita ·y of 
delight. 
Step-cleaners in the l\[etr p lis-' step-
girls" they are usually called-ar~ legion. It 
is a curi us call ing, but th :e wh foll w it no 
doubt pre~ r it \\·ith al l it:; drawbacks, t 
em ploymen t \\·h ich would i m p'J;;C re' trictions 
on thei r Ebert)". .:; a cia:,· th yare in a 
sense alien to the bard-dri\·en sis terh ood 
of more ma ture years who offer 
their sen·ices as chan,·omen. The 
vendor of fly-paper is more than 
a busi ness man, he is a hum ani-
tari an. H e di splay:> sa mples cf 
his goods on his hat, a mode 01 
ad\·ert isement tha t is frequently 
producti\·e of painful su rpri ses to 
the unthinkin;; fly. ~Iany humble 
\\·orkers eke out an existence by pre- ~, 
paring firewood. The pulling do,,·n 




to th ese 
p eop le. 
The rotten 
timber is 
and at King's ross bro\n1. Some of the 
more \\·ell-to-do members of the trade 
pro\'ide chairs for thei r patients, ,,·ith 
col1\·en ien t pedestals for the feet. To the 
a\·erage customer !i\·e minutes in one of these 
impos ing chairs must be rather trying. It is 
probably for the purpose of assisting modest 
patrons to bear with equan imity the "splendid 
isolat ion" of the position that the proprietors 
sometimes keep on hand a supply of periodical 
literature. One remarkable member of the 
corps has a partner in the business-a cat. 
Since the days of her kittenhood she has been 
bought fo r 
11 ext t o . 
nothing, and 
cut int o 
small piece . 




ter s in a 
barrow, and 
so ld by 
measure. 
I. CO .... LS. II. FLY-PAP EHS. 
HI. W OOL \\·OR K PI CTt.:RE 
~IAK [~G . 1\·. SHOEBLACK. 
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2.36 London Stereoscopic Company. Cockspur Street and Trafalgar Square, c.1886. 
--- - ---
2.37 Anon .• Whitehall and Trafalgar Square. c.1900. 
2.38 Anon., Westminster and the Houses of Parliament, c.1890. 
- . --- - - -
2.39 Anon., Ludgate Hill and SL Paul's from Fleet Street, ~. 1890 . 
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2.44 James Burgoyne, The Council House. Birmingham. c.1880. 
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2.46 Anon., St. George's Hall. Liverpool, c.1890. 




2.49 Alfred Brothers, Statue of Sir Robert Peel, 1879. 
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2.51 George Wardley, School Mills and Old Footbridge from I3lackfriar's Bridge, Manchesler, I ~77_ 
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2.52 S. L. Coulthurst, M. Iordoff and 1. W. Wade, Piccadilly and Markel Streel, Manchester Survey, c.) 890. 
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2.55 James Mudd (?), Royal Exchange Building and Old Shambles,Manchesler, 1875. 
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2.61 Anon., Statue of Napolcon I on the Vcnd6me Column after its demolition , 16 May 187 1. 
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2.64 Jne. Wulff, Hotel de Ville, Ruines de Paris, 1871. 
2.65 Jne. Wulff, Rue de Rivoli, Ruines de Paris, 1871. 
2.66 Thiersault. Ministry of Finances, Rue de Rivoli, 1871. 
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2.72 L'Avenue des Champs ElysCcs, Paris el ses environs, 1890s. 














3. 1 Baron Gros, Bridge and Boats on the Thames, 1851. 
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3. 8 Cellar Dwelling, Liverpool, Housing Conditions in Glasgow, London, and Liverpool, c.1 906 
1 3. 9 No.6 Coun-:Essington Street, Binningham Public Works Dept., c.1905. 
3.10 Privy in 10 Court, Lower Tower Street, Birmingham Public Work D pt. , c.l 905. 
3.11 Passage between rooms, No. 28 Lower Tower Street, Birmingham Public W rk pt., c.190S. 
3.12 James Burgoyne, Court, Thomas Street, Birmingham Improvement Scheme, 1875. 
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3.13 James Burgoyne, Court. Thomas Street, Birmingham Improvement Scheme, 1875. 
3.14 Willie Swift, Court off Cavalier Street. Leeds Slumdom. 1 97. 
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3.15 John Galt, Ma Robinson making mattresses, Bethnal Green, 1893-4. 













3.19 Backlands and their Inhabitants. Glasgow, 1901. 
PJIOT(). A . 
Th i" silo\\'" ;1 r;w,fl' of (, wo·storcy I la l'1;: h Illl, Iw It 11111 fOil r-stCll"('\" 
'" . 
propcrties facillg ;\ frflllt maill :-:tl"l'('t, ill lllL' ('ir.\'. 
Thc distallce }JC L\\'Ct'll t1Il'J11 is ;t1.()II(, :21 ied. TIll' g round-tlat 
hO\1s('s ill th('~p 1>,11·1;: Ialld , ;11 (' dad,. <Llld till' asllpit" axe sitllated 
tOll d<l~e to the t!\\"ellillg'" 
PIIOT(). E. 
The IJlspl'dol' is shown here st:1.lI l iillg at the el111 uf it narrow 
('otlrt l'ctwc('11 til!' llilck bJld and ;t :-:('('olld },ack bUlil ill the 
Co\\'t:ad ,lells II is! rid. 
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3.22 Anon., Unidentified Clos~ and Inspector, Cowcadden ~ , c.1900. 
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3.24 Jacob Riis, Tenement Baby, New York, c.1890. 
-- ---- ----
3.25 Jacob Riis, "A Boarder at the Rutgers Street Dump", New York, 1892. 
. . '. . 
/ ' . . , 
3.26 Jacob Riis, "Bandits' Roost", 59 Mulberry Street. New York , 188 
3.27 Jacob Riis, Baxter Street Court, New York, c.1890. 
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3.~8 Georgc Cruikshank, Fronlcspcice, Midnighl Scenes and Social Photographs, 1 R5R. 
3.29 Thomas Barnes and Roderick Johnstone, "The Raw Material A We Find It", 1875. 



























3.31 Thomas Barnes and Roderick Johnstone, Unidentified Youth, c. 1875 . 






I 3.33 Thomas Bames and Rodcrick Johnstone, Unidentified Girl, c. 1875. 
t. ~ _ 
3.34 Thomas Barnes and Roderick Johnstone, Kate Smith. 1875. 
3.35 Eugene Atget, Boulevard Massena, "Zoniers", Porte D'!vry, Paris, c.19IO. 
3.36 Willie Swift, Interior of Slum Dwelling, Mushroom Court, Leeds Siumdom, 1897. 
3.37 Anon., Slum Interior (flreplace), Glasgow, c.1 9 1O. 
-- - --- ---- -
3.38 Eugene Atget, Interior,lnteriors Parisiens, artistiques. pittoresques, et bourgeios, c. 191 O. 
3.39 Anon., Slum Interior (two beds), Glasgow, c.1910. 
3.40 Egene Atget, Interior d'un decoraLeur, rue de Montpamasse, Paris, 1910. 
3.41 Anon., Children in bed, resting on wooden planks, Glasgow, c. 1910. 




3.43 Anon., Woman sleeping on floor, herring box furniture, GJ gow. c.191O. 
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4.3 John Thomson, Covent Garden Rower Women, 1877. 



















4.9 John Thomson, Photography on the Common, 1877. 
.. ..... -"', ~ 11''';''''-';. ..4t 
.,.. . "9 -+--
. .. • .......... "V 
...... - . 
. '. ' ~~!i~ " '~ : ;:--' 
~. ~~·1f:.f1 " ·~~;  =-,.'&1 ~ .. :t'-':'~". . -. -, . • ~ ... ~< ' : ' ./ 
"'" - " . '. ' .. ':. ~,. ~. ', -'~lf,'!- )~t\.· ,. --:.. 
" , . .. . ~ ...,.. / 
.: -) ~ ,~ . . ~.~:~~.. .~ 
.. o· - -
... -- ... - , 
........ ". ~. , ~~ J . 
"' . -<t'~ ~ ........... '7 6 
~ .. _.... - . '.~' __ ... ~ ~ ~::~··7· .. ~·;:: .. _~. ' ... _ ... 'I"":;'-\... -;..:!!" - _ _ r~"'· .-~ - -
& 
4.10 j ohn Thomson, Waiting [or a Hire, 1877. 
4.11 john Thomson, "Caney" the Clown, 1877. 
4.12 John Thomson, Dealer in Fancy-Ware, 1877. 
4.13 John Thomson, The Temperance Sweep, 1877. 
4.14 John Thomson, The Dramatic Shoe-Black, 1877. 





























































































4.25 John Thomson, "SLrn ..... bcrrics. All Ripe! All Ripc! M, 1877 . 




















4.29 John Thomson, November Effigies, 1877. 





























































































































4.38 Thomas Barnes and Roderick Johnstone, Children from Dr. Barnard I H m . 1 7 . 
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4.40 Anon., George Gander ("Gandy"), London Boy fTom th Ragg 
ni n, .1 57. 
E.E.J. M. 
"or W orHing & Destitute Lads. 
(; I,( 'f/ lllr /".1 <If MI ;nr.! :\ '11, 28, I 
E. E.J. M. 
or WorHing & Destitute Lads. 
,,18 NOW A Llnl E WORKMAN 
(lIlt II/fir .'./'/ ,I I'll ' nr,! :V t>, 27 ) 
4.4 J Thomas Bames and Roderick JohnsLone, Carte-de-visile, Dr. Bamardo's Homes, c.1875. 
f. 
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4.42 Paul Martin, Street Markel, Farringdon Road, London, 1894 . 
... ...,- _ .... .. 
. ---- . 
4.43 Paul Martin. Street Arab, London, 1893. 
, . 
4.44 Paul Martin, "The Cheapside Flower Seller", London, 1894. ..5 Paul Martin, -The Cheapside Hower Seller-. cut-out figure, 189· .. 
4.46 Thomas Burke, Clay Pipes, Photographs of Li rp ) Lr t .1 
4.4 7 Edgar Lee, A Quayside Mark t, ewca tJe, 1 
4.48 EdgarLec,AStreet-Barrow,Ne\ ca tle, 1 
4.49 Edgar Lee, District Visitors, New a tI , 1 
4.50 Edgar Lee, The Crabseller, Ncwca. tJ , 1 
4.5] Edgar Lee, Hand-Camera in Lh IUm , 
Os. 
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4.53 Charles Spurgeon, Sweep. Greenwich, 1 84 . 
L-.:' ... _ . 
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4.54 harles Spurgeon, Cat's M~l, Greenwich, 1895. 
purgcon, Rabbit Seller, Greenwich, 1884 
4. 6 harl purgcon, Glazier, Greenwich, 1885. 
5. 1 John Thomson, The "Crawlers II • Street-Life in London. 1877. 
'. 
. 2 Jam · Buf' n Streel, Binningham Improvement Scheme, 1875 . 
An n.,77 L an Street, owcaddcn Special Inquiry, c.1910. 
· 4 h rna. urk, fr crard treel, PhOlographs of Liverpool Street Life, c.189S . 
· 5 An n., lum Interior (woman and child , small water closet), c. 191 O. 












5.10 Jacob Riis, A "Scrub" with her bed, Eldridge Police Station, New York, c.1889. 
5.l1 Anon ., Mother and Child (at Dr. Sutllcrland's, Maitland Strcct'?), la g w, . Il 10. 
5.12 Anon., Mothcr and Child (at Dr. Suthcrland's, Maitland Str ct?, la w,.1 I . 
6. 1 Alfred Stieglitz, The Term inal (The Car Horses), Ncw York, 1893. 
6.2 Alfred Stieglitz, WCt Day on thc Boulcvard, Paris, 1894 . 
6. 3 Alfred Sticgtitz, Reflection , Night , New York, 1 9 -97 . 
6.4 Alfred Stieglitz, From My Window, New York , 190 . 
Al fr d li glitz, The ity of Ambition, New York, 1910. 
. 6 Alfred Stieglitz. Equivalent. Mountain and Sky, L'lke George. 1924. 

6. 8 Alfred Stieglitz, Equivalent, 1930. 
6. 9 Alfred Stieglitz , The Steerage, 1907. 
6.10 Alfred Stieglitz, Equivalent, Music No.8, Lake George, 1922. 
